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PUBLIC POLICY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS IHDUS7RY I.HALYS!S 
Chapter!: Irtr~duction 
Richard R. Nelson 
t'raft 
May 1981 
This study describes the nature of the public pclicies which have 
influenced the pace and pattern of technical progress in a number of 
key AMerican indu~tries. and tries to assess the broad effects of t~esE 
policies. The Dclicles ~ons1dered of course include funding or subsidy 
of certain klnds of re~earch and developF~nt. but attention also lS 
directed to governMent procurement. policies regarding education and 
trainir.5. info~aticn disse~ination. patent protecticn and licensing. 
and whel~ ge~ne. re9ul~tory and anti-trust policies. The ind~stries 
studied are agriculture, ~har.T4ceuticals. semi-conductor~, ccm,uters. 
civil aircraft, automobil~s. and residen!ial construction. T~ese indus!ries 
vary significant1y in t~e pace and character of technical progress that 
has been achiev~d. inst1tutiort;l1 stru·:ture, and the government poli::1ES 
tnat have had the mcst lmportar.t effects. 
The prescnt tir.~ seems pa~icularly appropriate for such a study. 
When there is an ac':ive search for new poiicies and a sense of urgency 
about the matter, tnere is little ti~ or patience with b~oac historical 
and analytic ref'ectlon. Over the past t\lO decades t~ere tlave teen thre:e 
occaslons of actlve o~licJ lnterest. Only a s~ort tlme ago the Carte~ ad~~nl-
stration ~ad a come~tic policy review on ~ndustrla1 inncva!lon, in search f~r 
policies that could restore k~eric~'s l!gging producti~ity grow!h and inter-
national competitlvene~s. ~early a aecade earlier the ~lxon 2cr.lnistr~:lon er.;agpd 
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in a similar review of how federal policy could better spur industrial 
innovation. motivated by similar concerns that America was losing her 
place of technological lp.adership. In the early 1960s the Kennedy 
administration attempted to mount a civilian technology program as part 
of its package of policies to lift the economy from th~ doldrums of the 
late 1960s. It perhaps is revealing that on none of these occasions 
did the government agencies involved engage in thoughtful review of 
past government polici~s that have affected industrial innovation. Indeed. 
many of the documents read as if there were no such experience. Perhaps 
relatedly. the argume~ts (pro and con) about policies tended to be global. 
They proceeded as if structural differences among sectors in industries 
of the American econo~y were slight, or as if feasible or appropriate 
policies were inde~endent of these differences. In fact. past policies 
have differed sigr.ificantly from sector to sector. and in ways that seem 
appropriately tailored to differences in economic structures or purposes 
or both. A central premise behind this study is that. if they are to be 
successful, public policies to stimulate technical progress need to be 
nicely tuned to the particulars of the different economic sectors. 
Perhaps because there was no such historical reflection and anal)sis. 
few of the proposals that emanated from the forernentioned atte~pts to 
formUlate a policy were presented forcefully enough to persuade both 
the President and the Congress. Of those that were initiated. many 
were abandoned a few years after. The present. when there is little 
political pressure to find effective active policies to spur industrial 
innovation. seems an appropriate ti~~ for historical scrutiny and reflection. 
In treating the question of appropriate government policy to support 
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industrial innovdtion as an empirical one we are, in effect. disMissing 
IS uninformed the sometimes articulated position that government involve-
aent in the innovation process is virtually always expensive folly. There· 
Ire. indeed, many instances .,.here goverrment programs were just that. But. 
as the case studies we present will testify. t~ere are other instances 
where the success of such programs has been outstanding. It is just this 
variation that calls for analysis. 
In treating the question as one warranting detailed empirical ex-
ploration, we are acknowledging, reluctantly. that the general theoretical 
analyses and empirical observations of economists provide only limited 
and inccmplete guidance regarding the kinds of policies that will payoff 
under different circumstances. Indeed the economic literature on this 
subject has grown progressively less conclusive. 
A decade ago economists writing on the subject were stressing the 
limits of the ability of a business firm that finances an R&D project 
to appropriate and profit from the benefits that flow from that project. 
and the uncertainties that often are entailed in R&D seeking major 
technological advance. The fo~r appeared to point toward the desira~ilit! 
of government policy to subsidize or supplement private R&D. which. 
otherwise. would be ~onducted at less than the socially optimal level. 
The latter seemed to call for mechanisms for government sharing of risks 
on large and adventuresome projects. Over the Dast several years 
economists have come to recognize that the situation is much more complex. 
In the first place, it now is better understood that the protection 
of an invention by a patent or industrial secrecy leads not only to some 
restriction of its use (economists long h,d understood that) but also in 
-----
4 
some cases to duplicative or near duplicat1ve R&D efforts by firms, 
which yield little net social value. This phenomenon casts doubt on the 
earlier logic that unaided private enterprise will spend -too little- on . 
R & 0, and calls attention to ineffiencies of the allocation of R&D 
among different kinds of projects that the industrial R & 0 system ~ll 
generate. In the second place, economists now recognize better that th~ 
surrounding efforts significantly to advance a technology call for the 
exploration of a variety of different approaches without premature heavy 
financial c~itment to aroy, and warns that large scale concerted efforts 
are, in general, inadvisable until the uncertainties have been significantly 
reduced. Again, the policy problem is better described in terms of a 
possible failure of the market to spawn the appropriate portfolio of projects 
than in te~s of private expenditures being too little in the absence of 
government assistance. 
While, a decade ago, economists tended to diverge significantly about 
the appropriate roles of government in industrial R & 0, there was con-
sensus about the appropriateness, indeed the necessity, of governmental 
support of basic scientific research. That consensus has not become 
unglued. but it no~ is better recognized than earlier that the simple state-
ment r.~sks an important policy issue. What is treated as basic research. 
the proposed funding requests to be subject to peer re~iew, the research 
findings to be openly disseminated, is itself a matter or POllCY cholce. 
While most of the R&D done by private for-profit business firms aimed 
at enhancing the design of their products is going to be treated by them 
as proprietary, and the research done on a basic theoretical problem by 
a physicist in the university is going to be treated by the researcher as 
contributing to public knowledge. research to improve seed varieties. or 
--
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to discover a cure for a particular disease, or to identify and measure 
the properties of cert~in materials, may eventuate in public or proprietary 
knowledge depending on who does it, the sources of the financing, and the • 
precise form that the findings take on. As we shall see in the 
studies which follow, in several industries (agriculture, pharmaceuticals. 
computers, aviation), what the government in effect did was to define 
certain areas as basic, non-proprietary, and proceed to fund research in 
these areas. 
It also has been proposed that the government should fund R ! 0 aimed 
at meeting public sector needs, but stay out of funding R&D on private 
sector technologies. This adage too turns out to provide little guidance. 
Regarding needs of the public sector, the government certainly can, and in 
many cases has, funded or even undertaken R&D aimed to meet the~ better. 
But the fact that a de~~nd is governmental does not automatically signal 
that government R&D is needEd if innovation is to occur. For many public 
secter needs, the governMent has not funded signlficant R&D. In many of 
these cases, prlvate firms have funded R&D in order to create products 
that governffients would find attractive and wouid buy. It is in~eresting tra~, 
prior to World War II. ~uch of R&D on mllitary aircraft was f~nded prlva!ely. 
To further complicate the picture, often no ciean lines can be drawn 
between a technolegy or industry devoted to private needs, and one devcte~ 
to public needs. The most general case is overlap. Aircraft, ccn~uters, 
semi-conducto- devices which are used in ,omputers and, more broadly, 
medicines, ani buildings, are inputs into both private and public sector 
activity. As we shall see in the following c~apters, federal support of 
the development of a technology for public sector purposes often has 
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led to capabilities which meet private demands as well. 
Similarly. economists studying the relationshi~s between economic 
structure and technological innovation. and speculating upon how the 
structure-innovation links might bear on government policy. now recogn~:e 
better the complexities involved. Two decad~s ago the focus was on the 
proposition put forth by Schumpeter. and later echoed by Galbraith. that 
industries composed of large firms with significant market power tended 
to be significantly more progr2ssive technologically than 
industries more atomistically organized. The implications of 
the hypothesis seemed to be twofold. First, government R&D 
might be needed in industries where the bulk cf thE firms were small. 
Second, a tough anti-trust policy might be antithetical to technological 
progress. 
Empirical research has revealed a more complicated picture than 
sugsested by the simple Schumpeterian hypothesis. Some industries, 
dominated by large firms, are not technologically progressive. Some 
industries, populated by small and medium sized firms, are verY techno-
logically progressive. The early days of the semi-conductor industry 
provides a good case in point. The fact that firms are small does not 
automatically indicate that the industry can benefit from or even tolerate 
government R&D support. While government R&D support for agriculture, 
where the farr.~ are small. is a success story, government attempts to 
advance house construction technologies have not been particularly fruit-
ful. Nor does the fact that firms are largl indicate that government 
R&D support will not be fruitful. Aviation is a case in point. 
Similarly. t~ere are no simple implications for anti-trust policy. 
Further, industry structure and character of fruitful R&D 
tend to change over time. It is commo~ , if not universal, for 
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new industries to begin as a collection of many small firms with important· 
technological developments coming from individuals or small groups of 
scienti~ts and engineers. In many cases such an initial configuration 
tends to evolve over time into one in which viable firms are much larger, 
and R&D projects much more costly. This seems to have happened d~ring 
the 1970s in the semi-conductor inoustry. Relatedly. government policies 
that are appropriate, and feasible, at one stage in an industry's history 
may not be appropriate, or feasiola, at a~other staga. 
Industry structure limits what government can do. Whether a govern~ent 
policy will be effective or not depends at least as much on the changes in 
the allocation of R&D it stimulates as on whether total R&D spending rises 
or not. In designing a program, or in evaluating one, the allo~ating 
mechaniso is of central concern. Government agencies, hOWever, in some 
circ~~tances are quite constrained regarding the range of allocation 
mechanisms they can effectively employ. In particular, there may be 
limitations on the information to which public officials have acce~s. For 
example, if much of the infonr.~tion needed to make effective R&D decisions 
is proprietary, goverrurent officials are unlikely to be in a position to 
make detailed judg~ents. And, in a large pluralistic ~emocracy like o~rs, 
there also are likely to be political constraints on what gcvern .. ents can 
do. For example, the government is likely to be attacked as unfair if 
it pushes a program which cbviously benefits one part of an industry at the 
expense of another part. On the other hand, where fi~s do not consider 
each other rivals (as in farmir.g, or the practice of medicine) t~ere are 
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fewer constraints on governmental access and action. A public sector 
mission, as in aviation, and computers. also can relax constraints. 
The foregoing com:ents were designed to help the reac:rer of tr!e 
following seven chapters know what to watch for. These chapters were 
researched and written by the scholars who signed them. All are organized, 
however, according to a common format. Each of the chapters describes the 
industry in question and its evolution over time. Each chapter presents 
various descriptions, quantitative and qualitative, of the technological 
advanc~s that have occurred. and attempts to trace the sources of those 
advances. The particular focus, of course, is on the govenn~~nt policies 
which have had the mest significant lnfluence. The industries studied 
and described differ significa,tly in all of the respects abcve. 
Agricultlare, or rather fanning. is an i:1dustry where active governr:Ent 
policies to stimulate technological advance date back to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The federal-state supported experimentation stat~ons. 
and the agricultural extension services, generally are affiliated with 
land grant state colleges or universities, still another govern~nt in-
vention aimed to spur productivity in agri~ulture. The~e progra~s have 
been enormously, sometimes ell'barrassingly, successful. !lot so long ago 
thE United States felt it faced a food glut. Inter~stingly, the response 
to that ~as to establish a food price support system, and try to get lane 
out of cultivation, rather than to slow down the govern~entally fashloned 
engine of progress. 
Pha~~ceuticals is a different story. or rather a set of diffe~ent 
stories. Part of it is tre massive government funcing of bior.~dical re-
search and the training of research scientists, largely a post-~orld War II 
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development. Part of it is the complicated regulatory. tructure which 
has evolved over the }ears, first to chec~ on the safety of new pha~ceuticals 
the companies proposed to put on t~ market, latl- to assess the e~ficacy of 
new drugs, ~ncreasingly, to monitor and constrain the human experimen!aticr. 
parts of the research orocess. The ster} includes as well anti-trust 
lltigation, i~sues about patent life, and about ~hether physicians be 
requi~d to prescri~e generically, as contrasted with by b~and ~ane. 
Aviation is an industry where, from the beginning, a stror:g natio,lal 
sec~~ity inter2s~ has spilled over to facilitate the development Jf civil 
aircraft as well as mi!ltarJ. The history contains the aborted, and in 
our eyes at least misconceivec, su?erson;c transport effort, but it 
contains as -"e'i1 a well-conceived and effective prcgram under the Natl!)".,l 
Advisory Co~issio~ on Aeronautics. which later gave rise to NA~. DJr1n~ 
the 192~s anj 19:0s NAG; undertooK research, and testing, w~ich playeu 
an extre~ely i~portant role in perMitting the development of t~e ~~derr: 
passenger airliner. ~lso, in subsidizing the airlines (and the cevelc~­
ment of aviation) through the Airmail Act of 1930, the govcrn~~nt required 
that airlines and airframe producers stand as separate corDorate entities. 
(Until that tir.;e thel'e wa~ a considerable degree of vertlcal int2gratl=r..) 
This structural policy has had, as we shall see, a profound etfect en 
technological ad,ance ln civil aviation. 
~i-conduc~~rs shares wiL~ aviation both the fact of govern~en~ 
national ·ocuri:y interest. and the strong influences o~ gover~ent polley 
with respect to structure. An anti-trust consent decree ke~t Sell 
Laboratones (wnere tr.e transistor was imented) .jnd i.'eHem Electrlc 
out of c~r€rcial production of semi-conductors, and ope~ed up t1e technc10gy 
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for anyone to use. And the semi-conductor industry, like the airframe 
industry, in its early days sold mostly to a government ~~de market. 
The industry benefitted greatly from the support of research in basic 
physics, and materials research. sponsored by agencies ranging from the 
NSF to the DOD. Likewise. the industry was a beneficiary of a stTQng 
federal support given during the 1960s to advance scientific and en;ineering 
education. 
The first operational computers werE developed on government contract. 
The early mar~et for computers was largely governmental. The computer 
story and the semi-conductor story are. of course. closely intertwined. 
But whereas. in t~e semi-conductor case. government pollCY led to an 
industry consisting initially of many fi~s no one with a major initial 
headstart over the others. in the computer case a dominar: fi~ came into 
being very early in the game. Thus the computer ca3e ty:~fies the anti-
trust policy dil~4 that occurs when a firm comes to dc~inate an industry 
because (initially at least) it made shrewd judgments c:Jut where the 
technology and the market were going. 
The automobile industry is one where the governme~t's influence on the 
evolution of technology has been indirect and. until recently at lea~t. 
unintended. At the present time the story is ~ainly about clean air and 
safety regulation. and the effect of these on R&D incentives and con-
straints. Policies affecting gasoline prices also have been important. The 
recent. and now abor~~d. cooperative autcmobile research program repres2nts 
an attempt to define for tre automobile industry. a range of non-proprietary 
research. for which federal funding would be appropriate. There are 
some interesting parallels with other industries. like farming. and 
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phanmaceuticals. where a similar "non-proprietary" area has been defined. 
Housing. or res1dential construction. is a sector where. by all 
aeasures. techn010gical progress has been very slow. It often has been 
alleged that the government. through 1tS building codes. and More recently 
throug, other ferms of regulation, has been a large part of the problem. 
As w~ shall see. that is arguable. Residential construc:'on is interesting 
for our purposes largely because it is a s~ctor where. several tlmes. the 
federal government has trled to organize an R&D support progra~. each 
tllre without ir.uch success. Each time. analogles were drawn to a<;ncu1t:J r e. 
b~t apoare~~ly the analogies were wrong, or at least 1ncoMplete. The~e 
clearly are sone lnterestlng lssues here. 
but already.!'!' slipping over into a cO"lparatlve discusslon. ;re 
great ad\Jnt~ge cf c0llectlng a n~~ber of diffe~e'~ c~se st~d1es, eac, 
covenng cor.;,arJble r.atenal, lS t'lat this does perr.1t cOl'lNris;)n. Tr.e 
concludlng ch~~tcrs of this volu~e will be expllcitl) c~paratlve in 
nature, and ... !n a!tef"1;,t to assess ~ .. hat ~inds of pol iCles are appl'o;:,rla~e 
to what ot-JeCtlH?S and "'hat lndustry structures. One corparJtive chap~er 
",111 deal wHh gc\err. ... cnt 1\ S 0 su;:,;:,.)rt, procurement '!C~~vlt/. ana sur;-,"'rt 
of educatlcn. A second chJ~ter will be concerned wlth regulation, anti-
trust, and other 90ver~~ent pollcies ",nlch ha\e lnflu(~ced t~~ structure 
of industr). JPd t~u~ lndlrectly the pace and pattern of technol~glca' 
advance. The flnal c;,apter drJ ... 'S scme general lessonL 
OW'I'ER II 
Inno.Tati01 in the Semic:x:nductoc Industry* 
Rlchard C. levin 
Yale University 
August, 1981 
*Althouo~ based 01 the sale research, this report 1S somewhat d1ffere~t 1n 
focus fran t~ c:uptE'r that w111 actually re lOcluded 1n the flOal vers101 
of th1S volum:'. 
Innovation in the Sadccaduc:tor Ind\1atry: Ie. Slowdown ba1nct! 
The 1nnovative record of the .ea1cODductor indu.t<ry baa been caa of 
the major .uc:c ..... stori .. of the American ecoooary in the .. cond balf of the 
twenti.th c:e:ntu<ry. In virtually .ve<ry performance dimendoo-apaad. coapu-
tational capacity. &emOry storage capacity. c01llp&ctne .. of equipment ra-
quired for a given function--progr". baa been astounding. Perhaps none 
of the cyr1ad statistics describing the industry's perfot1:lllnce coaveya ita 
a.tonishing record so vividly ca a comparison made by A. Oaborne (l979). He 
notes that if transport technology had progressed from stagecoach to the 
Concorde as rapidly as electronics technology has progres.ed since the 
transistor, the Concorde would carry a half million passengers at twenty 
1 
million miles per ~our at a cost of less than one cent per passenger. 
Recently there bave been expressions of concern that the pace of in-
novation in the semiconductor industry is likely to slacken in the near 
future. In part this concern reflects a belief that the seciconductor in-
dustry viII succuch to the same array of forces vhich have apparently redcced 
the pace of productivity grovth across the vide spectrum of Acerican industry. 
But in considerable part concern about the future of aem1conductor innovation 
arises frt'tl a viev that the industry is entering the mature stage of its 
life cycle. In this viev the s~iconductor industry is he.~ed inexorably 
down the road taken by the autooobile and steel industries. vhereupon repeated 
major product innovation give. vay to incr.~ntal process innovation. capital 
requir~ escalate, minicu= efficient scale risee core rapidly than market 
demand. concentration ensues. the role of small firma and new entrants a. a 
locu. of iDnovation is dr •• tically d~1shed, and the rate of technical 
2 progr ... eventually declines. On the surface. there appurs to b. so .. 
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evidence lupporting th1a vi .. that the iDduauy 1.8 approachina teclmololic:&l 
maturity. lbe coat of R , D and of capital aquip1lll81lt h&.a bean r1.8inl rapid.l.~. 
there baa been .ubstantial meVel:M!llt toward vart1c:al integration, entry bar-
riers appear to be increasing, and the technological supremacy of the u.s. 
industry ~. been subject to intenaive competitive preasurea froa Japanese 
firms. heavily aubsldized by their gov~rnment. 
The object of thU paper is to explore the plausibUity of the view 
that the sem.conductor 1!ldustry is on the threshhold of a prO<!~ctiv1ty slaw-
do~~. First. data on R&D and patents wUl be briefly examined to see 1f 
a slaclening of innovative effort is as yet perceptible. Second, the impll-
catio\l.5 of changing technology for the structural evolution of the industry 
will be explored, as will in turn the iapllcaUoos of structural change for 
the likely character and pace of future innovation. Finally. 1 wUl discuss 
the likely ~act of a oajo~ new prograe of governnent R&D support, the 
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Prograe of the Dep"rteent of 
Defen3e. In this latter discussion. 1 vill ecphasize the importance of 
designing policies which can sticulate innovative perforQance without pro-
pelling the industry to an ~inecessarily early oaturity. 
Recent Trends in Sem1condJctor ~esearch and Develop~ent 
A direct attecpt to quantify the level and rate of change of the pro-
ductivity of seciconductor R&D ia beyond the scope of this paper. As noted 
else~~ere in this vol~. the ceasureoent of R&D productivity i. an exercise 
fraught with peril. In an industry like semiconduc:tors. where fires sell nUlller-
ous nae-homogenous product •• where each of the.e outputs is characterized by 
cultiple attributes. and where good ~rice indices for t~se attribute8 are not 
readily obtained. t:le&sUt"e:xnt of R&D productiVl.ty is a task requiring 
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painatalt1D.a affort aad a villingne .. to alta nu.roua heroic auuapt1ol18. 
Even the anUable Masur •• of input. to the inDovaUve proc: ... an ~eample~. 
and not auU,. interpreted. In diacusa1caa with ~ , D .aMgare, I haft 
learned that it u often the ca .. that what c:ounta a. on. fira's R. , D 18 
often labelled routine engineering expense by another. 
Quite apart from this problem of iDcon.s18tent definition, it 1a difficult 
to accurately gauge the aggregate level of innovative effort for the 8imple 
reason that alst firtlS do not distinCUish R&D expenditures directed ex-
clusively to\tard secdconductor technology. Indeed, mst secdcondu~tor R&D 
is done by firms \those reported corporate R&D includes expenditures on 
cooputer, talecocmunications, Dr military syat~ technology. Never:heless, 
by ';lulling together data from a variety of sources, one can begi~ to aacertain 
""'ether sen1conductor R&D effort has begun to decline. 
Table 1 presents several alternative esttcates of industrywwide R&D 
expenditures. Prior to 1972, the l'rational Science Foundation reported 
relevant data only at a very high level of aggregation, combining all R&D 
expenditures d. fires whose prioary product vas categorized by the Standud 
Industrial Classification as concunic3tions equipoent (SIC 366), electronic 
cocponents (367), or coccunicatioos services (48). In this broadly defined 
industry, total R&D did not keep pace vtth the gro\tth of sales; expenditures 
declined slightly in real teros from 1968 to 1973 and declined more rapidly 
thereafte.. Ho\tever, the entire decline in real R&D spending ia accounted 
for by govertu:lent spending. Cocpany R&D grew in real ten:a through 1973, 
k.eepin& pace vith the gr0101th of salea. ~le the ~SF data do not break 
down total R , D by funding source for )'Urs in t..1te later 1970s, thert 1a 
.QM indication that tha .. trends--co=pany R&D growing in proportion to 
sales and government R&D declining-(S)ntinued throughout the decade. 3 
Table 1 
Alternative Eatblatea of Seaicooductor R " D Expendituru 
NSF: Co.-micaUaa. equlpDellt and 
electronic componenta (SIC 366. 367. 48) 
eo.paay-funded R " D ($ mil1ioua) 
eonl'1UlODl-funded R " D ($ llilliona) 
Total R , D ($ Ilil1iona) 
~r-funded R&D (X of ul .. ) 
eovero.ent-funded R " D (X of salea) 
Totel R " D (X of aalea) 
NSF: Electronic ca.ponenta (SIC 367) 
Ca.paoy-funded R " D ($ mi111ona) 
Covernaent-funded R " D ($ IIlilliolUl) 
Total R " D ($ 1Ilil11ona) 
Ca.pany-funded R " D (X of aalea) 
Covenmeot-funded (X of sales) 
Total R , D (X of aalea) 
NSF: Total induatrW R " D 
COIIpanr-fundrd R " D (X of sales) 
eovemMDt-fUDded R " D (X of .. lea) 
Total R " 0 (X of salea) 
ITC: World vide Semiconductor R&D by U.S. firae 
Totel R " 0 ($ ai1liona) 
Total R " D (X of aalea) 
ITC: Japaneae Seaicooductor R " D 
Total R " D ($ ailliona) 











VLSI Progn.: gO~"rnMnt expendlturu ($ aill1ona) 

















































SourCN: National Science FO\D1dation. Reaeuch and Development in Induatry. Waabinltonl U.S. Con~t 
Printing Office. annually; International Trade Coaa!saion, Coupetitlve Factora Inf1uencinl Vorld 
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licee l.!J72 ths JIS7 !:".iiIi reporte4 .. parato data fo~ ftn. vboee p~ 
procluct fa.l.b rith1D. the three-d1ait iDdutty clu.1f1ed .. electtoll1c CGa-
poDIIDta. th1a e&taSOl'Y 1Dclud .. .,.t _rehat HldeODdactor Uz.. bot Ie 
aclud .. fira auch .. Art _ em wb:1ch are ptu18lably C01IIlted in the .,re 
h1&hly .~Pted tot.ala just d1acuad. IlL th1a ~re DarrOWly defWd 
tMwatx'y. 1 , D 1nc:na.aed aubatat1&lly both in real taraI cd ... po%-
cctase Oftr ulu throuah the md-1970e. 
l'ba apparently aubatmtial bc:re.ue in aeaicODducto~ 1 , D 1a at:rl.ldDs 
vbIm cccpa~ to the pattern of total iAdwatrial I. , D upenditure in the u.s. 
Aa table 1 indicates. total iDdunrtal 1 , D baa fallm froll 4.5% of ulu 
in 1963 to 3.2% of aal .. in the md-l97Oe. IDdeed. ~ I. , D U'paDdituru 
haft been ... ent1ally flat aiDee the aid 1960.. Intuut1qly. the decl.1.De 
1.8 ~t1rely attributable to the cutback in &OVtrmaent-fUDded I. 'D. Pr1.Y&tely-
aupported II & D baa grovD at approxiMtely the UlIe rate .. the KODCaY. 
Data cocpUed by til. lDtematioul Trade Coaaiaa101l coalu. the bt-
prcuion of a1gD1ficant receDt I. , D arovth in the HaicOIlductor 1nduatry. 
the Itt f1Juru include utiaatu of the aea1coDductor-related I. , D per-
foned vorldvide by u.s. f1r.. 1nc:lud1ng 'ftrtically intecrated producea 
auch as AlT and IBM. It 1a inteRatina to cOIIPAre til ... fipra with Itt 
utiMt .. of Japanue aadccmductor I. , D. wb1ch sr- at a rate far in u-
cue of tbtt U.S. apendituru. '!be .... 1'7 aubataDtial booat linD to the 
Japanese induatx'y by the JOVU'DMilt-.poaaored VLSI procr" bes= in 1974 
1.a clearly indicated in Table 1. 
M farther evidence of the coatiAued r.pid arowth of 17.S. NId.-
cooductor iDdlOUltty I. , D. Tabla 2 pnacta corporate 1 , D .. a perceD~ 
of aal .. for the fbe l.aad1n& opeIl-..rbt producer. of integrated c1rcuita. 4 
Of the £1.,.. firma. which together accoUDted for $~79 m0110n in corporate i. , D 
Table 2 
R , 0 .. a PercentaBe of Sale. for the Laraeat Merchant 5eaicoaductor riraa 
!!I!! (by 1979 .alea rank) 1973 1974 !ill 1976 .!ill. ill! ill.! !.!!9. 
T exa. lo.a t l"\.8eD t. 7.2 6.2 3.7 4.4 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.6 
hotorola 6.6 8.1 7.5 6.8 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.5 
lIltel 7.0 7.8 10.6 9.2 9.9 10.3 10.1 11.3 
lat100al S.a1coaductor 8.8 8.8 8.8 7.6 8.2 8.7 9.4 8.2 
rairchUd 9.7 9.5 11.9 9.9 9.5 9.4 
Sourc .. : Standard' Poor, COIIIPlJae,t data file; corporate annual reporta. 
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apeadicur. 1a 1978, caly Tazaa InaUwwta Ua ~ a ... UM!a 
tba ratio of I. • D Nlu Oft%' tbI perl'" 1973-1980. 'ftree of tbI otbsr f~ 
haw baU roaabl1 ccaatct, whUa Intel'. I. • D baa 1Dcnuec! na lEA 
rapidly tha ita pheDown.
' 
ul. .. aroarth. It ~ he kept 1D a1DII that 
tbuo fira uperieDced aal.cD arovth at anna- asmual. rat_ raa1D.a fro. 
8.41 to 36.5% over the period. 
Data aD .adCODductor pateatiq act:1nty tad to c.oa.f1Da tba blpna-
loa cCllllft18d by the I. • D data. 'atet COUllt. are a DOt.ahly 1JIpreciN 
..... u:r. of I. • D output, dace the ftl.ue of a pat8l1t ftrUa wic!a1y both cero .. 
cd viWn patent c:l.aaec. !feverthe1u., rithin a .1Dgl. fira or a .1Jl&l.a 
1Dduatry the tnnd 1D patent actiney Oftr u.a probably &1ft8 a rauoaeble 
1Ddic:atioa of whether ismovatift actinty 1a incruaiDa or decUD1nS. 
CoIIpar150Q.8 _de acro .. lira are leu .. ningful •• 1Dc. ldi~I:rac1. .. of 
corporate lUatory and .trategy often lead to wide 1at.rflra ducrapcdea in 
the propenalty to patent. 
Tabla 3 prwumta al tel"DaU" .... una of pattmtiDa actirlty at Mftral 
1.evw of qangaUon. A report recently 1uued by the Office of Technology 
A .... sment cd lOTeC&lt (1991) reveala that for the patent cl.u ... encc:apaas-
ins invent10na in integnted c:.1reu1t atructure there has been no perceptible 
.lacken1na in the rate of patent. granted to u.s. fir.. There haa. hOliever, 
bun .e:.. decre .. e in the number of patents granted per coaatant dollar of 
I. , D expenditure. Cb the other hand. in the broader NSF c:auSOry of electronic 
c:oa:ponenta cd coaun1c:ation.s aqu!pileDt. patenta per dcllar have increaaed 
vh1l. the rata of p.unt1n& hu decl1nedlOI in the decade 1967-77. TakeD 
O'ftrall, tbu. Usura related to • .m.cooductor induatry ac:t1rlty an IIOet 
reaaouably bt.rpnted II ahov1n.c DO dac:.1ded trend. Th. cor.trut with total 
O.S. patcntiDa l&etinty 18 atrlk.1.D& •• ine. both the ani of patct1n.& cd 
Table 3 
Semiconductor Patenting Activity 
Integrated C:rcuit Structure 
Patente gt'ADted of U.S. origin 
Patent. granted of foreign origin 
Total patents gt'anted 
Patents of U.S. origin 





Electronic Componente and Ca.aunicationa Equipaent 
Patete gt'anted of U. S. origin 5,546 
Patent. per conatant million $ R&D 1.81 
All Product Pields 
Patents gt'anted of U.S. origin 51,274 















Soure .. : Office of TechnoloBY AaaUSMIlt and Poreeast, U.S. Deparblellt of eo...rce, Patent Profil .. , 
Hlcroeconoaics I, Wa.hington: U.S. eovern.ent Printing Office, Pebruary 198~. w 
Uational Science Fowulation, Science Indicators, Washington: U.S. Governaant 




cd pauuta per I. , D dol.l.u dac:l.1DecI 20% 0'fU tha 1967-" period. 
tho coaclusiOl1 of DO d.sD1f1cat _Una 18 reiDforcK by data CD 
patata arantec! to 1Dd:!rldual Jl.Wfcooclaetor fu.. the pat_ta COUIlted :lJl 
table 4 1Dc1ude la:1ccmdaetor proc:a. aDd produet 1zmmt:1oDa, drnD froa a 
w1.cter JrCCIP of patent cl.aal .. tha aaed 1A the Patmt Office report acted 
above. Apin, it Ihoald be aphuizad that _ch fira'. mtertaporal pattuu 
18 of sreater aisnU1cance thaD the varut1Ol1 aero .. fu-, wb:1ch refleca 
differe.uc:ea 111 Itrategieca regL-.!1Da the protection of proprietary mowledge. 
Finally, cl."Ude .... ura of 1Ate,rated drcu1t teclm1cal paa.eten 
and perforunce do DOt u yet meal a decisbe llacmin• m the pace of 
tecludcal c.haDge. the trend to ldD1atur1utioll coatiDua ateadUy. )Un1 ... 
• 
feature dseo shrunk at a cou&talt rate tbroush the 1970. to the neighbor-
hood of 2 a1crona in 1980 for the b1gbeat reaolutiOll productioD procua ... 
l'he nUDber of circuit elementl per chip bas roughly doubled every year, 
although expertl expect lcae .oc!erate reduction in this pace. l'broagb the 
.id-1970I, DJQOry Itorage cqac1ty per chip followed a trend of doubling 
every year, as the luceeadve 1l1troduction dates of the lX, 4~, and 16~ 
dynamic randOtl acce .. aemory (lWf) chiPI vere approx:l.m.ately tvo yeare apart. 
It cppeara, however, that the spacing between dences representing the nest 
tva fourfold 1J:t:rovements bu increased to about three yun. It 1& difficult 
to perceive a decline 111 the rate of technical progres. fro. 100% to 60% per 
year .... rioua eauae for alUII. 
Clgina tec:bnololI and Evo1!in& Market Structure 
Al t.i2.ou&b the ..,aUable data do not meal a Ilcvdown in 1m1a.ati va 
actiney, there are umd..ataltabla aJ.ana of altentiOll in the Itructure of the 
Table 4 
Patents Granted to the Large8t Merchant Semiconductor Firma 
Firae (by 1979 aalea rank) 1972 
.!2.ll 1914 ill1 1n6 
Texas Inatrumentll 58 52 61 52 69 
Hotorola 62 88 56 11 &3 
latel 3 5 8 5 15 
Hationa1 Semiconductor 5 3 4 10 11 
Fairchild 13 16 6 19 24 
141 164 135 151 182 
.. 



















• .ueonductor 1Muotry. 'fM .. atnx:tun1 ehaqu. wh1ch are larply the ~ 
aequeneu of tho nolrln& teclmolol1' fit to 80M delI''' the patum "f 
_turat1.ca ducribed 1D the i!2duatry life cycle mdal of Abuuathy ad 
Utterback. A 8trlc:t appllcatiOll of the.:>del 1iIOwd Tift th ... ~1"1Ctura.1 
c:h.mgu .. leading ineviwl,. to a reduced pace and altered character of 
technical c:bJmge 111 t.bt induatry. In th1.a sec:tioa. I rill brlan,. ducribe 
the forc:.u driving atructural c:lw1ge, aDd thea proceed jn the rol.l.orin& 
section tQ disc:uas the 1IIIp11catioua of atructural c:han:e for tha future 
course of ae:llicondt1CtQ~ innovation. 
The do:dD.ant traj~to:y of .mdcoadw:tor teclmology hu been towud 
a:lll1aturiutlon. a course upon which prosreu requires a fail,. of re.laead 
technological advances. Scaling down iDdividcal circuit e.Ie.enta requ1De8 
filler lillu etched in the aillcO'G .ub.trate, which in turn requiru l1tho-
graphic equipment of higher resolution, ailicon with fever 1JIpur1tlu, and 
.,re pr-ee1se techniques of "dopug' the silicon to achieve the d .. ired 
electrl.cal propertlu. Increuillg the number of functlo;a perfoned 011 a 
.illgle chip wo require. advancu in the tec:bniquea of circuit duign rDi! 
innovations in _thO<I. of testing and quality control. S1gniI1C&Dt progress 
vas made along all t:~se required d!:leluiona 111 the 1'J70 •• and 1II08t illdua~ 
parUe1panta expect that ai.ni&tur1ution vill re::l&in the dC1rlnant techno-
logical trajectory of the next decade. 
!conoa.1cally. ain1.sturiutl.oc hu been accOllp&D.ied by uponent1&lly 
decru.1ll1 co.t per circuit func:t!oa. Jut a:1n1aturiuUOIl h&a 1JI;I11ed 
ai~1cmt incnuu in the capital nqu1re~ta of ~c:mductor p=odu.c:t 
danlopaeDt ~ production. According to Moore (1979). the :2oU1-hO".Jr re-
quire=enu of drc:u1t d .... 1gn have riun lIOn than f1vefoLi in the wt 
decade. '!'he eoat 0 f photcm.uk.1ns equ1~t h.u riUD. drau t!eAlly • Indee d. 
u 
,t •• 
tM coat of electroa-beaa writer. in the cOldDa era of ftry larp acale 
integrat10a (VLSl) u expected to aceed the colt of optical printer. a.aec! 
in current LSI teclmology by a factor of aU or .:re.S Tbue aDd other in-
creasea in capital C08a underline the ecoaoaic neceaaity of high wlu.e 
producUmi. '!bese nelated trench !laply that eff1cimt-scale entry at or 
near the frontier of integrated circuit technology iA uny timea .ore coatly 
than it vas a decade ago. 
rbe evidence on new entry is cOl1Sistent with the observed technologically 
driven increases in capital requirements and 1IiD1mua efficient scale. Among 
a sample of 90 semiconductor finu employed by ruearchen at Cbarlea 1l1ver 
Associates (1980), twenty-five entered the industry between 1951 and 1959, a 
rate of 2.78 neY firms per year. The entry rate spurted in the early 1960. 
and again fro. 1968 to 1971, so that the average annual number of new firms 
from 1960 to 1972 ws 4.69. Yet despite rapid market grovt.:: after 1975, 
only four new firma entered ove!' the period 1973-78, a rate of 0.67 per 
year. This precipitous decline in the rate of entry coinc1:::ea of course 
with the collapse of the U.S. venture capital market, but it seems unlikely 
to be wholly the :onaequence of rzduced capital availability. It is notable 
that wen venture capital resumed floving again 1n 1979 a V&ve of new entry 
occurred. But the new entrants ilave not aimed tovard high volume production 
of standardized circuits, as did a number of the successful new ventures of 
the middle and late 1960s. Rather, recent entrants have sought to fill 
specialized niches in the marketplace, a point vh1ch vill be given due 
emphasis shortly. 
In addition to ra1aing the cost of new entry. Idn1.atur1..zat1oo baa 
alao pushed ftr. in the direction of incraa.aed vertical integration, both 
d1nctly and indirectly. The dinct technological ilIperative for verdcal 
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mtep'at1oll como frca the lAcnu1q1,. .1arn4 cUat1Act1aa Htwaaa a1ec:trcD1c 
cOlJlPOG'lDta end 8J8~. A=.ore aD4 IIOH f1lDC:tiaIw are k11t _to a a1D&1. 
chip, .y8t.ea dodp u DO 1aqer a _ttu of COGf1prlaa etaDdardU..s ~ 
poD8Slu. Chip ad 8J8tea doeip haft beeo.a iDercuiq1,. ht.rdal*lcSat. 
!hU8, prodacera of dovDDtnaa e1ectroa1c prodaeu haft p' .. ter iDe_tift ~ 
aequire the c:apab1lltJ for 1D-boaa. "-dp _ productioG of c:u.atc::ai.nd 
drcuita. And atrehct euppllara of 1lltaaratad c1rc:uita haft anater in-
centive to dulp produce. uoUDd tbd.r :lJmovatbe dreuit%y. 
The less direct chain of causation runs frOlll wdniaturhation to 
vertical intagration rl.a the 1Aeraaa.ed capital roqu1r-.nta diaCWIoad abcma. 
Dupita higher entry hanan, tho eea1cacduc:tor 1Dduatty re.aina euff1eient1,. 
c01Ipetitbo to kaep profit .ar&1D.e at or be1cw the 110m of U.S. Mllufacturinl 
induatrl... In the faca of ruing capital eo .. , the ability of ...nu, 
indaplIDdent ea.1condu.ctor fira to f1nae~ arovth htaruall,. baa bee .. veroy 
iJlpalred. While OIle a1ght baft expected gruter uae of aternal capital 
_rkata to fiJunca in.,..t:Mnt, the daddod trend throqh the aidelle and 
lata 1970. h4a beem. tCMlrd acquialtion of aem1condu:tor lima by larpr 
firma, moat of thtu:l m.~ufactur.n of Ill.ectronic product. or 8J8ta:I18. Hany, 
but not all, of the recent acqu1aitiona have been by foreisn electronic fit'1ll8, 
.,Uvated by access to adv.nced technology and to marketing channels vithin 
the U.s. 
Thus, tec!moloSical forc .. appur to bave dri'V'8l1 tha aadcooductor 
industry tcnMrd a .. rut atruc:ture that i.e be,innin, to exhibit.,.. of the 
attribut .. of MturaUOIl-Dotably incnu .. 1D .1ohs ... efficient .cala, high 
mtry eceu, cd .. rUc&! intaaratlO11. Whether th .. e etru.ctura1 changta are 
yet .. dow caaae for coaceru i.e aa.otlaar qUiUtiOll. the I1DJt betvuI:D a 
_ture indu.try atructure and a .1ovdow h the rate of iDncrt'atioG, vh1le 
14 
vell illa8tratod by uapl .. 1D the literature, 11 by DO MaD.I dec1liwly 
utabliahed. Moreoftr, there are upecta of the .a.1couductor induatty'. 
receDt hatory vh.1ch .trOQ&ly .ugelt that it baa DOt yet ruched Itruetural 
.. turity. 'l'hua, for r ... oaa to be expl&1nad in the next .. etica. I ... 
Uttlo RUOU to conclude that a alovdOVD in ilmovatift perfol'Wluce 11 1.-
miDent. Heverthe1.... there an policy dec1liooa ca the horizon vldeb will 
be influential ill detendning whether the foree. drlv1n& contillued techno-
logical dyna=dsm .r~ to be .trengtbened relative to the forc .. driving the 
illdustry toward maturity aDd d1m1Di.hed innovativeneu. 
The Implications of Structural Change for 1I1novative Perfcrm&nce 
111 stylized models of the illdustry life cycle, technological competition 
eventually produces a relatively .. 11 number of lurviv1ng firu--typically 
illtegrated both vertically aDd aero •• & full lille of related producta. enjoy-
illg economies of ICOpe aDd .eale. and protected by lub.tantial barrierl to 
entry. In such aD environment, radical prod~t illnovation gives way to ill-
cremental product chaDge aDd refillementl ill proce •• technology. Oligopoliatic 
interdependence and comfortable profit margills dampen the vigor of technolog-
ical competition and productivity gal~. proceed at a modest pace. 
Th1a chat'&cteriution may apply. ill very broad outlille. to some'~ture" 
U.S. illdustries: for example. automobiles and major electrical appliances 
.uch as washers. dryers. &ad refrigerators. But despite rising eDtry coats. 
and the groving importance of acale and vertical !ntegrat1on. the .emiconductor 
uuiuatry doe. not yet ruemb1e the typical "mature" industry. !'int of all. 
vh11e there h ..... been lome clear villnerl and 10Mra ill technological ccntpetitioo. 
_rut coacCltraUon haa Dot yet belUD to riae a1gulfic.otly. The top four 
producers of aeaiconducton had 33 percent of vorldvide aalea ill 1971. 32 
15 
, 
porcCDt 1A 1975. ad 30 percat 1A 1979. Iforeo,e. tbera !au "-~ 
.tant1al turDOYer "'ca t.he ..rut leaden. OIIl1y OM (Tau WtnalDte) 
of thg top fift U.S. pnoducen of trau1aton 1A 1955 18 DDq tha top fi .... 
producen of 1Ate&r"ed circu1te today- lift of the top :a 1Ate&rate4 
circuit producen 1A 1975 von flOt aona the top taD Ha1.coaductor f1n8 m 
1965. and four of the .. firM vere utablbhecl after 1960. Today'. aa1-
conductor !Aduatry contaiu DOt thrH or four _jor full-liM producer. with 
8Ui;~taDt1al teclmo1011c:al copb1.8tic:ation. but perhap. 15 or 20 firM lIOrld-
vide with the capability for eipific:aat imlovation md laUut ~tratiOQ 
aero.. a range of tec:hnologiu and applic:atione. 
EnD if the tec:bolo1olY race 1D the • ..tcODduc:tor iDduatry bad pro-
o 
ducor! a .-ller mmber of aurv1?'Ora and a .ore concentrated induatt1al 
atructure. it is Dot obvioua that the rate of iDDcrfttiOD would 8l.ackan .. 
a coneequence. The liDk between Mrut atruc:ture aDd iDDoYatioo 1.8 DOt ao 
81mp1e. Tec:hDolol1cal coapetiUoo iDflucncu .rbt etruc:ture by produc:1n& 
auc:c .. aful fir.. vhic:h expand aDd failure. vhich contract. Market etruc:ture 
in turD. iDflueDCu the incentive. to wonte. 'l'be claia of life cycle 
tbaor1.8ta that oligopoly clwmela innovative effort in cmuervati.,. direc:tioo.. 
is plauaible. but 80 18 tM Schumpeter1aD arJUment tlat cODCentratiOD 1s!pravu 
tho predictability of the ecoaCllLic mrirODMnt md thua proeotu iDvutMDt 
1D tec:lmolo,lcally ruky. IODs-tera projecta. To di.untanale the likaly 
iJlpact of urkat atructur. OQ !m:l~at1oD. it 18 ... mtial to holate the 1D-
dependant forc. vhic:h jo1Dtly 1Aflueuce both realiad Mrkat .ttuetura md 
ilmO'YaUft perfonaane.. Th ... fore .. iDclu.da the UDderly1Da d __ d for the 
!Adaatry'. produeta. the ilIh.rent .dmt1flc me! t.clmoloJic:al opportUl1iu.. 
c:caft'ODt1q the iDduatry. cd the .... by which the returna fre. ~.tioa 
em be appropriatecl by c ~ator. 
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\lhm1 ODe reaecta upo1l the dameS, opportuZl1ty, ud appropr1ab1l1t:y 
ccmditioDa facina the sadcooductor indwatr)', it 1.8 nident that the 1n-
dunry bun little resf!2lblaDce to thoee 1nduatr1es vh1ch are paradipatic 
of the _ture stage of the life cycle. In contrast to the daaDd for auto-
.,blles and bousebold appliaDcu. wbich 1.8 u-,st uclwa1va1y ~ d ... nd for 
replacement.. de 1Dl!nd for electronic cowpouenta 1& continually augmentad by 
the opening of new market. and introduction of new applicationa. Ther~ 1.s 
little on the horizon to .uggest that the demand for inugrated circuit 
technology in consumer. industrial. and military application. will cease to 
grow at rates vell :in ezc .. s of the overall growth rate of econoaic activity. 
Of equal importance 18 the apparent fact that technological opportunity 1A aicro-
electronics ~1n.a abundant. Reinforcing the data presented above on re-
search and development activity is the consenswa view of experU in semi-
conductor tecbnology that there are no fundamental physical lllI1tations to 
the further pursuit of a1niaturizat1on over tha next decade. lbere are 
eventual thermal constraint. on the density of circuitry contained on a chip, 
vh1ch will ultbately necessitate a transition to superconductor technology 
for some applicat100.a. But lII08t experts agree that substantial further in-
creases in circuit density are foneeable with the use of advanced litho-
graphic techniques presently UDder development. 7 
The demand and opportunity conditions facing the industry thua strongly 
indicate that a alowdovn in the rate of innovation would be unlikely even 
if the indunry vere highly concentrated. That it 1a not is in • large measure 
a coaaequeuce of the severe CODJltra1nta on approprlab1l1ty that have char-
acterized the semiconductor induatry since ita infancy. J.. 1a vell-Jcnovn, 
tec!:moloz:y diffuaM rapidly acro ••• ea1conduc:tor firM. for a variety of 
17 
rOll8ou. IzportaDt upecta of proprt.tary tedmo1o&r. nell .. cJ.rcu1t 
dea1p, are DOt i'atctable UDder aiatiq law. EftID where patata are 
na1lable, thIy offer little protect1.em bec:aaae ero .. -WriDa __ t 1a 80 wide-
aprud ... to rencl!r.oat patalta u:oaforc .. ble 1A practice. ....ne 1IqiD .. r-
1ng hu been relatively a1Dple, and intarfim aploy .. .,bUity in S1l1eoa 
Vall.,. 1a le,cmdary. L1m1ted appropr1abWty baa DOt yet uartecl a a1p1fiCClt 
clalpeDinl influence em the rata of iImoftt1.oa, probably bec:aaae daaDd crcnrth 
hu been 80 rapid and opportunity 80 abuDdant. Vith rapidly arorinl deaaDd, 
• f." .cntha of l .. d tiM with a ncv product haft bam .ufficiant to insure 
adequate revard to :lm1oftt.1,.. ect.1vity. VbeD the arat for a1croelec:troD!ca 
approachu .aturat1oD (m nallt at1ll in the diatallt future), the .... of 
1Id.tat1oa v1ll 110 doubt accelorate tendenc:ie8 toward a reduced pace of iD-
DOVatiaD and toward _rut CODce:Dtration. 
Thad, de8pite aubstmt1al neent chmau 1A the atructure of the 
Maic:onduetor :laduatry. the _rat ia not yet hi&hly concentrated. aDd d_Dd. 
opportunity. aDd approprlabWty coadit1oa.a appear to favor cont:laued rapid 
teclmologieal progrea.. the fact re.ma1n.8. however, that the coat of UDder-
taking a , D at or near the frontier of aedc:oaductor teclmology hu ucalated 
rapidly. aDd the coat of entry :lato full ~. iDtegratod circuit produetion 
bas JrOVtl subatantiall,.. Althouah I haft aquad that the overall pace of 
:lDDovatioa vUl DOt slacken druatleall,., thue attuctural chan, .. neverthe-
le .. han 1JIp11c:.ationa for the character of aell1c:oaduetor a , D and ita 
c!1atr1butiou aero .. f1ru. In particular, it 18 11kaly that aall fir. aDd 
e.cv CDtnnta v1ll play • rather different role :la the adnnce v! an!conductor 
taclmolol1. 
III the put, --.11 lima aDd DIn atranta have had aubatant.1al bpac:t 
OQ the direc:tioa of u:laaerua tec:!molol1. If.- fu.., aach a. Fairchild :la 
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the l.te 19SOa me! btu ad Koetek • clacade latar. ach1e.....s aajor procua 
cd product iD:1avatioaa md juaped rapidly to poeitiona of both tedmololi~ 
cd markat luderah!p in pivotal. h1.sh-volu. product are... ToUy. it 18 
auch aore difficult to iJLag1ne a grus-roota entraDt .,v1ng directly to • 
position of market leadership in semcooductor logic or -.or, derlc:ea. 'the 
cwwlative It & D experience of the large eatabllihed fira. the ecaplerlty 
of the technology, md the co.t of ... embUng the required personnel aDd 
equipment now appear as fonddable barriers to a frontal .... ult on a .. jor 
market via product or process innovation. 
It is therefore likely the nut .everal generations of general purpo.e 
lIIII!SIIory and logic devices vill be iDtroducet aDd ilI.itated by larger established 
fims. Such devices are the types most Uk.ely to realize the remaining l.tent 
economies of Dliniaturuation. Innovation (aDd even 1D.1tation) aloog this 
trajectory vill be costly, md an expectation of high volume production vill 
be necessary to justify the investment. Innovation along thia trajectory will 
also require related advances in lithography. materials quality. circuit 
design, packaging. software, and testing. Only large utablished firu are 
likely to have the hw:um, organizational, md financial resources necessary 
to pursue simultaneously these related developments. 
Certain areas of opportunity nevertheless remain open to ~ler firms 
and nev entrants. Hany of these opportunities ariae as a consequence of de-
mand for innovaUve Applicationa by small and medium scale dClW'lWtrea pr~ 
ducers lacldng independent sea1conductor fabrication capability. While many 
dovuatrea users have made innovative u.e of stmdardized circuits prcduced 
in large vollDe by major merch.:nt semiconductor firu, others have !ncre .. ed 
the damd for custCII duigned circuita for specialized applicaUona. Virtually 
all of the nC'V sea.1c('lllductor finaa established in :he past two yean have 
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IIp4Ida1hed :1a cao or.on of tba related ana of cuat. drc:u1t a.ip. 
~utor-a1ded c!u1p (CAD). cat. fa!Jrtcatioa. _ custaa loftwan. s.d- : 
cua~CD c!aip ad furicat1oa., wbare aWcClQ walen an proc:aalact for nr10a 
appl1cat1oaa 1D identiCAl. f.,h1oQ ap to • fiDal atep .of ODe or two CUlt. 
S 
duiped ,taub, hal also beeD. a IroriDa ana of 1Dterut. 
S .. l1ar fu. aay proft to haft a cc.paratift cd pubapa abaolute 
aclvm~as. !D custoa cd aa:1c:uatca work. !fcly CUltca cleaanda can be aemel 
coat-effectinl,. b,. technology that 11 not at the ftxy froatier of the 
Idniaturizat1oo. trajectoxy. Consequentl,., CUltaa cledgn and fabrlcaticm 
hauna do DOt require investment :1a hUUZl capital and in atate-of-the-art 
procua technology OIl the IW,e of a large _rc:hant eellicODductor flna. 
At the lae tille, there 11 douhtlul auhltantial id1oeyncrat1c 1k.1l1 developed 
b,. deaip--..-. who apec1al1.ze in cuatca lervicea ~ which .., cc.penaate for 
. 
h1sber unit fabrication coats. Many induatry experta bel1ne that the Ia08t 
fruitful appl1cati011l of CAD tooa v1ll be in the duign of CUltCll or lmi-
coacluctor c1reu1ta vell v1th.1n the a1D1aturUaUcm frClQtier. Nave rthe lea I , 
!mlovations in CAD, CUltoa d .. 1gn, cd fabrication..,. haft a high payoff 
in productivity chmcement in nev bduatriu, even if they do not have the 
effect of 1.nereu1ng fUDcticm density or 1.Bproving circuit perfomance 
parameters. 
PrClCllOting Innovation in the Semiconductor Induatry: The VBSIC Prog':D 
Az:r.1dat public coacern for the future of the lam.cOClductor 1nduatxy, 
the u.s. lcrtU'DMS1t baa _arked upCIQ a .. jar prograa of Jt , D aupport for 
a1llt&r'1 applications of -"anced tec:bnoloo. The illpetua for init1atiq the 
VBSIC (Very B.1ah Speed IJltearatad Circuit) prolr .. vu quite independent of 
cirll1c COClcernl about the 1nduatry'a future or itl Itandinl relative to 
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Japan ... ~tit1oD. lather. plenniDl for the proar" be,_ ill 1978 a-
.ed1ately after 1I111ury inte1l1senc. reporta revealed that the u.s. advant.ap 
in the .lectronics eabodied in fielded veapoaa ay.t-. had bean 81p1f1c:.antly 
eroded. The principal objective of the VRSIC prograa 18 to utablish the 
capability for fielding veapoua .,.ateu utU1ziDg high apud integrated 
circuits of suh1ll1cron feature size by the end of the decade. Tec:lm1c:ally. 
one of the progrm'. central goals is defined as an increase of two ordera 
of magnitude in a critical parameter vhich is the product of speed (clock 
rate) and circuit density (gates per al). 
Technologically. the goals of the VBSIC prograa are highly compatible 
with the continued pursuit of m1n1aturization in the cClllmercial segment of 
the semiconductor business. The military hu certain specialized need.., such 
as the ability of circuitry to perform under extreme conditions of temperature 
and radiation. But much R&D funded by VHSIC. such as support for advanced 
lithographic teclm!ques to facilitate realization of submicron feature sizes 
and support for improved CAD. software. and testing methods. should have 
significant spillovers to cOCl:lercial application. In turn, the independent 
pursuit of s1.m.ilar technological objectives for cotllllerc:1al purposes should 
fac:1l1tate the achievements of VHSIC goals. Indeed. the planned Department 
of Defense expenditure of approximately $200 million over seven years is far 
less than industry viII spend on its own. but there is .u emerging consensus 
that the added stimulus provided by VRSIC funds will move forward the realiz-
ation of submcron circ:uiu by tva or three years. 9 
When the VliSIC progn.a vas firat announced, it vas enthusiastically 
received by .oet major suppliers of IIilitary electronics aystems. but aeveral 
leading Mrch.nt al!llliconductor finu expruaed serious reservatioa.s and SOllIe 
chole to abatain fro. bidding on VRSIC contracts. A .. jor concern va that 
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the VBSIC proar- woa.l.t cliftR .earce I. • D ruoarcea. _ eapedal11 crit1cal 
pencnas.sl. froa purau1t of COII!IUC1al oI»jectba. It ... fur.! that ~IC 
would bImd.1cap U.S. fima :lJl CCIIIpetitioD trich the J~ __ e for lea4anhip 
:lJl VLSI tedmolOl.Y. Thea. fean ... to hna beclll1qlacecl, .. 1D.dzqtry 
partic:1pmu have Ct.~ to neop1se the aub.tatial =-pt.entarity betveeD 
VRSIC md cCll!Derc:1al 'oILSI objectins. CD the other haDd, it would be a 
n.taka to vi_ the WSI'= proar- .. a dinct rapaaae to tba Japmue 1Oftm-
.mt'. .upport of the .-.icoaductor 1Dduatry. Vh1la it now appaara that WSIC 
vi1l provide m indirect boo.t to U.S. fima :lJl tachDo1o:lcal coepetition with 
the Japanue. _rchant .a1cODCluctor fn. .till .eek pollcy ... 1atmce acre 
cl1rectly related to uotiDg the Japmeae c:hall.e:D&e. l'be l.ea1alativa progr_ 
of the Sa1conductor Industry AaaociatioD (1981) baa three aajor COl!lpOUDta: 
tax incentives for Jl , D expanditut'ea, acca. to the Japanese dODUtlc aarbt 
rla relaxation of tad.ff. ad controla on direct :lJlvut:meDt, ad .upport for 
ena~ education. 
Early cr1tica of VBSIC alao questioned the prolrm'. emphu1a oa .up-
portiDa large .cale vertically intelrated reaearch effotta. The ProST- .. 
anv1aiOlled inVolved vertic:ally integrated lima or t .... of li~. md each 
propOS&! vaa expected to taekl.e a range of 1a.uu frcxa circuit fabricatiou 
teclmology md process equipMtlt to wertiou of circ:u1ta into veapcca .ystema. 
Critic. feared that the eapbu1a on larae fima md vertically iDtaluted t .... 
would wteD conc:entraUou of the .ea1coaductor induatry and ninforce the 
trend toward Tertlc:a1 intesntico, allqedly thrtatanill.& end rttal1~-of-a 
hiably =-P8t1t1ft md c!yna1c .arcl1ct .aicacduetor 1nduatry. Coa.ar ... 
1D1t1al1y cIolayed fU1uUni of the proar- mlt.11 it reea1vad aaaurmca that 
the proar- would not haft m mtieo.petitift mpact oa the iDduatry. 
Aa it hu cIoftloped, the _jor portioa of I. • D .apport w1ll be 
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al.located to vertically inteSTated cootractor u... rupoaa1ble for cIeve1cp-
1Dg the teclmology necessary at all 1eveh to utillie RbaicrClll integrated 
c1rcu:1ta in operational veapona systesu. Init1a.lll1ne-lIODth Phue 0 contracts 
were .arded to nine such te .. in 1980, and in Kay 1981 six of the teas 
were aelected as ccatractors for Phase I of the prograa, vh.1.ch vill extend 
into 1983. It 1B unl.1kely that eonf1n1ng VHSIC support to six teas (five 
of which involve merchant ae::dcot\ductor firu; ODe eODtract vas VCCl by IBM) 
¥ill increase cODcentration in the industry. especially since several non-
participating firms vill be pursuing VLSI technology with private resources 
on a significant scale. But the initial Congressional worries about zaarltet 
concentration did encourage the DoD to develop a program design that preserved 
niches of opportunity for mall. non-integrated firms as vell as university 
research laboratories. 
Paralleling the mainstream Phase I and II efforts vUl be a series 
of much smaller contracts to be warded on a continuing basis throughout the 
duration of the progrZlll. These smaller Phase III contracts v1ll focus on 
narrow teclmical problems. where significant cODtributiona, complementary 
to the Phase I and II objectives can be expected frOlll firms outside the main-
stream program. It is expected that Phase III cODtracta will be concentrated 
in areas such u lithography. CAD. softvare. and testing. In concept. Phase 
III represents a reasonable safeguard against the somemat remote potential 
that the VHSIC progra Yill unduly accelerate the industry tovard maturity 
and stagnation. In err c:a.ae, it appears to be an ex~le of organizational 
design vell suited to u x1:dz1ng technical advance. On the one hand, major 
support rill be ,iven to not one. but several. large-scale, vertically 
integrated efforts. OIl the othar ~d. substantial funda, one-third of the 
total budget. v1ll be ruerved for aaller .eale projecta c:omplel:lentary to 
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the proar£ll'a crrarall object1.Ta. IA prlJad.ple, nch _ orpnisatioaal deaip 
ca:1 be utU1sed to scerate 1smontioll frca both 1arp ad ...u fu. 1D tbo: 
area vbere each baa • cc=par.ti .... adYantap. 
cava this rather creative :1ut1tut1ou.l dea1p, the results of the 
first ~ of Phase IU c:ootract .arda are acaevh&t c!Ucourqa1Da. The 
first Phase III c:ootracts vera let amra! -.cxlthl before due date for Phaae 
I propooal8, and consequently, 1'irtually h&l.f (77 of 157) of the proposala 
aubmitted came from the large finis 1nvolftd in the uinatru:a Phue 0 pro-
gram. Evidently, PlwIe 0 v1nners a. in Phue III au opportunity to 1mprua 
the DoD with good work prior to the .. jor funding dedsiona on Phue I pro-
posals. Of the 157 proposals :ece1ved, onl1 4 cae froaa qualified ...u 
businesses and only 8 ~ frca aon-integr.ted aemiconductor fi%1U. Only 1 
of these 12 vas among S3 funded proposals, vhile 24 contracts vere .,arded 
to Phase 0 partic.ipants. Somewhat IIIOre encouraging vas the .,ard of 11 
Phase III contracts to S different universities. 
It is evident that if the VBSIC progrDl is to benefit frcaa innovative 
ideas from a v&.rlety of aources, lIOre attention must be paid to encourqing 
the auh::dssion of proposals from s:ull. and non-integrated firms. lUnagers 
of the program are aware of this problem, and they have taken steps to 
drastically a1:lpl1fy the format of the second-round Phase III requut-for-
proposals. Indeed, there is a graving recognition throughout the DoD that 
opportunitiea for sm&ll f~ participation in R&D aupport progra:a have 
been d1ainhhed by the escalating C01Iple%!ty of tha coatracting procesa. 
In a Tery pros1.a1.aa drnlopmel\t, the DoD Wtiated in April 1981 a n-. Def~e 
SUll luainu. Advanced Ted:nology P'rogr_. Propoula are solicited by • 
lucid 23 pq. docuaent, a atrildna c:ootraat to ~ 100 pqea of boilerplate 
coatainad in the first roc:1d reque.at for VHSIC Ph.ue III propoeu.. If 
n 
1. %h1I nr1lWl.a COIIpariaCD'" called to ., aUat1.oD by J.oaabeq ad 
SUi !'!!l1Mllar (1980). 
2. The n_ that induat~ evolutiOD foUon a typical We cycle pattera. 
with the .. tare stage oh1bitiDa the features 1ndicated in the text, baa 
been videly c!1.acu .. ec! in the literature OQ tec:hn1cal c:haDge and iDduatrial 
organiution. lor a full artic:ulation of the life cycle mdel, see 
Abernathy and Uttubac:k (1978), Abernathy (1978), and Utterback (1979). 
3. In the eue of An, which accounts for a substantial frac:tiou 0 f the 
It & D in this industry c:&teSOry. privately-funded 1l & D greII slavly but 
steadi.ly .. a percentage of sales over the period 1973-80, vh1le lavern-
ment-funded 1l & D performed by KIT deel.1ned prec:1pitously in real tems 
and u a percentage of sales. (Source: ArT annual reporu, 1973-80). 
4. According to estimates ude by Integrated Circuit Engineering (1980), 
IBM's production of integrated c:1rc:uita for internal use exceeds the pro-
duction level ~f each of the leading .arc:hant ses1cODductor firma listed 
in TAble 2. ICE's estimate of ArT's captive productiOD placu it just 
below the sixth-ranked merchant sesa1cODductor fim. 51guetics. and above 
such significant merchant producers as Hoatak. AHD. and RCA. 
S. Th18 figure is doc\Z:Iented by Rob1naon (1980). 
6. Tilese concentration ratio. are derived frca .ales est1lutes reponed 
by Dataquut (lS90). Captive production by IBM, .m md other fima 
vh1ch do not sell semiconductors in the open u.rket are excluded. 
7. lor two reprumtative stataents of th1a new, .ee lCeyu (1977) and 
Noyce (1977). 
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the VHSIC program follon thia lead. pro~c:ts vU.l b. enhanced for the pre-
servation of • dynamic:ally c:ompetit:ive sem.c:cnduc:tor industry atruc:ture with 
variegated sources of innovation. 
Judged against almost any criterion of performanc:e-ITOVth in output, 
exports, productivity, or innovation-the U.S. civilian aircraft industry asat 
be considered a star perfonDi!r in the American economy. Aaeric:an ca..ercial 
aircraft dominate airline fleets the world over, and the air transportation in-
duo try, • primary beneficiary of teclu:l.cal progress in commercial aix:craft, has 
1 
compiled an unequalled record of productivity growth since 1929. Along with 
this impressive record, however, the aircraft industry presents important anom-
alies in structure and conduct to the student of industrial organization and 
technical change. Fierce price co~etition coexists with very high levels of 
producer concentration and significant product differentiation. Infusions of 
government research support, both through the National Advisory Committee on 
Aero~utics CRACA, 1915-1959), and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA. 1959-present), as well as througp government support of military 
research and procurement, have been significantly h1;her in this industry than 
any other during the 1925-75 period. The industry s~ructure also exhibits rela 
tively low levels of vertical integration--contractual relationships predominat 
in the pursuit of extremely complex and highly uncer:ain goals in price and per 
formance. 
In this paper, we will examine the innovation process wlthin the commer-
cial aircraft industry, focussing particularly upon the role of government poli 
in affecting the pace and structure of innovation within the industry, as well 
1 
lendrick (1961) reports that output per person in the air transport industry 
&rev at an average annual rate of 8.8% during the 1929-48 period. higher than 
alDost any other industry in his sample. Output per pelson grev at an average 
annual rate of 8.2% during the 1948-66 period. far higher than any other of 
IAndrick's industries (1913). while total factor productivity during the 1948-
66 period grev at an &nnusl rate of 8.0%. 
.. 
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aa the atructural context within which auch innovation baa occurred. W. will 
argue that government policy has influenced innovation in the aircraft industry 
through its impact upon the demand for aircraft, in both the militar) and civil-
ian spheces, as much .8 through direct support of research. The peculiar struc-
tural combir.~tion of high levels of producer concentration and fierce price and 
quality competition among producers also reflects the influence of government 
policy, in the provision of both a market and resenrch and development funding 
for military aircraft. This government role also has encouraged the dev~lopment 
of a vertically disintegrated industry structure, and an important role for sub-
contractors, both of which imply a major role for the contractual provision of 
complex te~hnologies to an extent not generally encountered in orh~r high tech-
nology industries. The importance of subcon~racting in the commercial aircraft 
industry also reflects the extremely high costs and uncertain decand faced by in-
novators in this area. 
The discussion opens with a summary examination of important aspects of 
the process and product technologies underlying the commercial aircraft industry. 
We next consider briefly the structure and historical evolution of the industry 
and aircraft technology. The role of government-sponsored research, in both the 
military and civilian sectors of the industry, is covered in the subsequent sec-
tion of the paper. The general character and impact of government regulatory 
research and procurement policies is discussed next, followed by a conclUSlon ex-
plo~ir.g the relevance of the aircraft industry's experlence to other sectors of the 
economy. 
I. Aspects of Process and Product Innovatio~ in the Commercial Aircraft Industrv 




technological "borrower", in at lent two specific way.. KaDy o! the .ip1fic:ant 
:lnDovations in c01ll:llereial aircraft d •• ign, lOinS back to the DC-3 (th. lint arut 
co=mercial .uccess in tbe industry) vere originally developed by aanufacturera 
of airframes and engines for .1litary applicationa--8U~~ • li.t would include 
the air-cooled engine tbat powered the DC-3, a~ veIl a. tbe bigh-bypa.a turbo-
fans assoeiated with tbe L-lOll, DC-la, and B-747. "Borrowing" soe. beyond ap-
plications to commercial designs of components developed for .1litary purposes, 
as ve argue belovo Important benefits are reaped by airframe and engine manu-
facturers who are able to share development or, les8 often, tooling coats betveen 
ailitary and civilian designs that are less closely related. Borrowing of anothe 
.ort also has played a key role in the development of commercial aircraft tech-
nology. Aircraft have benefitted to an unu8~l extent from technological develop 
.eats in other industries. Noteworthy examples are the metallurgical and materi-
als industries, whence have co:e a vide range of new alloys and composite materi-
al., as veIl as the chemicals and pet~leum industries, where important develop-
Dents in fuels vere achieved before Vorld Var II. and ~lcctronics. which has pro-
vided since 1940 a steady stream of crucially important innovations. ranging froa 
radar to airline reaervation and navigational computers. The aircraft industry 
is unusual in the extent to which it has benefitted from the inter-industry flov 
of innovations that typifies the modern economy. 
The ability of the commercial aircraft industry to benefit from technical 
developments in so vije a range of seemingly unrelated industries reflects anoth, 
t.porta~t aapect of the commercial aircraft industry, namely, the high degree of 
aysttaic complexity embodied in its products. The finished commercial aircraft 
r 
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i. wide range of components for propul.ion, navigation, etc., 
\ 
that complex in many inatancea. The interaction of 
these individually complex systems i. crucial to the performance of an aircraft 
design, yet extremely difficult to predict from design and engineering data, 
even with computer-aided design techni,ues. UncErtainty about aircraft per-
formance is also exacerbated by the still modest state of scientific theory 
concenling the behavior of such key components as materials. A substantJal 
element of technological uncertainty thus exists in the design and production 
of a new aircraft. Performance, in many 
cases, cannot be predicted definitively before the initial flight. The major 
aircr~ft manufacturers have frequently pursued production and design strategies 
aimed at insulati~g themselves from the adverse consequences of such uncertainty. 
A final aspect of considerable ~ignificance in the commercial aircraft industry 
centers around the need to achieve large production runs for a given aircraft in 
order to take advantage of learning curves and in order to defray high develop-
ment expenses. Economies of scale and learning curves (which were first detected 
empirically in the production of airframes) playa oajor role in affecting pro-
duction costs and the overall profitability of a given aircraft. :uch high de-
velopment costs, which have become important with the advent of the jet engine 
and which reflect the systemic complexity of aircraft technology, render very 
important the greatest possible production of a given aircraft design. This has 
in turn endowed with great importance the "family concept" in aircraft deSign, in 
which a given aircraft, such as the Boeing 727, spawns 3 succession of modified 
designs, notably through stretching the fuselage. Technological trajectories thus 
, 
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ore of considerable importance in the industry. and .adem aircraft are designed 
so .. to take maximum advantage of thea. 
11. The Development of Industry Structure, 1925-75 
The c!evelop1llent of the cocmercial aircraft industry' 8 structure may be 
divided into four periods of unequal length, each of which saw a difference of 
development; 1920-J4. 1934-40, 1940-45, and 1945-75. Over the entire 1920-75 
period, the industry has grown substantially and beco~e much more concentrated. 
At present, only three producers of airframes and two domestic engine manu-
facturers are of major Importance in the commercidl market. 
1923-34: The 1920-34 period was one during which military and commercial air-
craft production were gradually distinguished from one another, and peacetime 
ailitary procurement came to play a role in airframe and engine development 
(particularly the latter). In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the market 
for aircraft collapsed, with the cessation of military demand, and a surfeit of 
war surplus aircraft available for purchase. Aircraft production declined from 
14,000 in 1918 to 263 in 1922, according to Holley (1964), but slowly revived, 
particularly after the military announded plans ir 1926 to maintain a total air-
craft fleet of 2600 by 1931, and the Kelly ~i1 Act of 1925 transferr~d trans-
portation of air mail from the Post Office to private contractors. Also of im-
portance during the 1920'. was the increasing level and quality of research being 
carried out by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, established in 1915. 
Mllitary support of aircraft engine development during this period culminated in 
the foundation of the Pratt and Whitney aircraft engine firm In 1925, on the 
-6-
atrength of atrong interest fr~ the Navy in the Pratt and Whitney Wasp. 
The revival of the aircraft industry ga~e rise to a aeriea of mergera 
in the late 1920's that produced, for the first and only time in the history 
I 
of the industry, several vertically integrated firms, combi~ing air transport, 
airframe manufa~ture, and engine production. United Aircraft, founded in 1929, 
was comprised of Boeing Aircraft, Boeing Air Transport, Pratt and Whitney, Chance 
Vought Aircraft, the Hamilton Standard Propellor Corporation, and Stearman Air-
craft. North American Aviation, incorporated in 1928, included Curtiss Aeroplane, 
Wright Aeronautical, and had large minority stockholdings in Transcontinental 
Air Transport and Western Air Express (subsequently combined to form TYA). 
Other major consolidations of the late 1920's included the Aviation Corporation 
and the Detro1t Aircraft Corporation. 
The onset cf the Depression placed all canufacturers under considerable 
stress, but the air mail scandals of 1933 and the Air Xail Act of 1934 were the 
1 
crucial events in the dissolution of these consolidated fires. ~nder the teros 
of the 1934 Act, air transportation and aircraft manufacturer had to be separated; 
United Aircraft divested itself of Boeing and United Airlines, North American di-
vested what were to become the Eastern and TYA airlines, dnd the Aviation Corpor-
ation "spun off" Ame:-1can Airlines. The 1934 Act also abandoned the goals of 
1 The Air Mail Act was the response of the newly-elected Democratic Congress and 
the Roosevelt Administration to the airmail policies of Walter Brown, ?ostmaster 
Ceneral under Hoover. Controversy erupted over the letting of air mail transport 
contracts, stecming from Brown's attempts to utilize these contracts as a Means 
of influencing the development of the structure of the air transportation firns, 
and with this, the development of the entire aviation industry in the U.S. The 
precise nature and impact of the Brown policies, wh1ch were intended to move 
transportation companies away from exclusive reliance upon mail contracts and into 







previoua airaaU legialation (the Kdfary-llatrea Act of 1930) 1n apecif,~a that 
.iut.um coat vaa to be the aole criteri~n for awarda of .. 11 contracta. 
Tbe data in Table 1 ahov the doainance of the aircraft aarket durina the 
. 
1920'. and early 1930'. by sovenuaent procurement (the figuru are diatorted 
alightly by the fact that Curtiss-Wright and United vere the onl, fire. producing 
engines). In both the ailitary and c01lllllercial aectors. IIOreover. a amall nuaber 
. 
of firms were dominant. The ahare of total sales of the two largeat firms. 
Curtiss-Wright and United. is in excess of 70% in the military. and over 90% 
in the commercial market. 
1934-40: During the 1930's. four airframe producers and two engine man~facturers 
comprised the bulk of the civilian aircraft industry. Boeing. Douglas. Lockheed. 
and Curtiss-Wright all were active producers of commercial airframes. while 
Curtiss-Wright and Pratt and Whitney were the major engine producers. This per-
iod also saw the production of the first monocoque airframe passenger transports • 
. 
tbe Boeing 247 and the DC-2 and DC-3. The last-named aircraft came to dom-
!nate the commercial aircraft market through the remainder of the decade. baaed 
pri=arily upon its efficient operating characteristics for passenger transport. 
The 1930's were the period during which pas~enger. rather than mail. carriage be-
came the central activity of commercial air carriers. as passenger demand grew 
rapidly. The data in Table 2. frca Phillips (1971). demonstrate the complete dom-
1D&ace by Dousla. of the commercial market. 
The other .. jor airframe manufacturers aurvived primarily on military coo-
tracta during the mid-1910'a; by the 1938-39 period. of course. the military mar-
ket vaa expanding rapidly. Throughout this period. ai11:.ry production reaalned 
Per Cent Per Cent 
of Total of Total Per Cent Government Government Commercial Commercial 
of Total Companies Sales Sales Sales Sales Total Salea Sales 
United $ 50,184,443 39.7 $28,056,208 48.0 $ 78,240,651 42.8 
Curtin-Wright 44,755,590 35.4 26,813,517 45.9 71,569,107 38.7 
Douglas 14,437,623 11.4 1,412,790 2.4 15,850,413 8.6 
., 
Glenn Hartin 9,895,605 7.8 none 9,895,605 5.4 
Consolidated 4,307,632 3.4 1,118.231 1.9 5,425,863 2.9 
Great Lakes 2,451,993 1.9 905,719 1.5 3,357,712 1.8 
GrulIIIlan 452.195 0.4 153,492 0.3 605,687 0.3 
I 
$126,485,081 • .. $184,945,038 cr Totah 100.0 $58,459,957 100.0 100.0 
TABLE 1: Aircraft and Engine Sales, 1927-1933 





of srut 1Japortance to the aajor ca.aerc1al .. nufacturer.. De.pite Dou&1a. 
Aircraft'a dominance of civilian air transport .. rket •• the areater unit Ta1ue 
of .1litary aircraft enabled producers to avoid f~cial disaster. Rolley 
I (1964) noted that in 1937. 2281 civilian aircraft were aold for a total cost 
of $19 million. while sales of military aircraft. totalling 949 unita, were 
valued at $37 million. l The data in Table 3 diaplay the shares of military 
contracts in total sales of the major airframe manufacturers for the 1931-37 
2 period. The role of subcontractors also renained rather minor during this 
period. as commercial producers strove to utilize more fully the substantial ex-
ceas capacity in their own factories. 
194C-45: During the wartime peried. there effectively was no comcercial air-
craft industry. All airframe and engine producers, as well as such non-aircraft 
firms as the Fisher Body division of G~neral Motors. and Ford ~~tor. worked fev-
erishly to produce military designs. Several aspects of this period merit men-
tion. The heavy demand for aircraft sp"urred the growth of firms such as Convair 
(formerly Consolidated Vultee). Bell Aircraft. and the Martin Corporation. rais-
ing what formerly were minor factors in the commercial market to the status of 
potentially viable entrants. Proprietary control of military aircraft desigr.s 
va. also reduced during this period, as cross-licensing of designs for maximum 
production was commonplace. Substantial "in-kind" technology transfer took place. 
~. 10. It was also important ~o note that very few of these civilian air-
craft ware multi-engine transports. 
~olley. p. 22. Phillips (1~7l) notes that for Boeing and Lockheed during this 
period. "Hilitary orders sustained them and each attempted new commercial planes 
prior to WOrld War II. Lacking the military orders--that is, in a market environ-
MDt IIOre typical of IIOst industriea--Lockheed and Boeing would presumably have 
failed." (p. 113) 
Deliveries of Particular Types 
Total 
Deliveries 
of New Beechc:raft 
Year Aircraft DC-3 L-lO L-12 L-14 L-18 18 8-307 
1936 42 29 10 3 
.. 
1937 54 47 6 1 
1938 24 21 3 
1939 41 40 1 
1940 112 95 12 S 




Total 309 267 11 3 9 13 1 S 
TABLE 2: Estim~ted Deliveries of Newly Produced Aircraft to Domestic Trunk Carriere. 1936-1941 





Manufacturer Total Sales 
Boeing S9 






TABLE 3: Share of military contracts in total sales, 1931-37 
(from Holley, 196~t p. 22) 
" 
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In the rush to increase production, subcontracting caoe to play a crucial rol~ 
in the aircraft industry. The large size of production runs also forced much 
greater attention to production engineering, and the maximum exploitation of 
scale economies and learning curves. The in-house research and engineering 
capaoi1ities of the major producers vere expanded greatly, as veIl. Finally, 
and of great importance for the postvar period, the development of the first 
.~erican jet engine, based upon the British design developed by Whittle, vas 
assigned by the Army Air Force to General Electric, on the basis of the firm's 
past experience vith turbine designs. 
1946-75: The postwar period'vas one in vhich the technology of the jet engine 
came to dominate commercial aircraft, causing substantial shifts in the relative 
importance of firms in both the airframe and aircraft engi~e sectors of the 1n-
dust~). Producer concentration in the airframe industry als~ increased during 
this period in both the military and commercial markets. An important =onse-
quence of the adopticn of jet engine and electronics technologies in the modern 
commercial airliner was a spectacular rise in the magnitude of development costs 
in the production of a new commercial aircraft design. Hiller and Savers note 
that: 
..... in the 1920's the cost of engineering developMent for 
an airplane was counted in tens of thousands of dollars -
$25,000 for the Lc=~heed Vega and S5,OOO for the prototype 
of the Hawker Hart; in the 1930's it ran 1nto hundreds of 
thousands - about S150,OOO for t~e DC-2 and S3,300,OOO fer 
the DC-3; as the 1940's began it reached the mi1110ns -
$3,300,000 for the DC-4; by the end of the war 1t was 1n 
the tens of millions - $14,000,000 for the DC-6 ar.d 
$29,000,000 for the two prototypes of the B-47; in the 
1950's it ran into hundreds of millions - Sl12,OOO,OOO for 
the DC-8 and $468,000,000 for the McDonnell Phantom; and in 
the 1960's it reached thousands of millions with the XB-iO, 
which cost $1,500,000,000 for two prototypes ..... 
Hiller and Sawers, (1968), p. :67. 
,. 
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HcDonnell Douglas atill faced $625 a111ion of deferred developaent coat. on the 
DC-10, tLn years after the aircraft. intToduction in 1969. MOre recently. the 
development costs for the Boeing 767 have been estimated to be in excess of 
$1 billion. The rapid growth of these cos:s in effect means t~t an increasing 
proportion of the costs of introducing a new aircraft are incurred during the 
phase of greatest uncertainty concerning ~'rket prospects and technical feasibili: 
The j~t engine was originally developed for American military applications 
by General Electric during and after Yorld ~ar II. General Electric, ~esting­
house, and the Allison division of General Motors all had substantial develop-
ment programs underway in 1945; they were joined by Pratt and ~nitney shortly 
thereafter. By the 1960's, however, only General Electric and Pratt and Yhitney 
remained as major factors in the comcercial jet engine :arket (wr.ich, by the 
early 1960's. essentially defined the commercial engine market). 
Table 4 gives the shares of the commercial carket held by the cajor air-
frame producers during the postw3r period up to 1965. Douglas, Lockheed, Convair 
and Martin dominated the commercial market during the heyday of the four-engine 
propellor transport. After 1959, however. when Boeing intro~~ced the 707 and 
Douglas followed with the DC-S. Lockheed. Martin. and Convair all went into 
eclipse. out of which only Lockheed would emerge in the early 1970's as 4 =oopeti-
tor in the widebody designs with the L-lOll. Boeing has come to dominate the co:-
mercial market ever the last 10-15 years, on the strength of the 707, the 727, 
and the 747, and the numerous modification of each design, as throughly as 
Dougla. dominated the commercial market of the 1930's. Table 5 cQntains data on 
the relative ioportance of Boeing, LOCKheed, ~cDonnell touglas, anct General 
Table 4: Sharea of commercial aircraft deliveriea, 1941-65 
Douglas Boeing Lockheed Convair Martin 
1941 74)~ 00"/0 171% 00% 16~o 19H 21 7 00 Sl 6(10 1)0 19-1'1 17 172 1ZS 481 00 'i 1950 91 00 608 11.11 17f1 19" 476 00 23ft 00 286 1~51 IJ 9 00 161 162 




from Phillips, 1971, pp. 110-111 
·. .- ,. 
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T.blll-2. Jet Aircraft In Sll'YiCl on Unh..t SUta Airlines 
wMtWl McDonlfd]. 
y"" 8OftII, SAC Dy .... 1fUCS Dcu~ SUD '-«tAd Orll~ To. 
lUI 6 , 
1959 6li 11 14 
1960 113 14 7S 201 
1961 170 39 93 17 319 
1962 116 60 100 20 "6 
1963 237 6S 104 20 "26 "-
1964 3S7 67 114 20 SSI 
1965 476 11 65 . 134 20 712 
1966 645 54 63 196 20 971 
1967 661 S-4 63 lOS 20 3 100) 
1961 113 57 59 311 20 1 3 1340 
1969 11'6 60 51 S03 20 1111 
19;0 1331 60 47 610 20 1061 
1971 Hoa S9 -46 612 1 1136 
1971 1395 61 49 619 1 6 1132 
1973 1341 sa 49 650 II 1 2111 
Notes The abo" fi."\Ir~ aR .. of Dcc:cmbc, 31 cadi ycu u"lItI971. ,.tlea tht Iff"lIYC 
date " AU£'I1l 31. Others Includes D-.ssault :aad Hanabw;cr f-III"'C-... b:all. 
Socucc' -Allcnll an O~UOft by CcrtJioted Roate All u ... :~n.- U.s. Department of 
Tnnsportauoft. Federal An:auon AdmJlIIIUaUoft, FAA SurtstJcal H.ndboo/c o{ Cml A.u-
1IOtt, nnous yean. 
from Carroll, 1975, p. 147. 
" ,. 
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Dynamics in the U.S. commercial jet aircraft market through 1973: by 1~73, over 
6J% ot commercial jet a1rcraft in service vith Amer1can airline. vrre produced 
by Boeing. 
The commercia! air transport industry vas regulated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board during the entire postwar period; this customer industry increased 
slightly in concentration. while price competition in transport was largely ab-
sent. Price competition among the airfra~e producers remained intense. however. 
despite increased producer concentration; the failure of t~e Convair 880. and the 
subsequent problems of the Douglas DC-9. were both due in part to aggresive ef-
forts by their producers to underprice the competition. More recently. the in-
troduction of widebody transports was marked by fierce competition between Douglas 
and Lockheed, in botn price and de11very date: The market for }~erican cocmer-
cial aircraft became an international market during the postwar period, aided by 
substantial government assistance in f1nance of purcnases by foreign concerns, in 
contrast to the situation of the 1930·s. when barriers to trade in aircraft were 
8ubstantia1. According to Carroll (1975). as of early 1969. "In the total world 
l1e~:J aircraft fleet. 2747 of the total of 3494 (or 78.6%) are United States 
made." (p. 153). 
The intense competition among major airframe producers during the postwar 
period has created several near-failures of important firms. The Douglas Alr-
craft Corporation approached bankruptcy as a result of poor financial canagenent 
and overly energetic and generous sales efforts for tne DC-9 in 1966. Despite 
an order backlog of $2.3 billion. Douglas vas forced to merge with McDonnell Air-
craft in 1967? with the acquie~enceof the Department of Justice, and the aid of 
~ 
a Federallyj+guaranteed loan of $7~ million. The Douglas firm. producing largely 
,. 
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civilian aircraft, complemented the prisarily ~ltary product lin. of MeDon"~ll, 
and. McDonnell-Dougla. moved quickly tel belin work on the DC-lO vide body trana-
port. Sales competition between the McDannel-Doulla. DC-lO and the Lockheed 
L-10ll, as well as the bankruptcy of Rolla-Royce and the C-5A debacl~, left the 
Lockheed Aircraft Coyporation financially ravaged. Collapse of Lockheed was 
averted in 1971 only by a Federal loan guarantee of $~50 m1l~ion. To an un-
preeedented extent in the 1960s and 1970's, then, the Federal lovernment vas 
directly involved in determining the structure of the commercial aircraft in-
dustry. 
• Market Structure and Conduct in the Jet Age 
As was noted above, the coexistence of high levels of producer concen-
tration and fierce price competition make the cemmercial aircraft industry an 
unusual cne within manufacturing. This unusual aspect of the industry reflects 
several unique structural features, wbi~h receive Ireater attention belovo As 
Carroll (1972, 1975) and othere have noted, the relationship of aircraft producers 
and airline consumers ttrough 1978. i.e., prior to deregulation. closelyapproxi-
mated that of bilateriat oligopoly. The market for commercial aircraft vas dom-
1nated by large orders from a small number (approximately four) of major trunk 
carriers. This dominance of the market was in part an outgrowth of the nature 
of airline regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Hoard (see below); within this en-
vironment of bllaterial Oligopoly, airlines tended to have tne upper hand 1n pur-
chale nelotlatloos, playing competing suppliers off against one another. as in 
Il 
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reliance upon contractual relationships in the design. production. and pro-
curement of complex cap1tal goods; the industry exh1bits a very low degree of 
vertical integration. The nature. causes and consequences of tnis market struc-
ture are of some interest. Production of new aircraft requ1res extensive ne-
gotiations between the airframe and engine producers. involving performance 
specifications and guarantees that are absolutely crucial to the success of a 
given design, yet may be nighly unrea11stic at the time a contract is signed. 
Both the Hoeing 747, utiliz1ng Pratt and Whitney engines, and the Lockheed L-10ll. 
relying upon Rclls-Royce as the engine supplier, encountered severe difficulties 
in meeting original performance specificat1ons. For tne 747. the initial range 
and veight goals had to be abandoned, while Lockheed nearly collapsed folloving 
the failure of the Rolls-Royce f1rc, a failure ~~e in large part to aesign prc-
ble=s with th~ L-1011 engines. One result of this ln~~~asingly complex and im-
portant engine-airframe interface has been the acquisition by such major air-
frame producers as Boeing or Northrop (an importa~t military producer and civil-
ian subcontractor) of a substantial in-house expertise in eng1ne performance, 
engineering, and evaluation, duplicating that of the eng1ne =anufacturers. 
The subcontracting of production of nev aircraft designs has also grown 
substantially 1n impo~tance 1n recent years, due to mushrooming development 
costs and the increasing comp1ex1ty of aircraft components. Rae (1968, p. 83) 
.tates that, in the 1930's subcontracting '~onstituted less tnan 10 per cent of 
the industry's operations", but by the mid-1950's, 30-40: of the assembly work 
for the turboprop LOCkheed Electra vas subcontracted. t/ith the introduction of 
the Boeing 747. six major subcontractors accounted for 70 percent of the assembly 
: 
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the case of Douglas, Boeing, and Convair in the early 1960'.: 
••• once the decision has been ~de to purchase, it becomes desirable 
to place orders for sizable fleets. Further, the fairly concentrated 
nature of the air carrier industry insures that the orders made by in-
dividual airlines are large relative to the total market. From this, 
and the situation of the sellers, a large airline derives considerahle 
market power from its purchasing decision. (Carroll, 1975, p. 158) 
The willingness of aircraft producers to undertake the expensive and 
risky tasks of development of new aircraft designs for which an insufficient 
market exists reflects the importance of early delivery of new designs to air-
lines under the CAB regime. The advantages to airline customers of multiple 
suppliers of new aircraft designs also le~ them to encoJrage competition 1n a1r-
craft productlon; thus Juan lrippe of Pan Amer1can placed the first orders for 
commercial jet aircraft with both Boeing and Douglas. Nonetheless, ~he desire 0_ 
producers to enter into such ruinous competition, as well as its recurrence, are 
not easily explained without consideration of the role of government military 
procurement (as well as the federal government's evident reluctance, in time of 
financial crisis, to allow a producer to go bankrupt.) As Table 6 shows, mili-
tary sales have remained very important during the postwar period for all of the 
major commercial airframe producers, and have provided a steady source of profit 
with which to support commercial gambles. Carroll p01nts out that 
large government and space involvement, p~ovldes the safety net that 
catches a plummeting airframe company. Large backlogs of government 
contracts furnish rather ste~dy income durlng periods when commerclal 
activities mak~ sales and earnings volatile. Government-sponsored re-
.earch provides the bulk of airframe technology. Finally, the govern-
.ent simply will not allow a major defense contractor to fa1l completely. 
whatever its commercial sins. l1975, p. 162) 




Commcmal ~In as I Plfcenta~ of Total Sate. 
Ctll<:NlI MdJOIllftU· 
Ytcr DyMmia Dautlu ,«"', LodAH4 
1951 31.5 2.1 
1951 III 4.0 U.s 
19.59 11.9 11.4 
1960 46.7 31.1 
1961 10 a 37..5 22.1 
1962 133 'll.S 131 3.0 
1963 194 21.4 14.1 
1964 20.5 21.5 3.5.6 
196.5 21.9 31.2 496 
1966 21.0 464 .52.3 50 
1967 31.1 .57.1 
1965 46 • .5 69.2 
1969 460 64.3 60 
1970 II 29& '71.4 40 
1971 17 lS 5 76.7 3.0 
1972 41 409 
Note. A bbnlr. indlC:llei d:lu .. ere not ~Y~lbb!c. 
Source Company A"lnu:i1 Rrpolu, waflou. ),C:Il1" .'loody Iltldu.~11 ~nd .\foody·, H~d­
book o/COII/mo .. Stocu. YUK:UJ yells. 
from Carroll, 1915, p. 148. 
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of the aircraft, according to Hochmuth (1974); a major subcontractor for the 
fuselage assemblY was Northrop. Subcontractors for both the 747 and the up-
coming 7b7 are also required by Boeing to share a substantial portioo of the 
development costs. Thus, subcontracting has increasingly come to fulfill a risk 
1 
sharing role in the aircraft industry. 
An additional reason for the growth in subcontracting in both the mili-
tary and commercial aircraft sectors is the increasing complexity of such air-
craft components as avionics. Major airframe producers simply do not have the 
requisite in-house competence to develop and produce these complex systems them-
selves. Occasionally, the decision is made to proceed with in-house developoen: 
of a given component, as a means of acquiring the expertise; th1s is far more 
co~~on with military development contracts than in the commercial se=tor. (see 
below). 
lhe final nexus of contractual relations in the aircr3ft industry is thz 
between aircraft producers and airline consumers. As was noted above, competi-
tion among producers is intense, in the areas of price, delivery date and per-
formance specifications. The importance of a large initial order for 3 new air 
craft design has grown substantially, reflecting the concomitant growth of deVE 
, 
ment costs. Producers must have a guarantee that at least a Slbstantial port1~ 
these development costs will be recouped prior to undertaking prctotype develo~ 
mente The airlines placing these initial orders thus are in a position 0: con-
8iderable power to dictate the performance characteristics of a given aircraft 
lAccording to Aviation Week and Space Technologv, discussing the new Boeing 
767 transport, "The 767 subcontracting also will be devoted to sharing the 
risk. It will resemble the 747 situation in many respects, althou~h in this 
case the major subcontractors will be required to assume a larger share of the 




the negotiation and specification of these performance criteria necessitates a 
large in-house technica~ and engineering staff in each of the mDjor commercial 
carriers. Further. since the route structure of each carrier is substantially 
unique. the performance characteristics viewed by each as m~8t desirable may 
vary substantially. The airlIne placing a large initial order thus may be in 
a position to influence the characteristics of a new generation of aircraft--
the relative financial health and route st~uctures of airline f1rms thus exerts 
a major influence on the direction of technical change in the commercial air-
craft industry. clue to this "user-active" pattern of new product design. As is 
the case elsewhere in this contractual system. the ability of producers to meet 
perforcance specifications is rarely certain at the time such commitments are 
made. 
Given the complexity of the technologies involved. as ~~l! as the severe 
uncerta~nties that are inherent in the production and procure~ent of such a t~c~ 
nologically sophisticated capital good, there exist considerable transactions 
costs w~thin this ir.du5try structure. Extensive parallel engineering staffs arc 
, maintained by airframe manufacturers, engine producers. and airline purchasers. 
The direction of innovation is highly responsive to a small segment of overall 
demand. Considerable resources are invested in negotiation and (not infrequent_ 
litigation. Finally. the incentives for misrepresentation of performance chara. 
,. istics--An'ow's "moral hazard"--and competition in pr~ce and delivery dates oa) 
.. : 
-..' .. 
. have deleterious effects upon product safety. The crash of the UC-l0 near Par~ 
in 1974 involved an ioproperly designed cargo door, about the dangers of which 
lines were not intormed rapIdly and wh1ch was mod1fied by McUonne11 Douglas onl 
after considerable delay (and not at all for certain ai~craft, such as the one 
that crashed in 1974). The faulty door was particularly dangerous because of t 
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design of the hydraulic system of the DC-lO; unlike the L-lOl1 or B-747, only 
three hydraulic systems were built into the plane by Mcuonnenuouglas, and 
were located close together, making the aircraft susceptible to a severe loss ot 
control in the event ct accident. One account (tddy, Potter, and Page, 1976) 
notes that the incentives faced by Mcuonnell DOUgla~O produce a widebody 
transport prior to Lockheed \ere partly responsible for these design defects. 
The 1979 Chicago crash of a DC-I0 demonstrated the vulnerability of the aircraft 
hydraulic system, and revealed additional difficulties of moral hazard and com-
munications concerning engine maintenance. The market interface in many of the 
transactions involvi~g commercial aircraft production and procurement occasional 
may result in severe icpediments to the free flow of information and/or full re\ 
elation of details of design and perfor~nce. Offsetting the~e potential costs 
of market-mediated fabrication and procurement processes, of course, are tne sue 
stantial benefits of competl~ion among airframe and eng1ne producers. lt is ex-
tremely unlikely that a greater degree of vertical integration in the commercial 
and transportation sector would have produced as rapid a pace of innovation, se" 
quality improvement, and productivity growth. However, the pace of innovat10n , 
bably nas been affected more heavily by military research and procurement polic: 
as well as regulation by tne C1vil Aeronaut1cs ~ard of the transportat~on, t~a-
by ptructure, Which itself has been influenced heavily by military developmeut, 
and procurement, as well as airline regulation. 
III. The Record of Technical Progress 
lhe innovative performance of the commercial aircraft industry oay be ca, 




1 (AS x V ). and costs per available seat mile. wbile these two measures do not 
c 
translate stra1ghtforvardly into a conventional productivity index. such as tlla: 
vided by Kendrick (1961, 1973) on a highly aggregated basis for sir transporta-
tion, they have the advantage of being available separately for various aircraf 
designs. Over time, with the introduction of successive "generaticns" of al.r-
craft. AS x V has r1sen, and costs per available seat have fallen. Tables 7 
c 
Bnd ~ display tne evolution of these two measures of aircrafl per!o~nce durir. 
the 19~O-15 period. ~xaml.ning dl.rect operating costs per seat mile, the quant~ 
drop represented by the UC-J stands out qu1te clearly; as Ph1l11ps noted, the 
seat mile costs of the DC-3 aircraft were " ••• SO much lower than those of al-
ternate aircraft that even with a relatively low load factor its passenger eile 
costs were often lower than those for other planes." (1971, p. 94). Another ea 
jor drop in seat mile costs came with the introdcction of the wide bodied trans 
ports, incorporating large, high-bypass ratio jet engines. lhe evolutl.On of c" 
ing speed and capacity (AS x V ) shows the large jump that came with the intro-
c 
ductior. of four-engine transports immediate_y after World War II, as well a~ tr 
improvement ~hat ~as registered with first jet engine transports. it is l.nter-
esting to note that, alone of the successive generations of a1rcraft, the Wide 
Dody transports ~ncorporate major increases 1n available seat velocity, and s~-
nlficant declines in direct operating costs per s~at mile. As Rosenberg et al 
(197~) no:ed, since the appearance of the mon~coque al.rfra~e deslgn in 1~33, c, 
per seat mile have dec11ned ten-fold, whl.le passenger capacity and spe~d have 
by a factor of lO. 
An additl.onal important feature of teChnical progress in aircraft is 0, 
looked in these tables, which present operating costs as of the ~e3r of introe 
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TABLE 7 - Direct opcr:ltint! costs of multicn~lnc !ulCric~ tr~sports - first 
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of a given design. An important element of technical change and performance 1m-
provement 1n this industry operates during the life ot a given airframe deSign, 
in the "beta phase" of the innovation process (see Enos, 19b2, for further dis-
cussion). For the Boeing 247, the first monocoque passenger airframe deSign, 
seat mile operating costs declined from 7~ in 19JJ to 5~ in 1940 (Table 9). lhe 
Lockheed Electra L-1H8, a four-engine turboprop, exhibited an annual rate of cost 
decline of roughlY 7~, while operating costs for the Hoeing 707 declined at an 
annual rate of 8.7% lsee Tables 8 and 9). These declines in operating costs stem 
from both modifications in aircraft design and improvements in the operating and 
maintenance of these complex capital goods, both ot which 1ncorporate important 
ele:ents of learning in use (SL~ Rosenberg, 1980 tor further discussion). 
There 1S now a co~siderable body of literature describing the i~prove=ents 
in productivity which have DeE~ associated w1th learning to manufacture a newly 
1 
conceived pro~uct. Indeed, in some circles the ?hencrnenon 1s referred to as the 
"Horndal Effect," after the Swedish steelworks where, over a period of 15 years, 
output per man hour was observed to increase about 2% per year even though no 
changes had occurred in either the plant or production techniq~es. The phenomenon 
has been further documented, not only in air-frame production, but in machine tools, 
2 
shipbuilding and textiles as ~ell. 
1 The next several pages are taken from Rosenberg, Thompson and Belsley (l9i8). 
2 A. Alchian. ''Reliabilltv of Progress CUrves 111 Airfrar.e Producticn," rccr.C':"'ctr:.ca 
October 1963, pp. 679-gZ; \ierner Hirsch, "Firm Progress RatlOS," Fccr.C':"'ctnca. 
April 1956, FP. 136-·t3; Lccrurd r..;lppin[!. "Learning and ","orld ;.jar II hOdt.!ct!cn 
Ftmctiens, .. kvle .... of Fconcr.lcs ~C Statlstics," 1965, pp. 81-86; Paul David, 
"Learning by tbll1b J . ',J Tan:.: ?I"Otectlon' A Reconsiderauon of the eLSe of tilc 
Ante-Dellun u.s. Cotten Tcxtlle Industry," Journal of rco:1Ci.lic IIistory. Sept. 
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Years After Introduction 
SourCQI Phll11ps.~. £11. pp. )a-J9 
TABLE 9 - Pet:! I'h.:lse Jlrt'Ct opentlnl: cost rc-Iuc:tlon of f\Jrtlcul.U (lutun 
urcT:lft 
(from Rosenbers. Thompson, and Bclsley, 1978, p. 67) 
14 
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We wish to emphas1ze nere, however, a different but related form of 
learning-by-doing. Not only does learning-by-doing take place in the manu-
facturing process as workers improve their 6~ill in the mak1ng of the product, 
but, as a result of the actual use of the aircraft itself, a considerable learn-
ing process occurs which reduces the operating costs of the aircraft in uye After 
Its manufacture. Much of the learning-by-doing in aircraft has been associated 
with the gradually growing body of experience associated with the operation of 
1 
a new ~odel airplane. The experience Is, perhaps, most characteristic of com-
plex f1nal products with elaborately difterent1ated but interdependent compon-
ent parts, and is theretore related to the complementarity phenomenor. uper-
ating cost reductions, as we Will see, depend heavilY upon gradually lparning 
(cont inued) 
Do1ng," Review of EcononlC StUdies, June 196~, pp. 1:>5-/3. According to Hirsch, 
the U.S. Air Force "fer qult.e so:::e time h?d recognized tnat the direct labor 
input per airframe decllned substantially as cumu~atlve a1rtra=e output went U? 
lhe ~tanford ResearCh Institute and the FUL~D Corporation initiated extensive 
studies in the late forties, and the early conclusions were that, insofar as 
World War II airframe data were concerned, doubling cumulative airframe output 
was accompanied by an average reduction in d1rect labor requirements of about 
LOt. This meant that the average labor requirement after dOUbling quantitles 
of output was about 80~ of what it had Deen before. Soon the aircraft industry 
began talking about the 'eight) percent curve'." H1rsch, Ope cit., p. l3b. 
It is possib1~, of course, that cost reductions which have been attrlbuted to 
learning by dOlng have actually been due to other factors wnich have not been 
defined as a residual. For earller discussions of the 1earnlng curve in the 
aircraft industry, see Adolpn ROhrbach, "Economical PrOduction of All-Metal 
Airplanes and ~eaplares," Journal of the Society of AutoMotl.Ve En~lneers. 
January ~J27. pp. 57-66. and T.P. Wrlgnt. Factors Affectlng the ~ost of 
Airplanes," Journal of tne Aeronautical Sciences. February 1936, pp. 1:2-128. 
IA parallel process. with which we do not deal, is the extensive learning 
which was involved in the operation and management of an entire aircraft 
fleet. There were many operational problems for ~hlch optimal procedures 
had to be developed--scheduling problems, turnaround ti:e, dovetailing the 
requireoents of equipMent with those of personnel, etc. Such "soft~'are" 
responsibilities belong to the realm of management and not technology, al-
t~ough the two realms are obviously interrelated. 
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more. during the actual operation of a new aircraft, about the ~erformance 
characteristics of an airplane system and ita components, and t~erefore under-
standing more clearly its eventual full potential. For example, it is only 
through extensive usage th~t detailed knowledge is developed about engine op-
eration, their maintenance needs. their minimu~ servicing and overhaul re-
qui~ements, etc. This is due partly to an inevitable--and highl~ desirable--
overcautiousness on the r~rt of the manufacturer in dealing with an untried 
product. As experience accumulates, it becomes possible to extend the oper-
ating life beyond original expectations. 
A point which deserves to be made e~plicit in all this is the persis-
tent importance of uncertainty in the precision of prediction of performance 
in airplane design. In spite of elaborate possibilities for prior experimen-
tation in wind tunnels of increasing sophistication and theoretical techni~ues 
of increasing prec1sion in aerod)~a~ic research. such things as scale effects 
and the phenomena of compress1bility an1 turbulence continue to result in un-
expected outcomes of a positive as well as negative nature. So~etimes perfor-
mance exceeds expectations and sometimes there are urexpected benefits as well 
as unexpected problems. ~ind tunnel tests in the past. for exa~ple. have re-
sulted in exaggeration of the increase in drag, particularly at transonic speeds. 
and handling problems u~sociated. for example, with a swept-back wing des1gn. 
One must not exaggerate, therefore, the extent to whic~. even today, the de-
sign of aircraft can draw upon precise scientific ~ethodology to achieve its 
1 
ends. 
~i11er and Sawers (1968), pp. :46-250. 
r 
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Secondly, we have the technological advances embodied in the hardware 
of the aircraft. One excellent aeans Qf gaining insight into how several com-
plementary technological advances occur at uneven intervals is to describe the 
proces~ as it occurs for a particular aircraft. We may consider the case his-
tory of the Douglas DC-8 as representative of this process of development; 
several of the events in this history are succarized in Table 10. 
In the DC-8 we have an aircraft which has experienced a more than 50% 
reduction in operational energy costs over its life span on a per-seat-mile 
basis, as well as an increase in productivity (AS x V ) from 62,500 or the DC8-l0 
c 
30 & 50, to 130,000 for the DC8-6l-63 series, although the basic configuration 
has been largely unchanged and, as we can see, the modifications have been rela-
tively unsophisicated co=pared to differences between aircraft types. Clearly, 
an important set of codificatio~s has had to do with the eng1nes, which have 
progressed both to increase ava1lable thrust and decrease specific fuel con-
sum?tion, thus increasing the potential payload and directly reducing operating 
costs. At the same time, there have been modifications tc the wing profile that 
reduce the drag of the aircraft. Yith the DC-8-30, a drooped flap was added, 
then a leading edge extension with the DC-8-50. Subsequent models increased 
I the aspect ratio and repositioned the flap. Eng1ne pylon design also under-
went some modification. These variations on the aircraft's geometry were :ot1-
vated by the drag reduction and consequent increased fuel economy they were abl~ 
1 .~ile the modifi~ations alter the aerodynamic parameters of the wing, someti:es 
substantially. the wing itself does not generally exper1ence internal structura: 
alterations. This is because of the prohlbitively high cost of wing design 
which makes it much core econo~ical to codify the flaps, leading edge and wing 
tips. At the same time, the possibility of eventually utiliz1ng even these ac=-
on devices must be anticipated to some degree during the init1a1 wing develop-
ment stage. 
--(.~ 
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to provide. But it is clear from the figure that a third very aubstantial 
contribution to increasing the aircraft productivity has been the ability to 
stretch the aircraft. increasing capacity fro~ 123 seats up to 251 seats, thus 
demonstrating the large leverage to be reaped by increasing the internal pas-
senger capacity. provided of course they can be operated sufficiently close 
to capacity. The interdependen(e of these technological improvements is per-
haps obvious but requires explicit exposition. The possibilities for stretching 
and consequently adding payload volume and weiLilt to the vehicle depend upon 
having more powerful engines to meet the take-off incorporated in the wings to 
maintain approach and landing speed as well. 
The story of the DC-8 is quite representative of the transport aircraft 
industry design p;~ilosophy. Innovations which have been incorporated within a 
particular vehicle and which have made substantial improvements in their oper-
ating cost characteristics predominat1y have a good deal to do with engine de-
ve1o~ent in terms of available thrust and fuel consumption capabilities. with 
reduction in overall Jrag by modification in wing design. with stretching of the 
vehicle to increase payload capability. Although the dramatic improvements in 
operating costs may initially appear to come directly from the stretching pro-
cess, this process is unattainable without the complementary developments of 
power plant te~hnology and sometimes wing technology, themselves highly 1nter-
dependent technologies. Engine technology in particular during the turbine era 
has experienced dramatic technological growth in teres of thrust per pound of 
engine weight. which has increased by over 50% in 20 years, but even more so 
in terms of fuel consuoption per hour per pound of thrust. For example. in 
1950. about 0.9 pounds of fuel were required for each hour-pound of thrust. 
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By the early 1960's, this requirement, with the development of the turbo fans, 
dropped to around 0.75 pounds of fuel per hour-pound of thrust. With the in-
novation of the high bypass turbo fans around 1968 and in use today, the fuel 
requirements dropped to 0.6 pounds of fuel per hour-pound of thrust. This 30% 
decline in fuel requirements over this period has direct implications for in-
1 
creasing the deliverable payload of aircraft within the turbiregeneration. 
The phenomenon of stretching as applied to jet transports from the Comet 
to the 747 is a classic example of a process which is not very "interesting" 
2 technologically but is of vital economic importance. To begin with, the pro-
cess reflp.cts the basic complementarity between the performance of the engine 
and the airframe. Inde~d, there is little incentive to improve engine design 
unless airframe designers know ho~ to exploit the improvement. 3 The carrying 
~oeing Commercial Airplane Co., (19;6) p. 4. 
2 The technique of stretching has a much older history and was applied with great 
success to the DC6-De7C series as well as the Lockheed 649 to 1049H series of 
propeller driven alrcraft. A well documented recent example of this technlQUe 
is sho~~ in the case of the De9 serles aircraft in Business ~eek (pp. 95 & lOa, 
Nov. 14, 1977) where the DC9 series has been increased in Slze by lengthening 
the fuseldge from 104.4 ft. (80 passengers) in 1965 to 147.8 ft. (155 passengers) 
in 1930 in five distlnct steps. In addltion, modlficatlons to the wing and pc~er 
plant have enabled it to increase perfo~~nce and keep abreast of the latest 
noise regulations. ~ 
3 The role of highly specialized producers, and the questlon of what constitutes 
the optimum degree of speclalization from the pOlnt of view of technologIcal In-
novation, are highly im~ortant questions which are stlll not very well understo~~ 
Specialist producers tend to be very good at improvlng, reflning and codifying 
t~eir specialized product. They tend not to be very good at devising the new in-
novation which may constitute the eventual successor to thelr product. They ten~ 
in other words. to work within an established regime, but they do not usually =a, 
the innovations which establish a new regime. Thus, the horse-a,d-buggy makers 
did not contribute slgnifican:ly to the deve1op~ent of the automobile; the stean 
locomotive ~kers played no role in the introduction of the diesel, and indeed 
expressed a total disinterest, until it was finally entrepreneured by General 
Motors; and the ~akers ~f pistcn engines did not playa promInent role, in Engl~­




capacity of the airplane depends, first of all on the capacity of the engines. 
As engine performance is improved, exploitation of the potential requires re-
design or modification of the airframe. The simplest response. as improved 
engines become available, is merely to stretch the fuselages and add more seats 
Indeed. as this phenome~lon came to be better ~nderstood. most airplanes were de 
liberately designed in order to facilitate subsequent stretching. Although air-
plane designers at any time design to conform to the ca~dcity of the engines, i 
is generally understood that improved and increased performance engines will be 
coming along within the lifetime of the ~odel, and it is i~portant to be in a 
position to exploit them. Since designers expect these future engine improve-
ments (as well as other complementary technological improvements), they con-
sciously attempt to design flexibility into the airplane. This a~?lies especia. 
ly to the design of the fuselage in such a way as to facilitate later stretchir 
Such stretching has constitute an importa~t part of the productivity improvemen 
which has been chara~teristic of the beta phase. Stretching may, indeed, be 
thought of as the process by which, as a result of accumulated kno~ledge and 
improved engine capabilities, the payload possibilities of a new airplane desig-
are expanded to their fullest limits. Clearly, this is an economic as well as 
a technological phenomenon. ~ben as original design is modified through the 
stretching process it is usually dictated by the gro~th of passenger demand or 
new route opportunities. 
(continued) 
The severely circumscribed technological horizons of specialized producers--to 
lome extent an inevitable "occupational hazard"-may help to account for ~hat c 
recent book on the aircraft industry describes as " ••• an apparent proclivity or 
the part of once successful manufacturers to remain too lon~ with the baslc tee 
nology of their original ~ ccess." Phillips, (1971) ,p. 91. The pOl 
is that intimate familiarlty ~ith an existing technology creates a strong dis-
position :0 work ~ithin that technology, and to m3ke further modifications leae 
ing to its improvement and not to its displacement. Scribes may be expected t: 
invent forms of short~and. but not typewriters. Ho~ever, if improved ones sho~ 
up they ~ill be adopted. 
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The sources of this impressive record of inter- and intra-generational 
technical progress are numerous. Below. we argue that aircraft have benefitted 
from technical developments outside of the industry itself to an extent greater 
than almost any other major manufacturing industry. Advances in metallurgy 
underpinned the development of the monocoque airframe in the 1930's. while im-
provements in fuels. the results of research sponsored by automotive and petro-
leum firms. aided in the propulsion of these new designs. In the postwar perie 
metallic and nonmetallic composite substances have played a central role in im-
provements in both the airframe and the engine; again. these new materials have 
been developed largely outside of the commercial aircraft industry. Advances ~ 
electronics also have been of great importance. The additional important aspec 
of technical change 1n co~ercial aircraft is the role ~f govern~ent in procure 
ment of m1litary aircraft and in the support of research for both militar~ and 
civilian applicat10ns. 
IV. The Sources of Technical Change 
The commercial aircraft industry has an impressive record of innovation, 
much of which reflects the industry's good fortune as a beneficiary of at least 
three important external sources of innovation and lor research support; 1nno-
vations in other industr1es. such as metallurgy or electronics, government-
supported research in civil aviation, and military proc~rement and researcn 
aupport. The number and complexity of the systems that are combined in a mod-
ern aircraft design are partially responsible for the fact that. to an unusual 
extent, the aircraft industry has benefitted from innovations and research 
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support from sources outside the industry. The characteristics and conse-
quences of government policies toward the aircraft industry, including pro-
cureme~t and research support, are discussed in greater detail in the 
next section. Here, we shall simply document and discuss the extent of this 
inflow of technical change from external sources. Initially, the contribution 
of other industries to aircraft industry innovation is discussed; this is fol-
lowed by a consideration of the Federal role, and a discussion of the sources 
and categories of aeronautical research and development expenditures. 
Inter-industry transfers of technology are widespread in advanced indus-
trial societies, characterized by highly sophisticated patterns of specializatiL 
and inter-industry flows of cocponents. Any purchaser of goods frum a given su-
plier is a potential beneficiary of innovation-in the supplier firm's industry. 
This pattern of transmission is especially comeon in the relationsllip bet~een 
manufacturing firms aed the f1rms supplying the~ with capital goods. As ~as 
noted above, the large number of widely varied components utilized in an air-
craft has placed the industry in a pos1tion to benefit from developments in oth 
industries. Innovations in these "supplier" industries occasionally have been 
motivated by an awareness of their potential applicat10ns in a1rcraft--in some 
cases, Federal funds supported research in these supplier industries, bases up~ 
the potential usefulness of the innovations frem these sectcr~ for military a1-
craft. The important point, ho~ever, is that tbe commercial aircraft industry 
has benefitted from innovations produced by research supported by other indus-
tries, which themselves were highly innovative. 
Electronics 
Over the last twenty-five years, the cocc~rcial aircraft industry has 
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greatly increased its reliance upon electronIcs technology, particularly lolid-
state semiconductor circuitry. The increasing utilization of aemiconduct~rs 
was spurred by the requirements of strategic missile guidance systems in the 
1950's. Compared to vacuum tubes, solid-state circuits were far lighter. more 
reliable and generated less heat. The increased importance of military and 
space projects. many of which were carried out by aircraft firms, blurred the 
boundaries between the electronics and aircraft industries, as such electronics 
f~rms as TRW ~ere chosen to be price contractors on major missi)e projects. Tt 
resulting develo?ment semiconductor guidance systems produced substantial bene-
fits for cocoer:ial aircraft. Ho~ever, the origins of this far-reaching inno-
vation were remote from the ~ommercial aircraft industry, stemming from Bell 
Telephor.e Laboratories' efforts to improve long-distance telephony. 
Exploitation of electronics technologies for commercial ~ircraft oS 
rapid during the 1960's and 1970's. Air traffic control equipment had to be 
improved Substantially, to m~et increasing traffic flo~s of larger comcercial 
aircraft. Communications, navigation, instrumentatlon test equlpment, radar, 
and other systems ~ere developed by the electronics industry for applicativn ~r 
cocmercial aircraft. The increasing use ~f integrated circults has facilltate~ 
miniaturization of a wide range of instruments. 
Applications of new electronics technologies in other industrles als~ h: 
benefitted co:mercial aircraft. The development of computers, greatly a~vance_ 
by semiconductors, also na~ yielded major splilovers into the coccercial ~irc= 
tor. Air tra:fic control and reservations computers have supported the expans 
of coccercial air transport. On-board oir.icomputers have i:proved the navlgat 
, 
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and maneuvering performance of commercial aircraft. In the development and 
production processes. computers also play an increasingly important role. 
Computer-assisted design techniques have reduced. if not eliminated. the great 
uncertainties about airframe performance. enabling more extensive testing to 
be carried on outside of the wide tunnel. Computers also are being applied 
to the control of machine tools in the fabrication process. substantially im-
proving productivity. 
Matellurgy and Mat~rials Science 
At least since the introduction of monocc~ue airframes in the early 
1930's. progress in commercial aircraft design and innovation in metallurgy 
have been tightly linked. With the advent of the jet engine. metallurgy as-
sumed substantial importance for developmEnts-in t~e powerplant, as well as the 
airframe. Since the 1940's, metallurgical research v~ the behavior of metals at 
high te:peraturcs has been of g=eat importance to the develop~ent of turbine 
1 blades, inlets. outlets and compressors for turboprop anc Jet engines. As the 
disastrous ~xperience of Rolls-Royce in the development of engines for the ~-lOll 
ut~lizing a new composite caterial. Hyfil. demonstrates, the uncertaint~es sur-
roun~ing aspects of metallurgical and ~terials development have impacted heavily 
upon cocmercial aircraft. Metallurgy remains a discipline in which a str~ng the-
oretical basis for predictions about performance is lacking: experimentation 
and uncertainty remain central. In addition. the utilizatio~ and performance of 
materials is governed by their behavior in use over a long period of time; metal 
ITaylor (1970) notes as central to the improved perfornance of hig~ bypass-
ratio jet engines, " ••• the fan. cooled turbine blades allow~ng higher turbine-
inlet temperature. and higher-pressure-rat~o compressors." (p. 56). r.entral 
to all of these improvements were imp~oved alloys. 
---
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1 fatigue re~ins poorly understood. and very difficult to te.t for ~ffectively. 
Major sources of metallurgical research for co~rcial aircraft are 
firms such as Alcoa. which developed duralumin under military contract for use 
in navy dirigibles; d~ralumin subsequently was employed extenSively in 
monocoque airframes. More recently, General Electric, a major prod'Jcer of 
.team turbine~ and other generation equipment req~iring advanced alloys for 
high-speed operation, became involved in metallurgical researche; involving 
the development of supercharged aircraft engines, and later, j~t engines. As 
was the case with Alcoa, military support of General Electric's supercharger 
2 
materials research was of considerable importance. Additional indirect Federal 
scvport for materials research was channelled through the Subcommittee on Heat-
REsisting Alloys cf the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), formed 
in 1941. 
Government support of coco~rcial aircraft research· the role cf NACA 
The commercial aircraft industry is unique among manufacturing industries 
in that a governmental research organization, the ~ational Advisory Cocoittee on 
Aeronautics (MACA). has long ~xisted to serve the needs of aircraft design. Si~ilar 
research fa~ilities, supp~rt by both government and industry to carry out research 
on "generic" techno:ogical innovat ion, have been advocated recently by pohcy:takers. 
The argument most frequently mad~ in support of such "cooperative" research estab-
libhments states that indivldual firms within a given industry face insufficient 
incentives a~d real disincentives ~the free rider problem) to carrying out the basic 
lA recent witness testified to the importance of such uncertainties: "Steiner 
pointed out that 'accelerated aging' tests have not proved accurate in the past. 
He cited t~e case cf certain alloys that 'aged in a most peculiar manner' a few 
years ago. In five to 10 years, these alloys--utilized on the Boeing 707 and 
other transports--developed inter-granular corrosion, requiring expensive in-
.pection procedures and replacements. With that kind of histor'l. Steiner sald. 
"any sound manufacturer or financial institution would have reason to be a little 
timid about locking advanced composites into a pri~ry structure which is non-
removable." (AW&ST, Septe:ber 12, 1977. p. 35). 
2"I~ this country, the early work of Sanford Moss on the gas turbine, starting in 
1901 at Cornell University. eventually led to the develJpment of the General 
(cont lnued) 
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reaearch necessary to support innovation. NACA i. widely viewed by indu.try and 
I 
government observers as a success in this reg.rd: the industry to which it wa. dir-
ected has exhibited impressive innovative performance. With these concerns a. back-
ground, the role of NACA in the development of commercial aircraft i. worth investi-
gating. 
World War I sparked the establishment of a number of bodies intended 
to bring together leading academic, business, and government figures in an 
effort to analyze important problems of national security, frequently in the 
areas of industrial mobilization, research, and technology. The National Re-
search Counc!l was one such body; the National Advisory Comm1ttee on Aeronautics 
vas another. more firmly under government controll than the NRC. Established 
in 1915, NACA t -IS intended to "investigate the scientific problems involved in 
flight and to give advice to the military air services and other aviation ser-
I 
vices of the government. Despite this early military-oriented mandate, NACA 
during the 1920-35 period did not ~~al solely with cilitary aircraft problems, 
instead working on general problems of ~erodynacics and aerona~tics common to 
both military and commercial aircraft. 
Utilizing large expericental facilities at Langley Field, Virg!~ia, and 
Moffett Field, California. NACA functioned as an im-
portant source of performance and other test data in aerodynacics. The Com-
mittee pioneered in the construction and use of large wind tunnels, cocpleting 
(continued) 
Electric turbosupercharger. This deVice, first applied to aircraft engines by 
Rateau in Fracce, was flown before the end of World War I. The U.S. Army's in-
terest resulted in Moss's concentration of his efforts on the aircraft super-
charger in the period between the wars. The expense was borne by the Arcy from 
1919 to 1931. It was ~he pr~ving ground in this country for improved high-tempera-
ture metallurgical development ••• " (Badger, 1958, p. 512). 
IStatement of Dr. ~oseph Ames, Hearings of the President's Aircraft Board 1925, Ames 
was to serve as NACA's first Chairman. 
,. 
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one in 1927 large enough to accommodate full-scale .irfr~.. This and other 
faciltties provided a steady stream of test results that led to significant 
improvements in airframe design. The famous "NACA cO\ll," intended to cut dow 
on the \lind resistance of radial air-cooled engines, reduced engine drag by 
nearly 75%. NACA research also demonstrated the superior performance of air-
frames with retractable landing gear, and yielded improved knowledge regarding 
engine positioning in the aircraft wing: 
By a comprehensive survey of the net efficiencies of various engir.e 
nacelle locations, the optimum position in the wing was found. This 
N.A.C.A. engine location principle, together with other refinements, 
had a revolutionary effect on mIlitary and commerc1al aviation the 
world over. It changed military aVIation tactICS, ~de long-range 
bombers possible, and forced the development of hIgher speed pursuit 
planes. In the co~ercial field it permitted the speeding up of cruis-
ing schedules on the a1r lines from 120 miles per hour of t~e Fords to 
the 180 miles per hour of the new Dougla~ planes. The overnight trans-
continental run became possible and the air l1nes vastly increased the1r 
appeal to the public. Even in the cidst of the de?reSSI0n, air line 
traffic boomed. (Hunsaker, 1941, p. 139) 
After 1935, NACA research increasingly was designed to serve military 
needs, and specif1c development projects largely crowded out the earlier activi-
ties of greater benefit to commercial aircraft. Phillips (1971) noted that af-
ter 1935, NACA: 
••• tended to shift ••• from research that lacked a specific military or 
commercial purpose to that relatIng to specific milItary mIssions and 
even to specific military aircraft. This changed the nature of the air-
craft industry's reliance on exogenous science and technology. Prior to 
this time, developments in both military and co~ercial a1rcraft occurred 
from technical developments achieved WIth neither a specifIC military nor 
comcercial purpose. After this, technical develop~ents L~re often had a 
defined military purpose and new t)pes of co~~erclal planes more often 
had visible antecedents in tlilitary aircraft." (p. 121) 
The prewar performance of NACA was ach~eved at a remarkably low cost, even 
by the st2ndards of the time. Total appro?riations for XACA between 1925 and 
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1940 approximated $25 million. It is crucial to note. moreover. that NACA car-
ried out very little research during this period that could be described .a 
"basic" in nature. Prior to 1940. the Committee functioned primarily to pro-
vide research infrastructure for the aircraft industry. making available as 1~ 
did extensive experimental design data and testing facilities. This was a very 
important contribution. given ~he modest research rescurces of the industry 
prior to 1940. but it does not resemble the type of support freque~tly envisioned 
by advocates of government-industry research cooperatives (this point is dis-
cussed further below). Indeed, one recent account of the development of the 
jet engine has characterized the United States prior to 1940 as a backwater of 
theoretical aerodynamic research. attributing the failure of American engineers 
to originate the concept of the jet to such weaknesses in the theoretical under-
pinnings of aeronautical design (Constant, 1980). 
Following World War II, during which NACA work was exclusively military 
in character, the divisior of labor in aeronautical research appears to have 
changed somewhat. The major aircraft producers had acquired substantial in-
1 house facilities of their o~ ; NACA's infrastructure was less critical. Mili-
tary support of research and developcent occupied a vastly core important role 
than was true of the pre-1940 period. NACA declined in impo=tance, functtcning 
in large part as a sponsor of more fundamental aeronautical research in fue acade:ic 
sphere. and ~ontinuing to conduct empirical research on a scale that was ncv 
dwarfed by military-supported activities. The Committee had fulfilled an i:-
port ant function, however, serving to provide research support on a scale that 
1 ~e idea of the growth in the in-house research establishments of major air-
craft finns during World W~r II is conveyed by a comparison of data ~n these fir--s 
contained in the 1940 ~nd 1946 editions of the National Rese~rch Council Su~vev 




would tax the resources of the commercial aircraft industry prior to 1940. 
Military-sponsored research 
The final major area of external support for commercial aircraft inno-
vat ion is military-supported research and procurement. Research supported by 
the armed services has yielded indirect, but very important, innovational spi11-
overs into the commercial aircraft industry, most importantly in aircraft engines. 
From the Pratt and Whitney ~asp of 1925 to the high-bypass ratio engines of the 
1970's, commercial aircraft engine development has benefitted from, and usually 
followed, the demands of military procurement and military support of research. 
In the immediate afteruath of World ~ar I. during the 1519-26 period, "Virtually 
every cent going into the development of engines" was derived from " ••• direct 
payment by the government from special funds all~cated to research an~ develop-
1 
ment." More recently, of course, the development of the first jet engine in 
the U.S. ~as financed entirely by the military, reflecting both the perceived 
military urgency of the project. and the lack of interest in development of such 
an engine expressed by commercial firm~ prior to 1940: 
In the United States neither Lockheed, where the first American deslgns 
of a turbojet were made, nor the Northrop airplane company, which pro-
posed in 1940 to develop a turbo-prop, was willlng to do any actual de-
velopment at its o~~ expense, only the prelimlnary studles being financed 
in this way. A year or two before this, some engineers in the Tu~bosuper­
charger group of the General Electric Company had proposed the developnen: 
of a turbojet to the management of the company, but the proposal had been 
rejected. (Schlaifer, 1950, p. 88) 
(continued) 
grew from 22 persons in 1940 to 111 in 1946; the Glenn Martin Company grew fro~ 
42 to 76 in the research depar:ment; Lockheed grew from 10 to 314; Consolidated 
Vu1tee went from 12 to 195; United A~rcraft (includlng ~ratt and w~itney, 
Hamilton Standard, and Slkorsky) grew from 80 in 1940 to 732 by 1946; and Curtiss-
Wright went from 14 in 1940 to 159 in !946. In view of the fact that 1940 was a 
boom year for the industry, due to rapidly increa:lng forelgn and domestlc mili-
tary orders, these figures are all the more impressive. 
ISchlaifer (1950), p. 160. 
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Hilitary-supported research into powerplan~s for the giant C-SA transport led 
to the development of the high-bypass ratio engines that now power the videbocy 
1 
commercial transports. 55% of the R&D costs for th~se turbofan engines wa. 
contribut~d by ~he Defense Department. while the FAA and NASA accour-ted for 
roughly 13%; industry expenditures were 32% of the total. 2 
Direct military research support has been most ~portant in the propul-
sion area. However. the development of commercial aircraft has also benefitted 
substantially from military support of airframe dp.velopment and production for 
purely militQry purposes. Such 5pillovers became important only after World 
War I. in contrast to the situation for aircraft eng~nes. With the adven~ of jet 
aircraft. however. airframe makers often were able to apply knowledge gained ~ 
military projects to commercial aircraft design, tooling, or production. In uany 
cases, similarities in airframe design were sufficiently pronounced that devel:p-
ment and tooling costs for coamercial airframes were reduced substantially. }~ 
example of this is the Boeing 707. Boeing had developed a jet tanker to provi:e 
in-flight refueling for the strategic bombers, the B-47 and B-52, th~t the fi~ 
prEviously had sold to the Air Force. Over 1,000 of the tankers, the KC-135, 
eventually were sold to the Air Force. The 707 airframe design follo~ed that =f 
the KC-135 quite closely, so closely, in fact, that the first prototype 707 tc be 
"rolled out" of the Seattl~ factory did not have windows in the fuselage. A c:O?-
son of thp. costs incurred by Douglas 1n the development of the DC-8 with those ~ 
l"all often happens the airbus is the result of a technological advance that ~"aS 
brought about by unrelated events--in this case, the U.S. Air Force's request 
to the industry in 1954 for engines with double or triple the thrust of exist~g 
power plants. The Air Force required engines for a huge new military transpo~ 
that eventually became kno\oTTl as the Lockheed C-5A." (",",hy Boe1ng Is Missing t!:.e 
Bus," John Mecklin, Fortune, June I, 1968, p. 82). 
2 DOT-~ASA study, p. A(9) 
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707 gives a rough idea of the financial benefits that accrued to Boeing: 
Douglas lost $109 million in the two years 1959 and 1960, having 
written off $298 million for development costs and production lGsses 
up to the end of 1960. Boeing did not suffer so badly. They wrote 
off $165 million on the 707 by then; some of the development cost may 
have been ca~ried by the tanker program, which also provided a fev 
of the tools on which the airliner was built. (Miller and Sawers, 
1968,PP. 193-194). 
The closer is the similarity betveen =ll!tary and commercial designs, 
the greater viII be such external b~nefits reaped by the co~tractor. ~ynamic 
spillover effects also a~e of importance; development or procurement contracts 
may serve to support the acquisition by a producer of new design or production 
skills. As was mentioned above, military contractors have occasionally chosen 
to produce specific component in-house, rather than subcontracting its manu-
facture, in order to acquire expertise in tbe area (this was especialiy true 
of the airframe producers and electron1cs components in the 1950's and 1960's), 
1 
at government expense. In certain cases, the costs of tooling for production 
~~ •• the decision taken in a small but significant proportion of such cases has 
been to make, rather than to buy. This tendency has been especially prevalent 
in the aircraft industry and other sectors of the weapons industry severely af-
fected by technological change. Faced with serious declines in their regular 
business of fabricating and assembling airframes, cost of the major U.S. air-
craft companies dec1ded to build up capabilities in new fields of weapons tech-
nology, especially 1n electronics. They asse~bled nuclei of eng1neers and 
scientists in the f1elds to be entered. At the outset, ho~ever. these groups 
had neither the breadth nor depth of experience available in fires already _OI~­
ing in the particular technology. Only ~ith actual experience in research, de-
velopment, snd production ~ould the companies establisn capab1lities equal to 
those already in existence. One ~ay to accuire such exper1ence ~as fer a pr1=r 
contra~tor to 'make' the cooponents and su~systems ~h1ch otherwise would be 
'bought' from established firms. 
The work done by these inexperienced in-house groups was often more ex-
pensive than it would have been if subcontracted to exper1encpd companies. ~i:h 
cost reimbursement contracts, these extra costs were paid by the govern:ent." 
Peck and Scherer, (1962), p. 388. 
,. 
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of a commercial a1rframe may be partially borne by • government procure=eat 
contract, as in the case of the 707 and the KC-135. In addition, aome of t~ 
"learning by doing" that takes place in production of a military airframe may 
be transferrable to commercial production. 
In order to convey some sense of the importance of external sources of 
innovation in the co:mercial aircraft industry, one need only consider the epoch-
al DC-3. As was noted above, the DC-3 represented a productivity improvement 
not equalled until the introduction of widebody transports 35 years later. The 
aircraft's low operating costs were due in large part to its radial air-coIled 
/ 
engines, rated at nearly 1.000 horsepower. Miller and Sawers noted that "The 
most st~ik!ng feature of the progress of the decade of the 1930s was thac more 
power was obtained froQ engines of the same size." (p. 94) In the case of the 
DC-3. the low weight-to-power ratio of its engines enabled transport of a larger 
number of passengers for a given horsepower rating thar. previously had been ~os-
sible. The improvecents in engine design referred to by Miller and Sawers ~ere 
the result of government-sponsored research. as well as improvements in fuel, 
notably the addition of tetraethyl lead to aviation gasoline as a result of re-
search sponsored by DuPont. General Motors. NACA. and the National Bureau of 
Standards. 
The DC-3 airframe design incorporated nume~ous results of NACA resear:~, 
including the cowling on the engiues and the placecent of the engines ia the 
leading edge of the wing. as well as the retractable landing gear. Th~ wing 




••• the vings of the DC-3. as well as those of the other planes of its 
generation. owe their origin to NACA and other non-commercial or non-
United States research. In particular. the DC-l had a NACA 2215 wing 
section at the root--with fillets inta the fuselage which vere the re-
sults of NACA research--and a HACA 2209 se~tion at the tip. (p. 117) 
The monocoque airframe of the DC-3 vas lIIa.le r • .,Jssible only by the develop.nent 
by Alcoa of the new dcralumin alloy. Th',;;. ;.:l·ile the design and development 
vork that combined these components succ£~se~l!y into the design of the DC-3 
vas brilliant. the origir.al research underlying the perfection of many of the 
crucial components had been per:ormed or funded by institutions outside of the 
aircraft industry. 
Industry R&D expenditures. 1945-69 
An examination of the sources and expenditure categories of research 
within the overall aircraft 1ndustry (including Doth military and c==cercial 
aircraft producers) will serve to illustrate more precisely the character of 
research support and activities within the industry. A useful sumcary of R&D 
data for the post~ar industry is contained in the study conducted by Booz, Aile, 
and Hamilton for the Department of Transportation - NASA study of R&D policy foc 
civilian aV1dtior.. Table 11 contains comprehensive data on the sources of re-
search funds for fiscal years 1945-69. Total R&D expenditures rose by nearly 
700% during this period, from $365 million in 1945 to roughly $2.8 blilion in 
fiscal 1969. The most rapid period of growth ~as in the 1950-54 period. re-
fleeting the substantial infusion of military funds during the Korean ~ar; 
from neaTly $60J oillion in fiscal 1950. R&D expenditures rose to core than 
$2 billion in 1954. 78: of this increase was accounted for by increases in 
military-supported R&D. Throughout this period. even in the late 1960·s. the 
defrnse portion of total R&D expenditures never fell below 65%. 
.. ORIGlNAl PAGE IS 
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Sources of Aeronautical R&D Funds 
Annual Expenditures in Millions or Dollars 
rcdcr:ll Prme. 
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Examining the major sources of non-military research funding, the de-
clining role of NACA support through the 1950's stands out clearly; from parity 
with industry expenditure;; (which appear as thl' "industry non-reimbursed" cat-
egory) in the late 1940's, the NACA portion of nonmilitary research support 
had dropped to less than 10% in fiscal 1958, immediately prior to Sputnik and 
the reorganization of NACA into NASA. Expenditures by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission supported research on nuclear propulsion of aircraft and space vehicles, 
while the Federal Aviation Administration supported work on avionics and (dur-
ing the 1960's) engine development. 
The industry contribution to R&D remains strikingly small in the late 
1960's, despite a rap1d rate of growth. "Non-reimbursed expenditures" never 
accounted for more than 25% of total R&D spending, and were below 20% of the 
total for most of the 1945-69 period. However, indust.ry expenditures accounted 
for an increasing share of non-military research expenditures during this per-
iod, reflecting the growth of large in-~ouse research establisr~ents and soar-
ing development costs for commercial aircraft. From 42% of non-defense R&D 
spending in fiscal 1946. the industry share rose to nearly 64% by fiscal 1969. 
Military-civilian r~search projects. was the primary form that government re-
search support took during the postwar period. 
Table 12 contains information from the DoT-NASA study on the types of 
research ccnducted by producers. breaking research activ1ties into "basic re-
search," "applied research," and "development"categories. l P~rhaps the most 
IThe DoT-NASA study offers the following definitions of research categories: 
"Basic research is concerned with exploration of the unknown. It is 
undertaken to increase the unJerstanding of natural laws and is fr~e from the 
need to meet immedigte objectives. 
"Applied research is directed to the solution of a recognized probleM. 
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Aeronautical U&D l'~um)s Used by Industry, 
Classified by Aircraft Component 
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.triking finding is the small portion of total indu.try re.earch (both private-
ly and publicly funded) that goes to basic re.earch; the ba.ic reaearch ahare 
of total R&D expenditures is below 10% throughout the 1945-69 period, and the 
industry non-reimbursed share of this small fraction is below 20%. Public 
.ources, primarily the Air Force. Navy, and NASA (1n the 1960's) .upported most 
of what basic research was carried on in the aircraft industry. Applied re-
.earch expenditures account for a much greater share of the total: the non-
reimbursed industry share of this in 1969 was 34~, substantially above the 
industry share of basic research. Once again. the direct military share and 
industry-reimbursed share account for the majority of this class of expenditures. 
Development expenditures account for the largest share by far of total R&D ex-
penditures throughout the period, never falling below 60~ of the total. The 
military share of this category is once again the largest. with the Air Force 
share alone of developme~t costs above 50% through the 1953-66 period. Develop-
ment expenditures comprise over 70% of total Air Force research support during 
the entire 1945-69 period. The share of development costs accounted for by industry 
non-reimbursed expenditures during this period never exceeds 15%. 
The relative shares of three major aircraft components in total research 
spending, avionics, airframes, and engines, are given in Table 13. While Air-
f~ames comprise the largest share of total aeronautical R&D, 40-45%, the avionics 
(continued) 
rather than toward investigation for its own sake. 
"Development is the systematic use of knowledge and understanding gained 
from research and directed to the production of useful materials, devices, sys-
tems, and methods. This work includes the design, testing, and improvement of 
prototypes and processes." Vol. 2, Appendix c, p. 49. 
" r 
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share exceeds that for engines throughout the postw~r period, The catelori.s 
of private industry research expenditures are given in Table 14; unfortunately 
the data do not distinguish between reimbursed and non-reimbursed R&D Ipending 
" 
by category, Nonetheless, the relative magnitudes of the varioul categories 
are of considerable interest. These relative shares have r.mained remarkably 
stable through the postwar period, with prototype development in first place 
followp.d in descending order by avionics, propulsion, and aerodynamics. These 
data reveal that the majority of R&D is expended upon the integration of these 
complex components, rather than their separate development, underlining the point 
made earlier about the high degree of systemic complexity embodied in an aircraft 
design. 
v. The Demand for Innovation: the Influence of government 
The preceding section documented the substantial research support that 
the aircraft industry has received from the Federal government during the 1925-
75 period. Since most of this research was directed to the development of mili-
tary aircraft, especially since 1940, we argued that the history of technical de-
velopment in commercial aircraft consists largely of the utilization for commer-
cial purposes of technical knowledge developed for military purposes, at govern-
ment expense. Government intervention and support to enha,.,ce the "supply" of 
potential innovations thus has been substantial. This "supply &ide" influence 
within the commercial aircraft industry of government has been joined with a sub-
stantial number of important innovations emersing from other industries for ex-
ploitatlon by commercial aircraft produc~rs. 
.~ ~ 
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However, government policie. have al.o played an important role in affect-
ing the demand for innovation by the commercial aircraft indu.try. Con.ciou.ly 
or not, the policies of the Post Office in the 1929-34 period, and tho.e of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board during 1938-78, influenced the structure and conduct of 
the air transportation industry 80 as to provide substantial incentives for ra-
pid adoption of innovations in commercial aircraft. Government policy toward 
the commercial aircraft industry is unique, we believe, in its impact upon the 
supply of technical knowledge as well as upon the demand for application of this 
knowledge in innovation within the civilian sector. In this section, government 
policies toward air transportation are discussed briefly to substantiate this 
assertion. 
The transfer of responsibility for air mail transpo.t from the Post Office 
to private contractors took place in 1925, following passage of the Kelly Air 
Mail Act. Bids were opened to private contractors on various mail routes; suc-
cessful bidders were to be paid on a weight basis. During the ensuing five years, 
airmail postal rates were reduced by Congress, creating a substantial increase 
in air mail volume, While payments to operators remained at their previous levels. 
The result was an increase in contractor profits. Smith (1944) states that "com-
pensation to carriers rose from 22.6 cents an airplane mile prior to July I, 1926, 
to 73.6 cents a mile for the second half of 1927 •.• by the end of 1928, however, 
payments were up to 92 cents a mile, and by the end of 1929 the government ~as 
paying the operators $1.09 a mile for carrying the mail." (p. 125). This period 
of initial prosperity for the mail contractors, many of whom were subsidiaries of 
commercial aircraft producers,was based largely upon mail transport. Such air-




The McNary-Watrps Act of 1930. and ita administration by Postmaater 
General Brown during the Hoover Administration. constituted a policy of de-
veloping a smaller number of large trunk carriers, who would derive a far 
greater proportion of their revenues from passenger trensport than had here-
tofore been the case. The Act changed the method of computation of payments 
for mail carriage from a pound-mile basis to a space-mile basis. i.e., payment 
was ma~e wh~ther or not mail was carried in an aircraft. In addition, extra pay-
ments were made to carriers utilizing multiengine aircraft, radio and other naviga-
tional aids. The final ~jor section of the McNary-Watres Act was to be it~ undoing 
as it conferred substantial discretionary powers upon the Postmaster General to 
alter or merge carriers of their routes when tI ••• ln his judgement the public in-
terest will be promoted thereby." Brown exploited his power to restructure air 
carriers to the fullest, bringing about a merger of Transcontinental Air Tr~nsport 
and Western Air Express into TWA, and working to develop a small number of fin-
ancially strong, transcontinental carriers, who would constitute a strong market 
1 for larger, more comfortable passenger transports. While Brown's goals were 
lTestifying in 1934 before Sen. Hugo Black's Special Committee on Investigation 
of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, Brown interpreted his activities in the 
following favorable light: 
"With the passage of the McNary-Watres Act giving the Post Office Department the 
requisite authority, it exerted pressure on the air mail carriers, who with minor 
exceptions had theretofore been confining their operations exclusively to carryln~ 
the mail, to transport passengers and express in order to build up revenues from tho 
public and thus lighten the burden on th~P~st Office Department; and it exerted 
every proper influence to consolidated kic/ the short, detached and failing lines 
into well financed and well-managed syst;m;, providing three independent transcon-
tinental operations with appropriate north and south intersecting services, be-
lieving that the pressure of competition would in time attract public patronage, 
reduce operating costs and develop, if possible, a transport airplane capable, un-
der the competitive conditions in the passenger and express transportation industry 
of earning enough to pay its way without any subsidy." (Hearings, p. 2351) 
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partially achieved, his tactics produced a furor that resulted in the Air Mail 
Act of 1934, mandating divestiture by aircraft producers of .ublidiary transport 
firms, and placing the award of mail contractIon a per-ounce ba.ia, to be award-
ed strictly to the lowest bider. While it repre.ented an inefficient mechanism, 
and Brown's administration of the Act led to its demise, this set of policies 
toward air carriers coincided with rapid growth in passenger traffic and the in-
troduction of the monocoque fuselage airtransports, the B-247 and the DC-2, which 
were of great importance in the development of the commercial aircraft and air 
transportation industries. 
Continued Congressional dissatisfaction with passenger safety and regulatory 
policy in general witt.in air transportation led to the establishment of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in 1938. Through i~s issuance of operating certificates and its 
oversight of airline fares. the Board effectively controlled pricing policies of 
airlines, as well as cntry into or exit from air transportation. These powers 
were used throughout the poatwar period to prevent entry into scheduled trunkline 
air transportation and to prevent price competition. The CAB also controlled the 
process that determined the routes that specific airlines could fly--in general. 
multiple carriers were allowed to operate in "major" city-pair markets (such as 
New York to Los Angeles, or New York-Chicago), while less important routes often 
were allowed to be monopolized by a single carrier. 
This regulatory environment. in wh~ch entry and price competition were for-
bidden and multiple carriers operated in the more profitable market segments. gave 
rise to a high level of service quality competition. One result of this was a very 
rapid rate of adoption of new aircraft designs by the major carriers, based upon 
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their belief that rapid introduction of .tate-of-the-art aircraft wa. an ef-
fective marketing strategy where price competition was not po •• ib1e. Jordan's 
study (1970) compares California's intrastate air carriers (not regulated by the 
CAB, and subject to price competition as well as easier entry) with the inter-
ttate carriers 1n the rapidity of adoption of cabin pressurization and jet air-
craft: 
The trunk carriers were consistently the first to introduce each inno-
vation. In fact, they introduced all but two of the over 40 aircraft 
types operated by all three carrier groups between 1946 and 1965. In 
addition, they adopted these innovations rapidly and extensively. The 
local carriers, on the other hand, were slow to introduce the two in-
novations and their rates of adoption were low. (p. 53)1 
The drive to be first with a new aircraft design is one of the central motives 
for the willingness of major airlines to make early purchase commitments to air-
frame manufacturers, as a means of achieving as early a delivery as possible. 
Service quality cocpetition thus has fostered rapid diffusion and adoption of 
innovations drawing upon government-supported research, as well as supporting 
fierce competition among airframe manufacturers. Fruhan (1972) also has argued 
that the lack of price competition under CAB regulation was partially responsible 
for the wide fluctuations in airline purchases of aircraft, as airlines attempted 
1 Jordan concludes that "The California intrastate carriers' service quality ac-
tually appears to have been affected less by carrier rivalry than by the desire 
or need of these carriers to achieve low operating costs. The intrastate carriers 
contented themselves with obsolescent DC-3's and DC-4's, or the nonpressurized 
Martin 202. until the prices of used,pressurized piston-powered aircraft fell 
drastically in the early 1960's. In contrast, the turboprop Electra was adopted 
by PSA 800n after it bec~me available, but this was a case in which low operating 
costs per seat-mile offset a high purchase price. On t~e other hand, turbojet-fan 
aircraft were not adopted until a medium-range turbo-fan aircraft was developed 
that had relatively low operating costs for short stage lengths." (p. 55) 
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to provide .ufficient carrying capacity to maintain higher load factor. in a 
1 given city-pair markets. Purchases by one carrier were matched by • competitor, 
resulting in recurrent binges of new equipment purchases, .uch •• that in the 
early 1970's, that left airlines burdened with heavy debts, and exces. carrying 
capacity. 
CAB regulation thus has encouraged a rapid pace of innovation and adoption 
within the commercial aircraft and air transportation industries. ~hi8 rapid 
rate of innovation and the associated impressive productivity growth exhibited 
by air transportation have come at some cost, however. Consumer welfare has 
been impaired by the lack of variety in service quality and price. The result of 
government regulation has been to restrict the range within which consumers have 
been free to trp~e off price against 'quality. A pattern of producer compe-
tition and comoetitive airline investment practices resulted that could be 
described as inefficient. In ~ddition, the direction of innovation may have been 
• 
affected by this regimen of regulation and service quality competition. As was 
noted above, the innovation process within the commercial aircraft industry his-
torically has involved substantial financial and design participation by major air-
lines in new aircraft development. The preservation by CAB regulation of the dom-
1nance of a small number of transcontinental trunk carriers, generally the most 
~rofitab1e form of service, made this the major market for new aircraft during 
the postwar period of regulation. Given the sensitivity of the desi,n and develop-
ment processes to the desires of the financially strong airlines, the result has 
been a bias in the direction of innovation, noted by Ca"es (1962): 
1rh1s apparently counterintuitive strategy derives from the fact that, within a 
middle range of capacity share on a given route (roughly 20-707.), load factors 
and capacity increases are positively correlated for a given carrier. Airlines 
competing 1n a ~iven city-pair market thus face strong incentives to match one 




A very important problem not eliminated by the increasing number of com-
peting aircraft manuf3cturers is that of optimal variety in type. of air-
craft offered on the market. In the decade when pilton-engine aircraft 
reached their peak of development, ending in the early 1950., the duopoliltic 
rivalry b~tween Douglas and Lockheed led them to concentrate on development 
of an aircraft that would capture the largest single market--that of airlines 
flying United States transcontinental or trans-Atlantic routea. Relatively 
forgotten were the airlines in need of large planes efficient on relatively 
short hops, as well as the airlines needing low-cost equipment to aerve low-
density routes ••• Airlines and aircraft manufacturers are both relatively 
few in number; airlines seek to minimize the number of different airplanes 
in their fleets for efficient maintenance purposes. These fa:ts guarantee 
a stan~ing pressure for aircraft manufacturers (operating under considerable 
uncertainty) to bias their research and development efforts toward the 
largest single market, whatever the structure and conduct of the airline 
industry may cause that to be. As already indicated, over the years the re-
sulting bias has normally been toward long-haul, luxury aircraft. (p. 103) 
An example of such a "missed opportunity" is the turboprop engine, which. as 
Caves and others have argue~ might have been developed further during the 1950's 
and early 1960's so as to compensate for its deficiences in speed (relative to 
the jet engine) with greater fuel economy and lower operating costs than obtained 
for jet aircraft. However, the regulatory environQent of the period precluded the 
option of offering passengers lower fares for slower transportation, reducing the 
incentives faced by the airlines for adoption of the turboprop in preference to the 
jet for short-range uses. While the implicit counterfactual case that is proposed 
here is somewh~t speculative, it raises important issues about the nature and the 
distribution of the benefits of the rapid rate of technical change in commercial 
aircraft. One may also speculate that had the turboprop been given the enccur~ge-
ment to develop which might have existed in an unregulated world, the industry 




prices in the 70's.1 
The impact of deregulation upon innovation in commercial aircraft likely 
will take some time to be felt. Airline operating conditions now are dominated 
largely by the soaring costs of fuel. It is interesting to note, however, that 
price competition has come to playa major role in airline business behavior, and 
that service quality has becolI"e increasingly differentiated, with various "no-
frills", advance purchase, business class, and other discounts or premiums in 
the cost of air travel. Simultaneously with these developments, one notes less 
competition among domestic aircraft producers in the introduction of the next gen-
eration of aircraft. No other American producer has stepped forth to offer an 
aircraft that will compete directly with the new Boeing deSigns, the 767 and the 
757. This probably reflects a less intense demar.d by the airlines for rapid de-
liveries of the new aircraft, as service quality and novelty lose their formerly 
2 
central roles in air transportation competitlon. 
lAnother case in support of this argument concerns the attempts of the FAA in the 
early 1960's to develop a short-haul passenger transport capable of replacing the 
DC-3, then heavily utilized by local-service airlines despite its advanced years, 
lack of cabin pressurization, and low speed. A study of Policy Planning for Aero-
nautical Research and Development prepared by the Library of Congress's Legislative 
Reference Service for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, noted 
that the FAA deemed action necessary because "While U.S. manufacturers had made a 
variety of studies, no design had been forthcoming ••• The key to starting the pro-
gram appeared to be the need for a single order pf at least 100 aircraft with the 
probability of at least 100 more. The local service airlines could not produce 
this order and only the DOD in Government could th1nk in such quantities." (1966, 
p. 238) 
2Clearly, the greater fuel efficiency of the new Bv=!"~ designs provides a powerful 
impetus for airlines to replace their older aircraft, such as the 727 and 707. Our 
point is that, whereas in the previous days of CAB regulation, airlines would have 
been motivated to purchase these planes both because of their fuel efficiency and 
because of their perceived novelty and superior passenger comfort and/or safety, 
in the current context, the "service quality" argument is less compelling, leading 
to a lower level of competition among airlines for positions in the delivery 




A final policy episode of considerable relevance to this discussion of 
Federal policies affecting the demand for commercial passenger transports con-
1 
cerns the SST development program. The SST episode in many ways constituted an 
application of the military procurement model to the development of commercial 
aircraft; the Federal government conducted a design competition and proposed to 
support the development efforts of the winning prime contractor. Such policies 
had proven more or less successful in military aircraft procurem~nt, simply be-
cause of the largely nonmarket character of this process--the Federal government 
was the sole domestic customer for military aircraft. It therefore was eminently 
sensible for the ultimate purchaser to specify in detail the operating and design 
characteristics of the aircraft that were to be purchased in the military market. 
The attempt to develop an acceptable commercial ~ST via government support was 
almost certain to lead to a design that ignored operating costs, as did the SST 
design and the Concorde aircraft. The SST project illustrates the usefulncss of 
keeping the Federal role in affecting the demand for commercial aircra:t a diffuse 
one, affecting only the adoption incentives of commercial aircraft purchasers and 
the developocnt decisions of airframe manufacturers, rather than specifying de-
sign and performance characteristics of new aircrait in detail. 
Federal policies toward air transportation have exerted considerable influ-
ence upon the demand for innovation in commercial aircraft. We have argued that 
the focus of inter-airline competition upon ser~ice quality during the 1938-78 
\ 
period of CAB regulation provided strong incentives for airlines to'push for the 
development of new aircraft designs, and to adopt these aircraft rapidly. While 
lSee Eads and Nelson (1971), for a useful and critical analysis. 
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this regulatory policy, and the McNary-Watres .j~mail policy that preceded it, 
did vroduce a high rate of innovation, it also influenced the form which com-
petition would take other policy instruments might have ac~ieved similar 
ends at less cost. Nonetheless, the importance of Federal influence upon ie 
demand for aircraft, in both the military and commercial sectors, has interesting 
implications for technology policy in other industries. 
Conclusion 
In concluding this discussion of Federal policy nnd innovation in commercial 
aircraft, we will summarize our assessment of the role of the Federal governt;cnt 
in affecting innovation within the indust~y, and address the degree to which other 
industries could benefit from a 3imilar fabric of governmenL policies. ~~ile the 
innovative performance of the industry suggests that this policy frame~ork ha~ 
been successful, it is likeJy to be limit~d in its applicability to oth~r indus-
tries. In view of some of the other failings of both this policy fra~cwork ani 
the commercial aircraft producers, such transfer to other industries of the ~.~­
cise policy framework may not be desirable. 
The crucially important aspect of Federal policy throughout this 50-yp~r 
period is its impact upon both the supply of and demand for inno~ation. Mil_:ary 
support of new aircraft development proviJ~d important technical skills, knowledge, 
:nd innovations that could be utilized by manufacturers in co~~ercial aircraft. 
Government d~mand for new designs, pushing at the outer limit5 of available t~ch­
nologies, was no less crucial in bringing about the rapid embodicent of new tech-
nical knowledge or isolated brpakthroughs in some subsystem in a new aircraft 
• r ~- ---- - ---~---~--------- __ ...-1' ... __ ..... -= --""'"-"'=='=""r::..l.._...;-:.....;;-..::.--~--=-:.:.-.::.-=--- -~ ..... -,,-- -- ...-.... ~ 
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design. The knowledge of an assured market for a successful military aircraft 
gave manufacturers considerable incentive~ to pursue and utilize rapidly the 
technical and scientific knowledge a~qllired at Federal expense. This assurance 
of the existence and characteristia (in varying detail) of the nature of the de-
mand for innovative technologies is of great importance in understanding the 
speed at which technical breakthroughs came to be embodied in new aircraft. The 
modest success of such programs as the NASA Technology Utilization program, or 
Federally funded demonstration projects, aimed at increas1ng the supply and avai1-
ability of commercially useful knowledge, reflect in part the uncertainties about 
demand faced by the potential 'utilizers of this knowledge. In the military aircra 
market, which generated considerable spillovers into co~ercia~.app1ications, suc~ 
demand uncertainty ~as minimal. 
The commercial aircraft market also was affected on the demand side by 
government policies. We argued above that the HcNary-~~tres Air Hail Act, and the 
subsequent regulatory policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, engendered a strong 
demand on the part of airlines for new aircraft embodY1ng military-spawned inno-
vations. While the number of commercially unsuccessful aircraft indicates that 
the market W.IS not an assured one, the effect of regulatory policies was to pro-
vide a strong impetus for aircraft manufacturers to quickly embody new technologi-
cal developments in innovative aircraft designs, as well as for the airlines to 
adopt new aircraft designs as rapidly as possible. To a lesser extent than was tx 
of the military market, knowledge by producers of ~ strong and assured demand in 
commercial aircraft aided the rapid embodiment of new technological knowledge. 
The usual justification for publicly supported research appeals to the pub1! 
,. 
-67-
good characteristics of knowledge and information, arguina that the locial p3y-
offs to fundament.al or basic relearch greatly exceed the privata return. to in-
vestment in ouch research. Government lupport of relearch therefore i. con.ider-
ed best applied to the most basic forms of research. However, in the ca.e of 
NACA, established as a source of research for the aircraE: industry, basic re-
aearch was notably absent. Constant (1980) argues convincingly that a major 
reason for the failure of any American firm to develop the jet engine prior to 
World War II was cue to the lack of theoretical work in aerodynamics and aero-
nautics pursued 1n the U.S., as opposed to Germany or Great Britain. NACA's role 
prior to 1940, according to Constant, was primarily that of a provider of test-
ing facilitil~ anJ empirical data, rather than a supporter of advanced theorct1cal 
work in aerodynamics. Nonct~eless, the America~ firms were well-placed to utilize 
the theoretical work in aerodynamics and the jet engine, most of which had 
been developed abroad, in the aftermath of t%rld War I!, the result being th\, 707 
and the DC-B, the first commercially successful jet transports. Constant attri-
butes the postwar dominance of American firms in jet aircraft to the extremely 
large and highly developed domestic airline system that had evolved since the 
1930's in the U.S. Gove~nment policies, such as McNary-Watres or the CAB, that 
affected the nature of the demand for co~ercial aircraf~ thus may have been as 
important as Federal support of research in the development of the postwar air-
craft industry. 
The experience of the commercial aircraft industry underlines the importance, 
in designing policy towards innovation, of affecting bOLh the supply of ~nd demand 
1 for innovaticn and technical knowledge. While this conclusion clearly is one of 
1 Nelson and Winter (197 ) and Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) provide analyses of the 
innovation process that emphasize the importance of linking both "market-pull" and 
"Technology pus"''' forces. 
-- ---- .. --....-... --- ...---- -~ 
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con.iderable generality, with obvious rel.vance to technology policie. in other 
indultrie., it i. not clear that the .pecific policy in.trum.nt. that have b.en 
utilized in the commercial aircraft indu.try are appropriate or applicabl. in 
other industries. Certainly, the resource co.t. of theae polici •• in the air-
craft industry have been substantial. Certainly, the re.ource co.t. of thels 
policies in the aircraft industry have been .ubstantial. High profit. and Federal 
research support in the development and aale of military Aircraft have comprised 
an important government subsidy to the development and manu{acture of nc~ com-
mercial designs. Carroll's study (1972) argues that government contracts have 
been much mOle stable in volume, and yielded substantially hIgher pro{its, thnn 
commercial sales in the 1950's and 1960's. To the extent that the profitability 
of military sales ~ade p09sible {ierce competition in commercial aircraft pro-
duction and nales, including poasibly excessive duplication of development costs, 
tooling, and product lines, Carroll argues, resources ~ere ine{ficicntly allocated 
as a result of this implicit subsidy. Further, we have argued above that the coru-
petition bet~een McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed may have had deleterious conse-
quences for product sufety. Finally, of course, there are the welfar~ costs to 
consumers of CAB regulation of air transportation, another element of the policy 
frame~ork that has supported rate of innovation in commercial aircraft. 
One area in ~hich an aircraft industry policy paradigm may be of relevance 
is that of technologies for reducing emissions of pollut~nts and c~rcinog~n5 from 
automobiles and industrial pr~duction processes. This is an area in which the per-
formancc ch4racteristic~ of the technologies that arc mandated by Federal regula-
tion could be clarified in such a way as to make the demand for innovation clear 
and unambiguous. Coupled with a mOle substantial level of government funding of 
----.--~ .. --,--- -- .- -. -~-. -~---
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re •• arch in thi. areA, a .et of policie. could relult that would affect the .up-
ply of technical knowledge and innovation., a. well al the d~nd for new emi.-
.iona control proceascs, 10 al to improve the .t.te of the art in thi. important 
arca. Another arC4 where such an approach might be uleful i. that of energy 
technolosi~8. Here, government currently funds r.search extensively, in contrast 
to the situation o{ cmissions control technologies, but ha. done little by way 
o{ providing 4 clear and stable dem4nd for energy technologies with certain spe-
cHic coat lind performance chllrllcteristics (indeed, until the recent moves to re-
move price controls on domestic oil and natural gas, gov~rnmtnt demand policies 
di8cour~scd the ~pplicntion of new energy t~~hnoloRieR). By making commitments 
to purchnse certnln forms of energy at a guaranteed price, e.g., synthetic fuels 
{or a strategic petrolc!lI~ reserve, or certain technologies with Rpc~ific co~t or 
performance characteristi~s. e.~ •• solnr energy sources meeting announced criteria 
Fedcral policies could I'ro\'ide a more effect ive set of "m4rket pulls" 1n add! t ion 
to thc currently available "pushes" frOID cxtensive resenrch funding. The ellscnti.1 
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Almarin Phillip •• * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments nave had a sigDificant role iD the computer industry from the 
very inception of ComputiDI technology. Charle. Blbb'ge (1792-1871) wal 
supported by the Briti.h government in hi. res •• rch on the -,nalytic 
engioe.- In core recent time', the United State. government. And forei~n 
governments have continued to have very important influence. on the 
industry. Governments directly and iodirectly support R&D, are ~portant 
purchaser. of large vnlume. of computer hardWAre aed software, acd act in 
several regulatory mode., including that of a ·preserver of competition" under 
ehe antitrust law •• 
It " a well-~nowu fact that during the initial ten or fifeeen year.-of 
cocmerc!al ,ale. of computer. and computer-related products and service in Lh. 
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the Itatf of the Hoare School of the Uaiverllty of Peanlylvaaia, bad IUCcoedcd 
ia fulfillina the requlreseata of a U.S. ~ coatract. !HIAC VOl capable of 
1 Ici,atlfic or 45 c~ercial coaputatlooa per lecond. It could ,rlDd out 
balliltic firm1aa tabl .. aad trajectorle. by -at lealt a factor of a hundred 
aad ••• probably 500· timel that of aay electromechanical predece.lor machine. 3 
It W&I aot !NIAC itaelf that provided tho Ireat techaololical impetUi to 
the c~put'r indultry. In ita firlt form, ENIAC had DO f .. libl, commerical 
application.. The loverument, ia .ponlorica ENIAC, did much more than it 
coa.cioully intladed, howe.er. Tho e.er curiouI, eVlr brilliantly ianovative 
John von ~eumaan becama a'lociated with the ENIAC projlc ia Augu.t, 1944. 
With Hlucbly, Eckert aad •• pecially Herman Goldltine, von Neumana developld 
tbs coacept of thl -It~red prolr .. • computlr, wltb 10lic ialtructiooa Ito rid 
1n memory 10 that they could be modified arithmet1cally without a manual 
re.ettica of chou.aada of .v1tehe •• 
The IVlat. 10 Pbiladelp1a Wire .careely froat PI,e DlW.. There were, 
however, & .mAll Iroup of Ict.nti.t., enl1nlerl, lovlrament orsanizat10oa and 
companiel very 1ntlre.ted ia the pro,re,. of computins tecbnololY. How.rd 
Aikaa ha4 bela develop1aa electromechaa1cal computerl at Harv.rd for .ome 
yeara. The Bill Telephonl Laboratori.1 ha4 developed a l1milar, very 
sopb1lt1c.ted computer. HIT .pon.ored • lecture .er1e. on computer. 10 
October, 1945, well prIor to !NIAC becom1aa act1ve. 
Plrhap. the mo.t .isaif1c.nt lovernmeat 1nfluence on the yet-to-be-born 
lndu.try caae from •• ix week course, ·Theory and Tlchniques for the Deslgn of 
Electronic Disit.l Computers,· glvoa at the Hoore School 1n July-Augult, 
19464• This course wa. org.nized by Carl Chaaber. of the ~or8 School, but 
,pon.orad by the OffiCI of Naval Re.earcb aad tho Army Ordinance Department. 
Attendee. rlpre.ented the Army, Navy, National aureau of Standard., MIT, 
Columbl., Penn.ylv.nia, Harv.rd, the lnat1tute for Adv.nced Study, ~br1dge 
Univers1ty. Bell rel Labs. ISH, Nat1cQA~ Cash Raai.ter, and General -ElectriC, 
&mong othert. 
MAny .. pect. of pl.nnod, .tored program machin •• were disculsed at the •• 
,e,.iona. 0nI topic vaa ·Conl.qulnce. of Government-Supported R •••• rcb.· Six 
month. lator. a four-day conference wa. ora&aized by Hovard Atken at Harvard, 
. 
&qd .ponQored bl the Navy Dep.rtment. There w«re 350 conferee., .ad tb. 
proceedlnl' we:e published by the Harvard University Pre.,. In addition to 
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lovlramlnt ADd aea4ea1c partlclpant., there were rlpre.ent.tlv •• of RCA, 
Ea.tman-Kodak, Electronic Control Comp.ny, Bru.h DevelopDlat Coap.ay, Northrop 
Alrcraft, laevlo Iaatrumsat Corporatloa, BIll Tel Lab., laytbooG, Prud.atial 
Lile IDluraDC. Co., John Haacodt Mutual Uft Ia.uraDC. Co •• Geaaral Electrlc 
Co., Enllne.r1q lell.rch .... od.t .. , !!aa.dlx .wlatlOG Corp., Marchant 
Calculatlna Hac!\1aery Co., Ha .. achullott. Mutual Uf. 1I1.Iur&nc. Co., Bau.ch 
and Loob, We.tora Unlon, Mon •• nto Ch~cal Co., Sylvania Electric, T.chD1cord 
Rocord., HUlhe. Aircr.ft, Sperry Gyro.cope Co., Clinton Laboratorl •• , Nlw 
Englaad Power Servico Co., Arthur D. Littl., IDe., Hydroc.rbon a..earch, tac., 
United Alrcr.ft, RCA, aad other.. The prl •• was reprl.eatld. 
1BK .pon.orld flve coutlreace' on coaputiaa between 1948 .ad 1951. 
Harvard repe.ted It. conferooc. 10 1949. The AI.ocl.tloo of Coaput1as 
Machinery WI. formed 10 1948 .round a ·very clo.e fr.tlraity of peopll· from 
un1ver.ltll., lndu.try and sovlrumlnt. ta .hort, aDd Irowiq dlrectly from 
govlrnment .upport for ENIAC aDd relatld projlct., therl WI. frll aDd opon 
acce •• to not ju.t the tlchnoloS1 of thl day, but frll and 0Pln acce •• al Will 
to thl maoy computlr-rllatld 1 & D project. thIn undlrway. Well-known .tored 
program computers .uch a. EDVAC (Ecklrt aad Hauchly), EDSAC (Wilkl., 
Cambridge, baled on Moorl School cour.e), S!AC (National Bureau of Standard.) 
and lAS (von Neumann, In.titutl for Advanced Studil.) Wire con.equlotly 
developed, u.ually uDder lovlrnmeot spon.orlhiP.5 In additioo, however, at 
lea.t 7 othor nonprofit orSlolz.t10Ql wire .imilarly enla,ld 10 de.ilniD¥ aod 
developlol .torld pros ram mac!\1n.l, lncludioa the Un1ver.lty of Am.terdam, 
Univer.ity of California at Berkley (CALCIC), Univerllty of California at LOG 
Angele. (SWAC), Univer.it7 of Frankfurt, Harvard Un1vnrl1ty (Hark III), 
University of 1l1inoi. (ORDVAC,ILLIAC), University of Hanche.ter, Yniverslty 
of ~ch1gan (MIDAC), MIT (Whirlwind), Un1vlr.ity of Rome, Unlvlrllty of 
Vienna, a Swcdi.h univ.r.lty (Stockolm?), Federal 8igh School (Zurlch), Loa 
Alamos Scientif1c Laboratory (MJ.NIAC), Patrlck Alr Force Su. (FLAC), R.AND 
Corporat10o (JOHNIAC, after von Neumanu), and the Naval Releareh Laboratory.o 
The dlrect ae.oc1at~on. of commercial flrm. with these nonproflt 
activit1.1 aDd tho attendance of rlprl.eotative. of the ...... flrma at thl 
conference. gAve many of them the rudimeot. of the technology ba.e on which 
commercial venture. might have been launched. Enumeratina actual potent1al 
entrants 1s not alway. a fruitful ta.k but, ~saed on the record. available, 
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tho'l that hid at l ... t the tubltantlve technolo21 ba.e include, in addltioD 
to IBM. .uch flraa .1 &sndls. Boo1nl. Doual ••• Huah.I, North ~.rlcaD 
Aviation. Northrop.(ltHAC). Raytheon. ~rry. Geural Ulctrlc, W.lt1nahon ... 
aCA, Phllco, Ill' 1', ITT, GTE, ~rrouah., Frldln, Konra., H.tloaal C .. h' 
aesbtlr, R.a1aaton bad, RDyu, .ad UDdlrvood.7 
NOnG of the •• val the firlt venturlr. Eckert.ad Kauchly, who wlrl 
di.miG •• d fo~ tho Unlvlr.lty of P.aa.ylv.a1a In 1946 blc.u •• of tholr 
lntere.t. la commercl.llz.tlon of the !NIAC .ad EDVAC concept., forced tho 
!ck.rt-Haucbly Computer Company la Philadalphl.. Por.onnal from the Naval 
R.s.arch Laboratory aad ONi fo~ !na1nearlna R •••• rch .\s.oclato. in St. 
Paul. Miane.ot.. The Comput.r Ia.a.rch Corpor.tlon WI. formed •••• pia-off 
from Northruop. la every c.... lovema.nt .pon.ored projact. war. tho direct 
.nteced.nt. of the •• DeV venture.. ADd thl pac. of the tochaololic.l proare •• 
wa. r.pld. SlAC, for lsample. was cap.bl. of .bout 103 .cientlflc 
computatioDl per .ocond or 254 commercl.l computation. per .acond In contra.t 
to the 7.S per .ocoad or 45 par .ocoad dellv.rl •• for ENIAC. S 
The early history of Eckert-Hauchly ,roup illu.trate. how chanco aIfected 
the lnltlal lndu.try .tructure. Thoma. J. W.tson. Sr., ofler.d both Eckert 
and Mlucbly po.ltloDl at IBM, lncludlna with tho of tar • laboratory under 
tholr ova managoment. 9 They d.cllno~, probably becau.e ISH did not as.ure 
thea that their computer. would be market.d. Eckart and Mauchly approached 
the Bureau of tho Can.ua which was knoWD to the lnterested ln a computer. 
Through the Satlonal Bureau of Standard. (NBS), Cansu. request.d bld. and, 1n 
addltlon to !ckert-Hauchly. found lnterolt at Hughes Tool and Raytheon. 
Hughes did cot submit a bid; Ray theron' I bld was ln excels of that of Eckert-
~uch1y. The later were awarded rho Ccn.u. contract in June, 1946, only three 
QOQths after their departure for Penn and mora than a year prior to formal 
incorporatlon. 10 
In 1947, Eckert-Hauchly recelved fund1na from AtC. Nielson and Prudential 
Lif. Inluranee Company, both of which a,reement. finally included 
po •• ibll1tle. tor purcha.e. of EDVAC (nov UNIVAC) computer.. Henry Strau., a 
Delaware racetrack owner, aad Vici Pre.ldent of Amerlcan Totallzor, .upplled 
half a milllon dollar. of caan and note. In return for 40% of Eckart-
~uch1y'. co=mon stock. Straua wa. kllled ln an airplane cra.h, local 
financial orianl:atlon. refu.ed Eckart-Kauchly's requolt for fund., and the 
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new corporatlon wal c1e,rly d •• tinod for bankruptcy b1 1949. 
Eckart aDd Kauc:bly knew virtually eVlryooe at "y corporatlOQ that bad 
hltherto .hOWD lntere.t in coaputer. throuaht partlclpatlon 1n coa1ere~I' &ad 
lovlrnaent contract.. ThlY contacted Nel, lem1aaton laud, IBM, 'h11co, 
Burrouah., Bulhl. Aircraft, aDd probably othlr.. lamlnaton laad made aD offer 
that was acceptod ln rabruary, 1950. 
Thl acqui.ltion of Ecklrt-Hauch1y hardly reflect. a confldent decl.lon on 
the tho part of aela1naton Raad that UNIV II:. val the va"e of the future. The 
fir.t move wa., ln tact, to attaapt to cancel all UNIVAC contract.. The 
Census Bureau refu.ed to cancel, but Prudentlal aad Nl11.0D did cancel after a 
year of unlrultful effort. at renosotlatlon.i1 The Cen.u. UNIVAC I WI. 
delivered In 1951, folloved by .ale. of flve mar. of the .a=e .. chine to the 
AlC, A1r Force, An.y, ID4 the Navy lilreau of Shlp •• ll COllllulcal del1verl .. 
of UNIVAC I commenced oaly La 1954. JNIVAC I va. capable of 14C Iclentlfic or 
171 co=morlcal computation, pot .econd and tOld for price. of ~l,OOO.OOO &Ad 
up. In all, 40 UNIV I.e I'. vore eventually in.talled. 13 
Covernment project. led to another early effort at commercial sale.. Th, 
Engineerina Re.earch AI.ociatea (ERJU ,roup, vhich included Will1am Norri., 
started with a NQvy contr.ct for ".pecial purpo.e," "highly cla •• ified-
computina machinery and related vork. Th1. Va' almo.t immediately augmeated 
by a Navy contract for what val called AILAS I, with the underltand1ng that 
variaot. of AtLAS t might be ·put out commerically·.14 The AItAS tva. 
renamed ERA 1101 t and wa. folloved by the EllA 1102 and 1103. 'nlree 1101' •• 
three 1102'1 aDd about 20 1103', vere lold. The ERA computer. utilized ~ 
patented mAiaetic drua memory. The 1101 wal capable of 683 .clentific or 302 
commercial computations per locond; the 1103, of 749 Icl.ntlfic or 666 
commerciAL c~putatloa. per I.coad, order. of magnitude la~ger than the 
EHIAC. L5 
III. The Scopo of Early Opportuaitie. 
While tho UNIVAC I and the ERA lerie. found a fev co~ercl&l cuato=er., 
nelther wal & co~rcial lucce... Both !ckort-Kauchly aad ERA ended up a. 
part of R.eCl1nstoa Rand. Tho acquirina cOlllpaay WIIa gooerally resarde.j 41 -tiua 
1ead1ns coaapany In tM EDP lndulltryin the oarly 1950,.-.16 Retll~,08t"lJ Rand 
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w .. thoulht to hay. an -initial yOU' to two yun lud ... b,. bavtl1l a ClcMna 
that ~. available aad operational before other machine. belaD to appear.- 17 
The t1NIV 1£ rwa.e beeho prounont eaoulh .0 that it va. tor a t1u the loaadc 
term for a eOlputer.!8 
The earl,. .. rutiQl ot the UNIV II:. hardly meaat that other COllpaa1 .. van 
not explorias coaputer d.volopmenta &ad po •• ible entry. The attendanc. at 
computer confor.nco. it •• lf bll1l. that conclu.1on. For it. part, I5K had had 
personnll work1aa with Aiken at Harvard between 1937 aDd 1944. In the 1944-
1947 period, IBM built tho SS!C (Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator). 
Demonltrated to tho public in 1948, the SSEC boa. ted rudimentary .tored 
prosru. ~pabil1ty. Only oae 4' IUde. 
In tho lAte 1940'., I~ e.tabl1.hed an Applied Sc1.nc. Iroup to perform 
.xplor.tory r •••• rch in po •• ibl. bu.1ne •• applIcation. of the new 
technololY. Whil. Thoma. J. Watlon, Sr., felt that the SS!C alone ~could 
lolve all tho important .ei.ntitie problem. in the world-, Hr. ~at.on, Jr., 
wa. more intrigu.d by the po •• lbllity of d.veloplaa computers for the 
co=cerclal market. There wa., howover, much oppo.lt1on withln IBM to the 
~lons hair", "doublo d~o~ electronic. leIenti.t •• Out.ider., eapeeially 
Ici.ntiltl, doubted that IBM would every produce a computer. 20 
Entering the computer Induetry when the fir.t UNIVAC va. yet to be 
delIvered po.ed ~ny obvlous problema tor IBM and otherl 11millrly litUited. 
The technology wal different frog that for typewriterl and punch card 
tabulators. The technology, moreover, ~I rapldly cn-ngins. Development 
would ule scarce fundl. 21 Wh4tever computer might be produced would have to 
be sold at a hiih prlce. Potential cUltomers had co knowledge of computerl 
and their po.,lble application,. Foreleen ule. in businel' were 10 limited 
that the market seemed very small. And, of course, Eckert-HAuchly and ~ had 
machines in development and Raytheon had announced Its intentlons to follow 
sult. 22 
ISH decided to movo Into the Induatry larsely a. a reault of the Korean 
~ar. Cuthben Hurd, who headed the Applied Science group, and the eager 
Thomas J. Wacson, Jr •• prevailled on Mr. Watson, Sr., and the relt of the IBM 
organization. Thoy Ireued that government agenclel clearly needed improved 
computational and data proces.ing abilitie. in the war effort and, le.a 
persuas~vely, that bus!~Qsae. had s~llar requirementl. Development of the 
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·Oefen •• Calculator· W&B authoriz.d 1D tbe lIll of 19~0. 
Tho ·oelona. Calculator- va. rlnA_ the UK 701. ttl dlVllopDODt &.ad -
production waI praai.ld on 19 Iltt.r. of intent, all froa 80veraaent aalnei •• 
and tbe deflDM relat~ work of privata coapaa1... Wh.n the pro.pect1v1 
reDtal pdca of the 701 \II. cbaaaed 10 1951 froa $8,000 to $15,000 pll: !IOnth, 
13 of tha 19 l.ttar. of int.nt were wlthdrawn. It appeared that the 701 wu. 
doomed to failure. 
The dlci.ion of IEM to continua with thl 701 project at thi. juncturl wu. 
pivotal to It. sub.equ.nt .ucc.... Haviaa d.cided to produc. the 19 mach1nea, 
and arraGgini for it. production on an ~ •• e.bly-liQI ba.11 rathlr than on I 
job-Ihop, cuctollMUde buh u w. true of UNIVAC aad EllA, Illf Wlnt ahead. 
Thl 701 val a~ouac.d 1n Hay, 1952, with firlt cu.tom.r 101tall&tlon about a 
year later. Th4 701 W&I capable of 993 .cilnt1fic: or 616 commercial 
operatloOl plr IIcOad, aad va. produced and d.liv.r.d at a rate of oae per 
month. Tho ;01, unl1ke oth.r. than in d.v.lopm.nt, va. produced in modul •• 
that lowered production co.t. and made de11v.ry and inatallation ~uitl ea.y. 
In itJ lnitial deSign, aad ualike UNIVAC I, the 701 could not handle 
alphabetic character.. The 701 had a superior tape drive aad :andom acces. 
macory. To the lIUlrk.et, the 701 va. an .. IJti UNIVAC-. 24 
Once committed to tho compu~er ~rk.et, IBM cont1nued L==ediately to 
improve it. products and it. related marketins effort.. In late Fall, 1952, 
and prior to firlt delivery of the 701, the Applied Science group propo.ed the 
IBM 650. There werl oaly .ix fire 701 order. at thl time, ,ad Sales and 
Prod~ct Planning forecaGt net sales of zero for the 650. Eve:y 650 sold would 
Just replace possible 701 sales in the1r Vicv. 25 Applied Science, on the 
other hand, foreca.t lale. of 200 650'., moatly for scieotific aad engineering 
use. 26 After heated internal debate, the 650 waG announced 1n early 1953 and 
firlt delivery was in November, 1954. In the end about 1,800 were produced, 
mOltl! for busines. application •• 
:he 650 wal DOt the faltelt of =achine.. It could originally output only 
111 ,clen~lfic or 291 commercial computations per .econd. The 650, however. 
wa •• ~ty flexible io ita USI', carried a relatively low prico, wa. rlliable, 
was ~'Y to inatall aDd ~tnt.1b and, ov.r ti~, was upgraded by alphabetic 
cape lity, an excellent pr1ncsr, tape drivel, the RAKAC disc: drive and thl 
$OAf ~ymbolic Cpti~:atioo ~sembly Program) a •• eebler. for progracaing. It 
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was al.o IUpported b1 trained and ~tivat.d .. 1 •• and maintaaence per.oDDel. 
" Tho 650 vas the -Modal r of cOilputon. In September, 1953, 111( alU1Ounc:ed the 
702, for ciol.ivery 10 19S5. IBH allO produced the IIOre .pecialized 604 aDd 
610. both of which were introduced in 1954. It va. the 650, aonath.l.... that 
changed 1m'. iuao froa a producer of -Iat UBIV 11:.'.- to tho leader in the 
indu.try. 
Goverument .ponaor.d computer r .... rch and procurement had put a cumber 
of other firma into a technolosical po.ition similar to I~'I in the early 
1950's. AX & T. which had coap1eted a lara_ scale •• lectromechanicel computer 
in 1940, was as.ociated with the ENIAC proJect, waa doing lara. amount. of 
research in el.ctronic., aDd IUpplied soveral eletromechan1cal digital 
computers to the aovernmont between 1943 aDd 1947. 27 Perhaps under.tandably, 
AX & T elected DOt -to develop and market electronic computera, but instead 
focu.sed on u .. of the same technology in telecommunic~t1ons application •• 28 
In :~52-1954, AX & T .old $263,000 of computer products to the U.S. government 
and could well have been seen as a potential competitor in cocmercial 
=arkatl. After the 1956 cone.nt decree with the Depar:cent of Justice, AX & T 
was l!ffect1vely precluded frOID the urket. 
Raytheon, another of the cOQpanie. following ENIAC and EDVAC developcents 
closely, was awarded a contract to produce a computer by the Bureau of 
Standud. (later the Offic. of Naval Research) in 1947. The computer became 
the RI~DAC (Rayth.on Digital Automatic Computer) aDd was delivered to ONa in 
1951. In the same time period, Raytheon also produced other computers for 
variou. classified government use •• 29 The company was reg3rded as -one of the 
pr1:1e c.!Qtera of technological develop!lent [in the early 1950' sJ and probably 
[aJ lea~er roughly parallel with the Univac operation in terms of scope of 
cOClpetenc.e.-30 
Despite the leading technological edge that government computer contracts 
acd outsid, a •• ociationa provided Raytheon, the co=pany did not market a 
cocamerclal ,·OIIlputer. A RAYCOH cOClputer, developed froal RAlD.\I:. was plann<ed, 
but ~ot lold. Raytheon .aw it.elf a. ·primarily a Government funded 
corporatioo- that -did not attack commercial activities 1n other fields very 
well.- 31 A coma.rcia! vontur~ would require -funding from the [corporate] 
exchequer" in contra.t to funding by government contract. 32 
In 1955 - by which time .everal other campanie. were in the market -
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RAytheon formed a joint venture, Detacatie Corporation, vlth HinDeapoli. -
HOC1O)'VOll Reaulotor COQpaDY. th8 id .. val to u.. the lAtCClC uebDolol7 to 
produce aDd IMrket larae ec.all ,y.UGI. nus Dat&aatic-1000 tal btrocSucld in 
lata 1957 with a capacity tor 481 .e1lntltle or 1,455 eo ... rei41 cuepuatiOD. 
per .-ecoDd. t'ba HoDlywell 800 appeared iD December, 1960, With .peld. of 
28,790 .clentitie or 23,760 coamercial coapuationl per 'lcoDd. .., theD, 
hovever, tbe IeM 7090, thl (J)C 160., the Pbllco 2000-211, aDd othau rith 
comparable or bettu .pe.cia had been 00 tbe urket tor .OM time. 33 Only 8 or 
10 0-1000'. w.re 101d, larloly for .trai,ht accouotiol work. Raytheon, which 
mliht vell have .ucceeded had it pur.ued thl RAICOH proar.. vi,orou.ly 'O!II. 
y.ar. ear111r, withdrew frca Dataa&t1c io 1957. It continuld, howlvlr, a. an 
extremely competent developer aad manufacturer of .pecial purpoee, iovernment 
computere. 31t 
RCA va. another compaoy that could I~ve =adl a -firlt !!IOVI- into the 
commarclal field. StudieD of electronic computina dlvice. had belun at RCA 
-a. &arly a. 1935.-35 Go~ernment support va. very importaDt. ICA dlveloped 
and dalivered electronic .y.t~1I8 for aoti-aircraft fire control 1n the early 
1940'. It produced a computer. the Typhon. for the Navy io 1947. By 1950. 
exploratory re.earcb v •• dODa io rel.tioD to a coamercial .pplicat1on. All of 
this anted.t .. tbe decldoo by 1ft( to produce the Defen .. Calculator (IBK 
701). &Jt. 11ke RAytheon, RCA devoted mo.t of It. activltie. to c:l ... 1Hed 
~overnment coaputer project. In the.. early year.. RCA worked 00 tube 
development for ENIAC .nd other comput.r. aad began r •••• rch on core memory 
and transl.tor. for computer uee in 1952. 36 
The BIZMAC. RCA', flr.t comm.rclal QAchin •• va. d.veloped under contr.ct 
with the Army. Itl purpo.c val -Itock control of replacement partl for 
milltary combat and transport vahlel ••• - 37 Only six BIZMAC'. wer. shipped 
beglnnlng In late 1955. The.e had speedl of oo1y 286 scientific or 968 
cOCQercial computationa pOI' .econd. Work be,An on the RCA 501 in 1958. When 
t~e 1&tt4r wa. introduced It was h81lod, incorrectly, .. -the firlt c~pl.tely 
tranlisturl,ed. ,enera! purpoDO electronic deta proce •• ing .y.t ... - 38 Ev.n 
the 501 r.lied directly on ioverumeat work. It .ro •• 1n par.llel with RCA'. 
being cholao prolr_ IUlUa"r for thl BKE\lS North .... ric.n Air Oefenl. Command 
early varnina .Ylt... The RCA 110 Indultr1al COntrol COmputer of the lat. 
1930'. had a .1.il&r origin. The company acknovled,od that it. -maj~r 
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oblt.c1.- WI. It. OWD -doubt. al to ICA'I Ilrlou.aa •• lD tbe 10. bu.lae ••• • 
39 R •• ourci' vlre allocatod to color tlllvl.loD, Dot t\l lO. aDd c08putlr •• 
&.r thl .ad of 1961, with the leA 601 -dl.a.tlr- .plllloa oVlr to taped. ICA 
J01 .a11., ICA'. EDP divi.lon va. quitl IfflctivIly dlfunct. 
t 
Claeral Elletric wa. aaothlr boaficiary of thl tlchnol0" .pavald by 
r 
ENIAC, EDVAC aad the 1947-19'0 computlr coaf.rlnel'. Llke .. 01 othlr 
co.panlle, it reetricted It. fir.t dove1opment and maaufacturlna effort. to 
.p.clallied .Ylt.a. for or~ncl and mllltary appllcatlon •• 40 Thl 19'3 OARAC 
(Offlc. of Alr Ro •• arch Automatle co.put.r) WI. on. of th •••• Th. ~ 
(El.ctronic a.cordlas ~thod of Accountiaa), announced ln 19'6, val thl flr.t 
comm.rclal1y avallable C! =achinG. ConlonAnt with thl prlvloue rllk-rlducina 
pollcy lnhlrlnt vlth iovlremlnt contract., the ERMA VI. d.v.1oped uad.r a $60 
milllon contract with thl !Ink of A=lrlca for uti ln chock handllng. Undlr 
thl. contract, JO ERMA'. Vlre dllivered, but G£ ~f.l1ed to capltll'l- on Itl 
llad In IVln EDP appllca,lonl ln thl bankina lnduetry.41 Wlth 11ttl. rl.k to 
It •• lf. C! contracted vltb Natlonal ealh al,l.t.r to produci the NCR dlelaned 
304. !hl. machloe wal Introduced by NCR In lAte 1959. In connectlon with It. 
dav.lopaent of numerlcal control. for machlne tool., C£ d •• laned And produced 
the CE 312 and. bal.d on the 312, dlllvirad the G£ 225 10 1961. Gov.rnm.nt 
and other contract dev.lopm.nt and production aavi C! the opportunlty to be 
amana che flrm. l.ad1ol che rlret decade of the commerleal lndu.try, but GE 
dld not opt for thi. rl.ky cholce. 
tn contra.t to CE. the soall Conlo1ldated Eolln •• rln, Corporatlon .et up 
the EloctrodAca Corporation to develop and market the CEC 202/:03 In 1954. 
Electrodata Introduced It. Oatatron 203/204 In Jun •• 1954. with carketlng 
headed by • formor IBM executlvo. 42 Thi. wa. don., however, under contract 
with tho Jet Propul.lon Laboratory. whlch In turn had ,overnment contract 
.upport. Slx addltlona1 Oatatron. w.nt to U.S. Naval Ordinance. All,tate. 
Socony-Vacumm. h30rlcan 8o.h Arma Corporation. Land-Alr. Inc., and Purdu. 
Unlver.lty Al.o acqulccd Oatatron.. Wlth an ,dvanced O.t.tron ~O~, 
ElectroJata had 24 tnet.lled computer. And 19 unfllled order. by ~rch. 
1956. A r.v Donth8 later. Electrodata wa. acquired by Burrouah •• 43 
for tto part, Burrouih. had blaun electronlc cOQPuter r •••• rch In 1947. 
Repre,eatatlvi. of the comp.ny were att~ndlll .t thl computer conf.rlace. And 
Burrough •• under coatr.ct. upgrAdad ENtAC by ,upplylna • new ·,t.tlc mAinet1c 
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ma=ory" fro. lte Phl1ldelphia la •• arch COocer. 44 y.t Burroulh. WI. eautiou. 
ln It. OVQ att •• pt. to .all coaputarl co~rci.lly. -AI late II 1953, 
Burroulh. oplned that- (1)0 buolno.o the arlthe.etlc 11 Uluall, aGt 
difflcult. It would be of DO advantano co .p.ed up che race of f{,urias, 1f 
lnput. output aad oth.r periph.ral operation. did DOC ka,p pac •••• (Thlr. i.) 
the major ob.tacla of co.t. The outlook for el.ctronic. 10 bu.ln •••• theo, 
mu.t be .ummed up in the word. 'not yet,.-·5 
!urrouaha dld noolth.l ••• produce 000 UD!C (Unitlzed Dlaltal El.ctronic 
Comput.r) for Wayoo State Univor.lty and uparad.d a UD!C to a UDEC 11 ln 
1?55. The .peedo of UOEC 11 vore rouahly tho.e of ENlAC. Comt.mporan.ou.ly, 
ana con.L.t.ot with It. vi.w of commercially u •• d comput.r., the Burroulh. E-
101 va. lntroducod la 1954 for .cilntLfic aad bu.lne •• application.. The 
Burrouah. 204 and 20S machlne. appear.d la 19S4 al.o. Throulh thi. perlod 
eurroushl v •• dlv.loplng computer. und.r d.f.o.e contract. aad ,iad •• d. "beian 
to .eek out def.n •• contractl for whlch 1:. facll1tl •• and capabilltle. ware 
be.t ,ultod and vhlch had the ireat •• t po.teotlal for commercial .y.tem. 
developed.- Thl major .tlmulu. for commercial latlre.t at &urrouah. va. thelr 
"recelpt of lovernment contract. involvlna prlcl.1on computatlonal and data 
proces.lns ~ul~ment ln the ar.A of flrl c~ntrol, aavl,atlon, antl-aircraft 
batt.ry evaluatlon, and ultl~tely, the auldanci computlr for the Atla. 
Sall1stic mi •• ile and the data proc •• llna .y.tem. for the SAGE 
intercontinlntal air d.fense nltvork."46 
The acquisltlon of El.ctrodata la 1956 .lint~1.d the beglnalng of 
Burrough' •• erlou. effort. In thl comm.rclal marklt. Production of the 
Oat~tron :20 began ln 1957, with deliv.ry .cheduled for December 1958. 
Unh~ppily. the 2:0 va. a .lov, vacumm tube computer thl introduction of which 
cauled EUrrough's effectlve, lf temporary, withdrawal from the market nearly 
simultaneou,ly vlth It. fir.t ,erlout eatry. The 0825 computer, wh1ch wa. 
produced for government u .. La communc.tloos ~na8emeot. was a precursor of 
the 8-5000 whicb, in 1962, brouaht Burrouahl back 1nto the commerclal ~arket. 
~.tional ealh Real.ter be,an experlmlnt. ln electrooic. in thl late 
1930', and val lncluded among thOle attendlaa the Hauchly-Eckert-Von Se~Qa­
Chambers-Aiken computer confereoce.. NCR perfor=ed cla •• ifled electronlc. 
work for tho ,overna.nt durlns World War II and, betwreo 1945 and 1952, 
produced a -Ilaot- electro-aechaoical brain for boabina neviaatlonal purposes 
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under loverament contract. NOl Int.r.d the I.nlral purpo •• ca.putlr fi.ld In 
1953 throuah it. acqui.ition of tha CoQputor a. •• lrch Corporaclon, • Northrop 
lub.ldiary. cac had It.olf boln 8Upportld by IO.lrnmont fuod.4 contr.ct •• 
The cae 10LD va. introduced by NCl 1n lat. 1953. Thi. aachiDl, al.o 
call.d the NCI 101, va. a •• ilabl, .t about tn. aam. tLae a. thl IBM 101, but 
it ral.mbled mort thl tNIAC in t.rms of computatlonal .peod.. NCI d.v.loped • 
303 whicb WI. not told baCIU'. of lta inflrior p.rformanc.. Tbt NCR 304 wa. 
announced in 1957 for d.livery in late 1959. It, too, VII called thl -flr.t 
all-.olid .tate .y.t.m- aDd II notld abovI, va. produc.d by GE ualna 
tran.iltoriz.d circuit. d.v.loped lad produc.d by CE. The 304 had 
computational Ip •• d. that Wlr. roul~tly 1/S0th of tho., of thl IBM 1090 Ind, 
indeed. ia1arior eVID to tboae of the C! 210. NCR .ub •• quently marketed the 
310 computer which val ba.ically tha CDC 160 and wa. produc.d by CDC. The NCR 
390 aad NCR 315 of 1960 vera really the flr.t of the compani •• own products in 
the carket. Neither va. I .tartllns marklt .ucc •••• 
Philco dld not attempt Intry into the commercial computer area untLl the 
mid-1950' ••• Dd did .0 on the ba.is of government contrlct. to d.velop and 
produce a -.urfac. barrier tran.i.tor.- From th •••• a contract va. glven for 
a tran.iltorlz.d Ilrborne comput.r, thl C-1000. for the Air Force. saaed on 
thls work. Phllco contracted to produce & large trlnslltorlzed computer for 
the N&tlonal Security ~ency. Phllco modified and lntroduced this computer 
commerically in 1958 a. the TRANSAC 5-2000-210. Thil computer wa. allo call.d 
the -flr»t large-.cale tranllstorized toP ly.tem.-47 
The t"ilco 2000-210 rap resented something of I quantum leap in the 
computatlonal speed. of comm~rclllly Ival1able machlnls. It had the 
capability of nearly 30,000 Iclentlfic or 28.700 commerclal computations per 
,econd, in contr.at to about 1,900 scientific Ind 10,200 commercial 
computations on the ISH 709 IDd 4.430 Ici.ntific aDd 5.500 coamercial 
computatlon. on the Univac 1105. The latter were lntroduced at about the same 
tieo. Follow-on 2000-2ll and 2000-212 machine. were announced, and early. 
cUltomcrl lncluded thl AlC, C!.48 State of Ca11fornia. United Alrcraft, 
Chrysler. SOC. ~p.x. State of Isreal, University of Wyoming acd the Defen.e 
Communicatlons Indultry. Core =emory for the 2000'. came from Ph!lco and some 
software wal lupplied by ADR. Philco lacked the 10phl1ticated peripheral 
hardware - disc drIve •• tape drives, printera - •• well a. the sale a and 
13 -
technical maiotlG4ocl tupport aecI •• ary for lar,1 ~rket plnetratlon bf tho 
2000 'Iria.. Ford Kator CoQpa01 acqulred Philco ia Dlel.blr, 1961, with thl 
obJletlvQ of lottinl into tho .paea aad deftn.t .erotor. of coaputer 
app11catio~.49 
Coatrol Deta Corporation wa. founded by Willia. Norri. 1a 1957. Norr1~ 
telt that Sperry laad (pre.ioualy lominatoa Rand) wa. DOt manaa1aa 1t. 
computer opportunitle. ia anythinl approach1na an opt1mal way. W1th other 
tormer Sperry Rand per.oonel, Norr1a .ueceedod 10 de.ian1na aad otterina the 
CDC 1604 computlr tor delivlry ia 1960. The CDC 1604 wa., they aaid, -the 
tirlt .olid-Itatt, laral .ealt computer- announced. 50 ~ early 1958, CDC al.o 
had lub.tant1al aoveraa_nt contract., lncludina a ~~vy award for de.elopment 
and production of the 1604 whicb, at thl tia., ~. a 1/10 Icale prototype. 51 
The 1604 had acieot1fic computat10n .peed. 10 tXCI •• of thOle ot the Ph1lco 
2000-210, and rouahly cooperable co=merc1al computat10n .peed.. Th. IBM 7090 
va. by thin on the market, however. and the 7090 va. con.id.rably fa.tlr 1n 
both type. of computation •• 
CDC clearly aot 1nto thl market with it. 1604. relying on other 
~nuf&ctur.rl for mainltic tapo drive •• pr1nters. card readlrl and paper t.pe 
reader.. CDC wa. aidld by lov.rament pr1vat. dev.lopment contract.. Th. CDC 
160 va •• nnounced in December 1959 for delivery six oonth. l.tlr. with ~CR 
having exclu.ive markotins rilht. in the United State. for banking and ret.1l 
tr.de applicat10nl. CDC prov1ded .ervici aad maintenanci. opened data center. 
(service bur •• u.) in 1960, and enaaged act1vely in acquisitionl. Through 
Nor:i., CDC wa. from the on.et convincod of an .xpandiaa EOP mark.t with 
1ocr.asi~8ly sophisticAt.d hardware and loftware. The CDC 160 was followed 1n 
the early 1960'. by the CDC 3600 aad CDC 6600. The determination to 
·focu •••. r •• ourc •• and conc.ntration on the computer bUline •••• such •••• nd 
luccess in that bulin •••• • and ·wil11ngne •• to t.kl rilks· were, according to 
Sorris, the ~iy factor. 1n CDC'. succall. 52 
A Comparilon in the U •• of Covernmentally 
Provided Opportunltie.: Project. Whirlwind and SAC! 
Proj.ct WhIrlw1nd Val ln1tially commislioned to desian a real-ti~c fl~&ht 
Simulator to t.ach pro'PQct1vo pilot. to interact with th.1r craft .nd to 
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reducI thl expln... lnvolved In build1aa ACtual warkins modll. of 
altlrnatively dl.lsned planus. The Alrcraft Stabl1lty aDd Control AD41Yllr 
(ASCA) for whicb tho Speclal Dnl ... Dlvilion of the o. S. Ibrclu at 
Aeronautl,. contrActed witb H.I.T. 10 Noveaber, 1944, va. to be a doylca vb1ch 
would por'll.1t a perlon to experiencI the covellCtnt. of &A aircrate I the 
lntlraction betWlon tho re.pont •• of the plr.on aad the rl.poDle. of the 
.imu1ated aircraft- cabin ware to be controlled by an analol coaputor.-S3 Jay 
w. Forre.tlr, an electrlcal ensinaer, ve. cho.an to head the project whicb wa. 
operated under the au.plce. of the Sarvoaechani.m. Laboratory. rorre'ter 
choel Robert R. EVlrett, also &A electrical Inaineer at H.I.T., to lead the 
project with him. The SorvoIIClchaDi •• Laboratory bad been 'It up In 1940 by 
Forrl.ter aDd Gordon S. BroVD aad conductld work 1I&1n1y In the aria. of flre 
control and r.dar .y.tlm •• 
AD asrlement betvaln H.I.T. and the Splcial DavicI' Civi.ion in May, 
1945, .paclfled a budget of $875,000 for the 18 montht needed for project 
completion. 54 the ASCA va" however, never completed. Forre.ter became 
rather di.contlntad wlth the analog orlentatlon of the II&chlne .ad sought 
lnformation from tho.e, particularly at the Mborl School, warkins on the £SlAC 
and faml11ar wlth dlgltal circult.. The chanae in orlentation from analog to 
dlgltal occurred AI a re.ult of thl inter~ctlon. tak1na place durin, the now 
famous Moore School Suamar Cour •• In 1946. 55 Conver.atlona &mOna .el.ntl.t. 
and techn1cl~n. that helped alter the conceptlon of th~ machlnl, although they 
depended heavl1y on tholo at the Moorl School, took pl~ce prior to that sUQQer 
, ••• 10n, aad perhapa a. early &I the fall-v1ntcr of 1945. 56 
The project nama ve. changed in 1946 from ASCA to Whirlwind. 57 
Electrostatlc tube. developed at M.I.T. and producld in the Dlgital Computer 
Laboratory wIre chocen for .torage, although thera W&I at leaat soml 
exploratlon of neoa (1.0. cold cathode trlonod.) technology. Apparently lt 
wa. the jolnt M.I.T. - Sylvaaia effort thAt re.ulted ln the 7Al7 tube, the 
flrlt tubo component do.laned axpre •• ly for cOQPuter.. Thl, tube attalned an 
av.rag. llfe of 500,000 hour., whlch allowed the Whlrlwlnd I cireultry to 
eeot. it. r.llabillty .taad&rd. 58 ~.n completed 10 Harch, 1951, Whirlwind I 
was • parallel .ynchronou" dill tal, binary, atored progrea computer with a 
world len.th of 16 bit.. Alona with 7~7 vacuum tube. the machlne al,o 
cont~l~ed ll,ooo cry.tal dlodl'. It could perfora 20,000 slaila-addre •• 
operationa PQr ,acond. Ace... tlm. to the el.ctro.tatic 'torase version ~. 
- 1S -
25 micro •• condl. 
Thi. &CC.IO time, however, wo. deemed too .lov. Wlthout au t.provomont, 
the Whirlw1Dd would not be able to m.et It. target of 50,000 linat. addre •• 
oporationa per Mcond. It va. durlna thi. period that Forr .. ter arrived at 
the idea of ulioa masnetic cor.. lor Itorase. Hi. inveation of colncldoat-
curr.nt maGnetic cor. memory which depended oa the rectaaaular hy.tereli.-loop 
effect allowed the WhirlwlDd to lncr .... It. laternal .torase ace ••• time to, 
on avora,e,~. In ordor not to .lov other a.pect. of the Whlrlwind Project, 
a separate -Memory Teat Co.Iputer- wu bullt and by May 1953 wa. ulina 32 by 32 
core., in a stack of 16. The HOmory T •• t Computer va. both rellable and 
fa.t. In Auau.t 1953 thl electro.tatic .torase tube. of Whirlwind I were 
replaced by rando=-acco •• magnetic core .toraS'. 
Proj.ct Whirlwind cr.at.d the early prototype of the SAGE (Semiautomatic 
Ground Environment) .ystem of the Atr FOre.. Had Whirlwind not pr •••• d the 
state of the art a. far a. it did, it i. likely that SAGE (AN-FSQ 7) would 
hav. baen eomDleted lat.r than 1956, the year ia which d.livery began. 
The ASCA project aireement wa. betwe.n M.I.T. and the Navy'. Special 
Services Division of tho U.S. Bureau of Alronautic.. The funding wa. of the 
expansive type prevaleat during World War 11.59 In 1946 the re.eareh and 
develoPQent organization within the Navy deportment va. shuffled and re.ulted 
in the creation of the Office of Naval Re.erach (ONR). The Mathematics Branch 
of the ONR took supervisory control over the ASCA project away from the 
Special Divisions Division. ONa wa. far more critical of the Whirlwlnd 
Project and objected to wh4t it teemed to be exc ••• iv. requirement. for 
funding. ~rhe show down came when H.I.T. r.que.ted $1,831,583 for the 15 
month period betweon July 1, 1948, and September 30, 1949. This request was 
double ONR'. propooed allocation ••• -60 Up to this time $2 million had already 
been sp.nt by the Navy. There wa. con.iderable bitterne •• and antagonism, 
ending io & reduced allocation, but oae lufflc1eot to maintain the 1ntesrlty 
of the program. For future year. iorre.t.r also cited SU4S 1n the 
neighborhood of a million dollar. a year a. mandatory. Compared to oth.r 
• ••• Federally .upport.d computer-d.velopment program •••• th. maximum order of 
C4goitudo of cOlta for .ueh programl ranged from half a milli~n to twe third. 
of a million dollar.. WhIrlwind, accordina to contempory el,imlte., would 
approximAte $3 million, and an additional $3/4 m1llJ~Q sho~ld be ~dded to that 
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amount if all r .... rch co.t. ainco the belianer. of the ASCA project warl 
included.61 
At thi. junction, ao ONR va. backina away from fundin& Projlct Whirlwind, 
lupport va. foua4 in thl Air Force. The Cold Wlr VI' heatina up. a" late 
1949, the Air !breI we. comcencina to cr.ate I contin.ntll def.n ••• y.t .. (to 
be jointly undertakon with CAnadl) and tapped an H.I.T. faculty member to aid 
1n Itructurina the proble. U. wal appri .. d of the Whirlwind Projoct by a 
colleaaue aDd found that ther. va. already an .xiltina advanced de. ian 
~omputer capable of the real-time application that would be needed for the air 
defense IYltlm. In 1950 Whirlwind became a prototype and te.t facility for 
SIGE. The L1ncoln Laboratory \0", IItablbhed at H. I. T. and Whirlwind wa. 
passed on to it in order to facilitate the Laboratory in thl development of 
S,lCE. 
Tho SAGE sYltem va. de.ianed to interpret radar information. It vas a 
cooperative effort between the U.S. and CAnada. If alien aircraft were 
detected the system was to .elect the appropriate interceptor aircraft and 
determine mi.sil. trajectorie.. The SAGE system waa also de.igned to store 
largo amounts of lnformatlon performlng in way. dkin to an accountlns 
sy.tem. The Air Force author1zed H.I.T. to lolicit proposals from a number of 
companies to aid 1n the design and implementation of the SAGE system. 
H.I.T. recognized the enormous complexity of SAGE. the Whirlwind 
prototype would have to be modified to become -a rellable, rep~atable, 
practical deSign- with an objective -to manufacture, install and maintain 
leveral dozens of the systems - systems of unprecedented complex1ty which 
employed heretofore unprov.n technologl0.-. 64 Serioul descissiona were 
undertaken with RCA, Raytheon, Remington Rand, Sylvania and IBM. 
The risks inherent in the S}~ partici~ation were of obvious concern to 
IBM. The company had never been involved in so largl and complex a 
project. 63 SeniQr IBM personnel apparently were embroiled in internal debate. 
includIng -a day Ions ~etina chaired by Mr. Wat.on, Sr., 10 the Board RoOD 
which resulted in co progr.ss whatsoever tow.rd a decislon.-64 Consider.tion 
of the possibility of subsequent contract c~ncellation and thl penalitie. that 
would be forthcociQ3 ware alao entert.ined. The Korean Conflict, had caused 
~. Watlon, Sr. to offer whatev.r help would bI appropriMte to the war effort, 
was also a factor. This offer of help waG not limited to current IBM 
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product.. Thl IDM Defense Calcuator (thl 701) waG not Ylt complet.d, and SloG! 
wa. ono{rmou.lY marl c~pllcAtcd and ri.ky. ICH nonethele.. .ubaittcd a 
propo.al. 
In October 1952, K. I. T. Idoctld I1tl to wrk with UncolD Lab. 10 tho 
d.llra of the SAG! dilltal comput.r. 1D April, 1953, ISH rec.lved a prime 
contract from tho Air fOrc. for mora dltall.d d •• lin. In Sept •• bor 1953, a 
contract vai awarded to ISH ·to do. 110, fabricat., .upport aad maintain two 
prototype comput.r. for the SAGE sy.t ••• •6S 
I!tf wat not tM only cootractor vorkiaa on SAGE. 'The R.Rm Corporation 
(and later, a 'pinoff, Sy.tem Development Corporation (SOC» WI. rl.poo.lble 
for applicationo prolramm1ns, Burrouaha va. r •• poa.lbl. for modlfyiaa th. 
radar slaDAl. 10to dial tal .lanals and d •• llnina the arid patt.rn. AI wall a. 
the operator'. con.ol •• and dl.pLay unlt., aad .ite con.truetlon wa. provid.d 
~y Westarn Electric. Th. ri.k in becomina involved io SAGE i. an •••• otial 
part of the story. 
HAny of thl concepts had \)eGO trild only io a 
laboratory. Thera was 00 guaraot •• I!tf could hire the 
numberl of people that would be naede4 to carry out It. 
respo~ibiliti... Fallur. to deliv.r the eomput.r. 
sueee •• fully, bleau.e thl project va. 10 ma •• ive. could 
have led to adver.e flnaneial rlpereus.iona and damese to 
ISH'I reputation ••• a mistake in computatioo miaht r •• ult 
in accidontal de.truetion of ODt of our couatry'. own 
airplane., with tho re.ultant finAncial expo.url and 
publicity .uch an acc1deot mlaht Intail. All of u. wer. 
coaceraed in 1953 about divlr.ion of key enaia.orins and 
syste~ persona and Applied Sciec. persona who w.rl 
barely completing the design of the 650, 701, and 702. 
~oreover. IBM. would need to coostruet a completely new 
factory to build the SAGE computer. and all of UI in the 
highest management group woodered what wo~~ happen if 
the contract ~re cancelled ln c1d.tre ••• 
But SAGE was Guccea.tul ~ad re ulted in numeroUi lnnovationa, many of 
which IBM va. to use ln later comm.rcl&l applicationa. The vacuum tube SAGE 
va. ona of the tir.t computer. to h've coincid.nt curr.nt random acee •• 
OAgnetlc cor •• tora,e. Although it lnitially had • capacity of ~nly 8192 
worda, thi. va. increaced to a l.vel of 69,632 word.. Word length wae 32 bit. 
and cycle time for this parallel, b.~ary, .inale addre •• machine was 6 
microsecond.. Average operating sr-1J wa. 75,000 1n.truet10ne per .econd. 67 
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Accordiaa to Qathbert Illrd, 68 I &It'. partic1pation 1n SMi! -led to reducod 
manutactur1ns co.t., improved rel1eb111ty aDd .erv1ceeb1lity, aDd reduced 81ze 
and pover requ1rement •• - Hurd noted the folloWina a. IBH innovat10n. in 
connect10n With SLG!:69 
1. techn1que. to rapidly, 1naxpen.1vely and reliably manufacture core 
mC.lllory. 
2. the f1r.t 1netance of computer-to-computer telecommunication. 
3. real-tiQO .imultaneoua u.e by over 100 people 
4. employmtnt of keyboard torminal. for man-mach1ne interact10n 
5 u.e of two procea.or. to iaproVi rel1ab1l1ty aad .erv1ceab111ty 
6. ab1lity to dovolve certaia funct!on. to remote locationl without 
interferins with the dual proce •• or •• 
7. uee of di.play opt10n. independently of dual proce.lor. 
8. construction con.i.ting exclu.1vely of printed circuit board. 
9. inclus10n of an interrupt .y.tem, diagno.tic programmina and 
maintenance warn1~ techniques 
10. work within the are. of .,soc1.t1ve memory. 
SAGE offered IBM the opportunity to develop a cadre of trained computer 
expert. a. w~ll aD to improve itl manufactur technique.. Ourina the time 
SAGE wa. being undertaken at ISM it required the bulk of IBM's employees and 
capital commitaente. 70 Hurd claimed that -the experi.nce which ISH gained 
from its work on the SAGE system was significant to the future luccesl of the 
company.-71 
Exactly why MeI.T. chose IBM over the other companies il not discernable 
from available recorda. An important reason may be that IBM had by that time 
elec ted to prodllc.: the 701 on an assembly line baais.72 H. I. T. may also have 
been especially iapreDaed with IBM's commitment to high quality and 
reliability and with the qual1fication. of the perlonnel in 18f's Applied 
Science Sroup. In any case, IBM received the contract and, mar. importantly, 
built on it. Another company might have been selected. 
ISH announced tho 704 and 705 computers in 1954. While aome 701 were 
then installed, delivery of the 702'1 had not begun. Bo,h the 704 and 705 
used the S1.GE related developments, in particular, the core memory 1n place of 
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tube lWIIory. the 704 waa sevaral tlmo. talter thaD the 701, .. ID after the 
701 was rode. lined to provide corl memory. Dollvlri .. of the 704 baleD lD 
1956. Tho 704 va. by It.olt r.sarded a. a -major technol081e&l Lmprovcaent-
aad a -creatlvo &a.tarpiece. _73 Aecoapaa.1ed .. lt wu by the F01T'lAH 
proguaina laQU48G, tho 704 had a ajor urklt impact. Tho 704 va. tho IlII 
704. no lonser -an 1ltl UNIVAC.-
15M contlnued with It. prosrl •• ion of cow product. with thl aDnouncece~t 
ot tho 305 IL\MAC (Ilandoca Aecu. Memory Autout1c Compuur) 1D 1956. The 30S 
was not a great comm.rcial .ucc •••• but lt introducld the concept of a dlse 
drivI. The accI" tl11l1 of tho 350 dllC drivi in thl 305 was 200 tlmol fa.t,r 
than that of the tape drlvl. then avallablo. 74 Thl 709 wa. announcld in .. rly 
1957 and dllivered to cUltomer. in 1958. Whl11 gonerally compatlble with the 
704. the 709 was agaln four time. falter than the 704 and provldld cany other 
technological aud u'er illlpro~nt.. AI wa. true of the other po.t-19S6 vacuum 
tube machinls. it qulckly bocallll apparlnt that the 709 would not be 
commercially successful becau.e of the advent of all of thl wfir.tW large 
.cale tran.itorized coaputer •• 
LARC 
In 1954 Univer.ity of Californla Radiation Laboratory (UCRL), now called 
the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. reque.ted proposall for a computer to be 
some 100 times fa.ter than the onel they were currently using. thole in 
current u.e included a UNIVAC I. Tho computer waa also required to have an 
upti~e of 90 p'rcent or greater. The call for proposals went to IBM and 
Sperry Rand, aeons other.. Within Sperry Rand, the Philadelphia (Eckert-
Mauchly) group wa. unaware of thl existence of the proposal for six montha. 
The St. Paul (~ group received the request and began on its own to prepare 
a reapon,e. Eckert was infuriated: he wanted his group to respond to the 
proposal. &ayood tho u=UAl rivalri •• , he was part1cularly interested 1n this 
contract becau.a whe thought that the company had to develop solid-.tate 
technologies for tM nut cOClllllrcial large scale .ysteN (ol1owil18 the UNIV At:. 
I computer. 75 Improvement. in the solid-.t.te ~8netic amplifIer technology 
(officially referred to by Sperry Rand as FERRAt:.TOR TM) th3t hsd been 
developed 1n the early 1950'. in an effort to i=prove computer speed and 
reliability offered a promising route. 
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Sperry iand Corporate =ana8~nt dld DOt want the two ,roupe to eoapete 
for the contract aad aftar conaidarabl, flahtlna. tho Eckert ,roup von the 
daht to eupply the lOla Sperry RAnd propoIIl for the WC (1.1"'&"IIOre 
Aut' At1c lo.aarch Computer). The propoeal val pre.ented ~ April, 1955, 
follovina the IS! pre.entatlon. The contract was asreed upon bltwaon UClL, 
actlna for tM Atolll1c Enersy CoaIII.1uion, .nd the Eckert SrOUP .t Sparry Rand 
10 Septetllber, 1955. 
The int.nded &DCe.tor of the LAIC YR. to be the Air Fbrce Caabridge 
R •••• rch Cen:ar Computer lAFClC), for which. contract had been .igned b.tw.en 
the Air Forc. and Sperry Rand in 1954. The AFCRC Comput.r wae the first 
compl.ted Sp.rry Rand ~puter to u ... olid-.tat. mAgn.tic amplifier 
(FERRACTOa) technology which had oriainally been te.ted .t Sperry Rand'. 
Norwalk Lab •• rll.r that y •• r. 76 When the LARC contr.ct w •• 'igned, it wa' 
anticipated that the AFCRC computer would be a small proc •• aor for the new 
computer and that ·coil gating,· a technique to improve the apeed of the 
FERRACTOaS, would .ufflce. The technique was to employ sOIDe tran,istors of an 
early type but to rely lIlAioly on magnetic amplifiers since the available 
transistors were expen.ive and DOt very reliable. 77 
The final LARC .pecificationa were a.tablished in March, 1956, and 
coapletion WI' planned for February 1958.76 After the starting date but 
before the .pecifications were frozen it became clear that no improvements in 
the FERRACTOiS would be sufficient to obtain the required sp.ed. Attempt, 
were made to use the medium .peed transistors that w.re commercially available 
but even those were too slow (in the 1 to 5 MHz range). Her=an Lukoff, the 
chief engineer for the Univac tARC, acknowledges that it waa towards the eod 
of 1955 that: 
We started hearing rumors about Philco's development of a 
new high apeed transiator, .omethiag called a surface 
barri.r transistor (SBT). A visit to HIT waa 
prOllli,lna. I waa introduced to a you", engloeor by the 
name of Ken Ol •• n (now pre'ident of Digital Equipm.nt 
Corporation) who had obtained .omG of the new surface 
barrier tranaistors frOll Ph1lco and was Uling them in lab 
experll1lOnto· Ho verlfied that the tranaiatora ware faat, 
ten to thirty time. fa.t.r than contemporary 7 
tranai.tora. Phllco called them 30 MHz units. 9 
When the flnal spacifications were .. t in MArch, 1956, the csgnet1c 
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&mpllflar 1011~ had bRen euperceded b1 Sir lOllc. All 0 , the AFCRC eoaputer 
that had been pnaWl4d to bI the lnput-output proce .. or va. el1a1aated u too 
slov. Tho orlllaal contract price of the LAnC was $2,850,000 but e .. n when 
this contract uu silned it va. bel1eved that it lliaht DOt coyer the enUre 
coat of the LAIC. Eckert 1iQ. convinced that fJaproved sol1d stato c.oGIponenti 
war" undatory to aU future Univac computera aDd any COlt OVUrunI would havo 
to be ab.orbcd b1 Un1VAC. The uac coc.tract would help fund mch of the 
neces.ary work on new technolosy. Additional cOlta would simply have to be 
born by the cOQp&ny. However, by the time the .pacificationa were frozen, the 
cost of the LARC ~ projected to be .e le •• t double the as reed upon 
pr1ce. 80 To Ipr.ad the development coat., Univac contracted for a seCOnd LARC 
deslgnated for the David Taylor Model Ba.ln. 
No1se and den.e circu1t packaslng difficultl.1 were presI1ns probl.ma 1n 
the LARC construction. C~puters were Uled to aid in the packagica d.sign. 
Indeed, Lukoff noted that: 
Pri~r to fabrication, several eng1neers reslgned because 
they believed that 1t would be impoIslble to w1re the 
backboard and they didn't want to be alloclated with a 
failure. Fortunately, the wiremen weren't aware of the 
fact that l~ could~'t be done, so they went r1ght ahead 
and coapleted the w~rk.81 
~emory development was also a problam in LARC. The 4 second meaory 
needed ~ type of current switch capable of handlica hea~ currpnts a~ rapid 
,witching, but the Yourke current lwitch had n."t yet been i::'"lented. Iolith'lut 
such a switch the LARC memory had to rely upon a more cOltly solution 
involving high-current, slow trans1stors and special diodes that were 
developed exclusiv.ly for LARC by Sperry Rand. 82 Also, magnetic cores with 
the 4 ::lSec cycle tloe \oIere unavailable, caus1ca Univac to devel"p and 
aanuf4cture unique corel for LARC. 
tARC was delivered in 1960. Th. followin& year the second LARC was 
delivered to the D~vid Taylor Model ~t.1Q ( nov Naval Ship Rese.rch 
Developeent Center at Carderock, Md.). All specificationl were ~t by tn-
tARC, but the .arly 1958 dellvery date was obViously missed. Lukoff .Gt!~ted 
the total cost of LAiC &t clole to $19 mil110n.83 
The possibility of Sperry Rand's market1na of LARe·s wal ~lsCUS$ed in 
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bte 1957. It •• eat1uteeS that perbapo 8 to 10 other LAIC'. couleS be .oleS. 
The ,alo. c~p_isn W38 to besin quite lato, however, de.pite the full pal_ 
adverti.emont. in tba ~w York tioo. a04 Wall Street Journal. Accordin; 
Lukoff: 
A group of &Groopace executive. wa. flown in fro. the 
WeISt Co&lt to .u the LAlC co:aputer. However, by the 
timo tho computer waD deliverod, the Raminaton Rand 
Univac =anagement had had .uch a bally full of pa.t grief 
that they WQr. in DO mood :0 move forwara. A deciSion 
v.. reached to carry many of the LAlC ccncept. forw~£d 
into a new .y.t_ known u the UHIV AC III cOIIIputer. 
The aajor achiev~nt of LARC va. it. contribution to system concept •• 
LARC pioneereeS in multi-proce.lina, containeeS aD input-output controller which 
va. forerunner of the inrut-output portion of mocSern operating .y.tama, had 
independent ferrite core .torase to deer .... the sYltam acce3. time, had four 
level. of storase with different .peed., capacities and co.ts, r •• pectively, 
hAd a CPU inatruction overlaps feature enabling the computer to operate from 
differen: inltructiona coincidently and included an electronic page recorder 
to reduce the need for peper output. a5 Whether or QOt one evaluate. the LARC 
as a success or a failure depend. on t'le vantage point- from vhich the 
evaluation i. being made. Since DO commercial salel were forthcoming, it 
certainly vas not immediate cocmercia! succe •• , although concept. developed 
for the LARC were later incorporated into machinel which were .old 
cOCllllerc1ally. 
S'I'RETCH 
After IBM 10Gt the LARe contract to Sperry Rand, it proposed what was 
e98~ntlally the same machine to AEC', Lo. Alamo. Laboratory. 7he proposal va. 
accepted in November, 1956, and the computer was de.igned under the name 
StRETCH. Froo IEM'. point of viev, the obj~ctive v .. to -stretch- the stat. 
of the art, -to build the fa.te.t po •• ible machine,- -explor1na the unknown 
ar~ rethinkina ,04 unde.ignina almo.t every a.pect of earlier IBM computer 
system •• - 86 Th1. objective wa •• et even as the 704 va. ln les ~rly Itase of 
installation and was even concluded in terma rllative to the 704. The lSi 
7030, a. STREtCH va. eventually called, wa. to be -lOa times more powerful-
than the 704. 87 
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Unllka Sporry IaDd. vb1ch bad .tertd uac vith a c~t"Dt to ",e tM 
mAunltlc amp11fler dealplte Eckert'. vieva. IDK planned to ute Cr.nal.Cor. 1~ 
STR.!TCH. hld unllke !porry Band. tltUch uecd off-th8"".helf tralUllltofi 1D LAIlC 
whan Deln.tlc aapliflor. f.lled to perf OrB •• tlf.ctorlly. I~ recolDilld che 
need to develop tr.nallCor tlchnololY to fulflll STlETCH roqulrcaont •• "a 
Whlle the toa Alaoo. contr.ct vaa for only $3.' 81l110n. 11K proJecte~1 
" enslQCorlna cOlto of $1' milllon &ad monulactur1aa co.t. of $4.5 ailljon for 
the flr.t machlne. 89 
Th. STRETCH was delivered to Lo. Alaaol 1D Aprll, 1961. It 11&1 DOt .... v. 
been 100 tical faltlr thaD the 704. AD ind.p.ndlnt •• timat. mak.. it or~y 
about 37 t~'8 .. fl.t In aclentltic compuatlo~~ and ebout 168 tlme. ,~ fa.t 
In co~erclal compuatlona.90 IBH may have .uft.red 10 .... of •• much al $40.7 
million on the proJ.ct. 91 But, stR!TCH: 
1. utillzed radlcally new par.llel archlt.ctur., perm1t~1na .everal 
operation. to be portormed .imultaneou.ly 
2. employed SHS (Stlndard Modular SYltema) compon.nt technoloiY 
3. emploYld prlnted circuit card. &ad ~provld back panel virloa 
4. 1ncluded AD 8 blt by to 
5. re.ulted 14 ar.atly ~prov.d trlo,l.tor. and the mean. for 
m&nufactur1aa thea 
6. had. c~on mode tor attractlns perlpheral. 
7. ampha.lzed alphabetlc character. 
8. combined flxed and variable word leoath operation. 
~,. used a combination of declu1 aDd blnary arlthmetlc. 92 
The tlrlt 7090, IBH'I entry lnto commerclal tr.nsistorized compter. was 
deli'/ered to the Air Forc. - whlch had orderod tour of thea for the OEWLlNE 
alr defeo ••• y.tea - io April, 1959, about a yo.r and a half before STRETCH 
was c~pletad. The 7090, however, ·becamo the vehlcle by whlch tho 
componentry of the srR!TCH .y.taa (includina tran •• l •• loD, c1rcui:. pluggable 
unlto, cards. fr&Ae.. power suppll .. and mesorie.] b.came a part of the IBK 
product lino •• 93 nt. cOliponeotl of tho 7090 ware S'Ill!.TCH cOlipon.nu and the 
engineers who worUd ¥'i1 the 7090 caoc dlroctly frOll the S1'R!TCB project. 'The 
7090 w .. perhaps CIa.. .. hird to oOll-eighth the .~ed of STRETCH, but It Wat IIIOre 
than t~ice the ~~ ~J ,~ tn. Phllco 2000-210. FUrth.r, the 7090 was de.igned 
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to be usld in coojunction with othlr 11K coaputlr., particularly the 1620 and 
the 1401, cad quickly 8.01ved iato the ·!&aily· coacept. Tba 7070. 7080, 
1410, 7092. 7040, aDd 7044 all appear.d 1D the aaxe tbr •• aDd • ball year •• 
Abo.,. aU, stUTCB, tbro\.ah labelled in the 70XX .art ... va. a dlrlct 
pr.cur.or of tho 1aK 360 .. rl •• of the ald-1960' •• 
The 1IIpetU.l Ilven by tho lovem:unt LItlC coatract dU cot lead Splrry 
Rand to pu.b thl tochnoloa1cal borilona aad allr.lllvaly .. rkat a 
revolutlonary oav commarlcal product. Ilaorlaa the advica of Ecklrt and 
othlrl, Splrry lAnd dld not eoca1t laral &DOuot. of corporatl fundi aad accept 
thl hlab rllk aatailed 1D .uccoI.ful lotry lnto thl -.acoad ,.n.rltloo- of 
computere. 18K cloarly did. Withla IBN thlr. es1.tad a con.cloully dlv.loped 
·~na'&m.nt by cootentlon.- Han, Oppolad thl STRETCH projlct a. they had thl 
701 project a tfl'tl yure before. WlthLn Sperry Rand, there va. ·utaIlnA,.d 
coot.otiouao ••• • that val couotlr productivI on LAIC Lt.llf and v.ry cOltly 10 
ten .. ot .ocood s.n.ratLoa !DIrklt .har ... 94 Sperry land did DOt !\aVI a 
tran.iltorlzod comput.r on the mark.t that approached thl Ip •• d. of the 7090, 
tho Phl1co 2000-210 or thl Hon.yw.ll 800, until the _pp.arlnc •• of the UNIVAC 
1107 10 October 1962.95 
V. Strategies io Dlveloplog and Utilizin~ 
Alternatlve. to the Vacuum TUbe 
Althoush the firlt electronic computer. all cootained vacuum tub.1 II 
active elemaot., tha rellability, pover r.quirem.atl and physical sizl aad 
heat-sonlratins propartle. of the tube. vorl alvay. ~ckaovledsed to be severe 
technical limltationD. Whnn alked about ENIAC prlor to itl operatioo, Enrico 
ferial predlcted it ~uld not ~ for flve mioutea bee au •• of tube 
problema. 96 ThA .v1tchlns ape.4 ot vecuua tube., which at tbe outset enabled 
~ 
electronic coaputera to perfora oporation • .are rapldly thaa aa exiltioa 
electromechanical computatioaal devicea, quite quickly came to be viewed .. a 
lLalt1na feature. 
A variety ot alternative techaoloI1 •• to replace the vacuum tube ware 
purlued before tbe doaioa~e of the tranalltor .. the fuodamlntal co~puter 
componeot was univer.ally rocolnized 10 approximately 1958-1960. Scme of 
the .. alternative. 1avo~ved dlfferent typal of tubea of vhich the thyratron. a 
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hot f1lUllQc cube. aDd tho tr10nod •• a DeOIl 1&' coleS cacbod. tube. are 
llADplol. Ochor alternatlve. lnvolved .aflout othlr for.. of IOl14-.tat. 
tQcbaolollc., witb co.t .ttort balns de.oced co "Ioatlc aapllf1er •• 
The cbolcl .adl by tba partlclpanta In thl Da.c.nt compuclr ladu.try a. 
to wh1cb tlchaololll' 10 wbicb to la ••• t Wlrl cruclll 10 lhaplaa the 
indu.try. The varlous partlcpaotl 10 tbe 1Ddultry IIl.cted a varhEY of _ 
t.chooloI10, to pur.u.. Soml warl dead lad., .ome war. viabl. tlcbnololle., 
and otherl. primarily in thl traa.l.tor cat'aory. v.re .ucc •••••• 
The roll ot thl lovoromeoc 10 the devIlopmenc of vacuua tub. computer 
t.chooloIY. partlcularly. but ooc exclu.iv.ly. a, a con •• quanc. ot mllitary 
procuremlnt policy. 1. froquontly acL~ovl.dl.d. What 1. oft'lI overlooked, 
how.ver, 1, the Involv.mont ot the lov.rament io the varl.ty ot t.choololl.a 
that wor. pur.ued a. alt.mativo. to thl vacuum tub •• 
Thyratrona. 
Thyratronl art hot filamfnt ga. tub •• that are able to haodle more 
current vith 1 ••• physical .1z. thAD vacuum tub.,. Cenerally, a amall.r 
nueber of thyratron tube. are Deco •• ary to perform the .ame actlon a. would 
required if V4cuum tuba. vore uled. Both type. of tube. have the dl.advantage 
of large .1ze. Thyratronl were uaed a. counter. 111 the 1930'., flr.e In 
England and thu In the Unlt.d Statu. A paper by Wynn-Wlll1am.a at th. 
Cavendish Laboratory In Cambrldge, Enal~nd, explaioina hi. ute of thyratrona 
In counting clrcults va. m.ntioned by Jos.ph De.ch aDd Robert Mumma, both at 
National Cuh Reslster In tl10 ute 1930'., u having had an important t.m,.ce 
on their rueurch. 97 Ouch and Mu..ma completed a workina model of an 
accuaulator Ullng thyratroo. at NCR In December 1939.98 and NCR hold. patents 
on th4 fir.t .l.ctronic calculator. ulioa tbyratrons In el.ctronic count.r •• 9S 
Du. to the d1sadvaDca,. at lara' dz., mniaturh.tlon of thyr~tron. wa. 
stre.cod by Celch aad Hucas. H1niatur1%.t~OQ provlded botb devi .. compactne •• 
and lncr .... d .peed. D.lcb bul1t a tub. Laboratory to focu~ .ffort. on tube 
de.liD aud eventually bullt a blah-epeed, low-aa.-pre •• url, minlature 
thyratron wh1ch produced good yleld •• Governmeat involvement 10 NCR'. 
thyratron tecbnoloi1 waG coord1nated by WarttU W.Av.r 10 the Offlce of 
S:1entlf1c Ru .. rch (osa) of the ~rloQ.L' Dehn .. bsearch Council (NDRC). 
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Tho ovorall chrult of Cho 051 raeurcb afforce WIll. cUroCCN to bu1lcl1n; 
aft .lcctroa!c dlfferenclal aaalYIDr. Alchouah lwforaaclom OQ .paciflc 
aCtribute. of tho th,ratroa. daveloped by MOl &ad. ln particular 1Dformatlon 
on tho alaiacudltel tbyraCroM NCI. dave1oped ... direcced to cbe Offlc:.e of 
Sc:1enUUc ..... arcb of HOlle. chb lnforuUon va. ,bared 811001 &t:lben of • 
committe. formed by Warren Weaver to IXChaaao tlcbnolollcal po,ltloDi and 
lnformatloa coacornlna the dcvolopmlDt of aD arcll1ery coapuc.r for HOIC. 
Hemb.n of thl Cor:s1ttH iacluded tho Anaour Corporatioa. He t. T •• Na. !altt'ola 
lodak. Ibll Lab. aDd RCA. 99 to addlcloa to an .. dy thyracron counter Ullca 
miniature tbyratron. bullt for Nea. aa NCR tbyratroa .l.ctronic calculator W6' 
deaonatrat.d at Parmi', proJ.ct at thl Uaiver,ity of Chlcaao. Aberde.a 
Proviaa Gtouad allO obtalnod an NCR thyratroa el.ctroa!c calculator. J.P. 
Eckart WI. aware of tbe NO! thyratron counter and ladeed evaluated lt alooa 
vith lCA rlaa couat.r aad L,vl, rlna couat.r. For thl EHtAC Eck.rt cho ••• 
hovever, to adopt aalther, de.laaina hi, ova decad. rins counter iBlt.ad. 1OO 
Oeacb aad Humza clata that NCI. plaaDed a computer ba.ad OD tbyratroa 
techaolol' but that World war II lDt.rf.red with tho.e plan •• 101 Thl. 
comput.r va. to have be.a able to add, .ubltract. multiply, aad importaatly, 
to cUv1d. &ad thoy r.f.rred to 1t a. pat.at Hodel 13154. Th.y cUd t11. a 
pateat for a binary computer capable of addltloD aDd multlpllcatloa la Karcb. 
1942. which was 1 •• u.d la July 1946 (Pat.nt cumber 2,404,691). A r.vi •• d 
var.loa. u.las f.v.r tube •• was al.o pateated, a. a aumber 2.398,150. 102 
Our1aa the ... r NCI work.d ex.clual voly with the Navy, tbat work ead1aa In 1946. 
&.r 1950 Oelch aad Mumma recognized that thelr appro.ch to cal:ulatlaa 
could not compete vttb Itoud progrAJI compuUl'I. For thil nalon thoy 
reco~nded 1t vould be advantaseoua to NCl to purchA.e a compnny with an 
alr.ady exi.tlns co=puter. Deach and Hu=ca bes.n negotiatlng witb Eckert aad 
~uch1y (De.ch aDd Hu=da were particularly iotare.ted io their mercury delay 
lina ~Qory) but lo.t out to Raml118ton Rand. DOlch and !'tuIaa allO attuptld 
to set NCl to purcha .. !aal0 •• rina R •••• rcb Aleocl.t •• , but they could Dot 
convince NCR una,eMat of thl arit. of tbelr proposal. Finally, NCR bouabt 
Computer Ie •• arcb Corporatloa (caC), a Northrop Aircraft 'pla-off, 1D 1952. 
Pr10r to the CIC acqul.itloa, NCI had 10 developmeot a machloe called NEAH. 
National !lectronic Accouotiaa Machine. Accord~aa to J.rry Mond.l.oo, 001 of 
thl lncOll.1I11 ClC group, thh vu to be 
_ ." -
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ID800t1dl, • paper tape acalol of AD Uti tab .y.ta. Ie 
had • p4per ta~ 10put, u,oltic tape. for 10tlnacU..Ce 
.toraSI, &ad thl1 ware 101DS co bAYI a .ortlr ADd • 
collator aad do IVlryth1a; 011 paper tape Vlth a "IDe tic 
tapo '~t.rmedlatl Itora,o. It va. 10erldibll blcaulO at 
t~"'t t1a at ate WI veri flcordiaa 124 biu to tM 1ClCh, 
aDd tha1 wen recordina 16 biu to tho 11lCb 10 ",Mtle 
record1ll8, aad tbac'. bow tho11~!re 101aa to bulld ao 
11eetroDic account Ins aachlna. 
HOlt likely thi. N!IIK .,.. to haft uled tbyratrolll, but the UCh.1M vu olver 
built. 
The oaly mAcbino c~rclally markltld by NCl that actually uoed 
thyratroQl val called the CocaputroDie. It va. ClOt .. rketed uotU 1959. Wby 
it loCI mArketed at IJ.1 at thit dati 11 a \lYltery. Dllcb aDd tbID& cla1ll that 
b1 thi. t~ the1 had rla11zed tbe domiaanca of tran.l.tor. aDd, lndlld, tho 
two of thaa ela1ll relpoa.lbl11ty for the fact that thl NCl 304, introducld in 
llovcmber, 1959, Val I tran.lltorlzod IUchlM. 104 1be Cocaputrolc v .. probably 
a flal.hed product vall baforl 1959 but due to 10ternal dlla,reement WQ. DOt 
marketea prior to that. The ComputroDic u.ed miDiaturl thyratroQl and 
conll.ted of a =ultipller tied ioto a bookklop1aa machioe. NCR lold 4,246 of 
thl machine. at a price of $18,000. 105 Commlntlaa 00 the miniaturl thyratron 
tubl., DOt 00 th4 Computron1c it.olf, Dolch DOtld: 
ADd. I think WQ finally did ,It morl rillability out of 
lAG tubal thao you'd ever expect to let. Of courlO, we 
vore alvaYI ridiculed pretty much by these other peopll 
about tho reliabillty of i" tubel, and they thought we 
vere on the vrana tracto l06 
Why did NCR fail to take advanta,1 of itl early opportunity in the field 
of etectroDic: cAlculatort? Headellon blHeved that in the 1930' I NCR had 
·very elaborate computlns development ~tivity 10 electronlcl and naver 
exploited lto· 107 In fact, he believed it never aot out of the NCR 
laboratory. 108 
Henry Tropp opinQd that z 'the Natioaal Cub baileer Company offen a 
particularl, lntrlsulas 1ndultrial 'aiabt-have-belo.' NCR actually had ao 
electronic computina davici con.tructld durin, the late 1930'1. It wal a hilh-
Ipeed arithmetic machine vhicb could add, lub.tract and ~ult1ply 
electronically, aDd pr.lumably thi. mscb10e could baYI btco .. thl f1rlt 
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cocmercial .1.ctroa!c coaputlr had the Co.plDY v1.hod to pioneer lD thi. 
Held. Bov~n'or, HCl aaa.qaoat uaa IiOt lDterllce4 14 autcgaUc co:aputlas J!!!. 
~, but oaly 1D tmprovlaa it. oz1.tiaa 1iD4 of off leo equipalDt. ., a ra.ulc, 
lc dlrocted It. raGearch Ifforte to luch acclvitS. .... dlll,Diaa aDd bul1dlQ1 
a new line of lUll thyracroD tubes. 109 
The Ua.aIUlODt at HCI vaG rllponeib1e for the IlOD-UJ.IUaco of u early 
comm.rcial coaputins dovic., for tho easi~.riaa capabll1ty of IUCh a .ach1ne 
had be.D dooaonatrated. Ind.ed, DOlch DOted that -thl rolllOD for bulldiaa 
[vorklaa modol. of thyracroD &ccuaulator. to be uaed 1D lac.r Illctroaic 
calculator.) va. to pro .. tbe oporabll1ty of tbe eoce.pt blcaUio at thi. polot 
[o.camber 1939) manale~Dt val DOt very ol.ctroa1cally oriented.-110 Do.ch 
aad Humm& properly focu.ad r .... rch effort. OD tube d.llao. EVIDtUllly 
DOlch'. tube lab DO loaser DOIdld to bul1d itl ova a.1c1aturl thyratrona a. 
Sylvaa1a bul1t the tube. for them. Sub.lquently Dllch aad Mumma u.ed thl 
ca.1naturo tbyutroDi that WItte OD tho _rket (2C4, a 6-volt tubl, aad 604 &Dd 
21/2-volt tube) aad had .tandaret .ocket.. It appear. that thl var, aDd thl 
.ublcqUint diver.loD of NCI to war-relatld work for tho Navy foculica OD 
tbyratroaA, rathlr thaD thl d.c1.ion to invelt lD miniaturlzation of thyratoro 
tube., WD. ln part rospoolibll for the fa11url of sea to marklt an &arly 
thyratron IllctroDic computer. Other Ixplaaatlone lovolve lack of fore.laht, 
but 10 thls NCR measaeseot 11 clearly DOt alooe. Accordlns to archlval 
oat.rial -IEM eaciolerl lubaitted &Q lDterDal report io 1939 lodlcatlna thelr 
confidanca 10 thl fea.ibllity of luch an (electronic calculator) davlce.-
Thls informAtlon ls ba.ed on an Interoffice Haag at ISH, wrltten by J.W. 
Brye., decod January 16, 1939, ln che Unlverllty of Pennsylvania archive.; lt 
.Cacl.: 
Selov I aa lubca.1ttiaa a luaury of what I have been 
devdoplna for IBK: We have boen carryias on an 
lnve.tlsatloo 1n connectloo with the develop:ent of 
eomputlQ3 doylce. which do aot .. ploy the u.ual add1na 
whe.l., but leatead utI Ilectronic effect. t~ employ 
tubcl limiler to thol. uled 1n radio work.1 
ADother 11K Interofflce MODO of January 112, 1944, fro. J. L. Walear a. a 
-Requ •• t for $6000 for work on an electronic coaputer.- 112 ADd J.V. 
Atana.olf, wrlt!~ In 1940, c~pared -vacuua-tube-coatrolled spark colli, 
radio frequent:' t • tided arc' t aDd thyratron-controlled dlscharle. -for u •• 
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In electrical puacbina aDd rcadlna eyeteae-aDd pr.f.rr.d the tbyratron-
coatrolled d1lcharSla. 113 
Thora 1D roalon to boll •• o that a larae-Icalo alectroG!c coaputor built 
b7 tb3 klUlb lUI a cryptanalytic _chb. dudaa World War II ~a4 known u thl 
Colouul WJQd thyratroa rlnsl .. countera. Accordlaa to !lrlan Randell' I 
receat annotated b1blloarapby,114 a aew bo~ on thl World War II cryptanalytlc 
ucblnci by a. Jotmlon1U ltatu that oaG lucb caachlD1, kDow al tho Colollul, 
ulod thyratron rlnal. A casput.r coapletod In 1956 at P.DDlylvan1a Stat. 
Uniy.r.lty In Unly.rllty 'ark, POCDaylyaaia,th. P!NNSTAC, wh1cb val limllar to 
the Imf 650 without porlpharal 'c.UlpMDt aad vlth an Illi 650 lUiDet1c druc 
Itora,., was allO construct.d Ulloa tbyratrona. 
Trlonod.l. 
Trlonod.1 are miDiatur. bl-Itable aeon &al tub.l. A Tr1onod. conlumel 
tar 1.1. pow.r than a yacuua tube, 11 oaly a fractlon of ltl liz., .nd h&a • 
lonl.r expect.d llf.timG. It .pp.ar.d to have pot.ntl.l co.t advantaS.1 ov,: 
the vacuua tube. Glean Raiea, wbo .. tra1nlna valla phYlicl .nd IILIthelUticl, 
and Charlal Wlll1am., whOI. train1nB WlI In .l.ctrical 'na1n •• rlna, d.v.lop.d 
the miniatur. bl-Itabl. n.oa gal tu~ which th.y named • trlonod •• t Northrop 
Aircraft under iov.ramlnt funded re •• arch In the lat. 1940'1. Wlth the 
addltlon of reli.tora, thi. tube functioned at • flip flop.116 
Deaplce the faatur'l of tho cold cathod. trlonod. whicb app.ar.d to offer 
advantages a. cOQpared wlth convencional vacuU2 tubes, no complete computer 
oado of trionod •• va. ev.r manufactur.d. Small part. of comput.rs (i.e., 
accumulators) were ~d. of trionodea, how.ver, and were actu.lly demonltrated 
at the AG.oclatlon for Computlaa ~chln.ry (ACM) Conf.renc. held at Rutger. 
Unlverslty, MArch 28-29, 1950. 117 
For a parlod of t1Jle 10 the lat. 1940'. the neon tub. t.chnology \MI 
be1na pur.ued .. an .It.rnat1ve to vacuUD tubo t.chnolol1 .t Northrop In 
connection With the A1r Fore. SNAlUC minUe Guldanc. proJ.ct. While tho 
Increment&l Slope Coaput.r proj.ct, at vell •• the KADDIDA (uin.t1c drua 
dLfferentlal analyzor) projoct, vert un4.rw&y at Northrop With the 
conv.ntional vacuum tube techDolol1, Hai.D aDd Will1ama Wire p.rall.llna the •• 
proj.ct. with th.ir own trioaod. t.chcolol1 r •••• reh. ll8 Ev.ntually the neoo 
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tube tochnolony waD abandonod. The probl ... witb the Deoa tube tachDolo" 
that rl.latod Iffcctlvo 101utlOD lnyolved thl It.tlltleal properties of th~ 
nooa tube luaU. A cold cathodo tube, .. tbe Deon tube u allO kDovn, -Urae 
or not whoa YoY put the Itartlaa volta,e OQ it [dopead1aa) lar,ely [00) 
vblther or DOt a colmie ray hitD lt or tometh1aa trl"lr. lt off aDd lt 
doe.a't alvay. trll1er off at the I~ volta.e.- 119 Be.ld .. tbe co.sie ray 
problaa, a cold cathod. tube can al.o be trll1lrld by ultr.vlolet fro. 
fluore.cent lampa. Accord1aa to Del:b aad ~, tba .t.tl.tleal propertle. 
of tho cold cathodo tube were DOt know at tbe tlme Ha,eD aad WUl1 ... ware 
workln: on th... They wera only fully uadlratooci arouacl 1970. 120 
Thl maiD probl~ connected with the trloaodl Wli bul1dlna the tube 
it.elf. Accordlas to Hasea121 , he had to r.j.ct 90 perclnt of the tubal that 
he haod-bullt bocauM tMY did oot fit lpec1t1cat1oal. !Ita clalmed that 1l 
Nortbrop (or a ,la •• maaufacturlr) had lnve.ted $100,000 ia a machlna to 
produce thl ,lall tubel, .uch a machiae would have bela able to manufacture 
trionode. ch .. ply aad rellably. 
The t1ll11l1 of the inVlntioa of thl trionodl vae allO part of It. 
pt'lbl... !la,eD claiM that, "U traa.htor. hada't been hot on our hlel., I 
think we could have intere.tld the maaufactur.r in manufacturina tho.1 IOrt of 
tube., which would have chanSed the cour .. of hi. tory a littll bit at that 
point, becau •• tbey would have been a lot .or. rillabli than vacuum tube .... 122 
Althouih Northrop funded tbe alon tlcbnolol1 chiefly lookina for 
miniaturization in connlction with ltl Air FOrel mi •• ile auidance coatractl, 
th4 probl~ in tuba production cauled Northrop to lell the patent 
riaht •• 12l The •• riShtl were IOld to the Walklrt Corporation which DIver made 
a commerc1al IUCCI •• of thlco tube. eitbor. Undoubtedly, ona of the probl~1 
with thl •• aeon tube. was not 11mply that they were difficult to manufacture, 
but that they had, ae mentioned above, Itati.tieal trigs.rina propert1es which 
were cot yet recolnlzed. 
concluded: 
In lummArlz1na the lnvlntlon of the trlonod •• dAaen 
It Wli unfortunate that tranai.tor. were .tartin, to come 
1n thea, becau.o Md the tran.i.tor !MID delayed a few 
aora yun, tMY would han buUt lar,_ cOliputers out of 
trioDod •• , becau.. they were peanut-.lzed ao4 con.umad 
far le.. power than the vacuua tube. • • • thlY ware 
[delpite certain disadvantaSI.) va.t iaprov ... nt. over 
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vacuUD tube •• ll4 
nuid Apl1f1u •• 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
14 .. rly 1960 the D14D01ld Ordlnanci P.J,I Laboratory In Wa.bIoaton. D.C. 
invented I pure fluid ampllfier that it cllimed V&I .uitabl. for C08PUtlro or 
control devic8 •• l2' fbi. control divici uaed lithlr II. or liquid. rltblr 
than Il.ctrlc currlnt and plrformGd functioDi idontical vlth Ilectronic 
circuit.. De'pitl the IcknovlcdSld .lov .peld of thi ... plifilf, it wa. 
1 •• lrtld to be vlry ruaaed aDd abll to op.ratl It hiah tamplraturl.. Thlrl va. 
no actual uaa of thi. device in coaputlr hardvarl. 
Magnetic ~pllfilrs. 
The exiitenci of mAgnltic amplifilrs and the knovlld,1 of thair 
proparti •• within the purvilv of the intlrnational .cilntific community b.forl 
World War II. Germany csdl direct uti of thl.1 101id .t.te d.vicl., but thlY 
found very limited applicatlon in =o.t other countril.. The 11=ltation of 
tonnaSI on battle shipi providod for in the trlatil. of World War I .purrld 
the Clr=ana to lnv.ltisat. altlrnat1vw tlcnnololi" intln.ively in an effort 
to incr •••• the r.liability of naval f~ring. with minimum weisht •• 
It SGems that it val lomlwhat =or. than difficult to 
introduce thi. new [mainltic ampllfier} tlchaolOIY to thl 
lIIIarican lnainocrins .torehoule, aM it took the 
activit i •• of our .rstwhile .ne=ill, the Germanl,-to sell 
the United State. on the ideal of the u .. of malnetic 
IOpllf1lro. Wh~n it woo loarned that thl rlliabillty and 
maint.nancl-freo operation predlcted for the'l clrcult. 
veri beiaa obtained in the German wr machinl [lII4gnltic 
amplifier. varl u.ed on C.rman battll,hip. to control the 
firins of IUDal. conllderabll activity was in.tisated in 
the Uolted State. to dev.lop th ... circult. for 
.ppllcatlon here. Firat, new and ~proved magnetic 
mat.ri.l. aDd r.ctifi.r. vere d.veloped for the Ixl.ting 
circuit., &ad r •••• rcb .nd dlvelopm.nt wal carried on to 
dltlraiOd th4 mo.t advaDtf!&oua circuit configuration. 
for vlrioue appllcationa. 
Aftlr tho var, Qlay appllcationa vlre •• .e for ~iQetlc amplifilr,. 
The'l lncludld their UIO in I4rvo-amplifier •• teaperaturl-maa.urlna devlce •• 
regulatorl of Ipaed. voltaSG, and frequeccy, d-c .. pllf1.ra and modulator., 
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froquency reducer. aDd mu1tlpller., audlo- aa4 radlo-frequeDC1 amplifilr., 
trI11er aDd multlvlbrator circuita, do1&1 liDai aDd aoaor,r dlv1cCI. 127 .... y 
of tlaaJ.aaton kad. wrote a popor, publ1.bed 111 1952, 111 tbet .... nun ID,Utute 
ot Electrical .~lQGtr.' Tran,actloDi l~tlt1ed, -The Slaa1e-Core Ka;Detlc 
mpl1f1ln .. a Couputlr !laaent.-U7 When COIIparld to vacuua tuba., IUlaaUc 
ampllfier. had maDY advantasol. The, verI .ub.taatlallr .arl rurled than 
vacuua tubo., and ~ mucb lonsor 11vI" Ther warl hlileall, -.aGlltlYI, 
h1ab-saia, blab-aplld, vlr.atlle dovlc .. capable ot dlllYtrlat lars, 
quantltle. of ~r tlflclant1y.-128 ROVlvtr, one drawback tbat mAlDetlc 
ampllfler. hAd W&I that the1 vara Bora or 1a •• eoa.tralD1d to operatl OQ Oel 
or two of the.e attrlbute. at a t1ma. lamey bellevod that -(t}ha appllcatlon 
of mAlnetlc aaplltltra 1, oalr the bo,1DD1aa.-129 Oaa article cla1m. 
rell.billtr to be thl foremo.t advaataae of thl maa~etlc corl .. pllfilr. 
There 18 ~th.1D1 to "'GAr out aDd the actual cOliponeatl-
COils, re.l.tor •• cd, perhap., metal rectifitr.--are flv 
in number. The dovlce. oplrate dlrlct fro. aD a.c • 
• upply, without inttrmediatt h1ah-ten.Io~ rectifitr., and 
thare efficitncy il hlab, oftta excttd1aa 90%. 
Phyaically, =aanetic ampllfilr. arl 8mAll and they caD be 
made very robult. Thoy are ralatlvely lnsea.ltlvt to 
tlUllporatun cbaaau and have DO ~rmina~p time. 
Masnotlc ampllfler. oporate by ylrtue of the flct that 
the Inductance of aD lron-cored or ferrlte-corld IDductor 
CaD be varied by i~Daiaa tha mllDetic .tate by means of 
a .iSnAl curro at. ~ 
!he general di.advantase. of maanltic amplifier. i. a .lov re.pon •• to .iinal 
change.. Soc4time. thoir w.labt i. al.o • probl ... 
TM other d.vl~ wh1eh coapetu with the usnetic 
AApllfier le the thyratron. Thls 1 •• fflcilnt aDd 
capable of handlioa hlSb powar., but .ufflr. fraa the 
u.ual dis.dvaotaSI. of tharaionic valva.. The two 
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dlviel •• re .ometlae. uted tOllthor. 
1. ae 
rana-
a._carch b7 U.S. computlr coapaaie. 10 thl .rl' of malnttic ampllfier. 
wa. mo_t .ctively cocducte4 by Ramey .e lea1aaton RaDd, .lthoulh Losi_tic. 
ll •• arcb Corpor.tion, BurroulhI, Raycheon .Dd 18K ~rl all to .ome extlnt .1.0 
involved. App.rlntly IBM w ••• w.rl of laminaton Rand'. uti of maine tic 
amplifier ... both amplifier •• cd component. of data proc.l.inl Circuit •• lll 
Information .bout leminaton Racd'. maln.tic amplifi.r r •••• rch waa publicly 
.vaLl.bl. 1n thl Digital Coaputlr ~ew.llctlr .nd parhapa in othlr public 
aourci .. vill. 
ReQlngeon Rand held olver.l u.s. patent. which involved thl us. of 
=aIQetic amp1fi.ra •• bi-It.ble devici' .uit.bl1 for atoral' ao4 in a rina 
count.r. 134 There WQr. al.o two Frlnch patlnCa Irlntld rll.tina to main.tic 
amplifler.. 008 involved the ~ •• of magnetic amplifier. in a coicident 
curcuit t~ich coul~ be u.ed In data procl •• ina curcuit.: the other rel~ted to 
tho m&gnctlc amplifllr Itself. It. patent. laminaton Rand had were assigned 
to them by Ra=e1. It wao anticipated by IBKll5 that Remington Ra~ would 
continuo it. Intereot In magnatic amplifier. ao4 obtain additioa.l patents, 
partlcul.,ly for the uae of mAgnocic amplifier. aa datI p~oce.aina 
component.. -Thi_ i. predicted on certain pronouncement. mad. io the public 
pr.a. &G to vlrlou. developQ4nt. 1n thi. Iroa.-136 
Reminatoo land aed LOll.tiea l •••• rch Corpor.tion ar. the only computar 
coopaniea 10 thl Unit.d Stata. to have 'naaled 10 mAloetic amplifl.r research 
aDd to have bullt .ed marketed a computer u.ina maine tie amplifi.rl. 
Burroulhl built a malnetie amplif11r c~putlr knovn a. the Burroulhl Lab 
Computer but it V&I not commercially mark. ted. In London, Elliot Brother. 
LTD., and Tokyo, Hitachi Ltd., marketed computlr. ba.ed On maln.tic loglc 
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technololY. I~ Pol~nd, tho Poli.b Nucl.ar Ia •• arcb Ialtltuta &ad War .. v 
Technical U~vor.ltY aleo built • aaaaat1c aaplifler computer but it vat not 
for co::Mrlcal \Uto. In all •• t lout nine cliff.raat _Inetie apllf1u 
coraputetl vln available. "ru ... uchiaa vena (1), the AFCIC, (Air roreo 
C&cabrldsa R4.oarcb Co~ur c.o.puter) _de by Ja1nato~ Raad, (2), the U~Y&c 
Solld St.te Computer (So-colunD-card &ad 9O-coluan-card verllonl, marketed 1a 
Europe u the UCT, U~nra&l Card TAbulati11l Machine); (3). the S'IU CotIputor~ 
IUde by Rwnatoa llaad; (4), tM 1308 u4e by la1111tOG bact; (5) the 
aJrroulh;1 Lab Computer, (6) tba ILWAC-800 IIIIde by Lolllticl Rauarcb Corp.; 
(7), tM tlIPAC-I (Hitachi l.td., Tokyo); (8), tbe Elliott 802 ~·lde by ElUot 
Croth.r •• Ltd., London; .ad (9), the EHAL-2 made by Poll.h Nucl.ar Re.e.rcb 
In.tltue &ad W.r5eV Techaieal UU1verllty. 
The !br'Coulha Lab Coaaputer, • aaodal of wb1cb WIll 101 talled at Wayn. 
Univ.r.lty ln Cetrolt before th~ .ummer of ~953, va. the earli •• t of th •••• 
It va. operaUna at aJrrouaba blslwna February 21, 1951. 137 This machine 
va. lat.r d •• llnated thl Philadelphia Lab CoGput.r .ad va. op.rated to .olvo 
both indu.trlal .nd 'naine.rlng probl.ra.. !brrou,hI claim.d thi. Lab Computer 
to be • unique electronic dl11tal comput.r: 
This machine, which hal a mAlnetlc-drum memory and 
taletype lnput-output tacllltle., W&I a.sembled .ntlr.ly 
frora gonoral-purpo.e unit. bllona to tho line of 
.qulpcant known .. Pul.o-Control Unit.. • •• Eacb 
Pulse-Control Unit i ••• tandard 10slcal component, .uch 
.8 • tllp-flop, sata or pul .. d.lay circuit, aDd 1. 
equipped with input and output buff.r.. W.v. forms on 
coaxial c.ble. which lnterconnect unit •• re r •• tricted to 
two standard type.: O.l-micro.econd pulse. and two-valved 
d-c control voltage. havlca 0.2 micro •• cond .witchina 
time. U.a of Pulse-Control Unit. permitt.d ••• embly of 
the computer d4rectly frOG logical dif§§amt wit~out the 
uDual intermediate enaineerina .teps. 
furroughc d~on.tr.ted It. continuica eommitGent to malcetlc. by e.tab11shlua 
a re.eareb facllity ln Paoll, Penn.ylvania, which had II one of It. focu ••• 
the development et mAinetlc coaPOQ.Qt •• 138 
The A1r ~rc. CuabrldS8 Research Center Coaputer built by the RamlngtoQ 
Rand va. tM nut _anetic: &CIpl1f1e!' cOCllputer. It va. fini.hed 10 June, 1955, 
;od wa. iDltall.d 10 Hay 1956.\39 Th. r •••• reh and d.v.lop.eot per10d at 
Remington lAnd occurred 10 the IE&,3 1950-1955. to thi. malD.tic acplif1er. 
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vere dev.1oped &ad actually utl1l:od 10 aD operatioaal cogputer. 140 Tho 
uanetie core apUflon Wled 1n thU cOIIputer vera tara4 P'!IIJCt01S by 
Univac. 'l11a AFCIC Q)Qpuur contained 600 EDlACl'Oas aa4 1.5 VBCuun tuboe. Tb.e 
track neoN of thU computer vu ueellont. -Fro. July. 1957 to 'cabrut.1ry 
1958, tM UMful operatiaa time hal averasod about 90% of the Khedulod 
op.ratiau t1=e. two hour. a day are devoted to prevlntive aalnteDanco.-141 
The uptime for tM A1C1lC cOGputor for the flnt 44 we.k. of 1958 WIll reported 
a. -90% for a nina hour Ichadule4 flve day. a velk.- 142 The AlCRC computlr 
VAl mainly usld for Icientlflc cocputation with lome real tiae appllcatloDa, 
particularly 1n the area of radar d.tection aad po.tlon locatlon. 143 
FERRACTORS wer. acclaimed l~ the trade pr.... For example: 
Ma~n.tic amplifier. ar. besiDD1aa to replace electron 
tub .. 10 high spud digltal computen. The FERRACTOR, a 
mAgnotic agpllfier capable of op.rating at frequ.ncie. a. 
hiah •• 2.5 me, r.pr.s.nt. aD inc rea,. in power-gain band 
vidth product aD order of magnitude over that 1gEeviou.ly conaidered practical with magnetic circuitry. 
Salel of a commercial version of the ugnetic amplifier computer vere 
predicted to begin in early 1957. 145 The OIW =ainetic amplifier computer was 
announced in iloving term.: 
The firlt high-Ipeed low price electronic computer 
utilizing masnotic throughout, in.tead of filam~nt tubea, 
has been announced by Remington Rand Division of the 
Sperry Rand Corporation. The computer employa an 
entirely new principle by uaing 'micro-ferractor' 
magnetic amplifiar~ which are no larger than the rubber 
eraser. at the oDd of ordinary lead peacils. Tba 
'ferractor.' will porfo~ accurately at temperature. from 
60 degree. below zero Fahrenheit to 222 degree. above 
zero, aDd are tb8 re.ult of five year. of l~boratory 
rel.arch. The co=putar open. up an err In which filament 
tubes and ~ran3istor. will bo outmod~d by devices of this 
~ind. Tile proto-type W3. completed la.t Jun., and 
prelent production plana will make tho 'micro-ferractor.' 
filled cooputer available early in 1957. 
A deacription of tbl Univac: ~gnetic computar W&l contained in the LRE 
Convention Record in New York. 1956. 146 
Des~it. the optia1.tic announc ... nt. aDd uid.-Ipread publicity, it val 
Decembar 1958 o. early 1959 that =-gnetic amplifier computer. were actually 
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lold commerc1ally in the United Statu. 'l'bo delay WIll tM r .. u1t of • 
m4CA,erial deci8lon. MaGnetic cop11fler cosputerl, lold under tbl D&DG ucr 
(Univac Calculat1aa tDbul4tor), VQra aarkatid 1D Europe 1n adyaace of the u.s. 
la1e. Accordla; to J4QOS Ca.. at Llbralcopl, a ela11ar incIdent occurred 
there: -When the LCP-21 came out it va. doUberately dowd dow 10 it 
wouldn't cOQplte with thee. LGP-30'1 -- .lace WI vlrl .till try1aa to ,It 
their $1,100 a month rental on thoa_147 
JZ. about tbG sama tia the UNIVAC Sol1cl Stato cocaputer 14. beica 
developed 10 Philadelphia by the Eckert-Kaucbly ,roup of Ra=iDltOD Rand thl 
Fl1e Casputar waa be1as devIloped 10 St. Lout. by the Enaineer1aa la •• arch 
Aaloclate. ,roup. In fact, ~ba Plll Computer wal announced 10 January, 1955, 
while the magnetlc amplifier computer W&I announced OD year later. 148 The 
flrlt Pllo co.puter wal delivered 10 hu,uot, 1956. 149 Tho flrlt Univac So11d 
State Ma,neUc AmpUt10r cOliputor val DOt deUvered in thla Unlted Stat .. untll 
December 1958 or early 1959, although the European verlion, the UCT, WI. 
reported u operational in the Dresden Bank In H.ambura. Genuny. in October 
1958. 
The history of tho Ec:kert-Hauchly aad ERA ,roupi which wre both owned by 
Reaington Rand, yet operated I~parately until the merser of Sperry Gyro,copl 
wltb Remington Rand In 1955, afford. many IDiiSht. into QaUAserlal deci,lon-
makina. it.: r-M tim of the IMraer of Rec:.1ngton Rand witl: :5perry Gyrolcope, a 
con.olidated computer ,rcup, deli,aatcd the Univac Divlsion, wal formad. 
Reminaton land acquired tho Eckert-Kaucbly Coaputer Corporation ln 1950 
and later acquired £nSlnalrlng Re.earch AI,oelat... ~a different 
orient.tlona msde a vlab1e meraer of t~ ,roupo practlcally impo •• lble. The 
Pbiladelpbia-ba.ed Ec:kort-Hauchly sroup baaan within. universlty context. 
tbd Eckert-Hauchly Computer Corporatlon a,rald vlth R~naton Rand vhen lt va. 
claar that the !ckert-~uchly Computer Corporation had .Ianiflcant ca.h-flov 
problems that threatened the coapletion of itl contract. for Univac computer •• 
'nlo hi.tory of DA is .trik1naly cUffer,nt. nu. company va. fomed at 
the end of World War II throuah the effort. of Naval personnel, ch1ef1y 
.\dmlral Jo.eph \k)nstr who wa. 10 charge of Naval cOIIIZIunicatlon. R .... reb and 
Captaln Hovard T. Ens.trOD who wa. chief of the Naval Communlcatlonl 
Supplementary Activlty.1S0 Of tho lnitial 52 .tafflna tho company. 39 had 




ComcuaiCltlon. SUppll .. lntary Actlvlt1 Which ha4 the r •• poa.lbll1c1 for thr •• 
ClAiD nllareh Afaao I c:oa'flaUoaal aD4 .~cl&1 cOIDul11c:aUoGi eq\&1pMGt aDd 
aAthcoat1cAl cec:tuUquI.. 11\_ Uea tQ. to kalP tos_ther tbe .qlDMrI who ha4 
worked a. a aroup dur1aa tbra war. Fot Unal1Cla, nllOGl, Sc. 'aul ... cho .. n 
AI I buG for tM QOV aroup.157 The • ••• d· 1I00a)' w. arunal4 1D ~rt by JobD 
E. ~Irk.r, a parto.r 10 the St. Paul brokerl,1 tl~ of Auchlaclol., .arkar 104 
Redpath. Parker wm. al.o Prl.ldlnC of Northwe.t Alroa&utlcil Corporatlon 
(NAC) vhlch, durlaa World Wor II, sadl slid.r. for the Air rorci. 
thl flr.t !lA lov.ramlnt contract WI. actuall)' • lubeontract fro. NAC aad 
lnvolved ,plclallzed c0C2unlcltloGl Iqulpmlot aDd 'parl part.. EVIntual1y tlA 
became a prima cootractor for that equlpDlot. ERA &1'0 bul1t dlvlc.. to 
monltor und.r;rouDd tl.t. IDd lat.r devoted lalrsy to ma,netlc dru2 memortl', 
,.tt1na I4vlrel kay patlnt. In the arl.. 10 facc, tlA 11Cln •• d 10K to uti 
ma,n.tlc .amorll. In the 6~O .lr11.. ERA'. flr.t important computlr, the !lA-
1101, W3. bullt for tho Navy. 
ERA employment Irev from about SOO in 1952 to 1150 in 1955, and 
thereafter JUCP to about 4,000 10 1957, dom1aatlaa 10 .lz1 the !ckert-Hauchly 
afOUp. ·Splrry Rand'. financlal dlcl.lon. ware QAd. fro. corporatl 
headquarter. in Nev York. Wlt~ 'ab.lntll' corporatl manalo.ent, the Univac 
Divi.lon h4~ difficulty ,Ittlnl approvil of It. plan., and to add to the 
prob1~ tbe fOrm4r ERA Insiae.f. ~ero at oddl wlth thl Eckert-Hauchly 
plraonnel.· 1S2 Obviou.ly, the orl.ntatlon. of the Hinno.ota aad Phl1adllphia 
,roup. vera differlot, aDd It .Iame that the corporate mana,emont wae nlVlr 
able to bridge the difference. ,uccI •• fully. 
Both the FHI Computer developed by the ERA aroup aad the Sol1d State 
80/90 computer developed by the tckert-Hauchly Iroup ware malnetic drum .tored 
computer., but the Fill Computlr quickly aot a bad reputat10n bocau .. of 
lateness of delivery and falatively h1ah price •• compared with other 
computer. of .imilar capabilitle •• 1S3 Con.equently, 1t had a poor .ale. 
record.l~4 It YS' .aid to have been .pec1fically enalneered for airline 
re.ervatloo .y.taa., t~ dl.culolona vitb thl alrllnl. purportedly 101na back 
to 1946. It~. al.o to perform ,enaral ~.lQ •• a lnventory appllcation •• 
Dospite the poor .all' rlcord, 10 • concerted .ffort to pUGh thl Fl11 Computlr 
and to eliminate tho po •• lbility of In-hou •• co.peticion, thl Solld Statl 
aO/90 coaputerl vere cot at flr.t announced aad mark.ted ln the United 
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State.. the1 wu arketld lnauad 1D Europe u tM ucr. 
Accordlas to Re~ Luko!!, d1r.ctor of r •• carch aad a4vaace4 tochDique. 
tor Uai.AC, tbe UNIVAC 80/90 ao11d-.tlta ca.puter., 
• • • ,ot caulht 1a the rlvalry that had dev.lped betve.a 
the St. raul &D4 Philadolphia d.1Y1I1ou. 'UNIV AI:. ft.1e 
CCQpuur, dove1opod by St. Paul .04 la roulhly tM .aM 
prlce ranae II tho UN IV II:. SoUd-Stat. c.o.puur, .... 
already belna .. rkat.d. there..... ,raat conc.rn that 
the 'lo11d-ltaCe' would int.rtar. with the P11. Comput.r 
'Ile.. Con.lqueatly, tbs 'Solld-Stlte' W&I held back 
trOll tM .. rut place aa4 DOt deliv.red 1D thi. country 
untll the .umaar of 1959, 11thou,h lt val marklted la 
Europe eOYlral year. earlllr. The Lat. entry of the 
UNIVAC Solld-Stlto Computlr rlGulted la a .bortlDld 11te 
.paD tor the projlct, &lthoulh 500 .y.t ... 1D varlou. 
torma vlre .old. ~ 1960, lt va. clear that the 
trla.letor WI. her. to .tI1, ~ malaetlc 4mpllfler 
tecnnololY vould DOt lurvlve. 
Commentins on tho mAlnetlc ampllfler tlchnololY Lukoff wroto ln 1969: 
to 1953, Univac re.U.zed that the daYI of the vacu\.ll tube 
Vlre cumbered. About 90% of all cOllputar lMintlDlaCI 
problema vare dUG to the VleUlD tuba aad lt limply had to 
be rlpllced. Dut with what? Unlvlc ploneered ln the 
dlvelopmlat of lolld Itlte elementl aad 001 of the.e VII 
the mAlnetic agplifllr. It fouad ltl way lato the Univac 
Solid Stltl Computer aad va. charletlrl&ed by moderltl 
,p4ld aDd hiSh clock pover. Trln.htou were 
co.merclilly aval1abll la tha early/mid flftle. but oaly 
la thl moderate .peed l'anse. the flrlt breakthrough ln 
hllb .peed trlnelltorl occured wlth the development ot 
thl Surfaco 85rrler Tranal.tor (sat). Univac kn*v that 
the tLma tor u.e at tran.lltor. In computlrl va. farS 
.rrlvlna and that lt h4d to dIve lop thl tlchnology. 5 
Univac utl11zed .urfac. barrilr traall.tor. in the LARC, but va. not yec 
committed to ~ioa only tranalltor. In It. commerlca\ product.. The 
anaouacement of St!l, a malcotic amp11fier computer, vaa made In Auauat. 1960. 
Tharo 1. uncertainty .. to whothar there verI actually two cOCllllltc1al 
veralo118 of tbG Solid-Stato IUSDlt1c amplifier coaaputer. SOCIIII rlhrencl., 
refer to both. Solid Stato 80 and 90, d1fler1n, oaly In the card input that 
they could accept, but wrlte .bout tho two aachinaa a. if they vlre availabl. 
cout'.poranaoudy aDd both .old 1a Europe in the aid-to lau 1950' •• 156 
- 39 -
Brock, 00 the other haDd, IUCI. that while the Sol1d SCac. 80 [lie) w. 
dlU.vared 14 ehe Ull1tad Stae .. 10 Auaun 1958, lt vu DOt UDcll Juao 1959 thlt 
the Solld/SCacI 80 [.le] could accozaodatl &O-coluzo card •• 157 Accordlaa to 
DO.t lourcl., tbl SoUd Stael 90 vu act dlUvlred uoell Dec_bar 1958. The 
Unlvac Sol14 SCael coaputlr probably could laltlally oaly acclpt 9O-columa 
card. aad vu .ub.lqulocly 8Odlfl1d to haadle chi ao-coluaa card., aad thea 
termed the SoUd Staci 80. tho 1=portaot polot 11 that a ca.putll' ~lld OQ a 
tot.lly uaique tlchnolol1 had beon dOYlloped. nw card lnput dll1an va. 
r.l.clvely unimportant. 
A cocaparhoD of thl r111 CoapUtll' aDd the Sol1d Statt 80/90 r.vult the 
clur dominance of tbG lattlr. The addltloa time io aicrollcoadl for the fl11 
coaput,r 1. 8,700, ubil' for the SS 80/90 il 1,360. Th. multipllcatloo time 
10 microl.coada 1. 23,800 for tha Fl1. Computlr aad 1,275 for tbl 5S 80/90. 
01vhloo took 27,500 III1crollcoad. on the Fill Colllputer aDd 1,275 OD the S5 
80/90. The time for thl .. operatloQl lnclud.. the acce.. time of thl 
comput1n8 '/It.lIIl. Thl pricI of the two mAchine., in 1961 dollarl, Wli 
roulhly the lame, $300,000 for the Fll. Computer aDd $347,500 lor the 55 
80/90. By way 01 further cOQparhoa, thl S1'!P bad tM u.aae operatlon tilll" al 
the 55 80/90. The IBM 1401, the traall.torlzed r.placem.at lor the ISM 6;0, 
had an add tlme of 300 microl.cond., a multlplication time of 1,960 
~cro •• cond., and I divillon time of 2,170. 
S, 1958, tho year the III&rketlna of the Solid Stat. comput.r. wal 
pormltted 1D the United Statel, IBH had alr.ady lnltalled .ev.ral hundred of 
It. ma~n.tlc drum comput.r., tho 650'. whlch had been announced In 1953 and 
1ntroduced 1n 1954. Thac. VOl'. vacuum tube comput.r. aDd vere compared to the 
Sol1d Stat. 80 .. of Jun. 1959 in tho lollov1na vay: 
W1th compatlbl1ity, tb3 ssao had a .ub.tantlal 
comp.tltlv. adv.nt.s. ovor tho 650. For sim1lar prlce., 
lt had a lIIuch fastar lnt.rnal op.ratlon, double ~peed 
card reador, .ad quadruple sp •• d print.r compated t~ the 
650. Accordlaa to tho Knlght'. calculatloDl of coaput.r 
p.rformancl, the SS80 produc.d 50 PfJi.nt more comm.rleal 
op.rat1ona p.r dollar than the 650. 
Reminatoa bad eventually lold about 500 of the Solid Stat. III&chln .. , 
whl1e 18K .old ov.r 1.000 of the 650'.. Brock'. clata, hovevar, that -[tlha 
5580'. adv.nt4a" over the 650 eould have be.n axpoet.d bec.u.e of the flv. 
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Ylar. of tlchnolollcal davilopmant that had cakln place .1ncI the 6~0 
introductlon, while Cbs 650 prlce had reaalaa4 cODltaDt.- 18 B1.takaD. 159 10 
fact, tbe techDolol1 ." devlloped 1.D the VIrY early 1950'. at about tbe .... 
timS .. tha 650 tachD010sy. TM urut1aa of tbl Solid State 90 aad 80 In 
1958-1959 cUd not 1.&Iply that thlY ha4 ju.t COIN oft the producUoD 11D1. 
Thal'l va. a dafiDlta .. 048arl&1 dlclalon to divert the .uperior product to 
Europa and leavo tbo way clear for the marketlna of tbl File eo.pucer 1D tM 
u.s. vithout competitlon from aDothlr product to tbe .ama Splrry Rand 
Corporatlon. 
,. RoMD bu noted -'nll Ra.1aatoD land dlll,aan had ueec1 _IMtlc 
aapllfllr. at a t1Dl ~D t~1 thousht traD,l.tor. vlre DOt Ylt 
practical.-160 Tb1. i, cooflrmed by a.~o Lukoff' 
I CAD remember the day that Prl.ideot Ecklrt lathered all 
of thl lna1OOlr1na plr.oonll tOllthlr at Aldin Park Maoor 
to dl.cUI. future plana for tbl compaoy. as .tated that 
the trao.l.tor wa. DOt yet a practlcal altlrnative; 
thereforl, we vould calt our lot with the aalnetlc 
arapl1f1ar. Several wilte later, a velk lona coune 1.D 
mA&DMt1cl W&I or,.nl%ed all all lnainllr. VII'I rlqul.ted 
to attlnd 10 they couUl be updatod 00 the cav _Inltic 
amplifilr tacboology. 
It would be incorrlct, hovevlr, to cooclude that thl Ecurt-Hauchly Iroup WI. 
alone 10 pur.u1na mAloetlc loSlc technolnlY at Univac, for thl old ERA aroup 
10 St. Paul, Hianl.ota. conltructed the four X-308 casentlc amplifilr 
computer. for cla •• ified delivery.162 ADd prior to that ERA lnve.~tsated 
maioetlc amplifier. a. an a1t.~tlv. techololY for traoslstorl for thl Athena 
leEH suidanci .y.tem which va. dellvered to the Air Force ln 1957 ERA actively 
built parallal model. of the Athena suldaoee .y.tes and oo1y alter eompetina 
the two workln; modol. wa. the final cholce eade to bulld the actual c~puter 
wlth trao.l.tor rather thaD mAlnetlc ampllfier circuitry_ 
The sanaaeriel prohibltion by Sperry !aDd aE).ales of the Solid Stat. 
computer. io the Uaited State. ha. DOt boen accorded the signiflcanc. lt 
dee.rv .. 1a .bapias the computer indu.try. Had the SoUd State cOCllputen, 
which clearly outperformed tbe 6S0'., been annouaced for sale ba,inn1na In, 
.ay. 19S7, the hi. tory of the computer lodu.try wUlld have belA different for 
At lu.t a few yean. wtead, Sperry Raad often. ~ prl,duct, the vacUWl tube 
- .. , -
111e CotIputer, clearly 1nfedor to the llIe 650, aDd upt it .. 1t1 eDtry 111 
tho coaputer aarut delpHI tbe poor reputatloa thlt it acqulred .Arl1 1D lt1 
product c7c1a. 
A further b1.ov to Si!erry Band caae 1a 1959 whoa, onl7 four .oatha &tter 
It. 5S 80/90 anaouacament, 12M announced thl 1401 .. a tr.n.1.eor1zed 
replacement' for the 650. k:cordlq to arock I 
'n\e 1401 Will 111 tM lam price racae .. both the 650 and 
the SS80 but had IalCb better perform&ace thaa either of 
thill. For e:u.aple, the 1401 cold react 800 caret. per 
lIiaute cOlipared v1tb 250 fr the Ill( 650 and 450-600 for 
the 5580. TM add ta of the 1401 va. 230 aicro-IIcoDdI 
cocapared witb 510 for the ssao &ad 100 for tho Ull 650. 
8f the lDiaht ca1culaUotUl, the tat 1401 had ovor tvice 
the auaber of cOGlllCtclal operation. per dollar tt-at the 
SS80 had. Coa .. queDt1y the ssao va. DOt cOCIpat1t1ve vlth 
the 1401 aDd ltl effoctive llfe II a computer to expaad 
Sperry B.aad'i market .hara va. l1a1ted to a Uttle over a 
year. 163 
The STEP comput.r, a mod1f1catloD of the Univac So11d State 80/90 WSI 
aQnounce~ la Aulult, 1960. As late a. 1961, J. P. Eck.rt dllculled addlca aa 
improved tape lpeed-up proaraa and con QUOty to the STEP coaaputer &D4 .dd, 
-!hi, i., however, the 'lalt drop' that can be .queezed fros the U.S. S.C. and 
w. mult not lo.e light of th1.~ 164 
ADnouaceaent. of DRV masnotic component' ~re commOQ throushout tbe 
1950' I. The tocbno1ol1 wu not .. crat. MaD1 announcementl appeared in the 
Oigltal Computer Nev.letter pub111bed by the Offlce of N4val Re •• arcb. Tha 
newllettar waa firlt i •• ued in April 1949 l~ w •• circulated to all iaterested 
military and soverna,ntal agoncloo ADd to all contractora of tho Fed.ral 
Governcent. Startles in 1956 lt was al&o r.prlnt~ In tbe Jour~ of the 
Anodation for Computlng Ittchlnery. CllC aonouocad a - Ferror-ResollAnt flIp-
Flop to replace vacuua tubae 10 certain COUQtlns, acpllfylca and control 
appllcatlona.- 165 In 1953 cac announced a new verllon (model 133) of tbe 
Ferro-R.uoDaat nip-nop whlcb r.duced the liu of the origin.al. device by 3~ 
p.rceat aad lovored the COlt by SO parceat. 166 It claimed: 
It caD dellver mora than 90% of the lnput anergy al 
uaabl. output .1nce coppor aad cora 101. are the oo1y 
lource ot pover cOnlu=ptlon. The use of non-dlseipat1aa 
rac.ctlya ele.ent. virtually el1alnate. tbe probl .. of 
heat dl.llpatloa. Other teatur.. iaclude oper.tlna at 
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frequoncl11 up to 1ook.c., tusb power pln, u.uD1t1 to 
h1ah acc,leratloa a04 • hock , and the abl1lt1 to vtg,.taD4 
v141 teaporacur •• hua14lt1. &ad prl.lurl cbansl •• 
laythlOn al1GOUl!CG4 HIllneUc ShUe lalilClfl (51-20 aad a-100) aD4 noted thae 
work 00 ualac mAIDltlc corl. In lo11ca1 and arlthaltlc circuitry wa. 
proclldinr. 168 laytheon c1almed that -[e)hI .. 4lvIlopeaent. Ilva proai,. of a 
.ub.tlntlal rlductloa of tuba curront In futurl coaputlr .,.t .... • 169 Jan 
lajchmAa ae lCA aDd lrv1aa Wll.olaan ae Te1 ... ter Kllnetlc. vere a1.0 
Ixp10rlnl thl u.e. of =aIDltlc corl' for 1011c. Wll.elmaa .tatl4 that all 
corl computlr., vblle techDicall, po •• lb1I, veri in fact ·paper tlllr.-
becau.I eranal.tor technolol1 bolaa eo be d~lnant at that tiDe perlod.-170 
Aeroautron1c of Nlwport atach, callfornia, a divi.ioo of Ford Motor 
Company, &D11ouaced tho BIAI coaputlaa ellmlnC In late 1959. 171 'nIe SIAX WI. a 
nev mAsaltlc computlr Ilealat capable of mutimlsacycle 
performance 10 10lica1 network. and memory array.. • • • 
The Ilement la a .mall rlctanaular bar of ferrlte , 
mAlnltlc matlrlal mea.urin; 50~Ox85 mil.. It reprl.lnt. 
a .1sniflcaac advancament 10 thl .cate-of-the-art of 
mllnltlc coaputlr Illmlnt. aDd It. appllcatloa DOV cakl' 
po •• lb1& tho ach1lvem~nt of reliable h1ah .peed computlaa 
at a r&l.onable co.t ••• [a.) rllatlvely cheap SIAl 
elemlat. will rlplace Ixpen.lve .emlcoaductor devica •• 
Pr •• oat I.tlmate. ladlcatl thl co.t .. vln; will be af 
lla.t a factor of 10 vlth rlsard to 1011cal devlel •• 72 
Aaroautronie bolllvld that the atAX could be IDOra den.aly paekld than 
.enlconduetor., redueles the aumber of .oldar connlctlna nlcls.ary ia aa 
average computlr by a factor of 10 to 100 -Thelr (che BlAX elemont.1 ba.lc 
passive nature plUi ieneral rugged phY'ical naturl aad iasln.ltlvlty to 
temperature generally enhanci' the rellabillty by a largl factor. 1ll 
Aaronutron1ca va. u.1na SIAl technique. 1n both alrborne and ml1itary 
proJectl. SII In Hanlo Park, Callfornia, announcld a universal magnltle 1011e 
eleacnt 1n late 1959: 
A DIY .ultl-apertured mAlnlelc 1011e el .. ent hal beGn 
devolopd at SlI undor .pon.or.hip of the OffiCI of Naval 
Racearcb, IntonuUOG Sy.tea Branch. rut device 11 a 
un1ver..t 1011e Ilomont in the .ea.e tht ,ener" d1,ltal 
10lie "1 bo perfo~.d with an approprlately wired array 
con.hUaa of llemont. of tM. 11011& type oaly. 'nIa DlV 
element belona. to the famlty of mAIDlt1e multl-aperture 
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dovie.. (HAnS) dovolopad at SRI for ueo in diod.le •• 
• hift {,ti.tor. .. vell •• far 80re coaplcs lOlle 
UDit •• 
Thua, do.plta tho fact thAt aucb of the lei.ntific world WI. alread7 
d8voloplQg a fuDdaaental uDdor.tlDdlaa of .ilicon cry.tal. aDd their btbayior, 
I. lat. aI- 1960 mln7 plople fal1.d to raali,e thalr importance &ad tad.ad the 
importanco of lara. ,clle fabriclclOD proc •••••• 
Tran.l.tor •• 
Th. re.earcb effort. 1D pb7.1c. that ev.ntually led to the development of 
quantua mechaD1ct .parked intereGt aad foeu.1d r •••• rch la the ar... of 
cry. tal detoctor., amplifier. and .ea1eoDductor.. The tran.i.tor eff.ct 
dI.co •• rod at the BIll TelephoDl Laboratori.. in 1947 vat the direct ouc¥rovth 
of both the ••• ffort. and the free flov of .cientifle information which 
proce.ded via the mobility of .eientl.t. and the active, onaoiaa wrltten aDd 
oral communicatiooa amona th.a. The di.cov.ry of the tran.i.tor may have been 
really a rodi.cov.ry for, accordiaa to Prote •• or W. eo'liDl,115 Juliu. 
Lilllealeld applied for a Canadian patent for what today would be call.d a 
junctlon field effect traoai.tor in 1925. In 1921, Lillienfeld fl1ed a patent 
for a blpolar tranai.tor and in 1928 be filed a patent for aD In.ulated sate 
fleld effect tranaistor. 
The di.covcry of the tran.i.tor effect produced a variety of expectation. 
oa the part of computer mAnufecturera a. to the applicability of traaai.tors 
as computer component.. Holt concern focu.ed around the reliability of the 
tranal.tor, which wal anticipated to exceed that of vacu~ tube.. The high 
COlt, difficulty of procurement and .. rly problea. with reliability were, 
however, drawback.. Indeed, ooa of the flrlt conferenc •• on translstor. 
concerned their reliability. Th1. conference wa. 'pon,ored by the WOrklna 
Group OQ Semiconductor Devlce. of the Advl.ory Croup on Electron Tu~. of the 
Offic. of tba AI.i.tant Secretary of Defeoae, ..... rch and Enaineerina and wa. 
h.ld OQ Septaaber 17, 18, 1956 in New York. The proe.edlaa' of the conference 
were publi.hed 1D 1958 by Naw York Univer.lty Pr.... Over fifteen different 
la.tltutioaa fra. lov.rnmant eDd indu.trr w.ra r.pre •• nted on the program, 
includ1aa Slana1 Corp. !n&lne.r1aa Labor.torie., BUreau of Ship., Air Research 
and eevelopc.at Command, Motorola Inc., Phl1co Corporar.lon, Bell Telephone 
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Laboratodl8, Cimneral Uectrf.c Cotapell1, Tna. IAltNMIlU Iac., au If.de' 
Kltloaal lAboratory. Sylvaw Ilactr1e 'roducCi. Ioelaa AirplaDi CoapaD1, 
Kavlll fobcoda! Lt\~ratory, Sperry 1404 CorponUoD, Dlaolkl orcSa.aaco I\&.ae 
Laboratory, IaJcbcou Kallulacturf.aa COIpA01. aDd LlncoLn Laboracorl.l. 
Tha daYtlopmeot of qUAntWD =oehaoicl, thl mobility of Icl.otllt. &Ad thl 
treo flow of .el.ot1fic informatloD v.r. the mOlt iaport.nt .lameotl le&dlaa 
to tha orsan.1zat10D of tM SecL1coaductor Croup .t Ball Lab.. A. It. W11eon 
vroe. a paper 1D 1931 1D Eaalaad 1D whlch he •••• lltl.11y .eatod ehe quaneum 
mechanlcal ebeory -that relatecS motloll ot .l.etroll. lD .. t.l. to • 
compr.hea.lvo eheoretf.eal-.zplaa&C10D ot lnlulatorl .Dd .eatcoaduceor •• - 176 
Wh.n thi. tMory .... be1aa CS ..... lopeCS iD the yuu lmucSlacaly prior to 
W11.on'. ospo.1t1oa of lt, ictlrnatioaal mobll1ty of IC1lotl.tl va. a1ded by 
var10Ul kiadl of f.llov,hlpi 10clucSlaa .om. provld.d by tha Rock.f.ll.r 
Foundatlon. Althouah thl appe.rallCl of 10111.00'. p.p.r In 1931 cau.ed 
helahtlnad iDeer •• t 11l tamicoa4uctor. and th.lr potlntl.1 roll In electronic 
communlcatloQl .ad .. rectlfler., .ceordlaa to W.lner, 
[T]he ~pllcatlon. of the W11.on th.ory were DOt .vld.nt 
to r .... rch work.r. 1D the field althoulh b.tween 1935 
and 1939 the thaory of semlconductor phy.lc. va. adv.nc.d 
by rreake.l aad Davydov ill the Sovl.t UcloD, Mott In 
EOllaod, aDd Schottky In CeflUny. A III&jor probllJl wa. 
that tho .amieonductor materlala aVlllabl. dur1ca the 
1930'. were too ~pur. tY7¥rovld. an opportuclty to 11nk 
th.ofJ vltb axperl&aOot. 
10 1923 larl t. Darrov, • r •••• rcb phy.lcl.t at BIll, beaan publlshlng a 
seriee of paper. In the Bell Sy.t~ Technical Journal .om.tim •• summarlzlng 
meetioal of the AD.rIcan PhYllcal SOcIety and at oth.r times .ummarl%lng the 
curr.ct .tate of the art. A paper pub11.hed In the Journal in 1927 by two 
Ball physIcist, C. J. Dav1l.on and L. H. Germ.r, on electron diffractlon, was 
seminal piec.. In 1937 Davi •• on received. Nobol prize 1n phYlicl. 
WIllian Shockl.y, an H.I.T. Ph.D., QAy have be.o attracted to Bell Lab. 
10 1936 lubltact1a111 duo to the fact that DavII.on va. ther •• l78 In 1939 
Jam .. F1.k, wcca Shockley had know whee they ware both auduata .tud.ou ill 
~hy.cil at K.I.T., joicad Bell aDd, before becomlna presIdent of the Lab., va • 
. a,polllib1e for the po.tvar r .... rch 1n physic. there. Anoth.r meQber of the 




job. Waltlr !rattain beln wrldDi at 1111 in 1929. Othen 14 tbs ,roup 
worked moro ,IQarall, in .0lLd .tate pb,.1c.. ltaccaiA vas attracted to Jell 
[",b. bccauco of bill knov1ed,. of the 1111 !yaee. Technical Joumal &ad 14 
~rticula&" beeaUN of the paper by Darrov. 179 JohD Budlla, • Kanoard lb. D. , 
did DOt Joia 1111 until afUr the Secoact World War, but he had know fIloekle, 
nM f1lk ia CaIIbridal iD the 1930'.. II&rdlia had allo lCudied under ooe of 
the l1li0 protall<irl AI ltlattl1a I John R. Vaa VlIck. Budlla w. penuaded by 
Shackle, aad r1.k to job th_ at BIll Lab. aftll' thl war rather than to 
retura to academic. 
While 8111 Labt 11 appeDded to AQ tndu.tdal COClpAa1, the atao.pbarl 11 
aD acadam1c ODa. If facc, 1D thl 1930'., the .eiloti.c., of mA01 divlr •• 
backarouod., DOC juac pby.1ci.t., Dlt to,lchlr oacl • wwlk 10 a di.cu •• ioo 
,roup. The uiD tople wu the quantLII MChan1c:.1 of thl .0Ud .tatl. 180 Both 
Shockley aad lIIrattaiD acuadld tl1a .. d1acuIIS.oa ,roup .. 
In the 19~O'., aDd l,plcla1ly durins the war, Bell Laba aad variou. 
unlvlr.ltil. aad ladu.trlal compaa11. bee"l 1avo1ved 10 projlec. rllated to 
cry.tal detlctor.. The work on radar 10 the laci 1930'. fall. ioto thi. 
category. Know1ed,1 waG ,ained fro. thl.e pro~~ct. thac latlr had a dlrlct 
effect 00 the develop.eot ot the trao.1.cor. The l1nk b~twtlo radar aDd 
computer. 1. al.o importaot: 
Radar had aoaQ of ths el.maot. of thl eoaputeri it had 
t1mina circult., which ultimately became funda.eatal to 
the modern computer. Some of the othlr related equipment 
like the Loran even had decade [vaccU3 tube] counter. 
associated with them. It was • rudimentary form of 
digital computer. 18l 
Wart i •• crystal detector work WI. fundamental in advancing tho state of 
the art. Work on increA.iea tho purity of a semiconductor, aermaa1um, wa. 
undertaken at Cornell Un1ver.ity. Work on producing another high-purIty 
seaiconductor, .11icoa, wa. uadertaken at the Univer.lty of_Penn.ylvaa1a in 
conjuQCtlon with !. I. duPont deNemours. Several membere of the physic. 
departmeot at Purdue Un1ver.ity wel'l conduct Ina a ,y.tlmatic .tudy of thl 
proplrtie, of t~~ .emiconductor ,&m&aiua. Accordlaa to we1ner, Purdue 
University, tho Un1ver,lty of Pennaylvan1a, H.I.T., the Genlral ElectrIc 
Compaay, and Boll Labs were the ain partlcipanu in wart1m. semiconductor 
crY8tal re.eAcch under the overall coordination of the K.I.T. a&d1atioa 
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Laboratory. which hid booa lat up 1D 1940 for rwr r ••• arcb,182 WClLner 
a .. ertl tbat I 
The ~cacloa asoaa tha •• laatltucloa. bl1ped create 
che 8utual anreco .. of cba poClac1al of .oa1coaductoC' 
catertal. that coatrlbuted co cho ult~ca tuCCI" of thl 
BIll effort. ror laltlace, oa Aprll 9, 19'5, oal, thr •• 
aoath. bltor. bll Llbe lnuod tha t Authorl.lt10a tor 
work' on 101ld-ltote .. terlll., repre.eatat1 ... of tbe 
parclclpatiaa aeadealc aad ladultlrl1 labor.torie. 
coav.a~ .fa!'l1 Labt tor. 'Ha.tias oa Cerua.1ua 
Cry.tall. ' 
Wlthia the vartLmG .cleatitic cQluait, cOGe.raed with cf)~t.l dltector • 
• ad uaplil1.ra there vu appareatl, the bel1ef that r .... rcb would be 
IUlIIulatod it pb,l1clltl &D4 aoaphyl1cl.tI could 1.atlfact. In 1947 ... p.raee 
divl.loa of the Amlrlcaa 'h,lleal Sociat, devoteeS to .olid-.tate pby.lc. va. 
tomad. 'nle •• troad. uy b..".e bua thl r •• ult of wrtllle dlllocatioa ••• WII11 
&I • fI.PODM to tM aew ldu. that tha war-provoUd IIObll1ty .pre&cS to ua, 
widal, .ap.r.t.d soolraphic .r.... Willi .. Shockl." althouSb not porlooall, 
involved ia .ay wartime ICDicoaductor r •••• rcb. v •• , aaoa, ochlr., at the 
for.froat of tha lIIOvemeat to opea QlV cb&anel. of comun1c.tloa. tor tho •• 
vorkiQl ia met.l.. Shockl., per.i.teeS ia bell.viae that .olld-.t.te r •••• rcb 
Ihould bI continu.d alt.r the WAr, aad la 1945 app.r.ntly r.layed hi. belief. 
to tho re,.arch director at 2011, Kelvia '-11,. 
One, the traa,i.tor .ff.ct WI. &aDouac.d, cum.rou •• ympo.ia &ad 
conIlrlocl. r.l.tina to tha traa.i.tor v.r. h.ld. Th .... ympoa1a w.r. videl, 
attended. According to Horaaa Sp.rk., one of the dlvlloperl of the junction 
tundltor .t Bell Labts ia 1950: 
Bell Lab,' fint importaat polic, wal not to ke.p 
traoailtor ioforlll4tiou •• cret. Not only W&I it aot kept 
A s.cret, but wa activ.ly expound.d the art aa well a. 
the .cilne. of pract1claa thl techaolol'. Sever.l 
1en1n&fI wre ho1cl 1D the ud,. 1950'. where va 
.ttlctlvel, told .11 Ya knew .bout tr.n.iltor 
tlchnololY. 'lbe whole tone of OpeD inforutlon uc:haaaa 
vith1n tM merlioa .eulconductor lndu.try was I.t by 
Bill .Yltas polie1a. of pat.at licla.lna ADd public.tlon. 
•• '1'be .ea1coaductor ladultry'. reurltable, abo.t 
ov.rn1Sbt. arovtb i. due 10 larla .... ur. to r.l.tiv.ly 
opea lnIonutioa exehana ••• 184 
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The JUDCcloa Craa.l.tor WI. 41oco •• rld 1a 1950, tbe juDccloa fleld-efflce 
trlna1ator (liT) 1a 1951, the aurface blrrllr traa.l.tor 1a 1953, &ad tho 
dlttu.Gd blaG trAo.1ator 10 1955_ 
Cov.r~Dtal aroupe alao .poa.orld conferiaci. OD traa.lltor._ oao 
tlWIp1a 11 thl Work.1q Croup oa $a1DCooduccor Du1cH of tM Ad.1.ory Croup 
oa Uectroa l\atMo la tbe OfUCI of thl MahClat Secrltary of Dlfll1Ie, 
Ralurcb aad ElltIlaeer1as_ 
The Allocltioo for Compucla.a Hada.ry "'. touc4td La 1948 and ,pol1lorlcS 
maay resu11rly .cheduled computer confirlacl.. 10 1958 che IateraatLonal 
FederatloD tor In,fomaUoa ProcI .. Lr1I w. founded. A PAper by J.D. Pa1lr.er of 
8111 ubi oa tbe -Perfonaaace ot 'BADIC TraatLttor DilLe&! Co:sputer" at thl 
!utlra Joiot C'.oopuur ConfereDCI (who.e thul va. the Dlilaa and ""pllcacloa 
of Seall 01,ltal Coaput.r.) La Phlladllph1a La Olc .. blr 1954 alva a full 
dl.cu •• loa oa the hiab-.pe.4 polnt trla.l.tor. us.4 1a the tlADIC (oa. of the 
flr.t Iaraa .eAlI traatl.tor cOlputer.) .. vIIl II tOle la.l~ht. lnto thl 
never Junctloa trla.l.tor., 
The poiat contact traaaistor hA. baea the fa.telt 
trl1a.lIto'C' we hi.,. had to von. vith. It allO hal bela 
the traad.tor WIll had 1a quantity &ad hal bMa 
reliable. The flrlt junctloa trln.l.tor. vere not Vlry 
reliable. 'nl.at .1tuatioa hal 1mpro~.4 ea.onaoul1y 10 thl 
la.t yelr. Junctloa trla.l.torl that 11'1 IVllllbl1 Irl 
not al fa.t a. polnt conCact craa.l.cor., but I tblnk lt 
bcc&.1D:3 clear co ua Ibout I year 110 that thl tuture 11 
vltb juactloa trla.l.tor. rlthlr thaa polnt contlct •• 
Therl veri two th11l1' that coadncld ua of thl.. ODe va. 
that phy.lcl.t. aren't lnterl.te4 1D the polnt coatact. 
They don't under.tlad and voa't von. on th4 polnt contact 
tran.1.tor 10 lt will never be improved. 
Th4 junct10n dev1cI oboya the m&theaatlc. t~t they 
under.taad, and thi. 10 I vary ra4l thina ••••• 
The othor th1aa vh1cb 1. equally .1an1flchnt 1. that the 
junction jEan.l.tor 1. nov becomlna fa.ter thaa the polnt 
cootact. l 
Many PQoplQ from differeat In.tltutlonl Ittladed tbl pre.latac10n of 
Felker. ThoGO who particlpated 1n the di.cu •• 1oa per10d follov1ns the 
del1very of hi. paper repre.entod the follov1na 1nItltutlon.: Electro DatI 
Corporatloa, Rea1naton Rand, Inc., We.t1nahoute Ellctric Corporatlon, Sperry 
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Gyro.cope CoDpan1. ~dlral Tlllcoaaua1cacloD Laboratoria •• teN. Alrbor~ 
I~tru&.nt. Laboratory, Arcour .... arcb roued.tloa. IRA 01yi.1oa - lamiaatoa 
land Inc •• "ortb kulricoo buttoa. Ull1verdty of IDchutlr lAd !lDCUS 
~latloD Corporation, Such vlda attladaGCG uaa c~oa. 
The trlnoletor .. I coapOntftt la coaputlr WI. di.cu"ld by Pllker almo.t 
two Y4lra ,.arlllr at a Joint AlII-III CoIputor CoaflrlDel held 1D Nev York 10 
Februlry 1952. 'l'he Utle of bt. peper •• -1'b8 TrIDI1.tor .. D111ul C'.oaputlt 
Compoaeat.- At that .amo coallrlnce JlY w. rorre.tlr (devilopir of mala.tlc 
COI'l memor1 •• ) pre'Gntld a peplr lotltlld -0111tll co.puter., Pre.lot and 
Future Tread.- 111 vtUeb hi dl.culle4 cc:.pontftt rlllablUty aDd how 1t can be 
,vl1uated. He WI. 10.8 eOQylacld tbaD CAay othlr. of thl ~dlltl advlata, •• 
of trloll.tor. oyor yacuua tube., 
1 would eautloo ladDit fll11aa that 101 1I&,1c Will 
.uddlal, .01va the d11 .... of Ilectronic unrlllabl11ty. 
WI haVI heard the trlc.l.tor propo.ld for thl .11mlnatloo 
of flUure DOV Ittributed to vacuu.'l tube.. Thl 
trloel.tor dOl. look proal.laa. t would cautloo I,alc.t 
cocoldlrlns lt I plnacea. VICUUl tube. 10 .ome computlr 
Ipp11cltloDl have • fll1url riCOI'd I. low I. aay thu. far 
proven for trla.l.tor.. The trln.l.tor will improvi vlth 
aot bo IUdI v1th thl lov1aa eare ,ivla to thl fiut 
laboratory modol •• 
With thl proper UN of IIIIrlla.al ehecklna [thie !MaDi 
1'111 lea lad lov.r1aa the vo1tl" beyond no~ 1'~11. lad 
rop11clQ1 tub.1 vb1ch II" deflCtlvl lc tho •• ranal.], thl 
vacuum tuba prl.eat. DO .lrloUi problema exclPt fro. opea 
vel,tl and .hort drcultt. Aldc, with the proper 
attitudl tovard rl111ble 11lctroalc8, the .. dlfflcultll' 
could be sreatly reduc.d. 
For comput.r u'., thl traDll.tor 11 not 10 latereatlna 
for ltl ~ll .lz1 and power conlumptloo .. for thl 
unproveo pOI,lbll1ty that 1t CID be more frel of 
lntermitt.nt eh4aaa. 10 performAoce thao vacuum tubl •• 
For futuro tr.nd8 lt ..... that the ol.etro.tatlc tube, 
reSArdl ••• of typo, i. but a tran.ilDt ~n tho-stase-and 
that it 18 .chedu1ed to be replaee4 111 the aut fev yelre 
by D8W dev~opmeDt. 10 1011d .tatl phy.1c.. A .trona 
coatendlr i8 tbs )-d1eeo.ioaal aa,Dltlc core .tora,e 
arrlY wifh I ,oad po •• lbl11ty for ferroel.ctric 
.torqo. 87 
Therl 1. coo.lderab1e cootrovlr.y conclralna which trao.1atoriz.d 
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computer va. "tuaUy the!!!!S. traal1.todlld coaputtr. 'lbe Urn 14ra .... 
• cal. coaputlr UGiQl traaai.tora 1, ,Iaerally accla1Bld to be tb3 tlJDIC. 
buLlt at b11 LAbl and fin1ahlCS 111 JaQu.ary 1954. 188 The work OQ tbs mADtC 
v:. dODl under &D Air rorco cootract. !lADlC contained 700 point-contact 
.ersaalua traaal.tora &Ld 11,000 poiat-contact ,lrman1u. dlodl •• (The diode. 
-,lve the traallltor [ald) 111 porformiQl It. fuactloDl.- 189 The hi;h-.peed 
polot cootacta ware aAoufactured by the weltlrn Electrlc CoQpAQy which btlaa 
to produce trln.l.tor. commerclally 111 1951. ThI TaADIC, runn1aa at 1 mc, va. 
oald to be coapetlt1ve witb tha maJor1ty of VICUum-tube co.puterl. 189 
'n\ot &trouaha Atlu Ko4 1-J1 Culdaace Ccaaputar ul1aa lurhce barrler 
trlo,lltor. 111 direct-coupled traDll.tor l011c 1. 00 di.pllY It the 
Salth.on1&D Inatltutloa •• -tho fir.t operltloaal computer to u.e trlnal.tor. 
rather thaa vaCUC.3 tub .. -190 - It WII. &.1.0 built uadlf &D Air Forci eolitnct. 
Althouab lt wat dellvered 10 April 1955, it W&I aot oplrltlonal uotll 
Septlmber 1957. 'nUl lith ... ICBH GuUloce Sy.tu, dllivlred to the Air Force 
ln 1957 by the R.lIl1natoo bDel Dlvla10a of SPIft)' bad, howevlf, l1l.I)' have 
actually beea operatlonal before the Atl .. Guldaace cOCllputer. lb&I Athana al.o 
wa. tran.l.torized aad hal b •• a roferred to al -&0 early hiih-rellabll1ty 
transi.torlz.d co.puter .y.t ••• •191 It contalaed 33,000 diode., 7,500 
traa,l.tor, aad 7.680 ~ioetlc core.. The m.mory con.lated of magnetic core, 
drua, aed maia.tic t4pe •• 192 
Th.re are ~ther very early tranalltor computer.. oae 10 partlcular, tbe 
~orth Amerlcan Traa.latorlzed Differeatlal (NAIDAN): 
~4a the fir.t full-tranlistorized or seminconductor-based 
c~puter to be built II .omethina other than a 
prototype. I think lt waa operat1na 10 1953. The 
fund1na "'... a1mtd at bulld1na a 10000eth1na that wno 
coapact. low 10 pover requlremect. and reliable. 
Tranai.tora fit tho blll very c1cely aDd cubes were very 
unreliable. There may have been other military projects 
that did the '&aG. We coulda't talk about the project to 
tM outl1do world, and 1t vaa fru.tratilll for- .000e of u.I 
to 10 out aDd hur peoplo a yur or two later un3D1 
about bu11d1na the flrat tran.1atorlzed machine. 
The lWao-Wooldri&8 .. chine-the 1W-300- has been acclaimed .. tbs firlt 
digital computer uaed for proce •• contro~. It vaa operationsl in 1958 and 
purch.aaec1 by Tuaco. 194 l.cc:ord1aa to Irviac bed, Lincoln Laba vu the fint 
to have conatf1~ted an all ~l1d-atate cCllllPUcer. 19S It waa the 0;-24 aod was 
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opera Una ia 1957. Not oa1y va. tho lOllc traaal.torlzed but ItO WII. tlw con 
IIICIaOrr. -Thera vare othor uchiau t}t~C ul:od traaallLorl, aDS cborl .. , baYI 
baGa c1rwI uch1D.G. thAt waro all lOUd lltatl. • • • IC cSet1D1td1 Wluencod 
tbs vorld.- 196 Although ALWAC 11 .&1d to ba .. maaufactured a .er,r early 
troaelltorllod c:o:Dpuur 1D 1956 or 1957. the /LWN; 800, tbe attice of Nnol 
Ruaudl pubu'catloa d .. cribq thl ALliN; 800 -u a hlah .petd, hip capacity 
olectroa!c data .Yltem coablDins mlaoot1c corl .tora,a. aaaoet1e elemoat lo,ie 
aDd modular con.tructloa.-197 Accord1a; to Raloa, oaly 001 of thtee computtr. 
w. tver 101d, aDd that oaa WIIat to ~dea. Othan Jutt ra&1aad W1Io1d ia 
etora,I.198 Halon. com=oatiaa OIl tho UII of tranaletor., Itattd: 
I hAd oppoeod traaaletor. all ~'oaa becaual I ftlt that 
they dida't bav. tho d181tal circulte worked out woll 
oaouah Ylt aDd that they dida't havi tbe r.llebility &ad 
10 tortb. I vallted to wa1t uatll tMY ver. better 
p.rfect.d. At that tta. it app.ared to me that the 
coabiaatloa of tube. aDd d10d.. waa lIIorl roliable tbaa 
tran.i.tor.. Thia wao before the development ot your 
modera lostc and aU tho .tuff 11k.e that; thi. wu very 
.arly 1D the Bma. 'nla oaly thin: tran.lIton .... ra 
really aood for at thl tlcG ware Japanese radl0 •• 199 
It ,.ea that the M.,WAC 800, whatever it, clrcuitry, '-Ia' premature and 
commerci~lly unauccoI.ful. 
Both RCA an4 Pb1lco WDro involvod very early 1n tra~s'~tor re •• arcb and 
produced commerclal aachla... RCA in 1951 dlv.loped tM junction field effoct 
tran.l.tor (FET) and in DocoGber 1958 announced the RCA 501 which wal a 
tran.i.torized machiDd wlth a cote memory. Phllco devlloped the lurface 
barrier tran.lstor 10 1954 in connection with a lov.mlllent .. curlty a,lncy 
contract to delian a biah-.poed traa.iotorize4 computer. The COIIIputlr waa the 
TRANSAC announced 10 t~ ONR Digital Computlr NOwalettlr in January 1957 aa 
beina a -hilb-.peed, airborne cooputer d.,laned for b1a bomb.ra.-200 The 
circuitry waa ~lrect-coup1ad traoliltor clrcuitry. In late 1958, by loae 
count. ona .oath balor. RCA, Phllco unveiled a commercial vor.too of the 
TRANSAC. 
De.pite thA early lead that Phllco had the poature of tho Philco 
executive, val that 
- Sl -
thay uan a ,ur or eor. ahead of mo.t cOllpaalC1. la tM 
d.vtlopDlat of biG traa.l.torlled comput.r.. • • • 
• • • • 
• • • [flh. Pb11co COQputGf .ttort WI. 13411 aDd poorl, 
flaaacect •••• Tho flr.t coapl.ta 7.000 (tbs d •• l,Altloa 
ot tho C0=8lrC141 tRAHSAC) d.llv.r.d (la JaDuary 1960) 
va. a BOdel 211, Which hid alr.act, chaaaed fraa the 
.urflc. barrler traaal.tof !81tha orl,laal lOd.l 210'to 
tho fa.t.r HADT trla.ltor •• 
IBM form.d ltl flr.t aroup to .tudy tr.n.l.tor. La 1952 &ad daveloped le. 
fir.e "famil,· of traD.l.eor 10S1C clrcuit. tbo follov1Q1 y.lr. It contlnu.d 
to 1o.I.t boavl1y la tho day.lopmeat of trla.l.tot. aact their 
fabrlca;10D. 202 In 1951 18K fabricated drlft-typo trIUli.tor., .. rk1aa tb. 
Hnt t1u UK UNd the c11ttul1oa t.chniqu. ct • .,.loptd 111 1955 by BlU 
Lab •• 203 The drift-type :raa.i.torl had hl.b .p.ed cap.billtl... At ehe .&a. 
tillO ISH wu al.o ballonina to UN .111coo a. wall u belianJ.11I to !mIlrov • 
• laalflcaotl, fabricatloa tlcbnlqual. 204 All thl .. d.y.lopDlnt. contributld 
to a dlflnitl &ad unamblauouo maaa,e=.at d.cl.10a 111 1951 that fro. that polat 
onwlrd, all machlno. dev.loped It IBH would u .. craa.l.tor •• 205 Thl. dacl110a 
wa. communlcat.d by W.W. McDowell, IBH Vlca Pr •• ldaat of a. •• lrcb &ad 
Eoglaeer1aa .ad mad. ·a.c •••• ry tho aval1.bl1lty of a r.llabl. lupply of 
tr.n.i.tor. me1t1aa ISH' •• peclflcatloo.·206 
Cen.ral EI.ctric .nnounced it. tr.n.l.torlzed computlr, the 210, la July 
1959. D1sital Equipment Corporatlon followed .uit 10 lat. 195~, •• dld 
Control Data Corpor.tioo la January 1960. 201 In 1960 NCR lntl'oduced it. 304 
system which wal manufacturld for NCi by Cen.ral Electrlc. This wa. a 
tran.l.torlzcd comput.r and the ma,n.tlc cor .... ory va. driven by 
tran.istorl. Coach and ~ claLa re.pon.lbl1lty for tho tact that the 304 
waa Indeed a tran.lstorlzed mach100 aDd .tat. that the chana' 1a Lnt.rnal 
circuitry, from the or1,Lnai plannod vacuua tubea to tran.Lltor., • •• t UI back 
about .1% Qontha.-208 Appar.atly, th.r. V&8 .~ Internal contu.10n about the 
production of tbo 304 before the daci.10n to award the contract to Ceneral 
Electr1c w.. ude. Tho 304 WIll 1nitially d1l11* at what va. • Ole 
Inatdlat10n ill Bawthorno, Cal1tonl1a. Th.n: 
(Hl.naaemlnt decided to hr1aa the 'na1n •• riac .v.ntually 
bACk to Deyton, and Hawthorn. dlda' t like it • bit. • • • 
.. . 
• 
voll ••• , tM bAllOl ~at CD for a wtU1e w, &Dd, &DIS 
Hr. AUYD val, of COUrlG, vas thl UD-do Val 1D1l1Uq 
tMe it be naheorad bare [011tOD), u4 thea hi cbanaod 
1\1, aJ.~ IOMwbat, aDd he doc1dc4 that WI VOWAD'C. 
uoulc1.D't oaa1l1Hr tbe .18 thina but be WlI loina to 
ba". laotb4r coaPAD1. • • • • aaotblr ollc t ronic. 
coapaa" build certaiD llaMllcl 0!oi1\11 ~clUD8 &D4 he 
d1dD't th.1Ak w could build thea. 
!Q!orl aellct1na CeDlral !i.etric .. 1tl coatraetor, NCI al.o !nvelt1satod 
ralatioosh1pa v1tb Ph1lco aad leA. D.sisa of the plr1pheral uD1t. rlD&1acd at 
~CI Da1toaa. A more Itr1k.1aa picture of thl NCR. dlc1l10a to coatract with 
Icothlr ~cufacturlr 1. ,lven b1 Jlrry Klcdll.oc, 001 of thl dl.1lcerl of 
tha304, who hal bMD with OlC whla tho cOllpaay vas ab.orhed by NCR r 
s, SchOiD. • • did thl trac.l.tor dlvllop.eot. Thi. va. 
la 1954. W. coapl.tld tbe de. 110 beforl thl .Dd of 1954 
aDd WII would ha.,. had a uchloe oa thl urut In .arly 
1956. NCJl paaiced vMC thly thousht ot the Wilt Coale 
upltlrtl (ClC] buildlns I machin •• ao thl, ,ave a 
productloa coctrlce to C! la thl coaput.r bual0 •••• G! 
had the tJlHA coctract an:! that \&1 all. NCI JUIt haoded 
thaa thl trlc.l.tor tocbaololY Ind the .ctlre 304 10l1c 
aDd eODc.pt da.1anl; chat co.t ov.~ two ,lIr. dela,. 
The, dido't d.l1ver a 304 unell 19'1l [de), wh.nAl WI 
vould bAva dlllvered I trao.l.tor aachlC1, flcall" but 
lt WI. oboollte alJaolt by the t1ll. lt CIII. out. It w. I 
machine thac would baw belD 1n ac1VICtl of lt had 1t coa 
out wh.c 1t lhould hav'10fDd WI. raall, ob.ol.nlclocl [.le) vben It did eoa.. 
Boneyvoll rap laced It. entry la the cOliputer mark.t 10 1960 with a 
tran.i.torized modal, the H-200. Ia Hay 1960 Sparry Rand announced the Univac 
III, it. tranal.tor1zad cOQputar. But Sp.rry Racd was .till purlulag dual 
technolosl... It contioued to be 1nvolved 1n maln.tlc amplifiar technology, 
a. 1. claar frOG it. aanouncoaont In ~iu.C 1960 of tho STEP computar. 
Burroulhl vaa tho la.t to .witch to traDll.torlzed mod.l.. It had d.livered 
tho vacuua tube 220 la latft 1958 and for a p4rlod of ti.lle uinta1nad that tM 
220 vao c03pot1tlvo vith tranal1tor1zod .odoll. Finally, in lato 1961, it 
Joined the C~aaoOvQr to tran.l.torl. 210 In ailltar, computar., SUrroushl wa. 
tho early loader ritb lt1 Atla. CuicUaco CoCIputer, (Modl), tho first 
opuacloca1 tranl1.tor MclUne, but it ralled to ute thi. t.cMololY In the 
commarcial marklt. 
Thu., by 1960 thl traa.l.tor .ffectlval, replaced the vacuua tube a. tho 
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luDd.aaeacll coupuur co::!POGOot. I310re t~ dca1DAOCI ot tbe traa,ietor WlSI 
achioved, othor tlchaolollo,. acd 1D partlcular tbat of .asoetlc ampllfl.r., 
vore puuuad. 1M,. vart eub.equClot1, abAD400ad AI tbo prlea10aacl ot tho 
t".oolator ~ ackDowlldaod b1 all lD4uatr,v pcrtlclpaotD. Tba creoclator 
reYolutioQ bad balo accOIIpl1ohad, v1tb '1&D1Ucaat tdYAneaMoti &ad 




Tochnical Change in U.S. Agriculture 
R.E. Even.on 
Yale Univaraity 
The agricultural .ector io videly regarded to be traditional and 
.ocially backward in most economies. Virtually all countries realizing 
what we usually term economic development experience a decline in the 
ahare of the labor force in the sector and in the .hate of the GNP 
originating in the .ector. Migration from rural to urban areas and 
from agricultural to industrial and .ervice occupations i8 a •• ociated 
with rapid economic growth. Agriculture has an image as a labor in-
tensive .ector and has not generally been regarded to be a leading lector, 
at least in many contemporary developing economies. 
The U.S. agricultural sector has undergone rather drastic changes 
in the past century. The percent of the employed labor force in agriculture 
has fallen steadily from 45 percent in 1900 to 3-1/2 percent in 1980. The 
sector contributed 18 percent to GNP in 1900 and contributes roughly 4 percent 
today. Massive rural to urban migration has taken place over the period as 
well. Nonetheless, the sector does not fit some of the stereotypes. It is 
certainly not a labor intensive sector today. The share of labor in total 
costs is roughly 21 percent. far below the comparable share for almost all 
manufacturing sectors (excluding land, it is 27 percent). Furthermore, it 
has been a dynamic sector. Productivity growth has been more rapid than for 
the rest of the economy. Today the agricultural sector 1s one of the major 
export sectors of the economy accounting for more than 20 percent of U.S. 
merchandize exports 1n recent years. 
Much of the decline 1n the relative importance of the sector is due to 
a transfer of activities of the farm to the industrial sector. The retail 
2 
value of farm foods in 1980 is $262 billion whil. the farm valuo 1a only 
$80 billion. RouShly the lame ratio hold I for the $60 billion in non-food 
farm products. The lector allo purchases lome $70 billion from the farm 
.upp1y indultries. 
The public lector has a long hiltory of inveatment in the development 
and dia •• mination of agricultural techDo10rY. The .tate agricultural 
experiment .tation system has been in place for more than a century as 
have 80me of the research units of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
While the interests of federal and Itate governments in supporting these 
research institutions have generally coincided, most of the expansion and 
development of the system in the past 30 or 40 years has been initiated by 
state governments. The private sector has also influenced productivity in 
the sector primarily via the rarm input supply industries, although in 
recent years plant breeding in the industrial sector has increased signi-
ficantly. In many fields of research the public sector and the private 
sector have developed a kind of informal coordination of their activities. 
In this paper I will review the productivity performance of the sector, 
the development of the public research and extension institutions and the 
investment in R&D in the private sector. Part I of the paper briefly 
reviews organizational characteristics of the sector. Part II reviews 
measured productivity growth. ?art III discusses the resources devoted to 
t~chnology improvements. 
Part IV reviews and reports studies which have attempted to attribute 
productivity growth to both private and public sector investment in research. 
Part V discusses current policy issues. 
3 
1. Characteristics of the SIC tor 
Table 1 provides a .umm&ry of major charact'ri.tic. of the aari-
cultural lector. The data pertaining to land IhoWI that nuabcr of 
farms peaked around 1920 and that land in fermi hal not changed Ireatly 
.ince then. Average lize of farm ha. ri.en by • factor of three lince 
1920, however. Production data indicate that the procel.ing And marketing 
of farm foods ha~ grown more rapidly than the farm value of products re-
flecting the transfer of many food processing tM~ks from the home to the 
market. 
Farm income data show that livestock production has become relativp.ly 
more important over time. Non-farm income of farmers now accounts for more 
th~n hal! the income of farmers. Also the ratio of farmer's incomes to 
non-farmer's incomes has risen substantially in recent years reflecting 




General ChAracterilticl of U.S. Agricultural SIC tor 
~ !2QQ. ill.Q .lliQ 1960 !ill • 
.!:!lli! 
, of Farms (thousands) 4,009 5,737 6,/t/tt! 6,097 3,962 2,330" 
Land in Farms (millions) 536 838 956 1,061 1,176 1,048 
Acrn per Firm 134 146 148 174 297 450 
t Tenants 'DIll 23.3 27.7 29.4 14.5 12.0 
t Non-Family Corporate 
ovnerah1p nla nla nla n/a nla 11.2 
Production Values 
Farm ~roducts (bil1ions)($1975) 19.25 32.4 41.2 56.4 
Marketing (bil1ions)(S1975) 24.75 45.9 84.0 118.0 
Export» ($1967) 4,689 4,551 1,910 7,489 12,834 
Imports (5196'" 1,972 4,388 5,:'72 6,515 6,526 
Crop Production (S1967) 9, c 74 12,647 14,202 21,438 31,109 
Livestock Production ($1967) 13,509 17,125 22,663 33,065 43,505 
Income Per Farm (millions 1975 Dollars) 
Gross Farm Sales: Crops 16,635 13,343 28,895 36,727 
l.ivestock 
Products 14,885 26,422 3!>,997 49,552 
Government Pa)~ents 4,136 1,334 2,545 
Net Farm Income 19,395 24,678 22,840 23,419 
Income from Non-Farm Source 
(as ~~ of total farmer income n/a n/a n/a 36 37 53 
Ratio: Income of Non-Farmers 55 91 
Prices (1910-14 • 100) 
Paid by Farmers 212 98 27, 638 
Received bv Farmers 212 100 239 52:. 
Ratio (rec~ived/parity) 99 81 80 70 
5 
T.ble 2 reports .oma of the f.ature. of chanlin; input mix which 
hal characterized the .ector over the pa.t 70 year. or .0. Th. decline 
in tho .hare of labor and the increa.e in the .hare. of mach1~Jry and 
Alricultural chemical. Ire quite .triking. OVer thi. period, the harve.t-
ins of I number or commoditie. (corn, cotton, .ugar b •• t.) VI. ch1fted from 
hand lAbor to fully mechanized harve.ting. Many other ta.k. including tho.~ 
I.aociated with livestock husbandry were mechanized I. vell. Hybrid corn 
and other improved .eeds vere introduced during this period and numerous 
other improvement. in technology took place. 
The importance of land as a factor dccreaQed from 1910 to the late 
1950's, but has increased in the past 15 to 20 years. Figure 1 shows 
capital gains and Asset holding in U.S. agriculture since 1960. Since 1970 
capital gains from land price appreciation in U.S. agriculture have exceeded 
net farm income. Even during the 1960's, there were a significant part of 
the total {ncomp realized by farmers and others owning farm real estate. 
Today the typical family farm has a large asset base. Entry into the sector 
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111. Productivity Grouth in thl Sictor 
Tabl. 2 provide. a .ummary of •• v.ral .tandard partial productivity 
ind4X" for U.S. agriculture. Sinc. thoy ar. partial indexI., they .hould 
be interpr.t.d accordingly. 1 hav. alrlady n~t.d the txtlnt to which many 
ta.k. have ba.n mechanized in U.S. alricultur.. Th. labor productivity 
mea.ur •• in TAbla 2 .how truly extraordinary lain. for mo.t commodities. 
Given the appArent .ase of .ub.titution of machin •• for labor and thl 
growth in the u.e of other input., th.se labor productivity indexes arc 
not r.ally compArable to .imilar indexe. measur.d in tho non-agricultural 
.ector. 
For crops. however. land productivity (yield per acre) is a more 
reasonable index of productivity change. It is influenced by the use of 
farm chemicals. but the mix of labor and machines g~nerally does not affect 
it greatly. The data in Table 2 .how that yeilds have increased dramatically 
after the 1935-1939 period in all crops. The classic .tudy by Zvi Griliches 
of the returns to hybrid corn re.earch was based on the yield changes up to 
1957. As the table shows, corn yields have increased dramatically since 
1957. In 1979 average corn yields were over 100 bushels per acre. This, of 
course, was due to increased fertilizer application to some extent, but much 
of it is attributable to the several generations of new hybrid corn varieties 
produced by both p~-lic and private sector research in recent years. 
Livestock productivity indexes are a little core difficult to interpret 
because fe~d inputs have increased. Modern dairy cattle are generally heavier 
than dairy cattle in the 1930's and consequently consume more feed. Nonethe-
less the more than doubling of milk per cow since the 1930's is partly 
attrib~table to breeding and related practices. 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of productivity change, 
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11 
the USDA productivity aeries for both labor productivity and total or 
multi-factor productivity .ince 1910. Table 3 r.~rt. the annual mu1ti-
factor productivity •• ri ••• inc. lH70. App.ndix A to thi. paper di.cu •• e. 
the detail. of the calculationl involved in the •• index.I and report. a 
comparilon between thele lerie. which u.e the factor veights reported in 
Table 2 and a Dlvlaia-type index vhich .hift. weight. each year. For 
present purposel, the diltinction between the two indexes i. not important. 
All indexes show the pattern of little or no grovth in productivfty prioe 
to the late 1930'.. All indexes .how rapid growth in the 1950's, a~d a 
Ilowdown in growth in the late 1960'., vith moderate growth 1n the 1970' •• 
There i. a pro~uctivity slowdown 1n agriculture in the 1970's, but it is not 
comparable to other sectors of the economy. 1979 was a 
good year and the index rose above 120 indicating growth in the 1970'. not 
far from the 1.9~ trend over the 1940-1970 period). 
These indexes have been computed for Itatea and regions and these arc 
of interest becausc th~y provide us with lome inll~ht into the impediments 
to technology transfer and diffusion hetween regions. Tabl~ 4 provides 
a .ummary of rates of change for several periods beginnl,g in 1930. (Appendix 
L provides details of calculations and reports state indexes as well). The 
time periods are relatively short (3 year Hverages are used as beginning and 
ending values) and some weather variations exists in these data. Nonetheless 
the degree of correlation between regions over time is not so high as to 
suggest rapid technology diffusion between regions. 
Over the 1940-1978 period, the leading regions in productivity gro~th 
were the Delta, the Southeast and the Pacific. The Appalachian region 
clearly comes off worst. The Pacific and Southern Plains regio~s have 
done best in the 1970's. The national data show the rapid gains of the late 
1930's and the 1950's. Interestingly the Pacific region has tended to lead 
12 
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other rogiona in term. or productivity srovth. (Aggroaated data for 
the North Central and Southorn ReaiOD' art Dot entirely comparabl. vith 
the data for the t.n region.). The Delta and-Southea.t.rn ro.ion. 
plrfo~d particularly voll in tho 1950', lusaoatiDg that th.y vore 
catching up to more advanced r'aion •• 
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Ill. Ralourc •• Directed Toward Tichno1oiY Improvement 
~ Doted in an e.r1ier a.ction, .o.t .gricultural produc1D1 firms 
.re .mAll. Very f.~ Inialc in formal R and D, .1thoulh .o.t do under-
tak_ exper1=lntation a •• oci.tld With .cr •• ning nev technology for COlt 
.ffectivencsi. It would be rel.onlble to .ay that plrhap. one fourth 
of the tima of a typical cont£mporary family f.~r i. devoted to .earch 
and acreening And experimentation vith improved technology. This entAils 
attending meetings and programs offered by the public extension service 
and by the State Agricultural Experiment Stations, a •• es.ing the literature 
generated by the public extension .ervice and by private input supply fir--s 
and visiting input suppliers. 
In the course of experimentation associated vith search and screening 
of technology, a certAin amount of technology adaptation and modifications 
takes place. Most of this adaptation qualifies II "sub-invention", but the 
farm scctor has also traditionally generated a fair amount of genuine inven-
tion over the years. 
Thc bulk of the new technology employed in the sector is produced out-
side the fa~ing Rector. A substantial part is produced by input supply 
firms, the farm machinery and farm chemical industries include a number of 
large R and D intensive firms as veIl as many smaller innovative firms. 
The post-harvest industries also include a number of large firms with R 
o activities although the food and beverage industries are not generally con-
sidered to be highly R and 0 intensive. 
Public sector research and extension activities are particularly 
important to this sector. It has long been recognized that the absence of 
large scale farm firms would severely limit the incentives for private in-
ventive activity. This was particularly the case for technology improve-
ments where patent protection vas not effective. Host plant breeding 
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improvements fall 10 this catelory. A n.v plant vari~ty aay differ from 
earli.r varietias 10 charact.ristics vhich are not .a.l1y ldentlfi.d. In 
tho.e crops vhere •• ed can effectively b. produc.d on avary farm and this 
include. most crops, an inventor vill find that he can appropriAte only a 
-=all part of the value of the nev technology. 
Actually the U.S. Patent Office it.elf can be .aid to have originated 
public aector research work directed tovard agriculture. Recognizing the 
limited appropriability of .ome agricultural inventions, it .et up an agri-
cultural division in 1839. This divi.ion undertook .ome re.earch and a 
number of regulatory activities. The Department of Agriculture vas estab-
lished in 1862 in part to handle the growing need for research and regulatory 
activities (particularly with plant and animal diseases). The Patent Office 
division und~rtook extension activity by reporting information of value to 
farmers in its annual reports. 
By 1860 several states had established colleges of agriculture (Michigan, 
1837, New York, l~53 and Maryland, 1856 were the earliest). The Land Grant 
College Act of 1862 provided funding for a College of Agriculture in each 
state. The early colleges were not research oriented - choosing to stress 
"practical" training. Research was given its main impetus by the Hatch Act 
of 1887 which provided research funds to each state for agricultural re-
search. Today the public sector system includes 52 State Agricultural 
Experiment Stations (SAES) an~ a number of USDA research laboratories. 
Figure 3 provides a typology of technology fields and research per-
forming organizations which may be helpful in this discussion. I have 
classified technology into biological, mechanical, chemical and post-
harvest types. For each type of performing organization I have attempted 
to indicate their relative importance in producing technology by a series 
of 4 letters. 
17 
Fiaure 3: Schematic Typology of T.chnolo,y lmprovemc~t 
by Type of Re •• arch Performing Organization 
Small Scale 
Supply aud 
TecMololY Family Corporate Purchadna Small Hfa- Lara' Mfa- Public 
Type Farms rams Fil'llll Firm. Firma Ile ICl arch 
BioloSicil 
Plant varieties LSW MI HlOW HlW 
Agronomic 
Practices HS MS LDS LO LO HIW 
Animal Breeding HI MI HI HI 
Animal Nutrition MS MS MID LID Hn: 
Hechanical 
Tillage 
Equipment LSW LSW LSW MlDW HID LI 
Harvellting 
Equipment LSW LSW LSW HIDW HID Ll 
Animal Equipment LSW LSW LSW HIDW MID LI 
Land Irrigation 
Drainage HS\.' HSW HIW MIDW MID HI 
Chemical 
Fettllhcrs LS LlDW HID Ll 
Herbicides L1l>W HID HI 
Insecticides LID\,,' HID HI 
Animal Health LS LS LS MIDW HD HI 
Post-Harvest Technolosv 
Crop-related LS MlDW HD HI 
Livestock-related - LS MIDW HD HI 
Symbols H M L - High Medium Loy in terms of degree of contribution 
S 1, 1 - Sub-Innovative, Innovative 
D - Development 
W - Wildcat 
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H, H, or L indicate. the relatiye importanc. 10 dly.lopin, technology 
(a number of cilla or a blank 1Ddicat1Da no .ianificant production). 
S or I indicate whether the or,lnization orilinlt.1 new inv.ntions I or 
priDirly modifi •• and adopt., i.e., lub-inv.ntion S. 
D indicate. that the performing oraanization !nv.ata in product dev~lop-
.ant. 
W indicate. whether the inventive Iffort 11 of • high rbk innovative 
.ort. The tarm "wildcat" is applied to this type of invention becaute of the 
parallel with oil exploration where certain firms .pecialize in high riak 
exploration while other •• pecialize 1n the development and refinement of 
fields already discovered. 
1 vill attempt to provide nome evidence to .upport at l.ast lome of the 
qualitative judgment underlying Figure 1 in later discusaions. Here, hovever, 
a .ucmary vill be us,ful. 
First we may note that fa~ theQselves, for the most part, sub-invent. 
They produce little in the way of chemical or post-harvest technology. They 
do a fair amount of mechanical technology modification through sub-invention. 
Farm ~chinery firms are always on the look-out for farmer produced modifications 
in machine design. A fair number of patented inventions emerge from farmers 
because of the wildcat phetlom enon. Large machinery firms seldom engage in 
high risk inventive activity so that virtually all new farm machines emerge 
from the farm and small manufacturing sector. 
Farmers do produce r1olog1cal technology. In foct virtually all ani~al 
breed improvements are produced by farmers, although they are aided greatly 
by _rtifical insemination firms and public sector research. Some crop vad-
ties have been produced by farmers, particularly in the early part of the 
century. In recent years changes in plant breeding patent protection laws 
have stimulated increased breeding activities. A number of larger corporate 
.L!I 
farms an now .pecia1izing in plant improvHllnt work. Kany 1&111 bybrid corn 
compania. are .aaentially corporate farm •• 
Firma .upplying input. and purcha.in, output. blve played a .. jor role 
in the development of firm tachnololY. Th ••• include aacbinery dealer. vho 
provide repair .ervice. and Ingagt in lome .ub-invention. Blacklm1th .hops 
and lmall cu. tom engineering .hop. allo fall in this category. On the bio-
logical .ide, this category includa. firma 'plcializing in technology pro-
duction and aale. Seed companiel, horticultural lupply companial and arti-
fical in.emination firms fall in thia category. Feed ,upplier, fertilizer 
lupplia. and veterinarians allo contribute. Many of thele luppliers conduct 
and facilitate the experiments which are important to any technology develop-
ment process. They deal with both farmers and manufacturers. Their .uccess 
dependa on lel1ing new product~ to farmers, they are continually obtaining 
feedback from farmers regarding the products they aell. They in turn pass 
this information on to manfacturers and thus "articulate" the demand for 
inventions. 
Manufacturing firms are not very important in producing biological 
technology except in animal feed manufacturing. 
importlDt in mechanical and chemical technology. 
They are, of course, quite 
In general, I have in-
dicated that the wildcat quality of invention is confined to small firms 
and that laIge firms generally do little high risk invention. This is a 
judgment on my part, although I will provide empirical evidence for this 
in the farm machinery sector. I am on less firm ground regarding the 
chemical area. It may be the case that large firms are quite innovators in 
some of these fields. 
The public sector, research and extension system, as noted earlier. was 
developed in response to several perceived short-comings in the private sector. 
First, it was clear that in certain fields, notably in biological technology. 
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private firms did not hav@ adaquatf lncent1ve. to eaBago 1n technology 
improvement. Second, there va. a perc.ived n •• d lor a pub1!c ro1. 1n 
providin, objective informAtion to fa~r. not only regardin, technology 
produced by tho public IIctor L'lt by the private .1ctor ., wll. Third, 
it va. recognized that evan vhere incentiv •• for private lac tor applied 
reaearch' activity b .trong, the !ncentivu for IDOr~ fundamancal or 
basic re •• arch are not. 
The pubUc system includes both Fed~~,ll (L5DA) and SUCCI (SArS) unitD. 
Host State units are integrated vith State w.nd Grant University teaching 
unit. and to a lesser extent with State Extension .ervices. SAlS progr4!ll8 
tend to be highly departmentalized and most res. archers a1ao hold univeraity 
teaching positions. In 80me SAES units, graduate .tudent research is a 
large part of the research output. Over time, a nu=bcr of agricultural 
science disciplines have emerged. The institutional .tructure of the SAES's 
includes very applied disciplines, such as plant breeding end agronomy and 
more basic discipl1es such as genetics. 
It has been argued (Evenson, Uaggoner and Ruttan, Science 1979) that the 
character of the SAES organization and the research programs have been imporw 
tantly influenced by farmer interest groups. The researchers in the SAES 
were to have full control over the research programs they would alter the 
programs substantially. In some ways the interest group influence or arti-
culation of demand produces certain inefficiencies. A fair amount of 
duplication of programs and field trial and testing programs have been 
demanded. Hany current critics of the system (mostly from the federal 
governcent note this duplication and lack of co-ordination and also what 
they perceive to be low-quality research. They do not generally note 
that the system actually has some means by which its clients can articulate 
their interests. This feature may well be worth (and 1 would argue that it 
is) paying the price of some duplication and of a fair amount of field testing 
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vhich do •• Dot qualify al high quality reo.arch. 
Tho articulation of farmer intereltl work. very differently at tha 
Itate and fldoral levoll. At tho f.deral l.vIl rel.arch inCet •• tl tend to 
be of minor importance compared to chI aor. direct i.IUI. of price lupport. 
tariffl and othor farm policy illue.. In fact, thlY are lometiael •• tn to 
bt in conflict with the broadar {arm income intere.t •• At tho .tate llv.l. 
prict and income policy inter.ltl ar. not important 11nce they mUlt b. 
daalt with at tho federal llvel. The r.a •• rch, extonlion and teaching 
programs are important, however, .ince they directly lerve .t.te re.idlntB. 
State. do not generally takl into account the efflcts of their programs 
outside the .tate. 
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Tlble 5 .ummarizi. p.t.ntad invlntioD' 10 four broad tlchnology 
fiald. rel.tad to crop harvelt1na, four animal hUlbandry filld. and 
four crop hUlbandry f1llda. Thl readlr vill Dot. th! larlo DUabtr of 
p.tlnt, obt.1nld in the 1850'., 1860'. and 1870' •• 
Tabla 6 ,aport. the patenting by dac.de in plantl" Ind drill. 
by oriain of the inventor. It 1110 indiclta. thl p.tt.rn of p.tlnt 
••• igamont at time of il.Ut. Allignmtnt to • corporAtion il an index 
of the degree of corpor.te or company invention II oppo.ed to individual 
invention. 
The reader will note two phenomena in Tabl. 6. Thl firlt il the 
steady growth in .alignment reflecting the dev.lopment of the farm machinery 
industry. The second is the regional pattern of invention. As .ettlement 
proceeded westward we ubserve tillage inventions emerging from a region 
roughly 50 years or .0 after settlement of the region. We also observe 
patenting, particularly assigned pattenting tending to be located where 
the farm equipment firms were located. In the period prior to 1880 or so, a 
large nuc~cr of small firms producing tillage equl~lu~r.: ~.rp in business. 
Danhalf ( reports that more than 800 distinct moJe1s of- plans were 
advertised for sale in the Northern U.S. in 1880. Many of these small fir=: 
or shops started their business around a particular in/ention. 
During the 1880's and 1890's, the industry consolidated rapidly, the 
large firms (McCermick Deering, John Deers, Case, Allis Chalmers, Minneapolis 
Moline, etc.) in the industry were located in the midwest. These firms often 
purchased the assets including patents of the small firms as they expanded. 
A final point of note about Table 5 is the practical disappearance of 
patenting activity in the New England and Middle Atlantic regions prior to 
the slowdown in patenting in the field. Appendix B provides similar tables 
for other technology fields. The pattern in Table 5 holds in most of these 
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f101d.. Appendix B d1.cu •••• thi. phenomenon 1n the cont.xt of •• odal 
of technoloiY tranlfer. The •••• nti,l eraumtnt 1. thAt .1nc •• oil, 
climAte and economic condition. varied by r.gion., adaptive r ••• arch or 
invention 11 po.~ibie. AA new re,1on. opened up, inventor. found it 
po •• ibI0 to modify and Idlpt tlchnolOBY to th ••• cond1tiona. KAny of 
tho •• inven~ionl ar. quite minor in nltur. and t.nded to b. !ncorporatld 
in more laneral d •• ign feature. of machina •• 
In .uch a .1tuAtion there i. I nlturAl tendency for there to be 
primary GupplierA of invention. and •• condary or Idaptive .uppliera of 
invention.. SecondAry .uppIier. cln Ixi.t when ada~t1ve invention. are 
low COlt. The primAry .uppl1era of invention. will b. oriented to the 
major markltD for tho product; in qUI.tion. In the cI.e of farm machinery, 
the gro~th of the miawe.t regionl .hifted th, primary market for farm 
machinery we.tward. Inventors in the original Now England-M1ddlo Atlantic 
primary m4rket lost t~e1r comparative adVAntage in inventive. for the 
primary market to inventors lOCAted closer to the operating conditions in 
the midwest. The New England-Middle Atlantic region reverted to the status 
of a secondary market with little potential for new adaptations. 
I, 
TaMe 5. fatentinr. Actl.lty ~rl~lturel TechnolOl7 fields 
T~chnolorY rlelds 
~8rvr~tln& tsul~nt Aniaal Related rtd~ Tl~.~l~ 
Gr<lin "ech. , 
Hay J~eapinc C<'rt'I Cotton ~iry Lyslk. Poultry Aa!1Ul Crop 'l.&fttera 
Han dl InJ Th~shing Husti", Hustinl [quips. Houslq !:quip. ~sa ~ DrU}a Oaltl ... tla Plow 
_(1) (') (3) (")(5) (6) (1) (I) (g) (10) (11) __ (17_) ~_ .!ill 
1. Pre 1830 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 , tl 
2. 1830-39 17 &9 38 0 0 1 0 1 0 12 ., 1~1 
3. 18110-119 22 ill 32 0 0 5 3 10 2 52 11 n 
... 1850-59 216 178 121 8 2 35 1 S9 11 332 55 ns 
5. lB~0-69 903 ItOl 1113 30 10 ~2 11 22' .. 9g'J IU tlr. 
II. 1970-79 7lt2 1155 186 31 17 51" n 393 lOla 1172 ,-~ I&~ 
7. 1880-89 668 5111l 1112 911 16 913 97 71'1 10 1661 656 UIJ 
II. 1890-99 1111 2'111 102 91 30 "9 111 529 11 12U Ian '-I 
9. 1900-09 _81t 355 111 183 77. 717 3"3 ItS6 11 1131 • '10 n: N 
~ 
1J. 1910-19 11"1 2111 12'l 331 196 1100 385 ]02 :125 115 3&1 ll~ 
11. 1920-29 211 182 128 387 139 10. 367 9.l 156 m 2'2 n. 
12. 1930-]9 Ilt7 162 97 622 12 _25 ~2 2. 2'lt Ian U2 125 
" 
" ~i 







TABLE 6: P~~ERS ~\~ DRILLS. PAT~T CLASS: SUB-Cla." 111: 1 to 89 • • 
E:llSJ$rn ""estern 
T!:-e t\ev MldcHe Corn Co:-n Lake Appala- Plains :-".ountain Pacific: t 
Period England Atlantic Belt Bell States chia South St:ltes States States roreicn Canadian i 
Pre 1830 
1830-39 5 6 1 
1840-49 14 31 7 
1850-59 20 103 98 66 . 25 9 3 8 1 1 
r .. 1860-69 10 181 282 408 69 17 19 9 2 
.. 
(1) (3) (1) 
IJj 1870-79 21 126 247 467 81 107 70 43 1 9 3 4 (.n (3) (15) (19) (10) (1) 
N 
1880-89 31 101 263 63) 102 12S 16\1 207 14 27 7 7 \It (1) (10) (1.2) (82) (19) (4) (15) (2) 
1890-99 10 99 216 339 102 110 ISS 211 8 13 10 13 (1) (8) (58) (69) (12) (13) (1) (26) (3) 
.. 
1900-09 
, 4 46 149 393 131 94 13S 149 15 15 18 12' 
(1) (/14) (94) (30) (9) (1) (9) (3) (1) (1) (2) 
1910-19 3 43 99 312 90 63. 82 133 22 28 14 14 (7j (28) (75) (29) (6) (4) (:') (6) (1) (1) 
1920-29 4 14 37 81 23 28 18 43 ') 17 13 6. 
(2) (11) ( J5) (5) (J) (2) (1) 
1930-39 6 29 66 126 51 32 11 59 15 26 25 13 . 
(9) (29) (57) (23) (10) (11) (2) (5)r (2) (6) 
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' .. ouch aDd bten.lon in the 20th CentUry 
table 7 aucmarizu public: aector investment in a,ricultural re-
•• ar~ and extension since 1890. l~e expenditure data are in constant 
1959 dollars 1 to enable coEtparisons over time. aDd all UJ)uditure ct.ta 
refer to re~earch and extension oriented to agricultural production only. 
Sere ve note that the system vas relatively small prior to 1910. MOst 
of the funding on research in the State Agricultural Experiment St3tions 
"(SAES) vas from federal Hatch Act funds. The United States Department of 
Alriculture (USDA) had developed the Beltsville, Karyland .tation with .... ral 
othtr~ and vas investieg almost as much on research- in these atAtions 
.. vere the states. 
The 1910 to 192j period exhibits a significant expansion in both 
SAES and USDA research as well as the development o! the Federal Exten-
8ion Service. After 1920. expenditures on the Vocational Agricultural 
Educalion system al~o became significant. In contrast to the earlier 
period. the contribution from state governments then becaae algnlficant. 
both in supporL of r~search and extension. The Grang •• and the Fara Bureau. were 
lrhe rrice index used to de11nte current expenditures is taken froc 
!vens~n (1968). It is constructed by deflatin~ sep~rately the e~penditure~ 
00 professional staff by an index of un1versity ?rofess~r~' salaries, 
technical and clerlc~ staff (skilled l~bor). equi?ment (metal and metsl 
equipment). nnd building investment (build1nS rna:er131s). The 1970 d~fla­
tion 1s based on An index constructed by NSF [1972]. 
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Public Sector: U.S. Aariculture 1890 to 1970 
Killions of eonstant 1959 Dollan 
EXPENDITURES ON WEARCH 
State !sri. Exp. Stations 
State Federal 
Total Funded FundeJ 
% % 
3.7 .22 .78 
4.7 .34 .66 
14.2 .39 .61 
13.1 .72 .28 
11.0 .77 .23 
16.3 .85 .15 
29.0 .73 .27 
30.1t .57 .27 
43.4 .54 .28 
43.8 .56 .23 
74.5 .63 .11 
96.4 .63 .11 
132.2 .55 .15 
147.8 .58 .16 
158.9 .66 .16 
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alao WtruMDtal in cSenloPiD& both .tate aDd federal _pport for ruearch. 
CDd to an even areater extent for extendon. 
After 1925, a further major expansion of the research aystem took 
place, again vith significant state support. Data for 1935 indicate a 
algniUcant new pattern of i:1Ve£tme:1t. The federal government in expand-
ing the USDA research nov belaD to locate a 11~1flcaDt aJK)UDt of ite 
relearch activity in the atates, often locating acientists directly in 
the 8tat~ experiment stations. Much of this expan.lon took place in the 
'southern states. 
The post Vorld War II expansion of the research system vas most rapid 
from 1945 to 1960, &Dd virtually all of this opm.ion took place in the 
.tate experiment stations. The USDA investment outside the state ~~er­
iment stations has changed little siece 1930. Since ve are considering 
proLuctjon oriented research only in this tabl~ve should note that the 
USDA has expanded its research programs in the utilization and marketing 
2S 
of farm products very sign$.ficantly since 1945. Additionally. it 11 intere.Ung to 
note th3t the federal government through its investment decisions has 
been very influential in ch~ging the research system, even though .tate 
lovernments have provided the majority of the funds. In the 1930's and 
1940's it located much of its inveslment in the "1&&ging" regions, chiefly 
the south. In this vay it had a major impact on the regional nature of 
productivity. In the 1950'5 and 1960's it shifted e~has1s to marketing 
aDd utilization research, to a much greater extent than would have occured 
if the states vere determining the investment pattern. 
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leseareb expenditures rose less rapidly 10 the 1960'. and have been roughly 
constant in recent years. 
aDd vocational agricultural programs have probably declined 10 real tarms 
aince reaching peak levels in the early 1950's. 
Ve do not have detailed data on the rase*rch a~tiv1ties in the private 
eector that are of direct relevance to 1:proveeen:s in the ef!icie~cy of 
agr1cultur31 production. The available data are suzflllluized in T3.ble 8 
where the .xpenditures reported are for .. r .... rch and develoPMnt. It It i. dif-
ficult to compare theae with tbe ezpenditur •• in the public •• ctor because auch 
of tbe re •• arcb in the public .ector does DOt lead to a .. leable product, and doe. 
not involve tbe same kind of develop.ent that characteriz •• new fara t.pleaants, 
pesticides, etc. On the other hand, the public •• ctor expenditures do support what 
aight be called, "development" as many field trials, for example, may be clusified. 
ror compar~tive purposes, ve vould include only a portion of the 
research in the fare ma:hinery and a&rlcultural chemicals industries as 
the private sector counterp~rt of the public sector expenditures reported 
in Table 7. The expenditures in the food and kindred products sector 
are mostly for utiliz~tion rese~rch and the marketing of agricultural goods 
after they le~ve the producing sector. The National Science Foundatlon 
data indicate that approximately three-fourths of the research and devel-
opgcent expenditures are for "c!evelopment." If ve make the crude adjust-
eeot to production oriented research ~d developeent expenditures that 
one half of these expenditures are co=parable to public sector activities 
called res~arch, ve find that durieg tbe 1950's the private sector accounted 




'Iabl' 8: lesearch and Development Expenditure. by Private Industrial 
rirms of Relevance to U.S. Agriculture. 
IU.llions of Constant 1959 Dollars 
1952 1958 1960 1965 1970 
Production Oriented: 
A,ricultural Che~cals 
(SIC 287) 31 35 27 52 67 
ram Machinery 
(SIC 352) 31 58 72 78 60 
Preduct Ori~nted: 
Food • Kindred Products 61 72 88 107 U8 
Source: National Science Foundation. "Research and Development in Industry 
1970." NSF 72-309 for 1960. 1965. 1970. 







private share rose to roUZhly 40 percent during the 1960' s. 
It 1s always difficult to drav a line drline~ relearch that 11 or 
11 DOt orlente~ to particular economic activity. The data 1D Table 
aDd later tables referring to the public aector include aome production 
oriented research undert3Kcn outside the state universities. That ia, for ~le, 
1f any USDA funding 1s involved, r.learch conducted in a private univer-
sity b includ.d. lIon.thel.al a arut deal. of qricultur-
ally related research is missed. Research in plant and anical. physiology, 
1n plant and ~nimal genetics. in cytolo&y, in experimental desi~ and 
'. number of other fields of Icience il of direc~ importance to applied 
agricultural research. Ve bave only one estimate of the magnitude of 
this research activit~ In 1965. a USDA study sroup estimated that expen-, 
ditures for agriculturally related research v~s approxi~ately seventy 
on agricultural rese~rch. 
percent of the public sector spendinsl If ve accep: this estimate for 
purposes of a crude alloc~tion of research effort relevant to agri'cul-
ture in 1965, the public sector (SAES plu~ USDA) accounts for alightly 
less th~n one half of the .total and the private sector, roughly 20 percent. 
The remainder is agriculturally related research. Since .uch of the 
latter sp~na1n& is from public funds, agricultural research is predomin-
atcly a public sector ~ctivity. 
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the data presented to this point do DOt adequately indicate hOY 
much research effort is being devoted to the lolution of particular 
problt:mS. It is difficult to obtain a measure of research "intensity" 
. 
or research exp~nditures per "problem." Lat.r we will uoe a .... ur. baaad 
on geo-cUaate region and on collllOdity coaplaity,. but bera va vant a lDiple 
.umraary aa.ure. Tbe re.earch intenaity ... ure that va pre.ent in Table 9 
1a reaearch expend1turu ,.ar thoulaDd dollarl of C01C3OGiq .alua. k ... rcl1 
intenaitie. for all live.tock and li.-.toek product. and for all crop. are 
then calculated for each of the ten reliona. 
By this .eaaure, the lOuthern regiona, even in 1951, vare DOt lagging 
behind the reat of the country. In 1951, the aoutheaat region had the higheat 
livestock rese3rch intensity, and ranked Sth in crop research in-
tensity. The Delta region also had relatively high research intensities. 
The Corn Belt.on the other hand. ranked low. 
This me~sure. as we have noted, is an imperfect one for several 
reasons. First. the intensities are not corrected for crops fec to live-
Itock. The value of forage and pasture crops not marketed should be 
lubtracted fro: the livestock intensity deflator and added to the crop 
intensity deflator. Doing so would bring the intensities more closely in line 
with one another. Of more importance, the dollar value of production in 
a reg10q is not necessarily an indicator of the difficulty of producing 
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Table 9: leaeareb Orientat1:m by leSion: U.S. Acrleul~re 1951 cd 1963 
lzpend1tures (in 1959 dollars) on Jasearcn by Orientation 
LIVESTOCK CROPS ECONOMIC lr 
Expend- ENGINEERING 
iture Share of 
laS ion 'UP I a per $1)00 bsearch 
Expend- Comodity ~ Commodity Expend- lxpend-
iture Value iture Value iture itures 
1. Northeast 
1951 3.66 1.79 5.86 5.96 .54 .047 
1963 6.03 2.65 7.42 7.4i 1.06 .062 
2. Lake States 
1951 2.48 1.12 2.68 3.62 .48 .074 
1963 3.91 1.56 4.10 4.38 .78 .076 
3. Corn Belt 
1951 4.48 .88 3.21 1.71 .77 .078 
1963 6.47 1.16 4.04 1.40 1.19 .084 
4. No. Plains 
1951 2.24 1.14 1.55 1.51 .27 .059 
1963 4.47 1.85 3.lL. 2.26 .70 .075 
5. ApJ!a1achaia 
1951 2.19 1.81 2.63 1.41 .49 .082 
1963 4.48 3.07 3.95 2.15 .81 .076 
6. Southeast 
1951 2.22 3.22 3.89 2.37 .69 .087 
1963 5.67 4.33 7.24 4.45 .91 .060 
7. Delta 
"1951 1.22 2.32 2.70 2.64 .68 .135 
1963 3.73 2.41 4.22 2.60 .55 .057 
8. So. Plains 
1951 r 2.32 1. 79 2.24 1.90 .40 .074 
1963 3.n 2.40 3.89 2.59 .65 .067 
9. Mo~ta!I! 
1951 2.84 2.21 2.38 2.60 .61 .088 
1963 5.21 3.30 4.74 4.07 1.01 .092 
10. Pacific 
1951 3.93 3.0\) 4.91 2.18 1.75 .067 
1963 6.77 3.70 9.53 3.59 1.54 .073 

























uew technology of value. The Corn Belt, for example, _y have a more 
homogeneous set of geo-cli=ate factors vithin it than the Southe2st. 
If .0, a research finding in the Corn Belt viII be adopted over more 
units of production. Hence, the resea!ch activity per economic problem 
aay ~el1 be higher in the Corn Belt. 
In addition to research directly oriented to livestock and crop 
'production, ewo additional categories are sh~Al. The e~onomics and engin-
eering rese3rch includes only production oriented rese3rc~ but basic research 
includes phytopa:hology, 5011 science, botany, zoology, genetics~ and plant 
~~d ar.i~al physiologJ' in agricultural research institutions. Regional dif-
feren~eE i~ the shares of econo~cs and engineeri~ are somewhat greater t~~ 
in the share of basic research, as the southern regions have relatively high 
shares of economics and engineering research and low shares of the more basic 
research. 
'. 
~sellrch and Ertension bpen4ituns in Qeo-C"!Mte Flftg10DS • 
!'he issue of research "denaUon" to obtain a .uure of ruearc:h 
.ffort per research problem is a difficult one. As we have DOted, re-
. 
D3arc:h per st~te, re.e~rc:h per f~~ and researCh Fer unit of commodity 
value all have imperfections. In this section we off'!r a measure based 
on ,eo-cl1ma~e zones or regions that is closer to a meaningful measure 
than the m:>re conventional measures. We will use thie definition in later 
econometric specifications which relate research effort to productivity. 
We deflate research by the "a1Justed" number of commodities and the number 
of geo-cliI:Jate zones within a state. We also use the regional research 
classifications to define the research activity relevant to the producers in 
each state. 
It is not possible, unfo~tunately, to obtain from the geography lit-
erature a standardized set of ho~geneous crop production regions for the 
United States. It is not an essy task, since several climate factors and 
• large set of soil and topology characteristics are important to crop 
produc:tion, and any attempt to define regions involves the explicit or implicit 
weighting of these fac:tor~. Of c:ourse,a number of them are reasonably 
highly correlated and this sicplifies the task. Soil characteriGtics are 
determined to a 13rge ~~tent by clicate factors, for example, and the 
definition of a geo-climate zone may not require a decisio~ as to ~hether 
elimate factors or soil c:haracte~i~tics are more icportant. 
The extent or level of detail to incorporate into the d~f1nition 
of retions or 20nes is also arbitrary. It could be fine enough to dis-
tinguish bct~een very small differences in soil texture, for example, and 
the s011 surveys prepared for many countries in the United States ~y the 
Soil Conservation Service have such detail. Unfortunately, ve are dealing 
with more atgres~tc econcmic units and require a broader definition. In 
particular, ve w;lnt a re.~fon to be defined in terms that are menningful 
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to the transfer of technology between states. 
We concluded that the regions and sub-regions defined by t!le re-
searchers in preparing the 1957 Yearbook of Agriculture were besJ~ suited 
to our purpose. W_ith some minor modifications to the regions presented in 
that report~ we developed the re~~onal configuration shown in Figure 2. 
In all there are 16 regions, each defined on the basis of relative homogeneity 
of soil and climate factors. Each region has frO!!l one to five sub-regions 
(40 in all), and most sub-regions and all regions extend across state boundaries. 
In Table 10 research expenditures in constant dollars by region are 
presented for selected years. The allocation of research expenditure to 
regions was done on a commodity b~sis. For each of 21 commodities, state 
research was alloted to each sub-region according to the share of that 
cowmodity produced in the region. The regional totals then are the sum of 
commodity research plus a proportional allocation of the non-comoodity 
orientej research. 
Co~odity Orie~tatio~ of State Agricultural Experiment Station Research 
In Table 11 we present a summary of research expenditures by com-
modity in the State Agricultural Experiment Station system in 1966. It was 
possible to divide the production oriented research into two subcategories, 
production-increasing and "maintenance" research. The production increasing 
resp.arch included improving biological efficiency, mechani~tion of cultivation 
and harvesting, crops' reproductive perfo~ce, feed efficiency livestock. 
The concept of maintenance of technical gains is very important in agriculture, 
because, in contrast to most mechanical technology, bio-chemical technology is 
subject to real loss or depreciation from diseases, insect pests, and internal 
parasites. 
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fDble 10: Research E!'CpencHtU%'es by Ceo-CUmate Region 
adllions of 1959 do~ 
1'4g10n 1915 1935 1950 1965 1969 
1. Ilortheast 2.09 
Dairy Region 
2. Middle Atlantic .53 
Coastal Plain 
8. Florida Uod .13 
Coastal FlatllocCs 
-. 
Southern Uplands .95 
5. East -Cclltral 1 • .,2 
Uplands 
6. Midland reed 3.1&5. 
Region 
7. Missis~ippi te1ta .19 
8. Northern Lake .03 
States 
9. Ilorthern Great 1.17 
Plains 
10. ~intcr Wheat and .61 
Gradog Re&ion 
11. Coastal Prairies .01 
(Texas-La. ) 
12. Southern Plains .18 
13. tlountain States .ss 
Grazing-trriLated 
R.e£lon 
111. Pacific Northwest 
.311 
Wheat Reeior. 
15. North Pacific .01 
Valleys 
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Table U. Co~dity Orientation of St.te Asricu1tur.1 Expert..nt St.tion ..... rch 
1951, 1961. 
Res •• rch 1966 Re •• arch Expenditures Expenditures 
1n millions IxpeDdi- Share of !.xpend1-
Col:IIDodity of 1959 Millions ture per ''Hainten- turea per 
dollars of 1959 1000 .nce Scientist 
1951 1961 dollars dollar. Re.earch" Man-year 
of I!roduct 
Livestock 19.59 32.92 67.42 2.72 .40 53,534 
Beef 14.33 18.13 17.48 1.67 .38 56,475 
Dairy 4.37 7.11 15.99 2.91 .36 55,971 
SWine 2.29 2.90 8.28 2.01 .45 60,272 
Sheep & Lr...ws 1.25 2.22 5.52 16.33 .37 48,733 
Poultry 3.87 5.88 14.36 3.47 .37 49,362 
Other 3.49 6.69 5.77 .59 53,729 
CroEs Total 19.19 27.88 81.81 4.45 .43 36,567 
Cereals 4.03 5.60 14.06 2.13 .40 34,340 
Corn 5.65 2.23 .38 34,484 
Sorghum loll 1.92 .18 30,248 
Wheat 3.67 1.81 .52 35,475 
Rice .66 1.63 .36 32.031 
Other small grains 2.98 5.63 .38 34.799 
Cotton 1.16 1.42 9.69 6.14 .52 40,103 
Oil seeds .56 .70 4.72 1.64 .35 38,052 
Soybeam; 2.53 1.01 .31 36,544 
Peanuts 1.21 4.48 .47 41,436 
Other .93 11.62 .33 37,556 
Tobacco .73 .81 3.51 2.90 .49 39,723 
Sugar Crops .28 .38 2.65 4.38 .53 37,656 
Pasture ~ FQrage 3.47 5.31 10.57 .22 36,97:! 
Horticultural Crops 8.21 11.94 26.86 6.25 .50 35,596 
Citrus Fruits 1.14 2.19 3.80" 7.60 .51 38,122 
Decid. Fruits & Nuts 2.47 3.15 10.71 8.86 .49 36,711 
Vegetable. 3.03 4.20 10.25 5.07 .49 33,586 
Potatoes .82 .68 2.10 3.57 .57 36,208 
H13ce11aneous Crops .75 1.72 11.54 .33 32,714 
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In Table 11 we provide research expenditures by cCIIIDOdity in 1959 
dollars for 1951, 1961, and 1966. The reader should be cautioned that the 
1966 data are not strictly cOIIlPflrable to the 1951 and 1961 data. They 
include USDA research located in the states and because of a more detailed 
breakdown of the research program, the 1966 data are more accurately production 
oriented. The 1951 an~ 1961 data are comparable, however, and indicate that 
research expenditures on beef, dairy, sheep and lambs, poultry pasture and forage, 
and citrus crops were increased by more than 50 percent over the decade. 
The 1966 data enable more accurate comparative statistics and three are 
provide:. The first, reasearch expenditures per thousand dollars of co~odity 
value, indicates relative research emphas~s. This measure shows that crops 
receive more e~hasis tha:. livestock. It might be argued that research on 
pasture and forage should be allocated to the livestock sector, but even if 
this were done, crops would still be more research intense. Within the live-
stock gro~~, sheep anj la=bs are verJ research intense. Withi~ the crop sector 
one finjs that the cereal grains and soybeans have low research intenseities 
while cotton and the horticultural crops are quite research intense. 
The second measure offered in the table is the share of maintenance 
research by coc:nodity. Here we find that wheat, sugar, cotton and the 
horticultural crops ~~ quite research intense. 
the second ~asure offered in the table is the share of ma!nt~naDce 
reaearch by cocoodity. H~re we find that wheat. susaT. cotton ~d the 
hortle~ltural crops have half or =ore of their research effort devoted 
to maintenmlce. The other cereal grains, tht! oil seeds, and all live-
.tock except swine. have Telatively low ~1ntenance shares. 
>; 4>; SQ 
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The final computation presented in Table 11 measures a character-
istic of the research system i tselr. The 1966 data allow a calculation of 
expendi tures per scientist man-year by research program area. Thil lives 
some indication of the scientific equipment and related technical staff 
associated with different research programs. The average spending per 
scientist man-year by commodity are clearly highest for livestock research. 
Relatively little variation in the averages within the livestock and commodity 
groups is apparent. 
:~tatistical analysis did not reveal si~ficant differences in these fi~es 
by state or region. Uost of the state variance in this measure is associated 
with the co~ditv mix in the states. 
.. , 
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IV. Contribution of Research and Extension to Productivity 
A number of studies of the contribution of public sector research 
and extension to productivity growth have been .. de. A recent review 
by Norton and Davis discusses a number of these studies. DOt.bly studies 
by Griliches on hybrid corn, Peterson on poultry improvement, Schmit% 
and Seeklar on the tomato harvester. Evenson. Peterson and Fitzharris 
and Lia and Cline on the effect of aggregated production oriented re-
search. No studies to date have investigated post-harvest technology 
and private sector research has also not been effectively handled. 
The methodology employed in most of these studies has been quite 
simple; essentially the statistical model is a productivity decomposition 
specification in which productivity change is regressed on variables measur-
ing previous research, extension schooling investment and on private sector 
invention. The underlying presumption is that the independent variables 
are exogenous, i.e., independent of productivity growth. Most studies 
justify this by pointing out that even if current investment is endogenous, 
the logged investment variables appropriate to the decomposition specification 
are not. (A study by Guttman did employ an instrumental variables technique 
and concluded that no significant simultaneously btas was present). 
The specification of the dependent variables is not a si~ple matter. 
If only time series data are utilized, one can avoid the question of the 
appropriate deflator, but some kind of time shape must be imposed on the 
construction of the research variable. Efforts to use standard distributed 
log procedures to estimate this time shape have not been very successful in 
these studies. A simpler approach 1n which alternate time lags of the form 
(a. b, c) are constructed and a non-linear least squares procedure employed 
to estimate a , b and c has been more successful. The parameter a b and c 









In a specification where a research .tock variable is constructed from logged 
expenditures 
t-a 
r W R + 







The weights W rise linearly to one over a periods, equal one for b periods 
t 
. 
and full linearly to zero over c periods. An alternative to this specification 
is to specify a depreciation rate to approximate the c and b parts of the con-
struction. 
When cross-section data are used, some kind of spill-over apecification 
must be made. It can be argued that schooling variables should be expressed 
on a per operation basis and that since much extension activity is location 
specific that an expenditure or man-days variable should be measured on a 
pe~ farm basis. This will not do, however, for the research variable where 
research findings from one state station clearly spill-over into other states. 
It is also clear, however, that this spill-over is incomplete. Environmental 
iapediments such as soil and climate factors cause technology which is directed 
to or targeted to a particular region to be less valuable to other regions. 
This incomplete transfer of technology is an important component of the public 
sector motives for in\"estll!2.'lt in research. (We will take this issue up in 
section VI of the paper). It provides an incentive for state investment in 
research targeted to the states farms. 
In this section I will report productivity decomposition results for 
..------.. -- ---- Ii + *T FP #+\PWq .. 
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three time period •• 1870-1925. 1925-1950 and 1948-1971. 
The analy.is for the 1870-1925 and 1925-1950 period. doe. not require 
that the i.aue of geo-c1imAte apecificity be add rea led becaule only time 
leries and broad regional data aeriea are ava!lable. 1 report 2 Itudies 
for the later period, both of which addressed the Ipill-over illue by 
utilizing the geo-climate data portrayed in Figure 2. 
. , 
--- --- - ---- - ----- -- -- - -- - -
-------- -- -------....... 
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We turn DOW to • productivit,. deca.polltiOD aal,..18 for the 1870 to 
, 
1950 period. Th. period of pre-modern growth, 1870-1925 will be 
conside~ed first. I bave 1Dcluded the p.riod of relatlYe atag-
Dation in productivit,. growth 1D thia aDa I,.. 18 because I wiah to put the d.ta 
to • otrong teat. Previoua autbora have concluded that productivit,. srovth 
during thia pre~odern period 11 not .,..teaatically related to r •••• rch or 
inventive activity. The eYidence r.port.d here indicatea othervtae. 
The apecification utili&ed in thia anal,..i. 1.: 
vhere: 
P 1a the Kendrick index of Gro •• Factor Product1vity for the 1870 to 
1925 period. INV is an invention index defined as: 
where CP. 1 is the cucrJ1ated stock of patents (lagged ten years) in l.~ 
technology field 1, originating in region j.l Eij 18 the "related" economic 
activity a •• ociated with tbe technology field and region. Thia index is 
&lu:iDariud in Table 11. RES 1a a reaearch baaed knowledge atock. It 11 the 
cumulated ~eaearcb expenditures in conltant dollars froc 1850 to date. A 
tiAe la, 11 built into the conltructioa ol thia variable. Tb1a tille l.g 
atructure vas 1Ddirectl,. "eat1mated" by conatructing uVeral alternative 
atocka with differing time laga between reaearch expenditure and full 
Lrhis presumes an average lag of ten years be~een invention and farm 
prcductivity import. Th1S is roughly the same as estimated for ~he time 
lag for research. 
_-~-~...,.. ..... - ~ ------ - -"~"""''''--''~'''''--'--''''''''''i _____ ~i -~.--__.... 
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Table 11. Inventive Activity Su.mary 
Cumulated patent. Activity weighted 
Period relevant to asricu1ture cuau1ated patent. index, INV 
1850-59 1,944 73 
1860-69 6,666 261 
1870-79 11,607 426 
1880-89 17.703 469 
1890-99 22,255 461 
1900-09 27,117 445 
1910-19 32,007 477 
1920-29 35,292 487 
1930-39 38,014 467 
-----------~~-------~-.... --.-----
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re •• arch blpact (3, I, cd 1I, .. n) aDd cliffarina rata. of 1au,.,1ed~e de-
,redation (0, .S aDd 1 pereat). Th. atodt 'Wadable whieb 8uppo •• d • 
t1M 1&1 of 18 ,un between expenditure aDd •• xi .... naulU (vith .. 1abu 
rt.inl linearly) aDd • depreciation rata of 1 pareeDt par ,a.r .tDia1zad 
the raddual .um of aquar .. cd v .. taken .. the b.at .at1aata of the t1M 
abape. 
~ 18 a land quality index. It vaa con.tructed .. followa: rirat 
tbe average yield levela of vbeat, oatl and corn for each atat. for the 
decadea 1880, 1890, 1900 aDd 1910 vere relrealed on the percent change 
in "improved" acreage in the prior ten year period, the percent change in 
the prior 10 to 20 year period and the percent change in improved acr.age 
in the prior 20-30 year period. The ratio I of improved land to total land 
under cultivation in the 10, 20 and 30 prior yeara vere allo included a. 
dependent variables. These regressions, which are r~ported in Table 12, 
allowed estiMates of loil exhaustion factors. A nelative coefficient on 
prior ratel and ratios indicatel that rapid prior expansion lowers current 
,ields through loi1 exh.ustion phenomena. Soil exhaustion appeared to be 
lignificant in the Eastern and Western Itates but not in the Hiddle atatel. 
Second, a Itandardized land leries was constructed by adjusting for 
,ield level changes and for loll exhaustion. The yield level adjustment 
tak~. into account the relative expansion of acreage in high and low yield 
atatel. If acreage expanded more rapidly in high than low ,ielding regions 
the yield adjustment treated thi. as a rile in land quality. The aoii 
exhaustion adjustment was based on prior expansion and the regrellion co-
efficient. Third, the ratio of the yield and exhaustion adjulted land 
---.~~. -- -._-- - ~--~~, ~---,. .......... --,p..,.v ... _--_ -----.--_____ ~ __ ~ 
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Table 12. 5011 Exhalation "lre .. 1on An.l,.d. 
Dependent Vartable: Ve1ghted averaze yield per acre of wheat, com cd 
oata ~here weights are ahares of .a1ue crops). 
Eutem Middle Veatern 
IndeEendent variable. Statu States States 
Percent change 1n t.proved -3.1 7.5 
- .4 
land in prior to (1.0) (1.0) ( .1) 
Percen t chan~e i n illJlroved .5 14.1 5.5 
land 10-20 pri9r years ( .2) (2.6) (1.3) 
Percent change 1n ~roved .3 .05 8.1 
land 20-30 years prior ( .1) ( .1) (1.5) 
Ratio: Improved to total -9.5 -2.9 -5.9 
land 10 years prior ( .8) ( .3) (l.S) 
Ratio: Improved to total 2.1 7.6 -11.6 
land 20 years prior ( .2) (1.0) (3.4) 
Ratio: Improved to total -1.1 4.6 -7.7 
land 30 years prior ( .1) ( .5) ( .8) 
R2 
.97 .92 .89 
Regressions include state dun:ny variables. Observations are for 1880. 
1890. 1900 and 1910. 
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The regression results obtained for this period are reported in Table 
13. They quite clearly refute the earlier conclusion that productivity 
change for this period is unrelated to inYeDtin actidty and to Z'Osoarch 
inTest'llent. They also refute the hypothesis that so11 exhaustion vas a .. jor 
determinant of productivity change. 
The agricultural research ",uiahle is highly ai~ficant and indicates 
that the early experiment station system was indeed producti",e. A rough 
calculation of the marginal product of an addition to the research stock 
can be made. A one thousand dollar addition to the stock increases the output in-
dex (holding inputs constant) by .00000009 units or roughly by $12,500 
dollars in 19"'9 dollars. This implies an internal rate of return of 
approximately 65 percent. 
It should be noted that the period of relatively slow productivity 
growth beginning around 1500 is included in this analysis. It is also inter-
esting to note that the activity weighted patents index reported in Table 11. 
shows little growth after 1889 partly because overall inventive activity slowed 
down during the period and partly because of the relatively IIIOre rapid 
growth of economic activities and regions with low levels of inventive 
activities. 
Next, consider the 1926-1950 period, a period when substar.~ia1 biological 
invention was forthcoming. Hybrid corn was the major case although substantial 
iJDprovellJents in animal health and nutrition practices and other crop varietal 
improvements were also being made. It was also a period of 
..... Q s: ,pc 
so 
Table 13. Regression Analysis: Productivity Decompo.ition 1868-1926 
Dependent Variable: Kendrick index of Total Factor Productivity 
40 annual observations 
Independent variables 
INV. (invention Index) 
RES (research .tock) 
LandQ (land quality factor 
Constant 
"t" ratios in parentheses. 






























transition from anilul power to -chanica! power I in field von. '!'his 
transition produced a C~ series of 1nve~tion by the fara aach1Der,r in-
dustry which is DOW a .. ture indu.try. 
For this period we have total factor productivity .eries of thP. CLG 
type for four regiOM. The analyais uses theae CLC indexes C1J 1ndepm-
dnet variables in a cro.s-section time-.eri.s analysie. Tvo alternative 
functional fQ~ are utilized: 
al 
TFP • A (00) 
Yhere; 
02 + a3 (SRES) 
(!RES) 
a4 W + Region and tiDe effects 
e 
84 V + Ja,iOD and tiaa effects 
• 
TFP is the CLG index of total factor productivity. 
INV Is the invention index defined earlier. 
TRES is a stock of applied or technology oriented research for the 
and time period. 
SRES is a stock of related scientific research for the region and time yeriod. 
The variable W is a national weather index c~nstru.ted by Stallings 
(1957). It was not possible to construct a regional index. 
In the first specificatioT\ TRES and SRE~ "interact" such that the pro-
ductivity of technology research depends on the stock of scientific ~search. 
Scientific research is productive only througa its effect on the ?roductivity 
of applied research. In the second specification, invention is interacted 
with applied rese~~ in a similar way. 
The variables, TRES and SRES were subjPc!ed to an approKimate non-linear 
-~-, ... ,.... ,--- -------- ----
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least .quarea proeodut'e to •• t1aate the tbe-.hape. The applied re .. arcb 
.ariable ll1n1mbed the reeidual a_ of aquares when it took thl fora 
of a 1., .trueture with ri.in, we1&hta for five year. , cooatant wei,ht. 
for 6 years and deelining veight. for 11 yeara. 
The SRES variable had weights rising for 15 years. eonstant for 2& 
years and declining for 25 years. ~us the average time lag between investment 
and impaet was seven years for applied research end 20 years for .ei-
entific research by these estimates. 
Table 14. reports results which indicate that invention, applied 
research, and related scientific research were all important determinants 
of productivity change for this period. 
The specifications reported in Table 14 include time dwmny variables 
which, indicate that the invention and researeh variables which jndicate 
that the invention and research variables account for only a part of the 
observed rise in total factor productivity over the period. Specification 1 
associates approximately one-third of the observed (30 percent) growth in total 
-====:=------------ -----.----
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Table 14. -Rc~re~tion An~lvsl~: D~~erDln.nts of Productivity: U.S. I~riculturc 
1927-19Sq Regional ~t~ 
• ~rcndcnt V~~i~blc: Loc~rithm Productivity Index (TFP) 
Jndrpcndcnt V~rjablcs Regression 
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fact.or productivity growth from period 1 to period 4 (1946-19'0) to the 
passage of time. Specification 2, which i. inferior on .tati.tical ,round., 
attributes almost two-thirds of the growth to t1me.1 
Regression (1) implies that an added on thousand dollar inves1Jllent in 
applied agricultural research would have contributed an additional stre8I:I 
of production rising to a value of approximately 11,400 dollars after ~ years, 
of this, $o,35J would be realized in the form of added product by producers 
i~ the state where the investment was made. The remainder would be realized 
b~' p"odu::ers in other states with sieilar geo-climate regions. An added 
tho~s~~j dollars invested in related scientific research would result in 
ajjej productio~ rising to a value of $53,OOJ after 15 years. Of this, 
Bpproxi=ate:y one-third would be rea~ized in the state making the investment. 
lA Nerlove-Balaestra generalized least squares procedure was also applied 
to these data. The results were essentially unchanged. 
- --- -----~-~-
-.---- ---,----
------.- - --.---~--. 
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v. Productivity DltCOtllPosit1on, 1948-1971 
Thia aaction reporta a dacoapoaition enalyaia of the .tate total 
factor productivity data for tha period 1948-71. A two atea. proeeaa 
b utllhed. Firat an analyda of th. combined "tiM-ehape" ead "conti-
luity pattern" of applied agricultural reeeareb 1& undertaken. Secondly 
a aore coaplete decompoaition analya18 ia reported. 
Time-Shape and Conti6uity 
The procedure utilized for the time Ihape--contiguity analyus 
is a partial correlation acanning procedure of • general research variable: 
A (a.b.c.) + 0 SA Ca.b.c) + 8 RA(a.b.c) 
A is the within-state applied reaearch atock. SA the atock in a1mi-
lar lub-regions outside the atate and RA the stock in aimiler regions 
(which includes the aub-regioos) outlide the atate. The parametera a.b,c, 
refer to alternative time ahapea. a ia the ti .. period of riling linear 
weights, b, the time period of constant weights. and c the period 
of declining linear veights. The parametera a and 8 are contiguity par.-
aeterl. They measure the extent to which research in contiguous or similar 
regions is contributing to state productivity growth. 
Table IS. reports the reaulta of a partial correlation acanning analy-
ais-acroll-varying time ahape and contiguity paraaetera. The analyais is 
undertaken for Northern Itet.a (Northealt, Corn Belt and Lake Stat.a regiona). 
Southern atat.1 (Appalachian, South £aat and Delta regionl) and Weltern 
Itatea (Northern 'laina. Southern 'lainl, Mountain and Pacific regionl). 
The highelt partial correlation for the Northern atates il for the variable 
------ -- ----------- ------.~ .. ---
- - - - -~-- .,.----.. 
fable 15. fS. III.,. .. Coatlp1t1 r.t1aau.: V.I. tIIr1aa1ten 1'41-1171 
'an181 Cornlet101l. Coeff1c1eeu Coatrollial for 1e&11q 'ar_ur, .. tu .. C,c1 •• &ticS 
Iduutloa. 
IIorwrD Stot .. .,t-O !!:1l !..:.:l !!:.:ll !!:!. !::l! ~ ~ !:! 
.. (3, 4, 7) .135 .324 .304 .214 .273 .224 .22' .219 .218 
a (3, " 11) .145 .321 .313 .303 .219 .225 .224 .222 .220 
.. (5, 6, 11) .165 .319 .338 .314 .297 .234 .2~ .226 .223 
I (5, 6, lS) .161 .323 .343 .325 .308 • 't2, .228 .227 .224 
a (7, I, lS) .167 .326 .346 .327 .309 .234 .234 .231 .228 
I (7, 8, 19) .158 .304 .342 .3ll .3.5 .227 .231 .239 .227 
a (7, 8, 25) .145 .277 .286 .266 .249 .278 .219 .218 .216 
I (11, U, 25) .140 .274 .282 .267 .246 .273 .218 .217 .2lS 
I (l5, %0, 25) .122 .221 .222 .202 .187 .221 .206 .%06 .205 
SoutherD Statu 
I (3, 4, 7 ) .456 .487 .481 .474 .468 .266 .1110 .107 .078 
.. (3, 4, 11) .451 .414 .483 .478 .473 .395 .203 .143 .107 
.. (5, 6, 11) .460 .490 .48' .482 .476 .310 .207 .146 .109 
I (5, 6, lS) .451 .483 .485 .482 .478 .328 .232 .171 .131 
I (7, 8, 15) .451 .483 .41S5 .482 .478 .329 .233 .172 .133 
a (7, 8, 19) .442 .475 .481 .480 .477 .337 .250 .190 .149 
I (7, I, 25) .429 .465 .470 .4'9 .466 .464 .216 .157 .118 
.. (11, 12, 25) .436 .471 .475 .471 .469 .471 .2lS .lS5 .116 
I (15, 20, 25) .418 .452 .459 .458 .456 .452 .210 .151 .112 
V.ltH'll Stat •• 
IU 4, 7) .224 .234 .201 .171 .150 .268 .240 .20) .101 
I (3 4, 11) .237 .252 .230 .203 .181 .293 .253 .225 .20a 
I (5, 6, 11) .248 .261 .238 .203 .186 .302 .258 ,2~ .2U 
a (5.6, lS) .253 .268 .254 .230 .207 .318 .278 .248 .226 
a (7, I, lS) .257 .273 .257 .23t .%08 .328 .280 .260 oJ .22' 
a (7, I, 19) .258 .275 .266 .244 .222 .323 .292 - .240 .21A 
a (7, I, 25) .295 .272 .254 .225 .199 .:!71 .286 .254 .233 
-a (U, U, 25) .259 .272 .251 .221 .193 .272 .213 .250 .221 
t (15. 20, 25) .257 .267 .245 .213 .114 .167 .295 .261 .240 
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constructed vith •• even year lag fraa 1nve.~t to peak effect. a 
fur'°hor 8 year constant lag and a 15 year period of declinin, wellhts. 
TM contiguity weicht 1a half of the ai.llar aub-regions outdde the 
atate, and the reaearch variable is deflateeS by the nUDber of =-odi ties 
and .ub-regions in the atate. (Soe Appendix 2.) 
The estimated time shape voight. for the Southern states vas 5, 6, 
11, and the contiguity veight vas .25 of the similar sub-regions. Note 
that very little difference exists between the Northern and Southern 
regions however. The Western region .hows the S8IM pattern in the .ub-
regions weight as the other regions. However, the contiguity weight is 
.25 of similar regions (which include the sub-regions) indicating a aa.e-
.--- ---..,.----- .~-- --
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what broader range of technology tramferability.l 
IAn approximate atandard error for the .. tiaated .. eNSe lq can be dezoiYed 
from the tnt for the aign1ficance of an additional .arlable In an equation. 
(See Th.il, Economic Forecasts and Poll51. [N. T.: J. Wiley, 196~]. p. 177 
for a discussion of this test.) consIder the two equations: 
P = al + bl Xl + b3 X3• 
Let X and X be alternative research .ariables with differing lengths 
of lag. the var~able X3 can be conceptualized as being equal to X, plus a 
tern which measures the differepce between them. Let b3X3 • b, X2 +-b" X". After substitution, the hypothesis that b~ = 0 can be tested eVen though 
we have no direct observation on X". The term X~ will add to the exolained 
variance of the dependent variable as long as the length of the lag is ahorter 
than the "true" lag, because the posidve terms included In it from the 
larger weights on more distant time periods will explain more than the explanation 
lost from the negative terms coming from lover weights on the more recent time 
periods. 
We can thus co~are a shorter or longer research lag variable with the 
estimated (highest R ) research lag. The test statistic 
A Regresslon Sum of Squares 
K-H 
---Error Sum of Squares 
T - K - 1 
-K-H is distributed as rt_k_~. In this case, K is the number of independent 
variables, H is the ntlm!ler of additional variables, and T is the number of 
observations. We are not really adding a variable but compari.'1.g a research 
lag of n years with or.~ of n+ z years, which should be the approximate 
equi valent. 
ApplyInr thIs test to the data in Table 15., we find th~t the eotl-
matej lag variables differ from the shortest lags, R(3,4,7) and the longest 
labS R~15,2J,25) for all weights Q, B in a highly significant fashion. 
The F values for this test ranged from 13.6 to more than 20, sufficie~t 
to easily reject the hypothese of no difference. 
------ ---- -- -- -
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Table l6 report8 tho r.eults ot Productivity decomposition analysis tor U.S. 
Il8riculture tor the 1948-71 period. The general apecU'lcat1on 1s: 
where 
TFP _ CeED) 8 1 (EXT) ~+a3(ED) AJ.G4+aS (BR)+a6 C!XT) IXP ~81C+ 
Region--T1me Dummies 
m is the tt!tal factor productivity index (eee Appendix l) 
~ la an index of year. of Ichool caapleted by fara operatorl. It 
11 con.tructed from Censul data and utilizes veight. developed in a Itudy 
by Welch (1966). 
EXTECON is a composite variable based on extension expenditure plus 
expend! tures on production-oriented economic (farm management) and applied 
~ 
engineering research (see Table 7)-
AR is the applied re.earch stock variable. It i • .ore fully defined 
in Appendix 2. 
BR 11 an index of '~a.ic" reaearch constructed vith ti_ shape (a,b,c) 
welghtl of (11,12,25 08)5) for Southern Itate., (15,20,25 a-.S) for Northern 
.tatea and (15,20,25 8-.5) for Ve.tern Itate.. The.e weight. vere •• ttsated 
in a oartial correlation Icanning analy.l.. BR 1s und,flat,d. 
PL il the Icaling factor for .tates. (See Table I, page 13 for t~e 
regional factors). 
]f is a bu.ine,s cycle index de.igned to capture the productivity ef-
fect. of the bUline'l cycle. It il conltructed as the ratio of two moving 
average. of r.al farm income. Productivity lains are expected to be higher 
in the "trough" ph .... of the budnes. cycle than in the "peak" pha.ea 
becaule of adjuatment prel.urel. See Landau (1973) for a fuller develop-
aent of th1l point .• 
lThe EXTECON variable has geometrically decllnIng time-shape weights. That 
is, 50 percent of the total impact is expected 1n the first year, 25 
percen't. oi tJle tottl.l in t.ue second year, 12.5 in the third etc. 
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The spec1f1cations reported in Table 16 demonstrate the .ffact of 
adding the region-time d~ variabl.. aDd of •• tiaat1D& .aparata coefficenta 
for the three major regions of the country for the research variable. 
Specification 1 is included to .how how much of the change in total factor 
productivity is associated with the region and time dUllllJy variables. It 
also allovs a relatively simple comparison of the proportion of the growth 
in total factor productivity change "explained" by the research and related 
variables. 
The second specification is included to show the effects of the de-
composition 'I&riables and to enable the reader to assess the effect of adding 
the region-time dUlllll\V variables in specification J. An experiment in which 
a simple time trend variable replaced to region-time dummies was conducted. 
The results were essential~ the same as those obtained for :opecification 
J. 
Specification J provides the basic decomposition results. The 
negative coefficients for the extension variable and the extension-education 
interaction variable do not mean that the marginal product of extension 
on eduoation is negative. The negative extension-education effect is 
to be expected. It shows that extension or adult education is a substitute 
for fornal schoolin~ terms of its effect on farmer efficiency. In 
states with high levels of farmer schooling/extension activities have a smaller 
impact. The po sitive (and highly significant) research-extension inter-
action term shows these act! vi ties to be complement.... We would expect 
extension to be lIlOre productive, the higher the level of research Bcti vi ty 
in a g1 yen state. The}l:> sitiv<;1 applied research--scientific research term 
also indicates that higher levels of s~ientH'ic research increase the prod\:cti vi ty 
of applied research. Thus, scientific research in the agricultural experiment 
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Table 16 Pro4ucth1t1 DlCCIIPOl1t10Z1: O.S. ~cult\U'e 1948-71 
Dltpt%l4clt YU'1abl.: UI (m) 
IDcSepenl!.lnt V&r1ables (1) (2) en (4) (,) 
OCIlItant 4.69 4.2' 4.73 Io.n 4.86 
1M (AR) .04237 .0174 
( .00997) (.0085) 
~ (AR) South 
.03309 .0)407 
(.00856 ) (.COO86 ) 
1M (AR) North .01187 .00991 
(.0084S ) (.00861 ) 
1M (AR) West .01874 .01882 
( .00887) (.0090.3 ) 
III (ED) • .314.3 .1770 .3540 .37.31 
( .0404) ( .0362 ) ( .0426) (.0..19) 
lR (an::OI.) -.000276 -.0.388 -.0.394 -.051': 
( .01176) ( .0(99) ( .0(97) (.0104 ) 
lR (IXlECON )'ED -.0122.3 -.00659 -.0116 -.0120 
(.00242) ( .002(6) (.0021 ) ( .0021) 
III (AR )'tr.E:OI. .1.314 D-5 .17.30 D-5 .1821 D-5 .1962 D-5 
( .0260 D-5) (.02)0 D-5) (.02)0 D-5) (.0227 D-5) 
Ln(AR}lBR .2054 D-7 .0171 D-6 .2061 D-6 .21C6 D-6 
(.8.30: D-7) (.07.37 D-6) (.0710 D-6) (.0705 D-6) 
III (AR'GRAD) .000247 
(.000071 ) 
LN (AR'SCA.LE) -.543 0-7 
(.60e 0-7) 
Prod~ctiv1ty ScalL~ -.OC)l)6 -.00014 -.00:16 -.00016 
Factor (P~) (.000030 ) ( 000034) ( .00003) (.00003 ) 
Business Cycle Index (S:) .34'09 .2486 .2297 .2237 
(.0200) (.0180 ) ( .0176) ( .0176) 
1957-63 Sol;th ~ .165 .158 .076 .075 
1957-63 Nort~ Ducmy .116 .074 .102 .lC2 
1957-63 West ~ .156 .136 .113 .112 
1964-71 South ~ . JOe .246 .136 .132 
1964-71 North I>.=-r .246 .115 .U8 .124 
1964-71 West ~ .286 .192 .152 .149 
R2 
.484 .413 .618 .'73 .651 




is productive through its impaet on the productivity of applied 
the fourth ~cification estimates seperate coefficients for the applied 
resench (AR) variable for the three major regions of the study; South, 
North, and West. This extension shows that regional differences have 
existed. In particular, the southern states have realized faster rates 
of productivity growth and it appears that at least part of this is due 
to the research system. Note that in specification .3 which impQsed a 
single AR coefficient, the time variable in the South accounts for almost 
80 percent of the change in total factor productivity from the beginning 
of the period until the ending period. In specification. 4 this proporation 
falls to less than 50 percent. In all three regions the 
variables account for 50 per cent or less of the "explanation" of pro duct ivi ty 
growth in specification 4. 
The ~ourth specification extends the ~~lysis further in an attecpt to 
explore whether experiment station characteristics have an effect on the 
productivity I')f agricultural research. Two variables, a measure of the scale 
of the main experiment station (measured as number of-scientists) and a 
measure of the size of graduate programs associated with the main exper~€nt 
station (number of Ph.D's graduated annually in the (1950s) were interacted 
with the applied research variable. The results suggest that the size 
of the associated graduate program positively effects research productivity, 
but that sca~ ~ ~ does not. 
The productivity scaling variable has the expected sign and can be 
interpreted as an indicator of "economic slack" in that states with relatively 
low scaling paraDetors have more potential to r productivity growth. They 
have more "catching up" to do and Clltching up requires fewer resources ~ 
.... --l· .:t;7"~_. ____ _ 
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than leading requires. The business cycle variable also indicates that 
as farm income falls in a cycle, total factor productivity rises. .As the 
farm income cycle reaches a boom phase, total factor productivity slows 
down. 
These results should be interpreted in the light of a certain amount 
of experimentation with the specifications. Alternative specifications 
were utilized in the study. Standard errors are reported as 
statistical indicators and simplistic applications of standard tests is 
not 1'ully Justified. On the whole, however, most of the results are quite 
robust with respect to changes in specification. In particular, a linear 
specification paralleling the log-linear specification yielded virtually 
identical results. Similarly, utilizing simple Time Trend variables in 
lieu of the Time -Region dummy variables did not alter the results appreciably. 
It should be noted that given the time-shape of the research effect, 
estimating such effects in the presence of timevariables constitutes a 
1 
very strong test of the model. 
It is possible that scme simul tanei ty exists in the reported results 
If research investment responds to total factor productivity, for example, 
a bias could be created. Recent work by Huffman and Miranowski (1978) 
IThe extension variable was the only variable highly sensl ti ve to 
specification. When deflated by a number of farms in the str.te, its marginal 
product was consistently negative. When deflated by the number :>f 
commodi ty-sub-regions as with the research variables the results were 
as reponed here. It is difficult to Bay a ~riOrl which is the most proper 
deflation. If CommLnication costs with indi dual farmers are of great 
importance, extension effort per farmer should matter. If not, the specification 
utilized here Is most appropriate. 
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as well as earlier work by Peterson indicate that current and expected 
future farm and non-farm income are major detem1nants of current invest-
ment in research. Our B;>ecification relates past iDvestment in research 
to current productivity charge. Since productivity change and farm income 
are not highly related it is unlikely that a serious bias exists. An 
experiment with a two stage least squares specification failed to alter 
the basic results. l 
The regression results in Table 16 do allow several calculations 
of interest for policy. Table 17 reports the computed increase in the value 
of farm production which would have resulted had the relevant research 
and extension variables been increased by $1,000. 





an alternative business cycle index. 
the number of faIms in lq59. 
the number of farms in 1969. 
the weighted number of crop cOIllllXldi ties produced in the 
state. 
LDC, the weighted number of livestock commodities produced in 
the state. 
RGC, the number of crop geo-climate regions in the state. 
~, the number of livestock geo-climate regions in the stete. 




Computed Marginal Contribution of Changes in Research, 
Extension and Education Stocks. 
1948-1971 
Change in Far::: 
Pr~du~tion due to: 
One Year of Prima:-y Schooling 
Spec. (3) 
Spec. (4) 




$l,QJJ adde= to Scie~tifi~ Rese~~~n St~ck 
Spec. (J) 
Spe~. (4) 
$1,000 added to Applied Researc~ Stock 
Spec. (J) 





































We should Dote. of course. that these estimates apply to the aggregate 
of research projects undertaken in the experiment atations and do not 
imply that all individual research projects have been auccessful and 
pzoductive • 
The estimation procedure have their limitations. One major limita-
tion is that the research and development activities of private firms 
supplying inputs to the sector is only indirectly taken into account. 
Implicitly. th1s and other studies assume that improvements in farm 
inputs produced by privatl~ firms are fully reflected in the prices paid 
for thee, (except for studies which included an invention var1able). 
They are actually only partially reflected in higher input pr1ces and. 
to the extent that the difference between actual and full reflection is 
correlated with public sector research variables, some part of the benefits 
attributed to public research is actually due to private research. This 
possible b1as 1S probably not sufficiently large to change the conclusion 
that returns to research have been pxtraordinarilly high. 
It should also be noted that some contributions of public sector re-
search are realized through improvements in the inputs supplied by the 
private sector. The public sector experiment stations produce genetric 
material, cheml.cals, pharmaceuticals and other forms of technology wh1ch 
lower private industry costs of input production. 
These stud1es of agricultural productivity growth have not fully ex-
plained or accounted for all sources of productivity growth. The reliability 
of the statistical estimates is sufficient to support the following summary 
propo:>itions. 
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1) Productivity Irovth 18 clo.ely ... oci.ted with !Dvaa~t iD 
.gricultural reaurch, and .CICIe part of the recant !IOd.r.te .l.ovdovn iD prOductivity 
arovtb 18 therefore .ttributable to the d.creue iD .aricultural rea •• rch 
iDten.ity iD r.c.nt , •• r~. 
2) The research contribution i. p.rt of the larger contribution of an 
iDtegrated aystem of extenaion aervices. technology-oriented r •••• rch •• nd 
acience-oriented reaearch. The .tatiatical re.ults .upport the prapo.ition 
chat .cience-oriented research improvea the productivity of t.chnolOIY-
oriented research (and vice-versa) and th.t technololY-oriented research 
improves the productivity of extension and .chooliDg activity. 
3) The high rates of return to investment in reaearch indicate that 
too little investment is being undertaken from a .ocial perspective. A 
more optimal program of public sector investment would call for added 
investment which would lead to lower marg~nal rates of return (bec.use of 
the law of diminishing returns which holds for research as well .s for 
other forms of production). in line with returns realized on other forms 
of investment. 
4) The high rates of return Indicate that the present research system 
is probably quite efficient. It is quite possible for an inefficient and 
poorly managed research system to yield to high rates of return. however. 
Many research programs in developing countries have high rates of return 
primarily because they have very low research intensities. So little re-
search is being undertaken relative to the potential value of new crop and 
animal production technololY that even poorly managed systems yield high 
returns. 
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VI. Policy l •• ues 
a. Diltributiooal CoD.equence.: The ... il for Political Support. 
The Itudie •• us=arized in the prev10Ul section .how that productivity 
Ir~h i. influenced by re •• arch and extenaion prolr.... Furtheraore. the 
transferability of re.earch re.ult. from one region to another 11 quite 
clearly impeded by differenc •• in .oil and clt.ate factorl and po •• ibly in 
economic conditions a. veIl. As noted • .olt Ipillover of technology from 
one .tate to another appears to be confined to 11milar lub-regions 
depected in Figure 2 for crops and to .im1!ar regions for animal pro-
duction. 
We also know that the State Experiment Stations have a .trong state 
political base. while research and extension are not given high priority 
at the federal level. Further. producers rather than con.umers form the 
interest groups supporting these activities. Given the importance of 
these activities in determining productivity growth. it is also important 
that we have a better idea of their political support base. To that end 
I find it useful to first engage in some moderately technical analysis 
of the gains and losses associated with new agricultural technology. 1 
then turn to a discussion of political interests. 
A. The Analytics of Distributional Effects 
Basically, research and extension programs can have a number of 
possible effects. 
(a) Research produces new technology. Extension facilitates its 
adoption and encouraaes further development of minor technological im-
• provements and managerial techno!ogy. This technology can be 
(i) factor biased (i.e •• labor using. etc.) 
(ii) Icale biased (i.e •• .are profitable for large farms) 
(iii) region biased (i.e •• not equally available to all 
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farmers in diff.rent r.,ions) 
(b) R .. earch and .xtenaion ... y chan,e the dUW1d for fara products 
(i •••• introduce new products. ancoura,e consumption via nutrition .ducation • 
. • tc.) 
(c) Research, especially private r.s.arch and .xtension, .. y lower 
the cost of purchased inputs (i •••• fertilizer. etc.) 
(d) Research. but particularly extension, ... y lower the cost of 
labor mobility between regions and sectors of the .conomy. 
From these possible effects, we can focus the ,eneral question regard-
ing the overall effects of agricultural research and extension on the dis-
tribution of incomes on four more particular issues, 
<a) the effects of agricultural research and extension on the dis-
tribution of incomes between consumers and producers; 
(b) the effects of agricultural research and extension on the dis-
tribution of income among agricultural factors of production; 
(c) the regional income effects of agricultural research and extension 
services; 
(d) the impact of agricultural research and extension on the dis-
tribution of income among different sized farms. 
The answer to the first issue Is rather straightforwarded. Agri-
cultural research and extension, insofar as it results in any rightward 
shift in the agricultural output supply function, leads to consumer gains 
(lower agricultural output prices) as long as the demand function for agri-
cultural goods is downward sloping. This is illustrated by Figure 5 where 
the initial equilibrium price and quantities, Po and Qo respectively, are 
replaced by PI and QI a~ the new equilibrium. The change in the area under 
the demand curve POACP1 , measures the increase In "consumer surplus" associ-
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Figure 5: Consumer vs. Producer Gains 
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function due to a&Ticultural r •••• rch and ext~iCXl. What happen. to 
producers ""lfar.? Iu the 1I1it1&1 .qaUibdua, the ar.a aDdar the 8Upply 
CUr1 .. , OBAQo, repre.ents payaents to variable factors vh1le the area under 
the 1I1itial .quilibrium price line ADd a~ the 8Upply curve, IPOA, re-
pr •• ents payments to fixed production factors or "quasi-rats". Since the 
elasticity of demand (~) 1. the ratio of the percentage change in quantity 
to the percentage change in price, total rr toue to producer., i.e., the 
.um of payments to variable facton cd the "qua.i-rents", vill increa.e 
if demand is elastic (Inl>l) and will decrea.e if deaand is iDela.tic 
(Inl<l). Producers, including the .uppliers of variable factor. of pro-
duction such a~ agricultural labor benefit from technical ebange if demand 
is elastic. If demand is inelastic, they lo.e. 
In this dmple lIodel, the final distribution of conau.er ,aills aong 
all consumers (and producers insofar as they too are consuaer.) would 
depend on their expenditure patterns. Consumers who spend a high propor-
tion of their budget on agricultural_products viII benefit proportionally 
more from a decrease in food prices. It is important to bear this in 
mind because the poor generally do .pend the highest proportion of their 
budget on food. Agricultural research &bd extension thus creates progres-
aive (i.e •• more egalitarian) distrioutional effect for that proportion of 
benefits passed on to consumers in the form of lover agricultural output 
prices. 
The aecond dimension of the distribution question regarding the 
di.tribut!=n among factors of production has been the .ubject of a fev 
theoretical .tudies (Evenson and Welch (1974), Evenson (1978) and Binsvanger 
(1978» Appendix C reports the main analysis. 
The simple.t c .. e of this distributional dimension is where there are 
only unsub.t1tutable factors of production, .ay land and labor. This case 
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can be l1luatrated Iraphica1ly. '!aure 6 portraya for Cl qricultural 
, 
aeetor a daaand curve DZ for land Z, .. a function of the reutal price of 
land S. Thia curve 18 derived from the behavior of a aat of profit aui-
alzin, lara aDd ahows that for liven tecMololY and a liven deund function 
lor agricultural output, as the price of land relative to the price of labor 
decreases, lIOn land aerviees vill be deaanded. A aimler deund curve for 
I 
labOr DL is also ahovn as a function of the vage rate, W. The initial equili-
brium rental price S is Sl and the rental vage rate is WI. These are deter-
ained in the separate factor aarkets vhere the supply of land and labor are 
equated to the individual demands for land and labor. 
Agricultural researcb and extension, insofar as it results in technical 
change, viII shift these curves. If the resultant technical change is neutral 
I I 
and demand is elastic the two factor deund curves to Dz and DL viII shift out-
ward equiproportinately. This is the results of two for:es. Technical change 
reduces the demand for factors per unit of output bu: because the output supply 
curve shifted downward. total output increased. We can nov see that the supply 
conditions of the factors are important in determining the division of the added 
producer revenue (price times quantity) between the two factors. Because land is 
in relatively inelastic supply. its price rises relatively more (51 to 52) than 
does the price of labor (WI to '2) which is in relatively elastic supply. When 
final demand is elastic, the factor with the most inelastic supply is the biggest 
gainer. When final demand is inelastic the factor with the most inelastic supply 
is the biggest loser (note the shift to DZ"' and DL"
1
). 
If technology were non-neutral. it would shift the demand curves in a 
non-proportional way. Suppose it to be labor .aving. Then the shift in the 
* * demand curves will be to DZ and DL• This will work to the disadvantage of 
labor and to the advantage of land as the figure shows. T'nis analysis can be 
extended to the two region case in which we suppose that output is freely 
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traded tbou,h botb land and labor are baobUe betveen the tvo re,ions. 
This would then sbed some 11,ht on the third dwnl10n of the dlltrlbution 
, 
qu .. t1oa. 'igure 6 portrays the f..:&it1al equilibrium with rental pricu Sl 
, " 
and 52 and vA,es WI and W2 for relions 1 and 2 respectfully. lote that for 
lz=obile factors these noed not be equal. 
analysis uf rigur~ 6 showl that technic.l change in region 2 lovers 
both costs and product prices for region 2 farms. However, aince only output 
is mobile between regions, only region 1 product prices vill decline. 
This imposes losses on the two factors in region 1 and these losses 
are determined by the supply conditions of the two factors in region I, 
the rate, but not the bias, of technical change in region 2 and the share 
of region 1 in the total production of the 2 groups. If region I is a 
small part of the total and demand is inelastic the effect on region 1 
can be drastic. 
" For region 2 the demand curves shift outward as shown by DZ2 and 
" DL2 in Figure 7 for neutral technical change. Landowners gain most be-
cause land is in relatively inelastic supply. With labor saving technical 
It, ... 
change (DZ2 and DL2 ) their gains are accentuated. For land saving tech-
nical change, the reverse is true. 
It is not suprising then that the owners of agricultural land rather 
than the owners of labor services have the strongest interests in supporting 
both research and extension. This becomes even more apparent if we relax 
the assumption of immobility of labor between the regions. If labor is 
perfectly mobile, group wage differences cannot exist and the wage will rise 
or fall in both regions by the same proportion, (predicted by the one region 
model). This will accentuate the losses by land-owners in region 1 and the 






















Agricultural extenaioa vb1ch effect' eo.e traa.fer of the reaioa 2 tech-
DOloI)' to ",ioa 1 producera will reduce the l08S" of re,1cm 1 lwovoera 
aDd the ,ains of re,ion 2 laDdowera. If labor is ~bUe it will do this 
for labor as well. If extenaion iDcreues the aobiUty of labor between the 
tvo regiona it will produce a .ore equitable d1.atribution of vale pay.ent8 
but viII exacerbate the ,aina aDd 10.ae8 to landowner8. Ve would accordingly 
expect all landowners iD lagging regioas (with low vagea) to preaaure exten-
sion aervices to transfer technology and to inhibit or at least not eDcourage 
labor mobility. Landowners in leading (high vage) regions will have an 
iDterest in aeeing that labor mobility is encouraged and will tend to atrees 
implementing atate-produced technology as opposed in achieving transfer from 
other atates. 
B. Political Interests 
This combination of interests goes a long way toward explaining our 
current research and extension 8ystem. We have state experiment stations 
supported heavily by state rather than federal funds and pressured to pro-
duce state targeted technology. The extension and research services seek 
to maximize adoption of technology and spill-over across state boundries. 
Sometimes this spill-over takes place through "adaptive" research and 
invention in which, for example, a crop variety produced for one state is 
utilized as a parent variety in a bree~ing program in another state. 
We would thus expect extension 8ervices, particularly those with a 
strong state ataff integrated with the research program of the states to 
have the effect of lowering the different1.al gains and losses between geo-
climate regions. The more investment m3de in state 1, the less the damage 
to pro~ucer8 aurplus imposed by new teChnology suited to atate 2. 
Finally, the fourth dimension of the general distribution issue, 
i.e., the .ffecta of research and extension on the distribution of income 
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across diffarent sized farms, is perhaps the ~t ... 11, UDderstoad. 
N.w tachnololY 18 often 41fferentially aceus1ble to 411farcmt 
aroups of farDAra. Within the s .. rea!ona. lar,. farDerl' have ~ra in-
centives to .. arch and to axpariMnt than ...u. faraars .inc.') the beDefits 
from surch are proportional to fat'll .be vhil. the COsU IU:!' '.:;,t. 'Ibis 
naturally leads to early adoption of new technolol7 by larae fama, provid-
ing them with innovators rent. Theae innovators renta to large hrms aay 
be transitory wlesa new technology itself bas a scale b1u, 1.&., the new 
technology reduces costs for large scale fat1llS such more then for smaller 
ones, or unless input and credit aarkets remain accessible only to large 
farms. Insofar as innovators rents are temporar)' in nature, these rents 
ought not to be eliminated. These rents provide incentives for 
large farmers to perform experiDIents in a given year. This also lowers 
the cost of learning and experbenting for the smaller scale producers who 
would bave access to and benefit from them in the immediate future. In the 
case where innovation rents tend t, be more permanent, institutional changes 
• that facilitate access to new technology become necessary. Agricultural 
extension services then become an important feature of any institutional 
package designed to eliminate the permaneut nature of 80me innovators rents. 
Extension activities lower the cost of learning and experimenting and thus 
lowers the levels of innovators rents. Reducing rents to innovativeness via 
extension does not necessarily produce too little innovative activity since 
extension can also reduce the real cost of ionovativeness. Again, however, 
the payoff to such activities depends on the capacity of small scale farmers 
to process and use new and cheaper information to their advantage. 
------- - -- - --- --
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C. &esearch Quality and Effectivene •• 
A recent review of the U.S. A£ricultural "I .. rch ".tea hal been 
critical of the .ystem on two countl. Firlt it appearl that there is 
conliderable duplication of research projects and a lack of coordination 
of relearch work. Second, the judgment is made that research quality is 
low. 
The methods of research quality evaluation in a particular research 
discipline (or lub-disclpline) are themselves quite objective and in lome 
cases, even quite formal. Reviewers of journal papers, for example, form 
judgments as to quality of submitted manuscripts. Such criteria as clarity, 
elegance and rigor are applied. Reviewers look for errors in logic, mistakes 
in the application of statistical methods, etc. In general, originality is 
also given some weight. 
It is important to note, however. that research programs, particularly 
applied research programs, are composed of a number of research disciplines 
and work-disciplines. Furthermore, so~e of these applied disciplines are in 
effect multiple or mixed disciplines with specific applied research objectives. 
These disciplines have different and sometimes conflicting objectives. In 
the less applied disciplines, useful knowledge 10 the form of new technology 
or new managerial or policy information is given little weight. In such 
disciplines the scientific publi~ation is the sale indicator of output and 
the publication review process and the citation process provides the archi-
tecture for the growth of knowledge. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the discipline may be solely interested 
10 producing new technology. The scientific paper may have limited relevance 
10 luch a discipline and much of the published output may be of a reporting 
nature. Allo, luch disciplines tend to produce extension type literature, 
i.e., literature for an audience broader than the discipline. The scientific 
paper playa a lesser role in guiding research project development in these 
7~ 
disciplines. which may allo respond quite directly to the intere.ta of a 
cliente!e. .A.aparagua armler. in California would be aD aaaple of a 
c.l" !Dtde group which can .. ke de.unde on aD applied r .. urch d1acipllne. 
f1nd 1t convenient to d18t1nr:u18h between the evaluation of re-
search quality vith1n narrowly defined di.ciplines and the evaluation of 
quality in a research progr&m encompassing several disciplines. 
Consider first the meaning of quality within a narrowly defined 
discipline or research area. Each discipline will have developed its own 
criteria for research quality. These criteria will be applied to the 
publications of scientific papers and to some extent to the evaluation of 
research proposals. A well organized research area will have developed 
consistant research objectives and r,search quality criteria. These objec-
tives will take inlo account the nature of the ~pecialized niche which the 
research area has in the larger scheme of the research program. 
Even in a well organized research discipline. research quality as 
measured in the diacipline itself will vary by researcher and by research 
institution. It will vary by age and by type ..:,! graduate training. The real 
world probJ.em of the outdated and WllIIotivated "deadwood" exists in spades in 
resear:h organizations. Furthermore, since many research disciplines are 
specialized on applied problems, they may ha\'e lit ~ Ie control over the "re-
search potential" which they work with and even high quality researchers may 
find it increasingly difficult to produce research and output because their 
potential is e~~usted. 
Siaple measures of research output per unit of input such as publications. 
patents, new varieties. etc., per SHY, are indicators of quality only in a 
restricted sense. They are subject to the exhaustive phenomen and to the 
problem that "Iupply creates its own rlemand". An expansion in the nu:::1!>er of 
scientists in a discipline may create an increase in the demand for journals 
ana related publications. but not necessarily in the real products of the 
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.y.tem. In our r .... rcb work .. part of th18 paper,.. utillzed patenu 
and citations a. output .... ure. to avoid 80Be of the vorat problema. 
Patent a are &ranted by examinera from outside the di.cipline and are 
.are reliable indexes of certain types of re.earch product.. Citations 
are al.o determined partinlly outside the discipline and have other 
desirable features. 
In some fundamental .ense. the .are 1JIportant questions regarding 
research quality have to do with both the organization and design of 
research disciplines or areas within larger re.earch programs and with 
the consistency of the research objectives and quality criteria of each 
discipline to the objectives of the overall research program. 
The design of an effective research program is an extremely difficult 
problem. We know some of the principles on which such programs should be 
based. but are not really in a positi.on to "plan" research in a conventional 
se~se. Actually. the agricultural rf earch system of the U.S. represents 
one of the few cases where a large number or research disciplineb and sub-
diSCiplines are institutionally related to each other. The USDA-SAES systec 
has evolved its structure over a long period of time in resp?nse to pressures 
from its ultimate clients, the producers and consumers of food and fibre 
products. It has developed a complex range of disciplines and sub-disciplines, 
each with its own quality criteria. 
Crop improvement work, for example, is primarily done in Plant Breeding 
and Agronocy disciplines. However, the closely related disciplines of Plant 
Pathology, Soils Science and Entomology are very much part of the crop improve-
ment .ystem. Within each of these disciplines. Bub-disciplines with somewhat 
different quality crit~ria exist. Further. experiment stations have also 
incorporated plant physiology and other biological sciences in their institu-
tional structure in an effort to produce new discovery potential. These 
disciplines exist outside the USDA-SAES system, as vell, and different quality 
standards .. , be applied by the two &roups. 
There is an unfortunate tendency 88OD& scientiat. to apply quality 
Dtandards .uited to one dlllcipline to related diaciplin... !'ben 18 a 
natural hierarchy among disciplines usually from the basic di.ciplines to 
the related-applied disciplines. The quality .tandards for publication in 
the "lIOther" diac1plines are lenerally regarded to be higher than 18 the 
case for the subsidiary discipline. In a veIl organized research system, 
they should be. !t is, however, the case that applied disciplines usually 
are subject to a certain amount of criticism from the basic disciplines which 
is part of the general snobbery of the sciences. 
The fact that agricultural sciences are subject to criticism then i& 
hardly surprising. What has to be determined is whether they are subject to 
legitim£te criticism, legitimate in the sense that an agricultural reaearch 
dIscipline is not demanding scientific rigor and other quality standards that 
are appropriate to its mission. On this point ve aay note that there is al-
vays an age distribution problem in any 8cience which is experiencing change. 
Many older scientists viII not have the incentives to maintain themselves at 
the research frontier of a more basic science (in fact many vill not maintain 
themselves at the applied frontier). Ne~ 9cientists, recently trained at 
this frontirr are required to keep en applied field lively. There is thus 
a natural time lag in the appllcation of new research quality standards in 
applied fields of research. 
The pattern of hiring in many agr~Lultural Bcience fields is one of 
rapid expansion in the 1950's with slower expansion in the 1960's and almost 
no expansion in the 1970's. This has burdened the u.s. agricultural research 
system with an unf~vorable age distribution. Another factor influencing judgments 
of quality of the system is the nature of the State Experiment Station System 
vith much apparent ~~plication of effort and limited coordination of the effor~. 
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'lba arau-nt baa be.c .ada alaevbera ~.oa. Valloo.r. IuttaD (Scienc.» 
that Bleb of thi. clupl1cat100 18 lIOn appareot thaD real becau.e of tbe l1a1ted 
tranaferab1l1ty of tecbDololY. It eaD be quite efficient to have a DuDer of 
parallel r •••• rch affort. underway. It 11 &YeD .are efficient if the.e prolr ... 
er. actively producing improved technololY tarletad to local econoa1c and 
cl1aaUc coadltloos. Perh.p • .are Ulportantly. the SAES proarau cable 
clientele intar.sts to be expressed far .ar. affactively than • federal 
system could. Thl. Is a strength of the sy.tem. 
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D. Pro.pect. for Future Gains 
I now turn to 
two questiODa npdiD, 
future r .... rch aDd extension actiylty aDd to future pro-
ductiv1ty Irovth. The tvo question. are: 1) Will the public aaricultural 
r .... rch and extensioo aemca continue to be wpport.d? 2) Will this 
.ystem cODtinue to be productiv.? 
The first question requir.s attention to chan,es in the aize and p~r 
of the interest groups supporting agricultural res.arch. I not.~ earlier 
that consumer ,roups have not been a dlllif1cant intereat Stoup supporting 
research and extension. Indeed. the "consUMris." of recent yeara has often 
antagonistic toward research. It has been particularly critical of real and 
potential collaboration with private firms who are leneraUy aeen .' .. il" 
"enemy". It has concentrated on food additives. regulation and related 
issues ratber than the price of food. I see no real on to suppo.e that 
con.umer interest groups in the next few years will become a significant 
force supporting r.search to lover food costs. They vill support lome re-
search on health. nutrition and related matters. however. 
It has also generally been the case in recent years that politicsl 
expression at tbe federal level has not been a key factor in research and 
extension .upport. Indeed, recent federal administrations have attempted 
to inhibit researcb. OMB has questioned its effectiveness in recent years. 
This partly teflects the fact that at the federal level .ome producer groups 
lee agricultural research as harming their real interests. I would think 
that this perception bas probably changed and vill continue to change as 
the agricultural economy becomes DOre axport oriented. 
There 11 Uttle doubt tbat tbe procluctirit1 ad uport perforuncc 
of tbe aaricultural ICOl10131 bu been a briaht 8Pot 111 the IlIllral acODOldc 
p'-cture of tbs p .. t 8 yean or 80. Purtbamore. with atroaa aport clamd 
IIDd rapid productivity arowth. fam 1Dco.u and "tuna to factor. have Irovn. 
Even a curaory IlaDce at the data will ahow that landowner. bave reaped hUI. 
lain. from the dtuation. Ve DOW have an incredibly wealthy aaricultural 
.ector. 
Ooe wonder. vhether the traditional political aupport for farm prolrams 
baa not ahifted in recent yean witb the rapid arovth of larae aeale corpo-
ration faradna and the srovth in walth of cCMDere1al far.eu. Can one 
.. riously u.e araument. about rural virtue •• clean air. etc. to tax the middle 
cla •• to protect the wealth of one of th~ economy'a vealthe.t .ector.? I 
.uppo.e we viII continue to hear about the virtued of rural life for decades 
to come. but it .eems to me that the real political .upport for farmers is 
based on pure interest Iroup polities which farm Iroupa perform very effect-
ively. particularly in forming coalitions with agriculturally related 
busineaaes. 
The growth of agricultural firms and private agriculture ,upply firms 
has not only affected the farm economy and its politics. It has also in-
duced a change in the relative balance of reaearch and extension activities. 
With the growth in private plant breeding in recent years and the increasing 
importance of farm chemicals and animal health products. the role of the 
public reaearch and extension .yatem ia changing. Less attention is being 
liven t~ .. in line production improvement and aore to .. intenance and 
regulatory problams. The caae can be made in many areas of research and 
extenaion .upport that lea. public research be done. 
The atate level public aupport baae ha. been the mainstay of the public 
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ayatu for aany yaan aDd will probably cOQt!Due to be. Jb1a, bowvar, 
1.8 aa1nly a producer !Dtar .. t Iroup aupport baae ad 1t _y be eroded by 
the 1Dcreu1D, rola of tbe printa fir. eactor !D eo. ataUa. IIowvar, 
with raapona1Vf.=ea. 00 the part of the ayata, tbe 1Dcr"'1D& aad-budna .. 
inter .. u .. y actually re.ult in an axpanaion of tbe ay.t_ .. tbe California 
.y.tu demonstrates. 
This brings me to the aecond que.t1on re,arding the future affectiveneas 
of the .ystem. It i. related to the clientele atructure of the ayatu. Over 
the course of the l .. t century, the agricultural r •• earch and esten.ion aystem has 
gone through a number of reforms and 1D.titutional restructuring. It could 
Dot have remained productive had it Dot daDe co. SOlIe of theae reforms and 
changes were responses to the chang1Dg demand for the products of the .ystem, 
aome to the changing aupply of fundamental .cientific knovledg~ which was of 
relevance to the system. 
It is important that any institution be responsive to both of these factors 
and that it remain true to its mission. The agricultural research and ext-
ension .ystu has a real clientele represented by the interest groups .upporting 
it. They not only influence funding, but in more critical vays articulate a 
demand for new techniques and .olutions to problems to the system. The extension 
system plays a role in t!lis articulation process. It 1s also ilDportant that 
there is a kind of competition among different .tate systems vhich induces more 
effective research. 
In general. a research-extension .yst~ vithout effective clientele pressure, 
cannot be expected to continue to produce the most valuable and useful results. 
If it .erves the interests of ita own .taff it viII generally become unproductive. 
On the other hand, a research system cannot ignore its .upply side. It must oe 
capable of using all available and relevant .cientific knowledge. Applie, 
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r •••• rch orlaniz.tions who cut t~alY81 off fro. the larlar lcientific 
cOllDWlity quickly exhaust their cU.lcovery potential. rul potential auet 
be replen1abed and developed 1f the IYlt_ 11 to raaiD proc!ucti.,.. 
Aa 1 look at the contempor.ry arricultural r .... rch and estenaion 
Iyltem, it leams to me that it 11 liltaly to prolper if it can convince 
I t.te producer groups that it 1.8 aervicing them vell. I would judge that 
the responsiveness to the d4m&Dd lide 11 pretty high and 1 would think th.t 
aany Itate systems vill be .ble to expand .long the lines of the California 
model. This will necess.rily raile the rel.ted politic.l issues of public 
.upport for priv.te groups, etc., vhich have 81so emerged in California. 
I am not quite as optimi.tic that the Iystem is .. intaining its lupply 
aide and much is happening on the lupply lide. The aodem developments in 
the biological Iciences have relevance to .griculture. No rese.rch ayatem 
c.n .fford to give fundamental science low priority. Yet many experiment 
It.tions have an .ge distribution problem because of the slowdown in hiring 
in recent years. 
Fortunately, if lome stations can realize some growth in staffing, this 
vill probably bring in some younger scholars who vill, by the nature of 
reasonably lood graduate training, be bringing in new ideas. 
In summary then, I don't see any serious erosion in the support level 
for agricultural research, or in its effectiv~ness. I vould think that there 
is lome prospect for lome growth in both dl~nslons. It follows than that I 
lee continued contributions to productivity growth in .griculture from the 
public lector. 
Cover~ent Policy and Innovation 
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1. Introduction 
Althouah the pharmaceutical iDduatry date. back to the l •• t century, it. 
development into a major industry vith it. current characteriatlc. began about 
forty year •• go. Prior to the thirtie., the iDdultry va. largely. commodity 
ba.ed iDdustry producing a relatively .mall number of chemical compounds and 
engagiDg in little re£earch or development of new pharmaceuticals. 
The present era of the res.arch oriented pharmaceutical industry had its 
origiDs in the mid thirties when the first important group of anti-infective 
drug' were introduced. In particular. sulfanilamide was introduced in 1936 
after it was discovered to be effective against streptococci bacteria without 
having toxic effects on human cells. This development stimulated consid-
erable interest in research on other potential drug therapies. Several imp-
ortant drug!\ most notably penicillin, and the other "magic bullet" Antibiotics 
were introduced over the next decade and a half. Aft~r World War II, pharm-
aceutical research broadened to cover several different therapeutic areas. 
A number of Dew drugs were introduced to deal with cardiovascula~ respiratory, 
neurological, and other disease categories. 
This development of the industry into a research based industry cocpeting 
in terms of new drug innovation has been accompanied by the evolution of exten-
aive government regulations of new drug innovations. Government regulation in 
this industry in fact dates back to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. Early 
drug regul~tion, however, was directed primarily at patent medicine abuses. In 
1938. following a drug disaster that killed over one hundred children, the Food, 
OTuZ and Co~tic Act was passed by Congreaa. This law required new drugs to be 
approved a •• afe by the Food and Drug Administration (the FDA) before they could 
be introduced into interstate commerce. It also provided the basi. for the 
\ , 
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eeparation of pharmaceutical. into ethical drull, which .. y be purcha.ed ooly 
vith a doctor'. prescription and proprietary drugs, vhich .. y be ,enerally lold 
over the counter. In 1962 Congre.1 further pa •• ed the ~f.uver-Harri. 
amendment. to the Food ,Drug and eosmetic Act. These amendment I required a nev 
drug'. efficacy as veIl a •• afety, be demon.trated on the ba.i. of vell control I 
Icientific tests prior to marketing approval by the FDA. Furthermore, they 
extended FDA regulatory controls to the clinical development pr~ress in order 
to protect human subjects involved in nev drug testing. 
In addition to these FDA relulatory controls, numerou6 other public policie 
impact the innovational process in the pharmaceutical industry. The oppor-
tunities for new drug discoveries are enhanced by government support of basic 
research in the biomedical sciences. The economic incentives for undertaking 
drug research and development are affected by federal patent and tax policies. 
1D addition there are a number of federal and state programs that are directed 
at the marketing and dist~ibution of drugs that also can have potentially sig-
nificant effects on the economic returns to ,new drug innovation (e.g. state 
lubstitution laws, product formularies, the Maximum Allowable Cost program of 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements, etc.) 
While the pharmaceutical industry has been one of our most innovative 
industries, the level of nev drug introductions appear to have declined sig-
nificantly from the earlier post World War II period. The reasons for and 
.ocial significance of this decline have been the subject of considerable atten-
tion by both policymakers and academicians. At the same time, there is cautiou~ 
optimi.m in lome circles at the present time about the future prospect. for 
indu.try in the next few decades, ziven the possibility of several important 
druS. nOV 1n the pipeline ~specially in the emerging biomolecular research area. 
Several important change. in government policies toward the industry, 
e.pecla11y in the regulatory and patent areas, have been recently proposed and 
3 
and are nov under active debate. Thi. 1. therefore. particularly apt time 
to examine the effects of government policies oa innovation 1n the ethical drug 
iadu.try. The .ections of the paper which immediately follow provide an over-
Yiev of industry structure and the character of technical prolre.. in ethical 
drugs. The last half of the paper then turns to an analysis of public policy 
impacts on drug innovation and also discusses the policy changes ~urrently 
under active discussion by Congress and other related parties. 
II. Industrial Organization 
A. Industry Demand and Gro~th 
4 
Table 1 presents some historical data on the value of shipments for the 
bureau of Census pharmaceutical preparations industry (SIC 2834). These data 
are further disaggregated into domestic ethical drug and proprietary drug 
lale. and overall exports to other countries. The rapid rate of growth in 
ethical drug industry sales since 1939 is clearly evident from th~ data 1n 
Table!. In the period between 1939 and the early sixties, growth occurred 
at a truly explosive pace with the value of shipments increasing mo~e than 
an order of magnitude in nocinal terms. Over the last two decades, the rate 
of growth in value of shipments has slowed significantly, but still remains 
above the average for all manufa~turing. 
Table 2 presents a breakdown of ethical drug sales for 1978 into broadly 
defined therapeutic categories. The two leading categories are central nervous 
system drugs (i.e. antiarthritics, tranquilizers, antidepressants, analgesics, 
drugs for epilepsy and stroke, etc.) and an<iinfectives. These two categories 
collectively account for almost 40 percent of total sales. The remaining sales 
are divided rather evenly among the other therapeutic categories. 
Table 3 presents informatlo~ on the buyer side of the market for ethical 
drugs. This table shows that approximately 75 percent of ethical drug sales 
are made through re~ail pharmacies. Retail prescription sales currently account 
for sbout 5 percent of total national expenditures for health services and 
supplies. 
The concentration of buyers in the retail market is very low. There are 
approximately 60,000 retail pharmacy cutlets in the United States and perhaps 










Pharmaceutical Preparations, except Biologicals, 
for Human Ule 1 
Value of Product Shipments in Hillions of Dollar •• 
DOMESTIC SALES 
ETHICAL PROPRIETARY EXPORTS TOTAL 
148.5 152.4 <a) 301.0 
520.7 317.6 (a) 838.3 
1088.9 368.3 (a) 1457.2 
2001.6 787.1 99.3 2888.1 
2885.8 999.5 112.7 3998.0 
4286.8 1427.8 125.0 5839.6 
6607.92,3 2221.23 260.34 8829.1 
<a> not reported separtely 
1 includes pharmaceutical preparations of industries not classified as 
aic 2834 
2 in 197' ethical category vas split up into presc~1ption legend and over-
the-counter professional 
3 includes exports 
4 figure obtained from Current Industrial Report 1977; MA 28G (77)-1 Table 5 
Definition of Terms 
Ethical - Products primarily advertised or otherwise promoted to or prescribed 
by the health professionals 
Prescription legend - A drug product vhich by federal lav is available- only by 
prescription by a licensed physician 
Over-the-counter Professional - A drug product sold over-the-counter and primarily 
promoted to the professions 
Proprietary - A drug product primarily advertised or otherwise promoted to the 
Jeneral public 
SOURCE: Bureau of Census, Census of Manufacture Industry Statistics. 
Croup 28C 
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Aprescriptlon drugs only. 
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SOURCES: David Schwartzman. Innovation In the Phar=aceutical Industry, 
(John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 25 as compiled from the following 
original sources - For retail and hospital sales, IH5 America, Ltd., 
u.S. Pharmaceutical Market, Drug Stores and Hospitals (Ambler, Pa: tHS 
America Ltd., 1970). Data s~ry, U.S. Dept. KEY, Social Security Admin., 
Office of Research and Statistics, 55 Pub. 59-71 (5-71), 1971. 
• 
lDdlv!dual doctor 1. an laportaDt decl.ioD-..xer. althoulh h. doe. Dot pay 
the price for the product. It i. the doctor. and Dot the patieat. Who .aka. 
the deci810a a. to what product aDd what braDd will be prescribed. It 1. 
,eDerally .aiatained that doctor. deci.iODS in this re~ Ird are primarily iD-
flucnced by constderatiQn5 of product quality and reputation of the ~ufacturer 
and oaly secondarily by a product's price. Consequently. demand for ethical 
drugs is often taken to be relatively inelastic over broad ranges In price -
iD large part because of the quality orientation of doctor's prescribing 
decisions. In recent years, hawever, Itate substitution laws have liven pharm-
acists more scope for discretion in p~oduct selection for multi-source products. 
The exact effects of these laws on retail dispensing patterns remains to be seen 
at the current time. 
The institutional sector - hospitals and various government purchasing 
agencies - accounts for about 2S percent of total sales and i. considerably more 
concentrated than the retail drug area. Drugs purchased bv these institutions 
tend to be bought in larger quantity lots, often using ==mpetetive bidding pro-
, 
cedures. Consequently, dem~d in this market is geDerally assumed to be more 
price elastic than in the retail sector and generic product sales are more 
cODcentrated in this sector. 
B. Supply Side Structure 
Three distinct segments or subgroups of competItors can be iientified in 
the ethical drug industry. The first and by far the most important group from 
the-standpoint-of industrial innovation consists of the large research intensive 
.u1tlnational firms. These firms account for the major ahare of both Dew 
product introductions and total ethical drug s.lea. At the other end of the 
compe~1tive .p~ctrum is a large number of generic manufacturers that specialize 
, 
1D produclDI unbranded product. at low price. after the orillaatiDl fi~ pat.nt 
baa .xpired. In between the.e .xtr .... i. a third Iroup of prt.arily d~.tic 
fl~ that have r.search programs to develop aew drua product. UDder their own 
braed naoes, but OD a auch .ma11er .ca1. than the au1tinati~ftA1 •• 
There are perhaps twelve to fifteen 0.5. firms that can be placed in the 
re •• arch iatensive multinational group. The.e firma together with 
their foreign multinational counterparts compete ia a worldwide market. Comp-
.tition ameng the multinationals centers around the discovery and promotion of 
new drugs capable of winning significant market shares in the international 
.arket. These drug products are typically protected by product patents (and 
perhaps also process patents) and marketed under copyrighted brand names. Al-
tbough many of the U.S. multinationals produce an extensive line of both brand 
DaDe and generic products for the domestic market, their profits and sales tend 
to be disproportionately tied to a handful of single source products d~~eloped 
by the company and promoted under brand names. 
, 
Table 4 presents the ethical drug sales ranking for twenty-four pharmaceutical 
flras with U.S. hospital and pharmacy sales in excess of 100 .i1lion dollars in 
1978. The U.S. pharmaceutical market is not dominated by a few firms. Instead • 
• ales are distributed rDther evenly across many major firms. This is reflected 
by the fact that the LOp four and eight leadi~g firms account for only 24 and 
42 percent re.pectively of ethical drug lales. Nevertheless, the rventy-four 
1 •• diDa firms listed in Table 4 collectively account for nearly 80 percent of 
total .a!e. and the multinational firms predominate among this ,roup. In 
addition to leveral U.s. multinational fi~, there are .ix foreign .ultinational 
firP.: amonS thase leading firms (three headquartered in SVitzerland. and one 
•• cb from Ceraany. the United Kingdom, and Mexico). 
TABLE 4 
LeadiDi Fi~ in u.s. Ethical 
Drul Sale. in 1978 
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tli Lilly Co. 13. eiba Celgy 
American Home Products 14. Searle 
Merck and Co. lS. Squibb 
Roche 16. lucroughl Yelc~ 
Smlthkl1ne 17. American Cyanamid 
Johnson and Johnson 18. Winder 
Yarner Lambert 19. Robins 
Iriltol Hyers 20. Revlon Health Croup 
Upjohn 21. Sterling 
Pfizer 22. Hoechst Roussel 
Abbott 23. Richardson Herrell 
Schering 24. ~tex 
Percentage of U.S. Ethical Drug Sales Accounted for b~ -
Leading 4 finns ., ... 25.7% 
" 8 finns ..... 41.7% 
" 12 firms ••••• 55.1% 
" 16 f1 nns ., • .,65.3% 
" 20 finns ..... 72.9% 
" 24 firms ..... 78. 3% 
lSales of ethical pharcaceutica1s plus ~thical ore in all drug stores, 
diacount houses and hospitals. 
SOURCE: IHS Americ~ Ltd., U.S. Pharcac~utical Market. Drug Stores and 
Hospital (Ambler. Pa: IHS America 1978) 
u 
Table 5 presents vorldwide aal.s data for the U.S. huaaD ethical phar-
aaceutical industry for the period 1965 to 1978. These data ahow the !mportaDce 
of forailD aal.a in th. Irovth of th. indu.try over recant ~=io4a. lD 1978, 
forei&n aale. represented 41 percent of total aa1ea compared with only 2S 
percent 1n 1965. Foreign aalea have been srowing at tvice the rate of 
domestic sales for u.s. firms in recent years. In addition, a list of e8t1-
aated a.1es for the top ranked multinational firms in 1977 compiled by the 
Dnited Nations Center on Transnational Corporationl indicates 10 of the 
large.t 20 pharmaceutical firms are U.S. firms, although the number one ranked 
firm i6 a German firm (Roech.t). 
In contrast to the competitive orientation of the multinationals around 
nev product development and introduction in wor1dvide markets, the generic 
firms specialize in producing lov cost multi aource producta after patent 
rights have expired. There are at prele~t several hundred manufacturers 
apecializing in generic products but their collective market ahare 
is less than 10 percent of the ethical drug market. Their s.les are concen-
trated in certain products ~ith above average tendencies for generic prescribing 
aD~ for certain institutional buyers that are particularly price sensitive. 
As discussed above, there are at the present time some important policy 
developments and structural trends which may enhance the competitive position 
of leneric products in future periods. In particular,several Itatel have 
paased liberal substitution laws which encourage ~harmacists to sutstitute low 
coat products for the brands prescribed by physiCians. While the amount of 
substitution that has occurred to date baa been minimal, some of the large 
chain ator~a have recently begun to promote and implement drug substitution 
programs. Theae developments, together with th~ tendency for the average ef-
fective patent 11£e 00 new drugs to decline in receot years, cay result io 
12 
TAIL! 5 
u.s. Suman U.. Ethical 
PharmAceutical Sales, 
1965-1978 ($ millions) 
Year Domestic Sales Foreign Sales Total (domestic and 
(including exports) foreign) 
1965 $2,940 $999 $3,939 
1966 3,178 1,162 4,340 
1967 3.393 1,351 4,744 
1968 3,808 1,494 5,302 
1969 4.135 1,102 5,837 
1970 4,444 1,981 6,425 
1971 4.796 2.213 7,009 
1972 5,136 2.603 7,739 
1973 5,644 3,078 8,722 
1974 6,273 3,683 9,956 
1975 7,806 4,468 11,554 
.. 
1976 7,867 4,908 12,775 
1977 8.434 5.404 13,838 
1978 9.411 6.567 15,978 
SOURCE: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. Annual Survey (years 1965-1978). 
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enhanced competitive opportunities for lenaric fi~ 1D future periods. Thi. 
illue vill be dilcus.ed further in a later part of the paper. 
C. Concentration and H&rket Share Stability 
Vbila the data In Table 4 Ihow that the pharmaceutical indU8try i. not 
dominated by a few firms vith large market shares, .ast economist. vould Itill 
consider the industry to be oligopoliltic. In this regard, it is rea.onable 
to argue that the relevent market I Ihould be defined in terms of therapeutic 
catagories rather th3n total ethical drug industry. This il because drugs 
oriented to one therapeutic us~ (e.g., vitamins) are generally not substitutes 
for thos,! in other categories (e.g., antibiotics or anti-depreSsants). Although 
no clasSl.f1cation scheme of "therapeutic markets" is likely to latisfy every-
o~e, a 7rior attempt to define such markets by one of the authors yielded four-
firm concentration ratios that averaged 68 (Vetuon, 1971). These data are 
presented in Table 6 and cover a selected grol.p of 19 therapeutic markets. In 
another study, Cocks and Virts (1974) conr,ructed therapeutic markets by system-
atically evaluating physician&' prescribing habits. Their scheme yields 
markets which are generally more broadly defined than those in Table 6.and as a 
consequence. had somewhat lower concentration ratios. Nevertheless. 
however one defines therapeutic categories, one tends to observe auch higher 
levels of concentration for these markets than for the industry as a whole. 
Some analysis has been undertaken in recent years of the dynamic "insta-
bility"of the market shares of ethical drug sales as well as within particular 
therapeutic marketl. Although drug markets are subject to considerable concen-
tration at any given point in time. one might also expect to observe a high 
rate of turnover in firm market shares overtime as a consequence of the rapJd 
flow of new product introductions in this industry. 
TAIL! 6 
Coacentration of Sales in the United States Ethical 







































Unweighted Average 68 
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SOURCES: John H. Vernon, "Concentration, Promotion and Market Share Stability 
in Pha~ceutica1 Industry". Journal of Industrial Economics, July 1971. 
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Doull~. Cocks (1975) has undertaken an analysis of this i •• ue. Spe-
cifleally. he first computed an inltability index for the ethical druB 
industry and compared it vith similar indices computed for twenty industries 
by Hymer and Pashi~ian (1962)10 a prior aDalysl.. Oo1y one industry Vas 
found to have a higher "instability index" than pharmaceuticals. In addi-
tion. he found a high degree of volatility of firm market ahares vi thin 
particular therapeutic classes associated with rival new product introduc-
tions displacing established market leaders over the ten year period 
examined in his analysis. 
D. Conditions of ,ntry 
Three major factors have been cited in the literature as important sources 
of entry barriers in the ethical drug industry: patents, brand differentiation 
and Icale advantages in research and development. 
Patents play a significant role in the innovative process for the ethical 
drug incustry. This is in apparent contrast vith many other technologically 
progressive industries. .. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the main output from the Rand D process 
is the knowledge and evidence that a particul~r chemical entity is a safe and 
effective therapy in the treatment of a particular disease plus the FDA 
certification of this evidence in terms of marketing approval. However. once 
this knowledge becomes publicly available, the costs of icitation by rival 
producers are usually low. Hence, th~re is little to stop rival firms from 
produclog this compound on similar terms as the innovator in the absence of 
legal barriers such as those afforded by the patent .yst~. 
rirm Rand D strate~ es are consequently oriented around developing 
products that are patentable. Over 90 percent of the new chemical entities 
comlng to the U.S. market in recent years have involvpd drugs protected by 
16 
product patentl. Furthermo~., approxt.&tely half cf .11 prascription drug 
•• 1.1 at the prelent time involve single lource products protected by 
patenu. 
A patent barrier, of courle, can b. overc~e by the development of 
chemically distinct substitutes for the eltablilhed market leader's product. 
Aa di.cussed above, there is in fact considerable market ahare turnover in 
thia industry associated with the introduction of Dew chemical entities. One 
atrategy for inventing around an existing firm'. patent that hal received 
considerable attention in the literature is "molecular modification." This 
refers to the development of a similar compound so as to retain a rival pruduct's 
main therapeutic effects (or hopefully improve them) but at the lame time 
possesses a chemically distinct st:ucture that can be patented. Our discussion 
in part IlIon the character of technical progress indicates many luch 
"families" of drugs with similar chemical structures and therapeutic properties 
bave been developed in just this manner. 
Nevertheless, the strategy of developing "me too" products through 
molecular modification is neither costless nor always guaranteed to produce 
an effective substitute for an establishc~ product. In contrast to imitative 
products involving already approved substances by the FDA (!.e., generic 
equivalents) chemically differentiated products must undergo full Icale re-
views of safety and efficacy by the FDA. Hence these drugs must be tested on 
the ssme Icale as all previously approved products. Therefore, under cur-
rent regulatory conditions the imitating firm i8 faced with several million 
dollars in development cost. and several years in lag time before chemically 
distinct follow on drugs can be marketed as approved new drugs. 
Data from trade sources indicate that firm.~ in the drug industry a8 a 
17 
Whol •• pend • little over t~n perc.nt of th.ir .al •• on r •••• rch and dev.lop-
.ent expenditure. and at le.st • comp.rable percentage amount on promotional 
outl.ya. Promotion.l outlay~ p.r dollar of 1.1 •• tend to be Ireate.t in the 
early Ita,es of • product l1fe cycle when information on a new dl~1 is being 
initi.11y diffused. As noted above, productl are p~omoted under brand names 
with the objective of building up • stock of good will or specific preference 
in the minds of physicians for the innovating fil~'S product. Thi. bas 
hi.torica1ly provided an important lource of product differenti.tion advantages 
vis-a-vis new entrants after patents expire (i.e., competitively a~vertised 
brands and generic products). 
There is also evidence that the firm ~hich introduces the first product of 
a new "family" of drug therapies can obtain important product differentiation 
advantages relative to follow on imitative products. Bond and Lean (1977) 
have examined this issue in a recent FTC study. In the case of the oral 
diuretic market, for example, they found that the first drug on the market, 
Herck's Diuril introduced in 1958, enjoyed substantial competitive advantages 
over a number of therapeutically similar (but chemically distinct) drugs that 
quickly followed it on the market. These data indicate that Merck spent less 
than half as much per sales dollar on promotion for Diuril than follow-on 
products and also charged a significantly higher price than competitors. Despit 
theae policies, in 1971, thirteen years after the original introduction of Diuri 
it was atill the market leader with a 33 percent share of the oral diuretic 
aarket. Bond and Lean further found that those follow on products that were mos 
lucc.ssful in ~apturing market shares were those that offered lignificant 
therapeutic ,ains over established diureticI, rather than merely relying on high 
promotion levels or price discounts. 
18 
At the pre.ent time. there i. evidence to suggest that the "J~r drug firma 
are concentrating more of their R and D effort. on developtna drugs which 
mody new approaches to disease treatment and les. on development of "ee too" 
product •• This reflects, at lea.t in part. the 'strong upward trend. in the 
co.ts and times for developing and obtaining FDA approval of a new drug entity 
compared with a few decades 6g0. Data discussed in the next section indicate 
that Rand D costs have escalated sharply relat1~e to overall returns for new 
drugs and hence there is less economic incentive to develop "me too" products. 
Of course firtl13 arp still motivated to explore compound II with chemically 
related structures to those of existing products in hopes ~f developing 
~ , 
products with improved therapeutic properties. There does appe~r. however, 
to be an increased emphasis on drug candidates with significant market ~~re 
potential to compensate for increased development costs. 
It also appears that as a result of the sha~ increase in the costs anc 
riskiness of developing new drugs ~hat economies of scale considerations ic 
drug Rand D is a much more important factor than was the case a few decades 
ago. This is consistent with the findings of recent studies that drug in-
novation is now much more concentrated in the large drug fi~ than in ~he 
early .1xties. (Grabowski ana Vernon. 1976) 
E. Industry Profitability and Pricing Trends 
The pharcaceutical industry has ranked near the top of the manufacturing 
.ector 10 teres of overall profit rates for most of the post ~orld War II p~riod. 
Thia a.~ect of industry performance, together with the high price cost marg.~ 
on particular products, has received considerable attention frae cougresslonal 
co==ittees beginning with the highly publicized Kefauver Hearings in the late 




In recent yeara, however, there haa be.n a noticable tendency for induatry 
profit ratea to begin converging toward the _vera,e obtained by the entire 
RAnufacturing aector. In Table 7. earnin~a data baa.d on the FTC'a Quarterly 
Financial leporta are prelented for the pharmac~utica1 industry and the Overall 
.anufacturing aector for the period 1956-1979. Theae data l~icate that 
pharmaceutical earnings a. a percent of net atockholder equity ha. consiatently 
been above the average for all manufa~turing over this period. At the a&me time 
there is • clear trand evi~ent in these data for the difference in th~ profit 
ratea to narrow over time. This is especially true in the pre t&1. profit aeries. 
A:ong other things this apparently reflect., vith acme relponse lags, the lover 
rates of industry growth and slower rates of new product introductions in recent 
years compared with the early post war period. These trends (together with recent 
technological developments that have produce~ more optimistic assela=ents of 
industry's prospects over the immediate future) vill be discussed in detail in 
the next part of the paper. 
Another iasue that has received considerable attention, primarily in 
acad~c studies, 1S the potentially significant bias present in reported profit 
rates for the drug industry (and other industries with s1cilar characteristics) 
which results froo the expensing rather than capitalizing of so-called intang~ble 
capital outlaY3--1.e., Rand D and advertising investment expenditures. It is 
atandard accounting practice to expense these intangible capital outlays even 
though conceptually they are in fact investment expenditures with expected 
returna distributed over future periods. Recent academic analyses by Clarkson 
(1977) and_Crabowlki and Mueller (1978) have adjusted reported profit rates in 
.everal industries including drugs and have found that profit rates in ethical 
drugs do have a aignificant upward bias on this ,·ccount. In the Grabowski and 





























late. of Retura on Average Stockholders !quit7 








































































































a considerable number of companies wh~re reclassified by industry. The 
percentage of companies reclassified 1n the drug industry is unknown. 
NOTE: For purpose of this Table the pharmaceutical industry 1s defined as corp-
orations pricarily engaged in manufacturing biologicals, inorganic and organi: 
medicinal chemicals, and pharmaceutical preparations; and grading and grinding 
botanicals. 
SOURCE: Quarterly Financial Rep~rts (for manufacturing, mining and trade corp-
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Source: Pharmaceutical Industry Fact Book as constructed from the following 
original .our.ed--CPI Indices; Consumer Price Index Detailed Reports, 
.ari~ 1I.ue8; Firestone Iod~ - Firestone, variou8 issue •• 
rate. between the dru& induatry and the overall aaaple ae&D vere eltainatcd 
when a and D and adverti.1n, outlay. vere capitalized rather than expensed. 
Vbile there i. room for di.agreement on tbe appropriate a •• u.pt1ona for 
..xing .uch profit rate adjustment., it i. clear that the.e adjustment. do 
tend to further reduce the difference between drug indu.try and overall 
aanufacturing accounting profit rate. ob.erved in Table 7. 
Another i.sue that ha. received con.iderable p~blic policy attention i. 
the high rate of price inflation io health aervices .ector. The price 
performance of prescriptioo drugs, bovever, haj been in marked contrast with 
other sectors of the health services L,dustry. In Figure 1, V2 present trend. 
10 the consumer price index for prescription drugs, for medical care (excluding 
drugs) and for all items over the period 1965 through 1979. Yhile overall 
bealth .ector prices have increased at a much more rapid rate than the eFt 
1Ddex over this period, relative prices for prescription drugs have declioed 
over t1me. The decline is especially pervasive during the sixties. It has 
continued at a diminished rate over more recent periods. It should also be 
Doted that current governmeot price indices tend to inadequately adjust for 
product quality 1mprovecents so that they tend to overestimate the degree of 
toflatioo in technologically progressive sectors vis-a-vis oon progressive 
ones. 
10 .ummary, the ethical drug iodustry, in common with many other 
technologically progressive industries, has experieoced above avera~e profit 
rates and declining relative prices over time. Accounting measures further 
tend to over.tate both profitability and price inflation io research iotensive 
iDduatrie. with high rates of product innovation. Nevertheless, given the.e 
.ea.urement error proble=a. there 1. 41so._ definite tendency in receot 
periods for .ome convergence toward the average for all manufacturing evident 
21 
in the tiM trend. OD both the •• yar1.ab1e.. lbe po ... 1h1e r ... ona for th1.a 
are dl.cua •• d further in our anal,.1. in the follovinl •• ct10D1 Oft t.chnical 
prolre •• 1D thl. indu.try • 
; 
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III. Ba.ic Characteri.tic. and Souree. of Technical 
Prosre .. 
A. Social and Economic Effect. of Nev Drug Di.coveri •• 
A8 ve noted earlier, the modern druB industry beJlD 1D the ald-19JO'a 
with the introduction of the firat aulfonamide drug. Since that time hundreds 
of new drugs have been introduced in the United State&. Some of the .. jor 




Chlorpromazine (major tranquilizer) 







Technical ~rogress in the pharmaceutical industry has particular 
significance, of course, because of ita key role in ~rovlng the quality of 
human life and health. In his vell known book on health economics, ~ ~ 
1!!!, Victor Fuchs (1974) stated 
Drugs are the key to modern medicine. Surgery, r&diotherapy, and 
diagnostic te~ts are all important, but the ability of health care 
providers to alter health outcomes--nr. Walsh Mc~rmott'. "decisive 
technology"-depends primarily on drugs. Six dollars are spent on 
bOlpital. and physicians for every dollar .pent on drugs, but vith-
out drugs the effectiveness of hospital. and phyaicians vould be 
cnorlCOusly diminished. 
The great pover of drugs is a development of the twentieth 
century--cany vould say of the past forty years. Our ::ge has been 
liven many names--atomic, ele'tronic, apace, and the like-but 
measured by impact on p~ple'. lives it might just a. veIl be called 
the "drug sge." 
Tabl, 8 .bow. AODe aljor chana.. in .ortality rat~. for .elected 
diaeaae. that have occurred .ince 1960. DruS. haye had aD t.portaDt effect 
in explainin& theae declinin& 80rtality rate.. The numberl of CAI.I of a&Dy 
dilealea have allo been cut becaule of t.proved druS therapiel. T.~le 9 
ahov., fqr example, that new mea.lel vaccines have reduced the number of 
~le. caaes by 46 percent between 1969 and 1978. Similarly, new antl-
infectlves have produced a 27 percent decline in the number of tuberculoais 
cases over the aame period. 
The introduction of new pharmaceutical agents has also reaulted in 
lignIfic~nt benefits in the form of reductions in the need for and extent 
of hos~~talization for many diseases. For example, tte introduction of 
tr~quilizers and anti-depressants was instrumental in reducing the 
populations in mental hospitals from 565,486 patienta in 1956 to 202,971 
patients in 1975. 
In addition, the cumulative advance in drug therapy has provided a 
relatively low-cost means of treating disease and producing good health. 
, 
This is important because the health sector is characterized by acarce and 
expensive professional manpower, labor intensive activities and complex 
technical equipment--all contributing to a very high rate of cost inflation 
in health aervices over recent years. By contrast, the costs of ethical drugs 
have accounted for a relatively small percentage of total health costs and 
have been a relatively stable element in the presence of rapIdly rising costs 
ellewhere 1n the health sector. 
B. Characteristics of the Drug Rand D Process 
In thi. lection ve shall examine the characteristica of drug Rand D at 
the level of the individual firm. First, ve deacribe the nature of drug discovery 
TABLE 8 
Mortality; Reductions 1n U.S. Deatb, Per 
100,000 Population from Selected Disease •• 1960 and 1977 
Activi Rheumatic Fever and 
Chronic Rheumatic Heart Disease 
Hyp.rtenlive Heart Disease •••••••••••• 





Cer.brovascular Di.eases ••••••••••••••• l08.0 
Art.rio.clero.is ••••.•••••••••••••••••• 20.0 
Pn.umoni •.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••• 32,9 
A!Jthma •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3.0 
'epeic Ulcer •.•..........•.•....••..•• 6.3 
Ndphritil and Nephrosis ••••••••••••••• 7.6 
Infeetion. of Kidney •••••••••••••••••• 4.3 
;uberculosis (all forms) •••••••••••••• 6.1 
tIIn1nslt11 ..... II ••••••••••••••• I. II.. 1.3 
Infectiou. Hepatitis •••••••••••••••••• .5 































Reductions Rep~rted in U.S. Casel of Selected Dilea.es, 
1969 and 1978 
'orm of TreatQent 
Diaeue 1969 1978 % Reduction or Prevention 
Diphtheria .......... . 241 76 68% Vaccines 
Encephalitis ••••••• 1,917 1,183 38 Antibiotics 
Measles 
(all types) •••••• 83,542 45,170 46 Vaccines 
Meningococcal 
Infections ••••••• 2,951 2,505 15 Antibiotics 
WhooFing Cough ••••• 3,285 2,063 37 V.cc1n~s 
Acute Rheumat ic 
Fever •••••••••••• 3,229 851 74 Antibiotics and 
Steroids 
Tuberculosis •••••• 39,120 28,521 27 An:i-infectives 
SOURCE: Reported Motbidity and Mortality 1n the United States. Annual S~rv, 
1978. (CDC) 79-8241, Center for Disease Control, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education. 
and Welfare, 1979. 
and review how a number of important drugs ~va been discoverad. The 
ca.plex ~ystem of drug development and FDA involvement 1. the next topic. 
A ve11-known .tudy of the cost of deve10piaa a marketab1a ICE 1. also 
raviewed. 
1. Drug Discovery 
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The process of drug discovery invo1v~. ~ ~u1ti-discip1inary research 
team approach which is generally characte:\zed hy considerable trial and 
error search effort. Serendipity has also played an important role in .. ny 
major discoveries. Same examples of how drugs have been discovered vi11 
provide further insight. 
The original sulfa drug, sulfanilamid;, vas a lifesaving drug in many 
severe human infections. It was discovered in 1935 by Domagk who observed 
that the red dye sulfamidochrysoidin& vas effective against streptococcal 
infections in mice. However, it had several serious side effects, including 
kidney damage. Medicinal chemists therefore synthesized almost 5000 derivatives 
of sulfanilamide searching for compounds without the serious side effects. 
TVo of the most successful drugs from this group have been sulfathiazole and 
sulfadiazine. 
A chance clinical observation that patients taking sulfanilamide often 
excreted a larger than usual volume of urine l~d to the developm~nt of a 
whole new class of diuretic drugs. Again, testing of many closely related 
chemical compounds was necessary to discover the most effective diuretics. 
Similarly, serendipitous clinical observation of patients on sulfanilamide 
therapy led to anti-thyroid and oral hypoglycemic drugs. 
There are .. ny additional exacples of drugs discovered by chance obser-
yat!on. The .aat famous is, of course. Fleming's discovery of penicillan. 
, 
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'rhe bportant .. jor tranqui~iler, chlorpromazine, va. the reault of the 
unexpected discovery that certain If the antihiatamine. are poteat deprea-
.anta of the central nervous ayatem. Otber. include the antl-hypertenaive 
action. of the S-blockers, the anti-inflammatory effecta of the aterolds, 
and the anti-gout actio~ of allopurinol. 
Random acreening is another technique of drug diacovery. Schvartzman 
(1975) has described one expecially interesting example. In search of a 
drug to combat tuberculosis, Lederle Laboratories systematically tested a 
file of 103,000 chemical compounds which had been developed by its parent 
company for a variety of purpose~. Eventually, after many years, a compound 
originally developed for use as an antioxidant additive for rubber vas found 
to be effective against tuberculosis. Six hundred similar compounds vere 
.ynthesized and the important anti-tubercular drug ethambutol vas discovered. 
'rhese examples suggest that drug discovery is largely an empirical, 
trial-and-error process. However, this situation is changing dramatically. 
For example, a 1979 article in Business Week: 
Hore and more, the development job is done today by setting forth 
in advance very specifically the characteristics desired in a nev 
drug. The molecules of the chemical compound are designed, atom 
by atom, to affect a pretargeted physiological process in the body--
inhibiting or stimulating, for instance, the flow of a specific 
enzyme. Examples of drugs developed in this fashion are Smith-
Iline'a Tagameti Squibb's Capoteni and Lilly's Dobutrex. 
We vill return to "discovery-by-design" in the discussion in Part C. 
Of course the actual discovery of a nev drug is only the first 8tep in 
the lengthy proceS8 of drug innovation. In the following aection ve turn to 
the development of a drug once it has been aynthesized and thought to po •• e •• 










ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALIfY 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT (U.S.A.) 
' .. DUN:' 
.--
, 
? I ''" 17) .-6", 2-),,. 
(),COO(?) I,OOC(?} K) I 

















2. Drug Development 
risure 2, reproduced from an articl. by William H. Ward.ll (19,9), 
provide. a load ov~rview of the pre.ent .y.tem of druB develo~nt aad 
f'JlA regulation. As explained earlier, once a De1I chemical com~,und baa 
been tea ted in an1=als and found to be worthy of human te.ting, the 
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developer must file an IND (Investifational New Drug applic4tion) with the 
FDA. 
If approved by the FDA, the drug proceeds through three phases of 
clinical testing, The-tirot-pha;e is directed 'toward examining a drug'. 
possible toxic effects and is performed on healthy in~ividua18.under highly 
controlled situations. If a drug succes.fu~ly completes this stage, it is 
then tested on a relatively small number of patients to examine its effec-
tiveness. It is then carefully evaluated from a therapeutic and marketing 
.t~d~int before the decision to begin phase three is made~ Phase three 
involves expanded studies in large pa~ient populations with a substantial 
escalation in development expenditures. If & drug 8uccessfully passes these 
three phases of testing and is considered to have sufficient market value 
to warrant commercial introduction, an NDA (New Drug Application) is submitted 
to the FDA. Marketing can commence upon receiving an approved NDA, 
Several further points should be made with reference to Figure 2. The 
time required to pass through the three testing phases is shovn to be 4-6 
years with an additional 2-3 years for NDA approval. The attrition rates 
.how that for every ten drugs entering the INn stage, only one viII t~ve an 
HDA .ubeisaion. Notice that Figure 2 .hows no further attrition. According 
to Wardell, "the one aurvivor that reaches an NDA submission has a ninety 







The coat figures Ihown in Figure 2 are baaed on a Itudy by Ronald 
w. Hansen. Hansen obtaired lurvey data from 14 phamaceutical firma on 
the 1 and D coa:s for a lample of NCE'. first tested in R&D from 1963 to 
1975. Aa shown, the discovery cost per NCE vas estimated .t $30 million 
and the development cost at $24 million, or a total co~t of $S4 million. 
This $54 million figure represents the capitalized value <at 8 percent 
interest and in 1976 dollars) at the date of ~rketing approval. 
It should be pointed out that the $54 million includes the cost of 
NCE'~ that enter clinical resting but are not carried to the point of NDA 
approval. For example, Hansen found that by the end of ~ifteen menths of 
clinical testing, testing had ended on over 50 percent of the NeE's that had 
entered human trials. Hence, the $54 million figure should be interpreted 
as the average expec~ed cost of discovering and developing ~ marketable NCE. 
c. The Sources of Pharmaceutical Inr.ovatlon 
We begin by considering some data concerning the expenditures for health 
R and D in the United States. Table 10 shows total health Rand D 
, 
expenditures (not just drug-related), the portion of that total accounted for 
by the F~deral Government. and the privately financed drug Rand D outlays 
by the pharcaceutlcal industry. 
Of the Federal health Rand D figure of $3.8 billion, $2.6 billion-vas 
heAlth R and D support accounted for by the :iational Institutes of Health. 
Whi~~ we do not know the total amount of Federal support for drug Rand n, 
• there are aeveral fOUMI programs concerned vtth drug development. The 
1ar,~st 1a the National Cancer Institute Drug Development Program with an 
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The relative laportance of private ver.ua public 1Datitutloaa 
(Iovenmeat, univerdt1es, aDd nOD-proUt fOUDo!ationl) in the dbcovery 
and development of new druss haa been a controversial l.aue. Por aaaple, 
the famous lefauver Comnittee hearin,1 OQ the pharmAceutical laduatry, 
which began in December 1959, dealt extenllvely with the .. dieal value of 
the R and D effort of the industry. 
Comanor (1966) has referred to that controverlY aa the "battle of the 
lisu." That 11, the cOllllittee staff and the industry prepared competing 
lists of n~ drugs. The committee liat tended to concentrate on drugs that 
abodied what it considered to be major therapeutic advances, and emphasized 
the role of public institutions. The industry list, on the other hand, 
"included new drugs that may not have embodied large steps forward but that 
are in frequent uae and thereby aeem to have the confidence of the country'. 
physicians. A large majority of the drugs on this list were disco\'ered and 
developed within iDdustry laboratories." 
Schwartrman (1976) has .. sembled s~e more recent data on thil question. 
A. Ihown in Table II, close to 90 percent of the NeE'a introduced over the 
1950 to 1969 period were discovered by private ethical drug firms (U.S. and 
foreign). Furtheraore, this percentage exhibits a tendency to increase over 
time as evidenced by the 5 percentAle point increase in 1960 to 1969 over the 
.. rlier ten year period. His analysis also reveals that the industry ac-
counted aver the 1960-69 period for 86 percent of the therapeutically most 
!=portant drug., .. clas.ified by Martin Seife of the FDA. This result i. 
conai.tent with slDilar analy.e~ of this question by Schnee (1971) and Deutsch 
(1913). 
Such exerct ... aa the.e, thoulh u.eful, tend to de-em?hasize a ba.ic point. 





Percentage of New Cheeica1 Entities Discovered 
and Introduced by the Pharaaceutica1 Industry 
1950-1959, 1960-1969 and 1950-196Q 
Periods in Which Drugs Were Introduced 
1950-1959 1960-1969 1950-1969 
86 88 
14 12 
100 100 100 
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SOURCE: David Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins Press. 1976). p. 74 • 
• OTES: List of NCE'.. Selected from Paul de Haen. New Product Survev and Non-
proprietarv Name Index. Codiscovers are each given 1/2 credit where the source 
of discovery could Dot be determined, it was assigned to other. 
thaD cClDpet1tive. Profe .. or Ernat I. Chain. a )Iobel !.aur .. t. for hU 
vork. 1D penicillin developaent. bas uc!a thb point well. Chain (1963) 
ob .. rved thAt larse ladunrlal labontor1es are ideal for "larle-aca1. 
Dcr.enins for n~ antibiotics. 1arle-Icale pharaacololical t.ltinl. aDd 
the Iynthelil of a val: number of anal0I0U. or related subltances with the 
a1a of improving one or the other pToperty of a drug." The academic 
laboratory, on the other hand. 18 desicned "to break fundamenta1ly new 
Iround toward. a better underltanding of the lawl of Nature. and in thil 
vay to lay the basis for eventual indultrial exPloitation of the scientific 
diacoveries emanating from its work." 
A clear exception to this delcription il the National Cancer Institute'. 
Drug Development Program. Perhaps because of the nation's overriding desire 
to cure cnacer--a. expressed in the National Cancer Act of 1971--the 
,everament has set up a large scale program which screens some lS,OOO com-
pounds per year. In fact, the NCI sponsorl all of the major cancer treatment 
clintcal trials groups in the u.s. and all drugs regardless of lource must 
be tel ted by these groups. Of the 30 anti-cancer drugs vhich are commercially 
available, 10 were developed prior to the beginning of the NCI program, and 
the r~ining 20 were developed with lignificant NeI lupport. 
A more rec~nt description of the complementary nature of private and 
public R and D was given by Richard D. Yood, chief executive of Eli LIlly, 
in a 1979 interview: 
The industry depends on the productivity of research. and research 
loes in cycles. Some of it i~ lerendipity, but progresl depend. 
~tly on what come. out of basic aedieal relearch and the knowledge 
it produces. Then indultry can take hold of this knowledge and 
da.clop new dfU3'. Sometime. this occur. in Itair-Itep fashion, 
&Cd y~u reach a new plateau of aedieal knowledge that aivel further 
~tUl to Dew drugs. 
OIl the othel" band. David $ChVaTta.aD (1976) hal arped that. 1D pbaraa-
ceutlcal I'D. wthere exi.t. DO .taple flov-throuah fro. ha.lc to applied I'D. 
lulc reMarch advance. relevant to ~.l.J1 discovery. ill coatrut to the role of 
ba.ic reMarch 10 other field., do 20t la.d ia aa1 direct va1 to a.v dru,.. Mev 
clrua. canDot be d •• ilned by 1011ca1 deduction. fra. valid lanera1 prlacipl •• ; 
chemical theory alone i. not enoulh and biololical theory i. woefully inade~uate." 
Schvartzman 10.. on to ob.erve that the .. jodt1 of disco".rt •• can be traced to 
~e of three lourcel: naturally occurrina compound., accidental dllcoveri ••• and 
. 
.ediflcations of previoully kaown drugs. Ia hi. vlev thil explain. the relatively 
high proportion of drug dilcoverlel .. de by the iadustry. 
In this connection, ve .hould emphashe ~he trend aoted .arlier that "diacovery-
by-design" appears to be replacing the IIOre inductive tdal and error methods 
•• phalized by Schwartzman. One iaference from this trend il the Itrengthening of 
the llnkage between baslc biomedical research and drug innovation. 
According to Dr. William I. H. Shedden, vice-p~elident in charge of cliuical 
evAluation at Ell Lilly, lcientists at Lilly are now taking a "very fundamental 
biological appra..ch" 1n lome of their TeseaTch. Dr. Shedden obsened that ln . 
the old days the chemists would sake a batch of compounds and .end them over to the 
blologists to put lnto animals to lee vhat vould happen. In contrast, today the 
biologilts ask the chem1sts to design .olecules to accomplilh particular effects. 
One highly .uccessful example of drug design il the anti-ulcer drug, Tagamet. 
vb1ch vas lntroduced by Smith Kline in 1977 and il already the lecond largest 
.. llinl U.S. drUSe KnOwing that the horaoae hl.tamice 11 a potent .timulant of 
tbe laltric .ecTetlonl that can lead to ulcer •• Smith Kline leienti.tl .ought a 
compound that would inhibit the flow of hiltamiae. They finally lucceeded ia 
de.1lDing a molecule that would lock oato a "receptor lite", th~reb1 blocking out 
the ho~ae an~1D turn. the le.tric aacr.tiOGa. 
Aa Dr. P. loy Vaaelos. head of II. • D at Merck. oburwc! ill • 1979 interview: 
There ha. been a flowering of biOMedical ra •• arch. Thi. i. a fantastic 
tille In biology. 'lbe cOlipaniea with the daht kind. of people and 
re.ource. can capitalize on it and brins th~ DeV kDov1ed,e to bear on 
the right diseases and compounds. 
The apparent trend toward closer tle. between advance. in .cientific knowledge 
and nev pharmaceutical products is vell illustrated by recoabiaant DNA. or 
"Iene splicing". This nev process ha. been used to induce bacteria to produce huun 
in.ulin and interferon, and has exciting pos.lb~litie. in other area.. Several 
•• tabli.hed drug firms now have research and development programs in this field 
and several ~ll new firms have been founded to explore it. commercial application. 
Even some universities are now considering the establishment of genetic engineering 
companies to develop the discoveriEs of its scientists. (Time, Nov. 10. 1980) 
IV. MYerae Trends in the Drua Inc!unl"1 DudDi the 60'. aU 70'. 
n. 1to1e of Re,utatory end Ww ReJUutory Pactor. 
A. Annual Levels of New Product Introductions 
Table 12 provides a list of the annual nuaber of new chea1cal entitie. 
(Mel'.) introduced in the United States between 1940 and 1978. (R.w chea1cal 
entitlea are new compounds not previously .. rketed and include nearly all 
aAjor therapeutic advances. New product. that are not NCE'. include combi-
nations of existing drugs and new dosa,: fo1'1U.) 
The rate of introductions of RCE's has c1.arly declined since the late 
1950's. For example, from 1955 to 1960, an average of about 50 riCE's per 
year were introduced. The corresponding n~er for the 1965 to 1970 period 
is only 17 NCE's, and for the most recent six year period the average is 17 
also. 
This decline in new product introductions has been accompanied by cor-
re8pon~ing structural trends on the input side of the innovational process. 
Aa discussed ~bove, Ransen estimates the current costs of developing and 
... 
aarketing an NCE are on the order of twenty-four million dollars. We may 
co=pare this finding to prior studies by Clymer (1970), Mund (1970) and -
Sarett (1974) that put the uncapitalized development eost of a new NCE in 
the one to two million dollars range in the .arly 60'.. Moreever, Clymer 
exttm&ted that the attrition rate for drugs undergoing clinical tests was 
two out of three in the pre-62 period. Current data analyzed by William 
Rardell and reported in Figure 2 suggests that only one in ten clinically 
, •• ted dru& entities becomes a Dew drug introduction. Finally the average 
lestation period for a successful new drug has also increased .lsnlficantly 
lrc:a four to .ix yeara in the early 8ixtiee to the ~urrent ten yeara or aore 
depicted in Plaure 2. 
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rAIL! 12 
Mev Stolle Entity Drul Introduction. in U.S. 
t.ar lumber tear "'-bar 
1940 14 1960 SO 
1941 17 1961 45 
1942 13 1962 24 
1~43 10 1963 16 
1944 13 1964 17 
1945 13 1965 25 
1946 19 1966 13 
190\7 26 1967 25 
1948 29 1968 12 
1949 38 1969 9 
1950 32 1970 16 
1951 38 1971 14 
1952 40 197;Z 10 
1953 53 1973 17 
1954 42 1974 18 
1955 36 1975 15 , 
1956 48 1976 14 
1957 52 19)7 16 
1958 47 1978 23 
1959 65 
SOURCE: PharmAceuttc~1 Manufacturers Association. Prescription Drug Industrv 
Factbook, 1980. 
'nlere thus hu been a decline in azmual new drua introductlolw ae-
coapanied by atrong upward tnnds in the CG~U. tiM aDd rub .. sodated 
with discovet'lng and developing new druas. In ecouoebU' tem1nolol"f. 
there has been a shift in the "production function" for new c!rug ltmovation 
in the direction of lower R and D productivlty--that Is to .. y. fewer new 
drug introductions are emanating from larger resource camm1ttments by the 
industry. 
'nle causes and importance of this decline in new drug introductions has 
been the subject of considerable controversy. 'nlis debate has centered 
around the effects of increaled regulation resulting from the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
amendments as a major cause of this decline in innovation. 
AD initial response by the FDA was to argue that the observed decline 
in pharmaceutical innovation was in fact actually compositional rather than 
real in character. 
The relevant question is not and never has been how many new drugs 
are marketed each year, but rather how many significan~. useful and 
unique therapeutic entities are develo~ed •••• The rate of develop-
ment and marketing of truly important, significant, and unique 
therapeutic entities in this country has remained relatively stable 
for the past 22 years (Alexander Schmidt, 1974). 
It is difficult, however, to substantiate the FDA claim that the 
observed decline 10 new drug introductions has been largely confir.ed to 
urgina1 type drugs. As discussed above, it is true that the much higher 
COlts and risks of developing new drugs have caused firms to focus less in 
their research programs on imitative "me too" drugs. Theae drugs do .:lpV~ar 
to have declined desproportionately over tibe. Nevertheless. there is also 
evidence which suggests a decline in therapeutically 8ignificant drugs as 
vall. MOst classifications of important therapeutic advances by academic 
analysts show such a decline, as doe. at least one prior FDA ranking of 
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u.poUaDt druss. 
rurther1lOre •• e&!lures of phanuceutical innovatioD baaed OIl ecOGOll1c 
criteda also au&&eat that a real decline has occurred. For aa.p1e. if VIe 
• .,.,-ine a "urket share" type ae .. ure which 1adlcate. the relative iaportaDce 
of RCE .alu to total ethical drug .ale., we find that the share of NeE' a ba. 
fallen from 20 percent in 1957-1961 to 8.6 percent in 1~62-l966, and to 6.2 
percent in 1972-1976 (Grabowski and Vernon, 1976).Of cour.e, the.e economic 
aeasureM will tend to live little weight to .. jor therapeutic advance. for 
relatively rare diseases. However. it is unlikely that the downvard trend 
can be explained by an increasing proportion of such innovations over time 
liven the adverse economic .hifts in the costs of discovering and developing 
new drugs which occurred over this period. 
Scm Peltrman has analyzed a related drug quality i •• ue a. to whether 
the large decline in NeE introductions could be explained by fewer ineffect1-re 
drugs .ntering the marketplace after the 1962 amendments were pa •• ed. His 
analysis of data from three groups of expert.--hospitals, panel. employed by 
state public-assistance agenci.s. and the American Medical Association's 
Council on Drugs-doeo not .upport this view. These d&ta .uggest only a R.alJ. 
fraction of the pre-1962 and polt-1962 NeE introductions could be clalsified 
as ineffective. 
In .um, the hypotheli. that the observed decline in new product introduc-
tions has largely been concentrated in marginal or ineffllctive drugs is not 
leaerally supported by empirical analy.... If one accept. that. a .ignificant 
decline in druS innovation occurred 10 the 8txtie_ and seventie., the queetlon 
atill remains •• to the rol. of regulatory versus non-regulatory factors in 
esplainins this decline. In the reaainder of this 8e~tion we consider various 
poa.ibilitiea in thl. regard and the evidence fro. varloUl aaareaatlve 
analYli. of thi. iaGue. 
I ... sulatory Deve1opc:ent:J in the Sixtie. 
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AI DOted above, a .. jor leai.latlve ch~ge occurred in 1962 with the 
p .... 'e of the lefauver-Barris a.ndmenta to the Focd, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
Thi. lav vas passed followinC the vall known and tragic event. a.sociated 
with the drug thalidomide (. drug introduced in .everal fordgn countries 
but no~ the U.S.). The 1962 amendments had two basic proviaioDJI that 
directly affected the drug innovational proceaa--a proof of efficacy require-
82Dt for nev drug approval and establishment of FDA regulato~ controls over 
the clinical (human) testing of new drug candidates. 
With reg&rd to the effir.acy requirement, the amendments required firms 
to provide .ubstantial evidence of a nev drug'. efficacy based on "adequate 
and veIl controlled trials". Subsequent FDA regulations interpreted this 
provision to mean using experimental and control group samples to demonstrate 
a drug's efficacy as statistically significant. '!he preferred mode of study 
vaa "double blind" control vhere neither patient nor physician va. avare 
whether he vas receiving the experimental drug or a .tandard therapy or placebo. 
AecQrding to industry .ources, these substantial evidence criteria led to laree 
increases in the amount of resources necessary to obtain an NDA approval, 
expeciAlly in therapeutic areas where .ubjective analyses of patient responses 
are necessarily involved (analgesics. anti depressen,s. etc.). 
the s.cond aajor change in the 1962 amendments influencing the drug in-
Dey,tional proc, •• vere the Inve.tigational Nev Drug (lND) requirement. on 
clin1e2l ta.ting. Prior to any teltl on hum~ lubject., fi~ vere nov re-
quired to aubait a Dew drug inveltigationa! plan giving the result. of animal 
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testl aDd relearch protocol. for huaan teltl. Baled OD itl evaluation of 
the IND and .ubsequent report I of relearch findin,l, the FDA .. y p~~hibit, 
delay, or halt clinical research that POsel excel live rilltl to YOlunteer 
.ubjects or doel no: follow loune! Icientific procedurel. Bence," a relult 
of the ~ procedu~es the FDA Ihifted in the polt-1962 period from e •• ~tially 
an evaluator of evidence and research findings at the end of the Rand D 
process to an active participant in the process itself. This il anothex 
potentially important factor leading to the higher development costs and 
times observed over more recent times. 
In addition to these evo major changes in the 1962 l£gislation, the 
external environment surrounding FDA decisiQns on new drug approval also 
changed significantly. The thalidomide disaster received wide publicity 
in the popular press. This in turn galvanized congressional and media at-
tention on new drug approvals. 
Former FDA Commissioner Schmidt has emphasized the problems these 
external pressures create for the maintenance of a balanced and rational 
dec1sion-making structure. He notes: 
For example, in all of FDA's history, I am unable to find a single 
instance where a Congressional committee investigated the failure 
of FDA to approve a new d~ug. But, the times when hearings have 
been held to criticize our approval of new drugs have been so 
frequent that we aren't able to count them ••• The message of FDA 
Itaff could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug 
i. resolved by its approval, the Agency and the individuals involved 
likely will be investigated. Whenever ~uch a drug is disapproved, 
no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for our negative 
action on new drug applications is, therefore, intense. And it seems 
to be increasing, as everyone is becoming a self-acclaimed expert on 
carciDo&eneai. and druS testing.l 
The arpanded attention from Congres. and the media thus tended to re-
enforce the natural incentive. of FDA officials to err on the lide of ca~tion 
or delay rather than the reverse kind of error. 
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A final set of factors influencing R and D co~ta and regulatory delays 
relates :0 FDA resource capabUitlea and ita 1D&oagement proceduru. Tha 7DA'. 
reiU!atory responsibl1itiea expanded dramat~~ally after the 1962 aaend=enta. 
L1ttJ~ thought ~ apparently given, however, to the resource and management 
proble::u that might arise in implementing the new law. Thb point baa cOQe up 
repeatedly 10 outside and intra-agency reviews of the FDA over the pal evo 
decades. 
The most recent analysis of this question vas a ~ecent CeneraJ Accc~nting 
Office study that focused on the NDA approval process. Despite the fact ~hat 
over 90 percent of all NDA'a are eventually approved, the FDA now t~kes berween 
two to three years on the average to approve an NDA. The GAO cited the f_1-
lowing problems in FDA procedural reviews: 
(i) FDA guidelines are 1mpre~ise. 
(ii) Reviev~rs ~f the NDA change, alowing the process. 
(iii) Scientific and professional disagreements betw~en FDA and ind .e/y 
are Dlow to be resolved. 
(iv) FDA feedback to industry abcut deficiencies io slow. 
(v) Chemistry and manufacturing control reviews are especially slow. 
(vi) Industry submits imcomplete NDA's. 
In responding to the GAO report, the FDA has indicated the goal cf re-
ducing over a three year period the proc~s8ing time on NDA's by 2S percent for 
drugs that represent important or modest gains and 15 percent for ~ll other 
drug •• 
To sua up, over the post-1962 period, there bas been a substant1~l in-
eraue 1X1 both the scope and intensity of r~gulatory controls on ethi.:al elrogs. 
Aa a conaequence, it has been postulated that the costs of discovering and 
-----------------------------
------ ~.~.y-.-~--- ::;.-----...... ---.-=:::.==~-.-.- --- _._---._.. -
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dcrve10pina a Dew dr11l, alooa with the ria" aacl UDCanainty of drul innovation, 
bave incr .... d aDd that thi.!l in tUrD, baa been a .. jor factor under1yinl the 
obaerved decline 1D Dev drug innovation 1D the United Statea. 
C. Alternative Hypotheses For ExplainingDeclintng Innovation Levels 
Several ot~er factors have been advanced tR the literature .. explanations 
for the decline in drug innovation aver the paat fev decades. 
Depletion of Research Opportunities This hypothesia has been liven the 
.ast attention in the literature as an alternative to increased regulation • 
. 
Adherents of the research depletion hypothesis argue that major drug in-
novations tend to occur in vaves or cycles and that in many major therapeutic 
areas ve have currently reached a point where the probability that a ncv dia-
covery will be an advance over existing therapies is quite lOVe they further 
argue that ve are on a research plateau because the major diaease areas left 
to conquer are the-ones where ve have the least adequate scientific under-
atanding of the underlying biological processes. Hence, they auggest that 
considerable investments of basic research may be nec~ssary before a nev cycle 
of increased drug discoveries is likely to occur. they further point to the O 
lover levels of drug introductions in other developed countries (where regula-
tion ha~ been le88 stringent than the U.S.) as important supportive evidence 
that a worldwide depletion of acientific opportunities has occurred in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
lo~r FDA Commissioner Schmidt has expre88ed the research depletion 
hypotheais in the following terms. 
Today's world includes a great number of important therapeutic agents 
unknown a ,eneration ago. These include antibiotics, antihyper-
tanaive drugs, diuretics, antipsychotic drugs, tranquilizers, cancer 
chemotherapeutic agents, and a host of other. • • • In many of these 




abilar drual. Au tbe lapa 1ft blO1MClleal bowledl_ deer .... , ao 
to the opportualtl.. for tbe developaent of new or uaeful related 
druaD. All Ihow by the decl1niD& nUliber of Dew aillli. entity drual 
approved In tbe U.S., [naland, France and Geruny, tM. 1.8 a:l 1Dt.r-
aatloaal phenoeenon. 11111 do .. not ref1~t a 101. of iDDoYative 
capecity, but rather reflecta the norul courae of a Irovth 1Dc!ustry 
as it !Mcca .. technoloaieally 1101' ... ture (Schll1dt, 1974b, p. 3057). 
thi. bypotheaia, advanced by tbe FDA and othera, hal beeD received 
with considerable lkepticl~ in Rafty Iclentlflc quarterl. Some bave 
challenaed the hypothe ••• on conceptual Iround.. Other. have po1Dt.d to the 
.alt expenditure. on ba.ic bioaedical res.arch by the National Inltltut.1 
of Health and other oraanizatioDl a. creating a renewed pool of basic 
knOwledge which Ihould offset any tendency toward a depletion of opportunities 
froD prior drug discoveries (Bloom, 1976). 
~nglng Expectations In addition to the factors of increased regulation 
and research depletion, Lebergott (1973) has po1Dted to the effect. of the 
thalidomide tragedy on the behavior and expectaiiona of phy.icians and drug 
ftrm. .s further confounding factors. In particular, be argues: 
Do any of u. bel1cve that after that c_ta.trophe. consUJlers vere 
quite as likely a. before to prefer new drugs to on~ tested by 
experience? Were physicians henceforth quite a. likely to pre-
.crib2 new drugs--with the prospect of acute toxicity (and mal-
pr.ctice luits) when the one chance of 10,000 ran against them? 
Vhich of our leading pharmaceutical fi~ would henceforth endanger 
its reputation (and its entire existing product line) on behalf of 
• new drug on quite the aame ten.. as it did in the 'days when, bto-
cbesrlsu could do no vrong? •• Such .. ssive changes in the U.S. 
per8pective on drug.--ve aay call them Ihifts in both supply and 
demand curves--h4d to cut the number of more vent~resome drugs 
put under investigation since 1962. It would have done so if the 
eatire fDA ltaff had Bone flahing for the aext couple of y.ars 
(Lebersott. 1973). 
tbua. LabarJott arsues that atroDg .hifts in the incentive structure 
fac1D& phy.1c1aDa and aanufacturers occurred after tbalida.1dL and that this 
would iDdepeDdently operate to 1Dere.ue Il and D costs and lover new dru& 111-
troductiona. ela analysis point. up the analytIcal difficulties in trying to 
ideDtify the .ff.ctl of recu1ltor, and aon-reau1ator, factore that chan.., 
• 
• t.u1taDGouI1y .. a reeult of the tha1idoa1de incident. 
Advance. in Pharaacololical Science Dr. Pett1D&a of 111 Lilly CDd 
oth.r. have al.o pointed to .cientific advance. 1D pha~c010lical ecieac. 
oy.r the pa.t fev decade. a. another potentially i8p0rtant factor. In 
particular, he IU'le.te that th ••• advance., which bay ... de t.ratolol1 and 
tozicolosical .tudie • .uch ~re .ophi.ticated and co.tly 1D natur., would 
baYe t».~n incorpol'lted into dru, fin te.tinl procedurel neD 1D the ab.enu 
of recu}atory requirement. to do 10. That ii, druS firae would ~rtaka 
aany of the.e increased test. in their ova .elf-intere.t, 1D order to reduce 
tbo likelihood of future lo •• e. in ,00dwi11 and potential le,al liabilities. 
Several plau.ible hypothe.es have thu.'been advanced vith respect to 
the ob.erved dovatrend in druS innovation. The.e hypoth .... are DOt IlUtually 
exclu.ive and may all have contributed aiaaificantly to decl1nin& innovation 
in ethical drugs. In the next .ection we dilcu •• the .-pirical evideace 
conceraing the relative importance of increa.ed lovernment reaulatioa ver.u. 
tb.ae alternative explanation. of declining drug innovation. 
D. Asgregate Analvtical Studies of Pharmaceutical Innovation 
1) T1ae Series Studiel by Pelt~ aDd Baily 
Sam Peltrman'l 1973 Itudy of tbe .ffect of the 1962 amendmentl haa re-
celved considerable attention in both economic and policy circle.. Pelt~n 
.-ploy. a "demand pull" !IOdel 1a which the aupp1y of nov dru'l 1a aDy period 
relpond. Yith a laa to ahifta 1a deaand 11de factora. The .adell ••• timated 
on pre-aaendment data (1948-1962) and then .. ployod to forecalt vbat the 
number of Ita'i would have been 1D the po.t-1962 period in the &beence of 
rqulation. the effactl of the 1962 &mendmeata are computed .. tbe residual 
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difference betweD tbe predicted ucS actual flow of lICE'.. Vstq tbia ap-
proocb, Peltt1U!ft concludeD that "aU tbe d1ffe~eftCe HtvHD the pre-1M2 IID4! 
poat-1962 DeW cheaical entity flow can be attributed to the 1962 ... DdaeDt." 
(poltlliWl, 1973: p. 1055). Rovever, hi. app~oach Dever fonaaUy bcluc! .. or 
eooaidera aDy of the supply alde factora iD the hy-pothe.oo cited above. All 
of the observed re.idual diff.rene. after 1962 18 attributed to bcr .... d 
resu!ation. SiDce this re.idual difference CaD plausibly reflect the effeet. 
of a fluraber of the other factors clted above (i •••• re.earch depletion. 
cbaDlin& expectatioDs. ucS scientific factor.>: it probably encompa •• es various 
non-r.gulatory phenomena a. veil. 
Kartin laily (1972) employed a productlon function .adel of drug development 
which doe. try explicitly to .eparate the effect. of relulation from the 
depletion of scientific opportunitie.. Be po.tulate. tbat the Duaber of Dev 
ch,!mical entities introduction. in any period viii be a function of lagged 
indu.try R and D expenditures and tbat both regulation and re •• arch depletion 
effect. operate to shift this R and D production function over time. Regulation 
is captured ~licitly in Baily's aodel by a time intercept ahift var~ble and 
depletion by • .aving average of past introductions. Both variablea vere 
quantitatively and st&ti.tically aignificant when hi. ~el Va. extimsted over 
tbe period 1954 to 1969. However, when the .odel va. later e.timated for the 
period extending through 1974. the relearch depletion variable became inSig-
nificant aDd UDatable over ttDe. 
Thua, the early tiDe .eries studies of thls isaue by Peltrman and Raily both fc 
atroaa Desati.e impa,ts of resulation on Dev drug iuoovation. Bovever. neither 
atudy provided .ery a.tisfactory approaches for isolat1D& the effecta of 
rosulatlon on innovation from other confounding effecta diacuaaed above. This 
f 
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ia a difficult ftCono=etric probl_ to haDdla ill tha contut of aureaate 
tlEo a.rl .. analy.i. of u.s. introductiona. 
2) Vardell'. Dru& Las AD4lyaia 
In order to aeparate the eff.ct. of iDcr .... d recu!atioD fro. other 
bypothesi,ed factor •• one vould ideally perfora aD "expert.cDt" tavolv1n& 
two dHferent .tate. of the world: on. with the 1962 b~ndMnU in effect 
and one where they are not. Civen the tapollibillty of thi. experiMot, a 
HCond-beat type of analy.is .. y be to fioeS another country which is a • 
• 1D1ler to the u.s. as po •• ible, but which differs .1snific:aatly in terms 
of regulatory cootrol. and procedures. 
With thi. kind of methodological approach in aind.Uilliam Wardell. a 
clinical pharmacologist. performed a .erie~ of comparative analyses of drug 
iIltroductlons in the Uoited States aod the United Ilngdom in the po.t-1962 
pe~iod. This latt~r country is similar to the United State. in terms of 
htSh .tandard. of .edical training and practice aDd aleo baa a v.ry re.earch 
intasive cultioatiooal drug industry. Bowever, the regulatory .y.tems in 
.ffect in the United lingdom and United States bave importaot differ~ce. in 
the po.t-1962 period. Pre-market .afety reviews of new drugs e •• eotially 
belan in 1963 in the United lingdom a. a re.poose to the thalidomide tragedy. 
tho aafety review. in the Uoited Iiogdom bave been characteri~ed .. high 
quality in tera. of the depth of review process and the type of evidence oecessary 
to iain approval (FDA, 1975). At the .ame time. the United lill&dom did not 
require foraa! proof of efficacy until fu Hedicina Act va. iJlplemented 10 1971; 
before thia the task of .vGluatlna a dru,'. efficacy va •••• entially left to 
the earket .. chant... Furthermore. the V.I. INn procedure va. 00 a voluntary ba.is 








aitt •• a of ac.demic a!tdical experu b ultiq approYal. dedalou ad 
. 
&ad eapbu1z.a poat1loar1tet aun.UI.DCe of uew druaa to a aach ,ruler 
dqr •• than &:he United Stat.a. Aa a nault. the Jdti.h ~at_ baa baa 
cbar.ct.rizec! .a lea •• dvaraarial and bure.ucr.tlc thaD tbe U.S • .,.t .. 
which reliea to a ,reater exteDt on the dlclaiOD. of career clvil .ervanta. 
cODar ••• ional oversight be.riDaa. and the judici.l proc.... . 
V.rdell'a firat compar.tive atudy of Dew druB iDtroductiODa iD the 
United St.t ••• Dd United lingdoa covered DiDe therapeutic cl..... for the 
period 1962-1971. For thia period he fiDds that the uumber of new chemical 
entities introduced iDto the United Ilngdom va. roughly 50 perc eDt hi,her 
than the number iDtroduced into the United Stat •• (159 NeE'a compared to 103 
for tbe United Statea). Moreover. for the druse th.t vere autua~ly av.il-
able 10 both cOUDtries by 1971. twice .. UDY vere introduced fir.t iD the 
United JCinadom •• vere introduced firat in the United ~tatell. 11IiI "drug 
1.g" v •• found to be the greatest in the are •• of cardiovascular, diuretic, 
, •• trointE.tinal •• nd respiratory aediciDe. On the other hand 10 cancer 
chemotherapy. Vardell fOUDd both countrie. had compar.ble availability of 
nev therapie •• 
In a related paper. Vardell attempted to a.aes. the therapeutic conae-
quence. of these different r.te. ~f iDtroductioD through a detailed di.cu.-
a10D of the individual drugs available in the two countriea. Be cODclude.: 
PrOD the preleDe atudy. it ia clear that .ach country baa 
,aiDed in aome way. and 10.t in otherl. On balaDce. 
hoveY.r. it i. difficult to argue that the United Statee baa 
•• caped an inordinate amount of nev-drug toxicity hy Ita 
conaervative approach: it ha •• ained little el.e in r.turn • 
OD tho coatrary. It ia relatively ea.y to ahow that Brlt1an 
hal ,aiDed by having effective drugs available .ooner. 
Furthlt1lOre, the co.t of thia policy in tenu of damage 
-------- ----------
due Co adverla dru, r .. ctiona have been .ul.l 
compared with the exllt1D& 1 ... 11 of ~,e produced 
by older druSI. There appear to be DO other therapeutic 
cOltl of any conlequence to Britlan, In yiev of the clear 
knef1u d~Dltrable froca lcae of the dru,1 introduced 
iDto Bdtlan, it appean that the United Stat .. hal, Oft 
btalece. lost DOre than it hal ,ained frOll adoptit\l a wore 
conlervative app~oach than did Britlan iD the POlt-
th41ldomide era. 
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In a follow up Itudy to Wardell'a orisinel drug la, Itudy covering the 
period 1972-1976, Wardell found comparable trendl in the aggregate numbers of 
excluaive introductionl and comparable l8S1 in .utually available drusl to 
hi, .. rlier analYlis. However, he allO noted lcae tendency for the larselt 
clinical differences to narrow over tiae. Be attributed thil convergence in 
part to more "realiltic" regulatory ltandardl in the U.S. in lome (but not 
all) areal and a trend to sore conservative practicel abroad. 
E. Further International Comparative Analyses 
. 
I~ a recent paper,Grabowski (l980)analyzel the time pattern of all NCE 
introduction. in the U.S. for the period 1963 to 1975 relative to three 
European countries-the United IU.ngdom, Cermany, and France. De find. a 
aimificant lag has characterized NCE introductions in the U.S. relative 
to O.~. and Germany in the post-1962 period. This 1. true for both NCE'. 
discovered in this country a. well •• thOle discovered abroad. For France, 
the data indicate that the U.S. atill lenerally lead. that country in the 
introduction of U.s. dilcovered NCE'a, but not foreign dilcovered onel. 
Second, hi. analy.i. allo indicates that the 1&& with Europ. il not confined 
to drua' with little or .ade.t aedical lain, but a1.0 include. drug. ranked 
.. liauificant therapeutic advance. (aa cIa •• ified by the FDA it.elf). Third, 
there 11 eYidance, from a regres.ion analysi' performed in the paper, that 
reaulatory approval la,s have NeD an ilaportant factor contribut1n& to this 
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btroduction lq. FiDally. the analya1a further iDdiutu that nplat101l 
baa bad aD eopec1ally atrODl iapact Oil the introduction 1a& for foraip 
cl1acO'Varad drug I over thb par1oc!. 
fta recently released GAO atudy of the· FDA drua approval proc ... 
discussed above allO examined the availability nf fourteen th~rapeutically 
1Dportant drugs in the U.S. and four other countries (Canada. Norway. Sweden. 
Svitzerland and the United 1C.1ngdOlD). 'rhb .tudy focusel on dru'l introduced 
in th& U.S. between 1975 and 1978. They found that all but one of these 
fourteen drugl vere available firlt abroad vith lag. ranging frca 2 .onths to 
13 yeara in length. Furthermore they found the average FDA approval time Oil 
theae drugs of 23 monthl va. lignificantly ireater than that for all other 
countries except Sveden, (vith England and Svitzerland having av~rage 
regulatory approval times of S and 12 months relpective1y). 
While a patte~ of lagging U.S. NeE introductions (including therapeutically 
tDportant drugl) thus emerges from a number of recent Itudies, a broader 
i .. ue u the effect of regulation on the~, rather than the timing, of 
introductionl. Thi. may be characterized as the issue of "drug los." rather 
than "drug lag". Thi. i8 the iSlue addrelled by the ~rlier econometric 
cna1ya11 of Pe1tzman and BaUy. ~ noted ~ove, havever, these aggregate 
tiDe series studiel had lubatantia1 difficulties 10 aeparating the effectl of 
regulation from other confounding factofe luch al research depletion. 
ODe, of courae, uy viev the drug lag findings aa lymptomatiC of broader 
1apactl of reculation on the innovational procesa--that il a IC£n&rio of reg-
ulatioa leadiDl to Ireater coati, development timea, and commercial un-
certaiDtiea for Dev druss and heDce to fever annual NeE'a being developed 
and int:oclucec! each year. Bowever. the aagnltude of theae impacta are 
!.. 
• arauab1e and remaiD iaportaQt iI.u.. for .-pir1cal r .... rch. 
III a Itudy that we perfof1Ded joiDtly vith Lacy Thomu, ve bay. U8IIiDed 
_urasata "It and D productivity" chanau iD tha UDited Statu ADd the United 
Ilaadom to ,alo .cme iDaisht. iDto the atfect. of reculat10a OD the l~el of 
taaovatibD. Our .trategy in this analy.i. va. to .tructure the analy.i. iD 
tet'1U of an ecoDometric model and to &we lotemational data a. a aeaaa of 
, 
•• paratiDg confoundiDg regulatory from Don-regulatory factor.. We found iD 
this analysis that U.S. It and D "proc1uctivi:y"--defiDed .. the Dumber of Dev 
chem1c~l entities discovered and iDtroduced iD the U.S. per dollar of It and D 
exp8Dditure--decliDed by about six-fold betweeD 1960-61 aDd 1966-70. The 
corresponding decrease of R and D productivity in the U.E. vas about three-
fold. On the basis of a regression analysis utilizing these and other datum. 
we concluded that locreaaed regulation 10 the p08t-1962 period baa probably 
, 
at a minimum, doubled the cost of obtaloing an NeE. At the- .ame time, DOD-
regulatory factors (.uch as research depletioD, scientific advances iD 
detecting tDxic~logy, changiDg expectations) also appareDtly have significantly 
, 
iDcreased costs here and 10 the UDited Ilngdom. However. the .pecific 
IMchaDin.a and magnitudes of theee different regulatory and Don-regulator, 
factors avait a acre extensive and disa&gregative analysis. 
P. Summary and Implications 
The various empirical .tudies discussed above do not provide defloitive 
cODclwaioas on the exact role of regulatory verSd non-regulatory factors 10 
ezplainloa the lover levels of drua 1DDovatJon experieDced 10 the sixties and 
seventi... On analytical ,rounds. it is difficult to .eparate the effects of 
th.s. cODt~rary factors. Neverth.l •••• the .tudie. do provide a Dumber of 
different anAlytical epproache. to the problem and a cODsisteDt fiDding i. 
that iDcru .. d relUlatiem ~ ODe of the 1aportaDt uplcato~ factor. ill 
chi_ nlueS. 
hoe a policy _t.ndpoillt, tbe evidence baa bea lufficieDt to abUt 
tho perception of lawmakerl quite draaat1cally.comr.red witb the lituatioa 
in tbe early .ixtiel. At the time of tbe P .... ie of the 1962 -.adment., 
little th~u&ht or credence v.. .pparently liven to the notion that iIlcrea.ed 
regul.tion could have unintended or undeair.ble aide effect. on innov.tion. 
Bovever, siven the industry'_ experience. of the p.at two deudu, and the 
evidence from various .cademic .tudies (eopec1ally the drug l.g atudie.) even 
tbe proposed regul.tory reform l.va of liber.l congrelsmaD inclu~e .t le •• t 
provia1ons for improving !:egul.tory perfonflance 10 that useful nev drug 
therapies can be obtained by pati~t. em • apeedier b •• i •• 
In the last aection of the paper, ve pr~vide • detailed analysis of 
current leSi51ative proposals in thi8 regard. Befole dcing 10, however, ve 
turn in the next tvo sections to .ome lDOre aicroeconOlllic odented studies 
on tbe returns and dete1'1!1inanta of pharmaceutical II and D investment. Using 
a IIOre 1Iicroecon01rlc framework, ve also Ittempt to analyze the effects and 
inter.ctions of other government policy vari.bles on fi1'1!1 II and D inve.tment 
behavior. 
V. Studio of t~e lteturna to and DltendDaDta of 
Pbamaceutieal I. and D 
A. lAte of Return Studies 
Several empirical studies of the rate of r~turD to drua iDnovation 
bave bee~ performed in r.ecent yeara. 
&avid Schwartzman'. study of the rate of return to pharmaceutical 
innovation ia the 1IIOst extensive published vork em thb topic. For this 
reason, ve shall discuss his .tudy firat. We then turn to a more recent 
contribution by Fred Veston and John Virts. 
1) David Schwartzman 1~7S Study . 
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Schwartzman begins his analysis by c~puting tbe annual sal.. revenues 
leqerated by the new chemical entities introduced in the United States in 
the 1966-1972 period. In order to calculate an expected rate of return to 
discovering and developing these drugs, he further estimated (1) the level 
and time pattern of researcb and development costs incurred to obtain these 
RCE's, and (2) the current and expected future prdfits generated by these 
new product sales. 
Schwartzman's estimates on the average COlt and revenues streams over 
this period yielded an after-tax rate of return on pharmaceutical Rand D of 
only 3.3 percent. 'Schwartzman's analysis clearly embodies a number of 
1I:portant assumptions. Perhaps the weakest link in bis chain of assumptions 
concerna bia procedures for estimating expected profit .argins for new drug. 
and expected product lifetimes (see Grabowski, 1975). However, Schvartzcan 
does perfora a senaitivity analysis to see how hi. rate of return result. 
chanae with different assumptions on thelle paraetera. Other things conatant 
a 40 percent profit aarlin (instead of 7.5.6 percent) and a 20 year product 
, 
.-~-~-------
life (inltead of 15 yeare) yields an after ta return for tb18 period 
studied bJ Schvartzaan of 7.5 percnt (lutead of 3.3 perc_t). 11118 1a 
stU1 • very low rate of return for what 1a. ,enually couUered to be • 
~rJ riaky activity. 
Perhaps the most in%eresting fiDdiD& of Schwartzman'. 
analysis is DOt his absolute extimates on the rate of return to druB iu-
aovation but the rate ot: change that he obaerves ia thia lleuure when hi. 
Mthodology ia employed backward ia tae on data frCllll an earlier period. 
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Specifically, Schwartzman found an after tax rate of return of 11.4 percent 
in 1960 (compared to 3.3 percent in 1966-1972) usiag conservative extimate. 
011 the model's parameters. This ia generaily cousistent vith findiags of 
bi&her returns in prior aralyses by. Baily (i972) and Clymer (1970) for this 
earlier period. In contrast to Schvartman'. approach, BaUy constructed a 
tvo-equation econometric model from which he calculated the rate of return. 
Bence these two studies, despite the use of quite different methodologies, 
aeem to be in general agreement. 
Schvartzman also investigates the riskiness of new drug development. 
Be performs a rough analysis of the variability in rates of return from nev 
product introductions over the period ia question (1962-1968). While a fev 
dru,s apparently earned spectacular rates of return (for example, the 
tranquilizer Valium), aome of the largest fi."1IIS did DOt have any new drugs 
over this period vith salea lar,e enough to be conlidered a commercial auc-
ceaa. In ,enera1, the analysis ahows a bigh variability in the sales of new 
ehellieal wtitiea: thia vould suuest that • significant "risk" premium is 
appropriate for new drug development throughout the poat-amendment period 
omi nod by Schv.utz:man. 
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2) the We8tOll-Viru 1979 Stud,. 
VutOD ai1d Virta vere concernd with the expected rate of return for 
pbaruceutical Jl and D in 1976. lihUe they did DOt calculate aplic1tl,. a 
rate of r~turD estimate, they did provide estimatea of the preaent value of 
at revenuea. these estimatea vere then CO&pared vith the preaent value of 
a and D coats taken from the Hanaen atudy (discussed above). 
Weston and Virta atudied the aales performance of 119 lICE' a arketed 
over the period 1967-1976. They eatimated that average annual aalea per NCE 
vere $6.9 aillion. Bovever, the average for th~ top 25 percent of the 119 
liCE'. vas $21.1 aillion whUe the average !or the lev 75 percent vas only 
$2.3 aUlion. 
Based upon a large number of seemingly reasonable assucptiona about 
profit "rgins, product lives, etc., Veston and Virts tr*nsformec! the annual 
. sal.. figures above into present values of net cash flovs at the date of 
marketing approval. They employed an 8 percent interest rate to permit a 
rough compariaon with the Hansen $54 million cost figure. lbe present value 
for t~e average NCE vas less than the $54 million cost, or only $43.5 million. 
Thi. would suggest that the average NCE is not a commercial success. Hawever, 
the present value for the average NCE of the top 25 percent vas $133.5 million. 
and the corresponding figure for the lov 75 percent vas $14.6 million. These 
results support Schwartzman's finding of a relatively -=all number of highly 
profitable "big viDners". coupled with a larger number of drugs that can be 
toned eoa:merc1lll failures (At laut with the benefit of hindoight). 
CiYeIl the dlnd~ of these studies-that the .expected rate of return on 
pharaaceutical a and D 1s nov sianifieantly below the ra~e obtainable on 
alternative 1Jrn!se.ent.--one would expect to ob .. "e a decline in real 
S9 
re.Gources devoted to drua I. cd D and a corre.pond1n& .bift of tbeae reaourctt.} 
.laevhere to activities offeriD& a hiaher return. V. tum to tbia 1"112 in 
the aezt .~ctlon. 
I. Trends in and Determinants of Rand D Expenditures 
In Table 13 we s1:ov R and D expenditures by tbe pharmaceutical iDdwstry 
for the 1965-1918 period. The first column shows that in absolute dollars. 
the Daunt of domestic R and D outlays increased in every year over the period. 
However, if one adjusts the R and D expenditures for inflation, the result is 
a Srovth rate of around three percent per year in constant dollars over the 
lut four or five years of the period. Ve should note that the GNP price 
deflator probably understates the true rate of price change in R and D activity, 
ao the true growth rate may in f~ct be zero or ev~ negative. 
Table 13 also presents the t~ pattern of foreign research and development 
expenditures for the period 1965-1978. While it is not clear how to ~eflate 
theae outlays, it is clear from these data that slover gr~h rates in domestic 
~ and D have been offset in part by faster~rowth in foreilD R and D expendi-
tures. The proportion of total Rand D accounted for by foreign R and D 
roughly doubled from 7.5 percent in 1965 to 16.9 percent in the most recent 
year. This is consistent with the greater percentage of revenues from foreign 
aarketa and also the possibility of incurring less stringent regulatory controls 
in early clinic8l trials abroad. It may also, of course, reflect other 
oconomic factors as ~ll. 
the fiDal column in Table 13 sives the tiDe trend in tbe ratio of global 
I. aDd D expenditures to salea (i.e., including both domestic and foreign 
pharaaeeutical activities) for u.s. fi~. This ratio has been quite atable 
.rner the period, ranging between 8 and 9 percent. 
-_ ... - """"T----- ..--- ---- ... 
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TABLE 13 
~.tlc and Foreign a , D Expenditure. of u.s. 
Ithical Drug Induatry: 1961-1974a 
latio of IaUo of 
no..Uc no..estlc FordID roreign a aDd D 
a and D Rand D Rand D a and D to Sales in 
Current: Conat&I1fi Current to Total Current 
Dollars Dollars Dollars I. and D Dollars 
Ten (millions) (millions) (millions) (percent) (percent) 
1965 304.1 304.1 24.5 7.5 8.3 
1966 344.2 333.3 30.2 8.1 8.6 
1967 377.9 355.4 34.5 8.4 8.7 
1968 410.4 369.4 39.1 8.7 8.5 
1969 464.1 397.8 41.; 8.2 8.7 
1970 518.6 421.9 47.2 8.3 8.8 
1971 576.5 446.2 52.3 8.3 8.6 
1972 600.7 446.5 66.1 9.9 8.6 
1973 643.8 452.2 108.7 14.4 8.6 
1974 726.0 465.1 132.5 15.4 8.6 
1975 828.6 484.3 144.9 14.9 8.4 
1976 902.9 501.7 164·t 15.4 8.4 
1977 984.1 516.5 197.7 16.7 8.5 
1978 1089.2 532.3 222.0 16.9 8.2 
a For human-use pharmaceutical research and development. (Veterinary-use 
pharaaceutical I. aDd D is excluded.) 
hneflated by GNP price deflator cODverted to 1965~ase. 
ce10bal pharmaceutical Rand D and .ales of U.S. firms. 
SOUIC!: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Factbook 1980, ewa.hington, 
D.C.: 1980). 
Oca other trend lD lDd.,.try beh .. tor 18 aleo worth MtiDI at thi. 
polDt. Specifically. u.S. firu haft ben lDcre .. iaa thalr .... of 
partlcipatioo lD DOo-pharaac.utlca1 activi~1e1 1D receDt y .. ra. '!b18 
'1 
11 ref1.cted lD V.,tOD and Virtl' aDAlYlil of c~ .. 1D the aaareaat. 
perc.ot.se of pharuceutlcal to nan-pharuceutlcal .. le. for elaht 1 .. d1n& 
flrms over the perlod 1973-1978. Thul .... ur. d.c1iDed frca 58.9 to 
55.3 percent for this aix year period. Moreover ana1ydnl the looler 
perlod 1962-1975, ve found a ligniflcaot1y dec1in10& trend lD overall, 
corporate R .nd D to .ale. ratl0' (that 11 iDclud1nr pharmaceutical and oon-
pharmaceutical corporate activltle.). Thl. trend 1 •• 1.0 cOD.i.t.ot vith 
lDcrea.ed flrm d~~er.ificatioo lDto 1e.s ri.earch ioteo.ive .ctivit! •• luch 
AI .peci.lity chemicals and coamet1cl. 
10 ,um, the lar&er firms .eem to ~ exhibit1aa • mixed l~r.teIY to 
their iDve.emeot behavior 10 recent yearl--aaiot.1ning their R and D 
.ctlvity in pharmaceut!c.ls vith low ratel of Ir~h in real terms, vbll. 
d.voting lomewhat more managerial and financial relources to non-ph.rmaceutical 
.r.... While theae trends aay be viewed •• provld1n& lome ,upport for the 
findings of low rates of returns on pharmaceutic.l R .nd D by Schwartzaao and 
other., they are cuch Ie •• thAD one al,ht expect if firms r.ally expected the 
1av rate. of return observed by Schv.rt~ to hold on their current R .nd D 
.ctivity. There i, thus an apparent par.dox. If current r.te. of return .re 
10 lov, vby do pha~ceutlc.l firma continue to iovelt ,uch lubltantlal luma 
of ICOney in 1 aDd D? 
10 our recent .tudy of the detel"lllinaDu of R .. ~ D expenditure" we 
.tteBPt~d ,0 aasvar thi' que.tiOD. 
laale.lly. ve performed a aultiple regrel.ion analy'i' on • lample of 
ten Uru over the period 1962-1975. Th. dependent nrubl. Val the Ut1Il', 
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.. and D tC') .. le. nUo. The two pri.ury aplGatory .artabl •• vere ... lUna 
of put .. and D .ucce .. and cub flov. 
'l'be Muun of put I. and D aucc ... ~ ••• sntially a .,-.,tq a.eras. of 
lira'e introductory sales of NeE's over a prior,five y .. r period 4iY1de4 by 
-- ---- --- .. 
its I. and D expenditure. over this period. It, of cours., va. intendad to 
refltct the firm'. expected rat. of return from R and D investment. The c .. h 
flow aea.ure, lalled profits plus depreciatioD, va. included to teet the 
hypothe.i. that fi~ ~pute a lover cost to internal funda, because of the 
lover transactioDs co.t. a~ ri.ks, than they impute tc external fundi. cash 
flov al.o leemed espect.lly important for inveltment in activity characterized 
by such Jreat uncertain1ty as pharmaceutic'l Rand D. 
Our re,re •• ioo re.ul~. 1ndica~ed that_fi~_do_react_to_lover:xI&11zed 
returns 00 R and D activity in ~he expected aanner, but the adjuI~ot proce •• 
t. a very ,udtUl ooe with relatively long lag.. This i. perhaps not 
surpri.ing liven the fact that new product 1noovation hiltorieally haa been a 
central and quite profitable acde of competition for the industry dating back 
to the pre-World II era. Horeover, the high degree of uncertainty and 
serendipity that characterizes diocovery relearch and early clio1cal developmeot 
triall in pharmaceutical. 18 also coos1atmt with a cautious re.pon.e to lower 
realized retUrn8 00 pa.t R and D efforts. Future returns .. y be very different 
thao CUlrent or palt returns, expecially at the individual fira level. 
10 th1s re,ard, it i. worth .. ntion1o& once a,ain that aaDy firms apparently 
ezpGct that industry returns frClla new druSD will 'be IJUch Iruter in the cocUng 
~acade ... a result of eneral baalc research "breakthroughs" previoualy dia-
cuaacd 1D Section III abovo. It la, of courae, expectation. about future rather 
than palt returna that ultiAately count in tenu of fina 1nves~nt bet"k\vlor. 
It rCDain. to bo .een, bowev.r, vhether the .. 'kale r .... rcb ac!vaac.. CAD 
be traDDlated into profitable new drua' tD the fore .... bl. future. 
Our r.,r ••• ioa r •• ult. al.o tadicat.d that the ,eaaral a.ailability of 
interaal fund. or ca.h flow i. another t.portaDt factor that iDflueaeed ~ aDd 
1) behavior. over this period. We found a .tati.tically dp!if1caDt atabl. 
po.itive relation between firm re.earch intensitie. aad tbeir 1alled ca.h 
flov ursin.. Moreover, tilele uraiDt vera relatively biah over auch of tbe 
period under .tudy as a relult of the record number of prt'duct. introduced 1.:1 
the fifties. These product. r~1Ded under patent protection and ,enerated 
biah c .. h flows for the iODovatins firm vell into the I1xtie., aDd .ven 
•• ventie., in many casel. 
Bence, ve CaD infer from our analysil that the relatively high level. 
o~_~teraal calh flow over auch of post-196: period operated to moderate 
vhat would otherwue have been a more dramatic decline in II aDd D investment 
patternl. 
In lum, our regre •• ion analy.il indicate. that botb expected returns 
aDd ca.h flow are two aajor economic factor. influencing firm villingne.1 
and ability to invelt in R and D outlaYI for new drua product.. From a 
policy .tandpoint, these results therefcre indicate that i and D expenditures 
will be .enlitive to the Ipectrum of soveroment policies that impact on 
thele .Ar1cb1el. The remainder of the paper 1. concerned with an ana1Yli. of 
~arloua policy impact. in this res.rd. 
ft. Covernaent'a lapaeta em It\Dovattoa 
Klmy dlffenot 10vet"EllMnt lava and Rlulatlell' aft'~~ the P!'Oe'" of 
pbarueeutical 1D.Dovatioa. SOlie "e,ulatiou directly affect bDoYaUoa. e.I •• 
FDA'II relulaticu cODeemill1 aatety aDd eff1c~y teatiDl bcr .... the co.ta of 
developing Dev druB coapounda. On the other Iwu!. .OM law an le .. dinet ill 
their iapact. A lood example il the currellt aDvemellt to r.peal .tat. aDtl-
.ubltitution laws. 
Stat. anti-aubltitutioD lava prohibit pharmaciltl froa lubltitutinl 
leneric products for brand Ilame product. pre.cribed by phy.iciaaa. Repeal of 
then laVi Ihould .lead to increased ccapetitioa for the lnaovatar'l dru& by 
iaitative drug product., thereby reducinB .xpected returns. to innovation. 
I.portant iDterdependence can exilt amonl the var10ul lav. and reaulatioas. 
ror .~ple, the effect. of the new lubatitutlon lavs on innovation 1ncentives 
DUIt be cousldered in llaht of ,overnment patent or regulatory policies. Since 
Dubstitutlon lava alter the expected revenues of a Ilev drul only after the 
patent expire. and altemative supplierl enter the market, their impact on in-
QOvatioaal retuml depends OIl the patent protection. The .ffective pateat Ufe 
for new phanlACeuticall is typically ItUch shorter than the legal Ufe of 17 
y.ars due to the long lestatioD period that i. required to develop and ,aiD 
relulatory appro.al for a Dew drus eotity. Bence, drug .ub.titution. patent and 
re!ulatory policies have potentially .1goificant ioteractive effectl OIl the 
inceDtives for drug innovatioD inveltwent. 
lToa a Iloraatlve or policy per.pectlve. these public policies are allo obvi-
ously iDtarrelated. If chaDI~1 io druJ lubsUtutiOD lavs vere I.eo as leadiol 
to luboptUml iDenti ... for clru& ilano.,.t100. policyukera have the option of 
~ . J adjuatlDl patent llfe to lacrease 1DceatiYel. It would not be Decel.ary to uiD-
6' 
tain .ubatitution raatricti0D8 on all pharaaceuticala 1D order to ..tDtl1n 
wffic1C1Dt iDcentiva witb reapect to druS innovation. 'l'hu latter object1 .. 
\ 
could be accoap11abcd by cbaDlinl tbe patent llf. on uv drupe 'l'bt. point 18 
d ... loped in .are detail later. 
!he objective 1n tMa aection 18 to provide a coeprebendva dbcuaaion of 
bov aovemment lava and regulatlotUI affect tbe expected return to I. md D 
1nveDtMDt. Ideally we would alao provide an ..... nent of tbe ralative 
importance of tbe.e various lava and regulation. in .timulating or retarding 
inDO~tlon. tJnfortunately, adequate evidence doe. not exiat for .uch an aase •• -
.. nt in aany casea. Thia is neceasari1y tbe ease for policie., .uch a. tbe new 
.ub.titution l.vs, wbicb are just DOV becoming operational. Bence, our .. se.s-
eent. In auch c .. es will necessarily be somewhat .peculative. 
It v1ll b. useful to orsanhe our dbcu .. ion around the .tandard investment 
.,del of the firm. 
Suppoae an NCE 10 expected to be introduced in year t. It will involve 1l 
end D CO.tD over a years and earn positive profita fOr n yeara .fter introduction, 
, 
p of Whicb are .ubj.ct to patent protection. Then tbe rate of return, r, for this 
particular product introduction is found by .olving tbe equation: 
• i P Rt +j p Rt+j (1) I C
t
_ i (1 + r) - t - f + t -1-1 j-O (1 + r) j-p+1 (1 + r)j 
vbere 
Ct _1, Ct _2, •• • • Ct-a are K and D coata and otber inve.t~nt expenditures; 
I.t • • • It+p - net income stream before patent expiration; 
~l • • • It-u - net income atre .. after patent ~xpiration. 
Tb1a expected rate of return abstracts frca potential differ •• eeD in ri.k u-
lociated with .pecific developaeDt projecta. The expeeted return f.~ each 
projoct would b4ve to be adjusted for .ucb t.bk differentials aero .. project. 
" 
(unlus the tim is risk neutral). 1'be fin'. clecbloa to illYe.t ill • 
part1eular cleve10pIHDt project ~ld depaM OIl ""ether ite ecljutecl ute of 
retura ace.ds or falls below the fin'. c:.apital cost. ¥h1c:b nfleetl the 
opportunity coot of alternative 10vestMUti for the fin aDd ite .bare-
bolden. 
Th. f11'111 is assumed to .. ke such calculationl for all po .. lbl. aev dru, 
development opportunities. It thea uses this Infomatloa to coaatruet • 
.. rgiual rate of return ~) Ichedule by arranging projects 10 order of 
decreasing rates of return. The latenection of MRR and the aarliual cost 
\ 
of ~apital Ichedule (HCC). which reflects the opportunity cost of alternative 
lavesements for the firm and ita shareholders. determines the optimal level 
of R and D investment. R*. This il IhoVD sraphically in Figure 3. 
Va nov begin an analysis of bow various .lovel'lllDent policie. can be 
expected to affect R and D lavestment decisions. 
A. Funding of Basic Biomedical F.esearch 
In Section III the large ~xpenditures on basic biomedical research .. de 
" 
by the Federal Government vere Ihow. lie concluded that whUe it 18 tapos-
.ible to quantify precisely the impact of advances in b .. ic science on • 
pharmaceutical innovation. the impact is undoubtedly of sreat importance. 
In terma of Figure I, it is useful to viev such advances .. ahlftlag the 
the HRR Ichedule rightvard as new opportunities for drug developDent are aade 
pouible. 
Given the lengthy dl.cu..ion in Section III of the role of lovernmeat 
crupported basic research in druS discovery and deve1o~ent, we Ih.all DOt 
cliacun it further here. It ailht be recalled, hovever, that aaay expertl 
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ailht aab the sociaI payoff to fUDCU.q of b •• ic ruurch .. pecWly h1&h 
at thi. UBI. 
I. FDA legulation 
FDA regulation affecta both .ides o~ the present-value equation 
presented above. Earlier ve la~e a brief deecription of Baneen'. estimates 
of 1l and D coate, i.e., the left-hand aide of the equation. FDA ngulatious 
exert important effects on these costs, e.I., by specifying the number of 
teote and the amount of evidence on safety .nd efficacy that must be accumulated. 
And, .. described above, the 2-3 year period of FDA reviev of the RnA add •• i&-
Difieantly to the cost. (Earlier ve referred to our 1978 study which concluded 
that the increased FDA regulation resulting from the 1962 amendments more than 
doubled 1l and D costs.) 
rnA regulations al.o exert effects on the expected revenues from an NeE. 
There are .everal possibilities here, .ome of which have opposite iaplications 
for expected revenues. 
Regulatory 'control. viII reduce the probability of commercialization for 
, 
BaDy compounds and lover expected revenue.. One of the primary benefit. of 
reculation i. the extent that the regulatory agency screens out and deters drug 
entitie. that preaent rialta that the .. jority of consumers would DOt movingly 
and v1l11nsly undertake. Evaluating whether the FDA has been too conservative 
in it. ri.k/benefit decisions i. one of the .o.t difficult and controversial 
area8 of regulatory analyseo. 
There are 01.0 aeveral vay. that regulation can operate to tacr .. se the ex-
pected revenueD of dr.:o. approved for .. rketina by the lIlA. ' lirat, regulations 
•• rYe • certification function. Stringent regulatory proc ... e. provide phy.icianD 
an&! paUente with conf!;!~ce in • new dru&'. Niety and efficacy, thereby 
'9 
facilitating rapid .arket diffulion and penetration for Dew dru,.. Second, 
drual thlt are approved 1D a etdDleDt re~torJ re,iIIe fac. 1 ... actual--
and potential competition than 1D an unresulated .. rltet. 1bia ia true for 
two badc nuon.. rirat, Bany IUrsiDAl druS- vill be undeveloped, liven 
the ,reater coate of developing drug. under regulation. SecODd, the .id ... 
Icale at which R and D can be profitably undertaken v1ll tend to 1Dcrea!~ 
under regulatioD. lowering the D\JIL)er of firms engaged 1D pharmaceutical in-
Dovation. 
Regulation also affect. the effective pateDt life, p, for a Dew drug 
entity. Since the average time to develop an NeE and ,ain resulatory approval 
DOW far exceeds the time necessary to obtain a patent, regulatory-derived 
increases in development or approval times vill operate to lover the effective 
life of a drug patent. While the length of patent protection has been of .ec-
ondary import historically 1D the drug industry, this .ituation could change 
dramatically Jith the repeal of antilubstitution lavs. 
Bow do these regulatory effects balance out and what i. their Det impact 
aD the rate of return to innovation? OE course, there i. DO definitive aDswer 
to thi. question, but the evidence .urveyed earlier suggest. that increased 
regulation has been at least one important factor underlying the declining 
trend in average innovation returns. We .hould emphasize that these atudies 
811 dealt vith past time periods; the 11kely impact of FDA regulation in the 
future i, les, certain liven various proposed legislative reforms currently 
under active consideration. 
c. Substitution Lava 
AQ DOted earlier, the repeal of ant1aub,titution lava aight result in 
1ncraaain& the importance of the lecgth of patent protection. To lee hov this 
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alSbt COllie about, IOIBI:!! bacqround on the anti8ublUtutloa lava .bould be use-
ful. 
11' .. a lava vere eaacced in the .. rly 1950'. in rupcmaa to the drua 
"coUDterfe1t1n&" problm, 1.a., tbe dbpenaln.g by pbanaae1ata of drual at.Uar 
in Ihe, color, and packaging to popular b!'mld name proc!ucta, but of UDlcnow 
quality or origin. AatilubltitutiOD lavi ver~ adopted by .11 fifty Itatel and 
lenerally prohibited any fora of lubltitution for the brand vritteD on the 
prescription. 
the lava aade lt pouible for innovating f1r11lS, tbrough atrong brand 
loyalties, to uaintain dominant uarket posltiona for their productl even after 
patent expiration. Bence, even though love~ cost leneric productl became 
available upon patent expiration, in aany easel phYllcians bave continued to 
prelcribe the original brand name product. 
A .. jor Itructural change taking place in the pharmaceutical industry to-
day is the repeal of atate antisubstitution laws. OVer forty Itates have 
passed product selection, or drug lubstitution, lava. Vhile the state-enacted 
lev. have lignificant differences, essentially all enable pharmacists to lub--
atitute generic products (lome mandate lubstitution) unlesa a phYliciaD prevents 
lubDtitution by check1ng a preprinted box or vriting "dispense as vr:!.tten" (DAtJ) 
on the prescription fora. 
If lubltitution lavs foster increased competition for the innovator's 
product, then the degree of patent protectio~ assumes a critical role in the 
appropriability of drug returns. A shorter effective patent life Ihifts the 
iDpKt of drv& substitution forvard in tme, amplifying the impact of revenue 
loseea on tha upectc return to innovation, r. in equation 1. Table 14 shovs 















Avora.e Effe~tive Patent Life for ~ Chea1ca1 Entitie. latroduced 


















ROTE: Effective patent life refers to the length of time from the date of 
FDA approval until the date of patent expiration. 
SOURCE: University of Rochester. Center for the Study of Drug Development. 
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology (unpublished report. 1979). 
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iD the rAnle of niDe to twelve ),ur •• 
In • 1979 .tudy ve performed a .enaitIv1t)' gna!)'.I. of the rat. of 
return to chanae. in the effective patent l~fe and the de are. of aub.titution. 
Aa a benchmark for our analy.1a we uaed Schwart~'. rate of return .tudy 
de.cribed.above. In partIcular, for a certain .et of a •• umptiona (20 )'eer 
product life with effective patent protection throughout, 20 percent gross 
profit Bargin, etc.), Schwart%m&ll e.ttmAted n 7.5 percent rate of return to 
Ii and D. 
In order to .tudy the sensitivity of this 7.5 percent return to changes 
in the effective patent life and tne impact of substitution on net revenues, 
we imposed .elected values of these paramet~r on Schwartzman's data and re-
calculated the rates of return. One ca.e vas an effective patent life of 10 
yoar. and a SO percent reduction in net revenues after patent expiration. In 
terms of present-value equation (I), p vas .et equal to 10, and all the R's 
in the .econd .ummation term on the right hand .ide vere reduced by SO percent. 
The rate of return for this case vas only 7.1 percent as compared with the 
benchmark of 7.5 percent. The results for all cases are liven in Table 15 • 
A8 one would expect,the calculated rates of return in Table 15 ar~ lover 
for .horter effective patent lives and for greater percentage reductious due 
to lubstitution. Under the molt unfavorable conditions for R and D activity 
considered here--a lo-year patent life and a SO percent reduction in net income---
the rate of return i. reduced t~ 5.6 percent, or by about 25 percent from the 
7.5 porcent benclm.arlt. On the other hand. when a 30 percent net income reduc-
, 
tioD and a 12-year patent ilfe are ... umed, the return rate i. 6.7 percent. or 
roushl7 a 10 percent reductIon due to .ub.tItutlon. The.e estimated effects are 




projects DO lonner 8ttractt~e to pharmaceutical .aDufacturers. 
The results in Table 15 Uftder.cor~ the fact ~hat the effects of subltitution 
OIl I. and D returns are highly unJlitive to ~he length of pateDt protection. If 
the patent life for drugs actually equalled tho? legal life of seventeen years, 
the effects of increased. substitution on a and D returns would be quite .odest 
For example, with Q seventeen year life, a SO percent reduction in net income fro~ 
substitution causes R and D returns to decrease from 7.5 to 7.1 percent in the 
pre.ent example. On the other hand, a. patent lives decrease, the effects of dru c 
substitution are magnified. 
The results in Table 15 are preliminary in character. The analysis 1s based 
on aggregative data sources and contains tK~ simplifying assumptions discU8sed 
above. Ye plan to refine and expand the analytical framework and data for inves-
tigating tl.is question in future work. Nevertheless, results luggest ~t the 
effects of substitution laws on tnDovation incentives are consequential in nature 
and are highly sensitive to the longevity of patent lives over the ~anges cons ide: 
(i.e., 10 to 17 years). 
D. Other Laws and Regulations 
To conclude this analysis of the effects of various gonrn:lent policies on 
the incentives to undertake Rand D. ve briefly discuss the Maxtmum Allowable 
Coat (HAC) program and the F~dera1 income tax code. 
The HAC program 18 somewhat s:lm1lar to the nev substitution lava in the 
way it .ffecta the ~cted rate of return to pharmaceutical innovation. Spe-
eifieally, HAC 18 a prosrac deslsned ~o limit Federal Government third-party re-
1mbursement, prim.&rlly under Medicaid. for prescription drugs. It U.mits re-
imbursement to the lowest price at which • ~&rticular multisource drug is gener~l 
TABLE 15 
Sensitivity AnalYlb Shovi~ 
Intcnsal btu of Iletum for Alteraative Allumptloal About the 
lapact of Substitution aDd the Effective Patent Life 
Percentage Reduction 
10 Net Income 











Effective Patent Life 






r (-18.7) (-5.3) 
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NOTES: The standard against which the above rates should be compared is a 7.S percen 
return. This is the rate of return for the data representing blseline conditions. 
(2) It is assumed that at the end of the patent life substitution will 
reault in the alternative reductions in income given above for the remaining 
years of the 20-year commercial life. 
(3) The percentage reductions were applied to total net income even though 
foreign inco:e should not be affedted by substitution. Hence. the implied 
domestic percentages are somewhat larger than those above. 
(4) The numbers in parentheses are the percentage reductions for each rate 
of return frOQ the standard 7.5 percent retum. 
SOURCE: Het.ry Grabowski and John Vernon. "Substitution Laws and Innovation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry" in Issue on Regulation and Innovation. Law and 
Contemporary Problems. WJnter and Spring 1979. 
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8Y5ilcblo. Sinee MAC i. only applicable to aultisource 4~. it 1 •• tailor 
to tho Dubotitution lava in actina to reduce an iDDOyator'. Det feweaue. 
after patent upiretlon. O:l the otMr haDeS. HAC cnaly appUe. to 4naa purchue. 
which qualify for ,ovarnment reimbura.aeat. Medicaid pr.acriptiaa.. for 
example. account for only about lS percent of all pr •• criptiaa.. 
Since the firat maximum coat limit for a drug product va. aet for 
capicillin in 1977. it ia clear that thia proar .. ia juat ,ettin, atarted. 
Bence. it 1a too aarly to a.Dcaa thft overall tapact of KAC on iDDovat1on 
incentives. 
Tho U.S. Internal Revenue Code baa been deaianed by Coogre •• to a •• iat 
U.S. pos.eaaions 1n obtaining employment-producing inve.tmenta by U.S. 
corpora tiona. !hrough Section 936. so-called "poaaeall1ona corporation." can 
be acmpt from Federal tax on incO<le frOll operation a 1n Puerto IUco. Amer1u.=& 
. 
S4m0a. Guam, and the Panama Canal Zone. ,.. a result. uny pharmaceutical firma 
havo aet up operationa in Puerto Rico and thereby obtained lar,e tax .avings. 
The tax aavin,a are, in fact, quite aub.tantial and are concentrated 
"pecially in the pharmaceutical induatry. For example, the Treaaury Depart-
~t has estimated that in 1977 4S percent of all tax .avin,a to U.S. 
corperationa accrueeS to the pharmaceutical ineSu.try. It .lao reported that 
16 drug firma had a total of $344 million in tax a.vin,a in 1977 under Section 
936. t'b1a aum representa about 10 penct of the pre-tax iDeClle for theae 
finu. 
the ailaablA tax oevins. from Puerto Ricaa operatioos add siauifieantly 
to 1nduatry euh nOVD. Givan the iJ!Iportance of caah fl0V8 aa a detendn&ut 
of K aoes D expenditure ••• noted earlier, a change in tax policy to reduce 
thia taz advanta,e couleS have a .1gn1ficant ne,ati.e effect on a and D incentivea. 
Just INch a chanse la po .. ible 11 the IllS .uc:c ... ful1,. _que .. 1.a _ currat 
court caae that Lilly bae allocated uc .. ai.,. proUte to ita "'eno UC&Il 
cuboidiary. A rulin, '.vorinl tho lIS could poe.ibly be .pplied to the other 
pb4t~c.utical firma. 
To IlUCUrhe briefly. va have examined hov .ix loveraaent 1.va aDd 
rerulations affect the expected rate of return to phar.aceutic.l lnaov.tion. 
Th~8 •• ix policies are fund1na basic bioaedic.l r •••• rch. FDA rerutatlon. 
patant policy. at.te substitution lavs. the MAC prosram. and the corpor.te 
l.oCOlM tu. Ie. key polnt that baa bUD Bad. throuahout the dbcuuion 1.a the 
loterdependecce of these pollcies and the ne.d to consider policy changes In 
lisht of that loterdependence. 
It 1a cle.r th.t public policies have had both sisu1ficant po.itive and 
a.sative locentive effacts on innovation. Historic.lly. It .ppears that the 
.aiD positive effect. have baen derived from sovernaent funding of biomedical 
res •• rch vbile the .. in negative effects have been •• so~1ated vith health and 
amfety r.sulationa. Other public polici ••• currently 10 an evolutionary state • 
... 
• uch .s HAC and state subotitution l.va. could .lso have .isuificant Des.tive 
1ripacts on the economic returns to innovation, over future periods. This vUl 
be GO if the effective patent lives for nev druss contloues to trend dovnv~rd 
over t1me and the.e evolvlog nev lavs and regulations cause. dramatic increase 
10 leneric drug uaase .fter patonta erpire. Thes. negative incentive impact. 
could b. offset by various compensatory pollcy actions. Th.se are discussed in 
our fiDal •• ction on current policy initiatives. 
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VII. Current Public Policy InitiativG. 
O •• r the pa. t tvo year. propo.ed blhlative eMUS" for the 
pharDec.utical indu.try have focu •• d OD refor •• of the druG rel-
ulatory proce •• and allo on chanse. in the .ffective patent pro-
tection for the indultry. Each of the.e lubject. i. conlidored 
1n thia final .ection of the paper. 
A. lelulatory Reform Proposall 
In 197~, the Carter Ad.int.tration intro~uced parallel bill. 
into the Bouie of Repre.entativel and Senate with several co-sponsorl 
that would have comprehensively overhauled all Itases of the drug 
regulatory procells. This leghlation came to be kl'\0\It1 as the DrUB Reg-
ulatory Reform Act of 1978. In addition, billa with sinilar (but 
D~' identical provisions) were introduced into the Senate by Senator 
. 
~ennedy and the House of Representativel by Congreslman Rogerl. 
Thele regulatory reform mealures were introduced during a period 
of changing attitudes tovard drug regulation and attempt to balance 
" 
a number of lomewhat conflicting objectives. Amona the apparlnt ob-
jectivea of the bills were - i) to ap6ed up the approval of .1snifi-
cant now drug thercpie1i Ii) to increa.e the degree of public parti-
cipation in the drug approval proc.aa and .ake it aore open to outside 
Dcrutiny; iii) to facilitate the Intry of ,eneric producer. into the 
Darket after patent expirAtion by removing duplicative testing re-
quirlnontai iV) to oxpaad rDA regulatory controla over the poat-
.arketins period. ror exampll, the FDA could require extonaive po.t-
.ark.tinllurvelUance teDto, order .elective distribution of certain ./ 
type drusa. nod al.o would have e.ster recall procldure. vhen nev 
infor.ation on drUB hazard. beco.e available. 
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Aa ODD aiaht e.pect, nODe of the intere.ted partie. here -
tbo drua •• Duf.cturer., con.us.r .dyoc.te., pr.cticiDI phy.lcl.n., 
pharaaclate, aad the .c.doaic •• dic.l coaaunity - •• re coapletely 
Batiafled with .11 .ectloa. of th ••• propo.ed drua reaul.tory refora 
billa 8nd they vorked vilorou81y to .aend cert.in proyl.lon.. In 
Sept •• ber 1979 •• fter extoD.ive h.~rinl •• the SeD.te p •••• d .n a.ended 
drua r.aulatory reform act tbat cODt.iD.d .oae iaport.Dt coaproml.e 
f.atur •• and omitted 80.e of tbe aore cODtrover.i.l provi.ion. of • 
the oriaiDal bl1l. Bovever. aepre.eDtative loaer. retired from tbe 
Bou.e of l.preaeDtative. iD January 1979 and bl •• ubco •• ittee chair-
Ilan.blp p ••• ed pn to lepre.eDtatlve Wax.aD. No further actlon on drug 
relulatory reform v •• theD taken 00 tbe Bou ••• 1de duriDa the 
iDt.rveniDa period. 
At the current tiQ •• there 1. Yirt~.lly DO pro.pect that. drua 
reform .ct vill be en.cted before the aev 97th Conarea. i. ID.t.lled 
ia Janu.ry 1981. Heverthel •••• tbere obvlou.ly are 11kely to be 
drua r.aulatory reform act. con.idered In future leat.latlve .e •• lon. 
and tb.y vill revolve around n.ny of tb •••• e i •• ue. that bav. been 
pre.eDted in recently propo.ed 11,1.l.tion. Glven thi. to b. the 
c •••• ve nov examine tbe proposed reaulatory reform aea.ure. from the 
particular per.pective of tbelr li~cly effect. on the drug 
proc •••• 
1. 'ropo •• d Changes to Speed up New Drua Introduction. 
the ao.t importaDt propo.ed chana_ for ep •• dinl up Dev drul Intro-
duction. v •• tbe .o-c.lled "bre.kthrousb drua" provi.ion. Tbi. vould 
peralt the conditional relea •• of certain i.portant nev drua therapie •. 
In particul.r, tb. atand.rd of evidence for bre.kthroulh dru,. vould 
b. re1 •• ed froB ".ub.t.nti.1" to ".llniflc.nt" to allov p.tient •• c-
ce •• to tbe.e drulG while fin.l t •• tinl ia bting coapleted. 
" Aa di.cu8.e~ in Section IV, a number of anal,ae. indicate Cbat 
tbe 1962 Aaendmenta requireDent tb.t eff.cti~en.aa b. d •• onGtrated 
b, aubat.ntial evidence, cODaiatiDI of adequate and •• 11 cODtrollad 
inYeati,ationl, and tbe va, tbi. require.ent baa baan i.pla.encad by 
tba fDA, baa been a .ajor factor producinl tha "drul la," and relatad 
pbenoDena considered above. In particul.r, the FDA baa cboaen to 
delay approval until the "pivotal" at~diea of efficacy bave been per-
for.ed even in the ca.e of drul. which offer atronl therap.utic ad-
~ance. over exl.tinl drula and for which tbere app.ara :0 ba no 
reascbable scientific doubt about efficacy. The proviaional approval 
aection of the bill i. addreoDed to thia problem in that it would pro-
~ide for provisional relea •• of breaktbrough drul. for ua. in life 
tbreatening or severely debilitating or diaablins aituationa by aub.ti-
tutins the criteria of "ailnif1cant eVidence" for auch drulG for the 
"aubntantial evidence" concept that nov appliea. Depending on hov 
this provision would be administered by the FDA, it could be an important atep in 
apeeding the availability of important new th~r.pies. 
It Dhould be kept in Dind, hovever, this proviaion vould apply to 
only a very Dmall fraction of new therapiel. It alao ~hould be empha-
aized that Dcientific advanceD in the dru& area., aa in otber fields, 
are often incremental in character, and frequently cumulate only Ir.d-
ually ove~ time to major sain. in .ocial velfar~. Thia ha. been the 
ca.e bi.torically for ex.uple, io anti-hypertenlive therapy and com-
biDAtion che.otherapy for cancer. furthermore, the "breakthroulh" 
atatuD of • Dev dru, .ometiae. become. appareat only after a dru& i. 
in leneral uae aad often for a different ~urpo.e than orillnally ia-
tended. Tbe recentl, di.covered pro~ertiel.of the dr~1 AnturAne 1n 




It Dhould al.o b. notod in thi.·~elard tbat the 'VA ba. already 
balun inple.eotiol a proszaa of "fa.t-trackinl" certaia drul. ia 
the allocatioa of ita r •• ourc •• durial botb thG I.D aad IDA ph ••••• 
Ia particul.r, all IND'. ara nov cl ••• ified at a fairl, earl1 .tale 
in tho d.velopment proco.e iato three ba.~c cat.,orie. - drul. 
likel1 to be A) an iaportaot .dvaace B) a aode.t advaace C) little 
or 00 advance. The iotention il to sive priority treatment 10 accordance with 
how a drug is placed under thi. cl .. ~ific.tioo acheme. Vbile th1l 
approach may let .ome iaportaot tberapiea lnto publlc baod •• oooer. lt 
i8 al.o potootia11y a double edC.d .vord. 10 particular, if tbe 
rDA'. judlemeot 00 a oev drult. therapeutic value i. io .rror, lt 
.ay delay rather tban .peed up tbe time for a dru& to cl.ar r.culatory 
burd1e. (i ••• , by puttlol- ao importaot druC 00 a .lover track). Tbl. 
i. an ar •• vhere further rOlearcb on rDA performaoc •••••• d •• irable. 
Aoother drua ionovatioo relat.d a.pect of the relulatory reform 
billa wuld attempt to give Mre flexibility and diacretloo to flrma 10 
adaloi.teriog early clinlcal trial.. In particular, the Admloiatra-
tlon'l !lll'lvouid restrict FDA .upervis1on 10 lnitial clinical 
'r~!la to consider.tions of patlent protectloo from rlak aod not 
queetion. of reaearch deaisn or Icl.ntific methodclolY. The FDA 
would beco~e involved with the merita of the rea.arcb approach only 
if an wben !erse .cale cllnical trial. are required. Tbe Amended 
Senate t11l vould 80 .veo furtb.r in tbi. rec.rd. Specifically, the 
rDA would i •• ue soneral relulac10na and would tben autborize certain 
delo,atod h •• lth in.tltutlon. (such a. r.s.arcb ho.pit.l.) to .pprove 
aod .upervlle tho lnlti.l clinical investi,atloo. In aan. Tbe rDA 
would retain .uthorlty, bow.v.r, to r.vok. any drul inv •• tllation. 
i.aued by th ••• delesated h.alth or,.nisation •• 
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tbi. decentrali.ation of relulator, authority o.er early 
clinical trial., a10nl with tbe breaktbroUlb .rul pro.i8ioD, are 
aeDera1l, ralarded by cODlr •• aioDal 8~eD.ora of tbe drul ref orB 
, 
aaasurOG a. the Boat i.portaDt propo.ed atapa for apaa41Da up the 
introductioD of approvable Dew drul •• 
2. Provla ioUl to Make 'Drus Approval Hare QpcQ to PuhltC Participation 
All the resulatory refor. blll. contained aection. that vould 
treat the evideDce OD .afety and efficacy data filed by fir.s in 
a nev drUB applicatioD a. publ1c lDfor.ation. All data vou1d be 
rolea.ed prior to public heariDS. OD Dev drUB applicatioD. Thia 
would be a •• jor departure fron curreDt practice vhich live. thi. 
infor.ation tr.de lecret. st.tu.. Tbe FDA currently relea.e. only 
•• cieDtific .ummary of this lnfor.atlon after the RDA bas been 
approved. The bill. vould al.~ provlde for fund ins of publlc 
partlcipation in both .dmini.trative .Dd court proceediDS •• 
Tbe public.rele.ae of .cientific d.t. on •• fety .nd efficac, 
la the .o.t controver.isl •• pect of re~ent drus resulatory reform 
•••• ur... It v •• viloroualy .upported by both COD.umer Iroup. aDd 
tbe rDA and .troDgly opposed by .ember. of the industry. 
Advocate. of d.t. disclo.ure arsued th.t Ire.ter openne •• vould 
.110v Dore .crutiny of Dew druS approval. by ac.demic expert., 
Ire.ter public under.tandins of tbe i •• ue. iuv01ved, .nd provide 
Ireater credibility for rDA deci.ionmakins. Opponent. of thi • 
•• asure arlued tb.t lt could be a .ajor disincentive to iunovatlon. 
ID p.rticul.r, tbey .rlued tb.t tbe r.l •••• of .11 cliDic.l d.t. 
prior to approval could provide competit~ve flr •• vith economically 
•• 1u.bl. Information th.t vould .llow tbe. ~o .arket leneric and 
iait.ti.e druS product •• o~e quickly. Tb1. 1. e.peci.lly the ca.e 
in for. liD .arketa vhere patent protection i. linited or doe. not 
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axlat ADd vhera tho .yeilabillt, of the cll.ci.l d.tA ai.ht .110v 
fira. to I.ic fe.tor r •• iDtr.tioD vith r •• ul.tor, .uthoriti ••• 
A .tud, perfora_d by tb. IC~DO.ic AD.l,.1. Croup of the lDA 
(1978) .tt •• pted to ld.ntif, vbicb %or.if,D •• rketa h.ya a coablDatioD 
of both we.k p.t.Dt protectloD .Dd atrlDleDt rellatr.tion require-
.eDta .0 th.t •• rl, r.l •••• of d.t. could put tbe a.l •• of iDDOya-
tlve fir •• at risk. Thair aD.l,si. indic.ted th.t over nDe-third 
of United St.te. firm a.l •• rev~nuea .r. iD auch •• rk.t. and in-
clud. auch countri •••• Can.da, Sp.in, Svede~. Switzerl.nd, .Dd 
Br.zil. Of cour.e the fir •• could counter t~e •• ri.k. of lo.t .ale. 
revenue. iD for~ian .arke:. by d.l.ylnl iDtroduction iDto the United 
State. untll competitive po.ition. in "for.iID •• ~ket •• re aecured. 
lut thi. beh.viour vould be coapletely counter to • pr~8.ry objec-
tive of the.nev drul l.v - to espedit. tbe approv.l of i.portant 
neV aedicines into the United St.t~,. 
Another argument Dade vaa that the relea.e of .afety .nd effi-
cacy data tile. could aid rival. iD ~oth the United State. and over-
•••• in aarketinl i8itative product. that .re ao-c.lled "th.r.peu~ic 
.quivalent" druga, i •••• product. which po •• e •• differentiated ao-
1ecular .tructure. out have .i8it.r therapeutic effect.. ID parti-
cular, the availability of rav deta file, and re.earch protocol. / 
could alert euch follow-oD firas t9 promi,inl future direction. for 
rea.arch aa vall a. blind alley. to avoid. It .leo vould provide 
iD.ishte into bow to de.i,n the re.earch protocol. to achieve fa.ter 
ro,ulatory approv.l. 
Tho opti.al a.ouDt of protection to ,iv. an innovato~ in thi. 
aroa •• well •• in the l.n,th of pat.nt ri,ht. clearl, ,ive. ri •• 
to difficult ~r.de off. which auat D.c •••• ri1' b.lanc. de.ir.bl_ 
eompatinl objectlve.. Boveyar, a Duaber of •• in.nt a.dical acienti.ts 
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te.tifi.d At tho heAridSI that a acieDtific lu •• ar, (of .cholerl, 
reoearcb article leDltb aDd aubatADcej would adequatel, .erve tbe 
objective of opoDiDI the reculator, deci.ioD procGal to tDtar.ltad 
aeabera of tbe aci.ntific coa.uDit,. Tbe coaproat.e btl I wbicb 
palled the SeDAte 1D fact adopted tbe lua.ar, approach. It required 
firaa to prepare a auamary of their evideDce OD .afet, and efficacy 
wbich the FDA aUlt approve. It thul woul~ .aiDtaiD the trade lecret 
.tatul of the rav data aDd report. OD tbe iDveltilatioDI. Tbe 
Amended Bill, bovever, did provide for loverDmeDt fundiDI of.public 
participation in adminiatrative and court hearingl in order to facili-
tate and encourage public participation. 
3. Propos.ls To Facilitate Ceneric Entry 
The rights of .~~sequent entrants to rely on the I.fety and 
officacy data of the innovating firm in obtaining FDA approval for 
an already eatabliahed product has recently become a very IlUrltey legal 
are.. This il.ue i. al.o considered in the propoled reform bills. 
In particular, the Amended Senate Bill would allov all follov-on 
producers to file an abbreviated NDA, aasuming that a leven year 
period haa ela.ped lince the product vas initially approved. The 
iaitator would have to demonstrate in the abbreviated PoDA that it. 
product a.etl Itandarda of identity, Itrength, quality, purity, 
Itability and bioavailability. It would, hovever, not bave to dupli-
cate any of the orisinator'l data on lafety and efficacy. The leven 
year period i, included to provide loa. protection and inveatment 
inceDtivoI for producta that are unpatentable or thOle vho.e patents 
have alr.ady expired (e.a., a new u •• of an old 4rul). In point of 
fact tho FDA hal uled luch an abbreviated NDA approach to cover 
follow-OD applicatioDI for approvad RDA'I of pre-'62 orieiD. Hovever 
the .alidity of this abbreviated applicatioD approach, aDd e.pecially 
: 
lta poalibl •• xt.nlion to POlt '62 producta nOw cOBlol off pat.Dt, 
haa b.eD the 8ubject of a.veral r.ceDt 1.,a1 cha1l.DI... 00 tho 
000 baod, 80a. of the seooric aanufacturer8 vaDt all provloul1y 
appro •• d productl to b. cat.,ori •• d .1 "old dru,~" aot aubject to 
any oew rPA druB .ppllc.tion procedur.1 (1 •••• lubj.ct oD1y to 
poot-•• rketins. lood •• nuf.cturinS practic.I .nd rPA pl.Dt lD8p.C-
tiODI). On the other h.nd. 80me •• Dufacturers of ploDeer drulI 
epp.reDtly waDt to Ie. I.D.ric •• nufacturem perform all the ori-
aiDal I.f.ty and .ffic.cy te.tl •• a w.y of .recting Don-p.tent ~ 
eDtry barrierl to generic riv.ll. The courtl .re curr.ntly conaider-
ina the aerit. of these position •• 
Th.re would .ppe.r to b. f.irly comp.llinS ar1ument. in favor 
of an .bbrevi.ted HDA proc.duro for follow-on ,eneric producta. 
thl1 would provide phyaici.nl and p.tientl·with lome asaur.nce of 
product equiv.leDce vithout roquirins unn.c •••• ry te.ting of I.fety 
and effic.cy. The latter vould not only b. w •• t.ful of Icientific 
r.lources and .xpoae patients to unD.c •••• ry rilkl, but allo could 
produce losj.ml at the FDA .nd divert r.lource. from the revi.w of 
re.l new druS .pplicationa. To the extent One b.li.vea that current 
petent lives in druSD .re too abort Co .ncour.S. lufficient inve.t- ~ 
.ant in R .nd D. thi. would .eem beat .ddr.a.ed.throulh chanse. in 
p.t.nt life r.ther th.n the erection of entry b.rri.rl through 
dupllc.tive aafety and .fficacy t.ltina. The l.ngth of .ffectiv. 
pat.nt prot.ctlon in .thic.l druSI ii, in fact. an i •• u. of current 
1.,I.lativ •• ttention. fhi. il dilcul.ed further b.low. 
the i.eu. of ,en.ric fir. r.li.nce On prevlou. I.f.ty .nd ~fficacy 
app.rently will ha.e to b •. decid.d .ith.r by the courtl or throush 
Dev le,i.l.tion. 
4. Ixpanded Po.t Hark.tinl rDA aelulationa 
Tbo FDA'a diacratlonary autbority aftar a Dav drul ia approvad 
would be vaatly axpanded undar tba propo.ad rafora lawa. rirat, 
the ~DA could require axtan.lva poat-aarkatiDI taatlDI aa a cODdi-
tlon of approval. Furtberaora, tho FDA could al.o raatrict th~ di.-
tribution of a neu druS to aodica1 practitloner. with apacific 
traininl or in particular inatitutioDa. thlrd, tha rDA would be 
able to remove dru8s from the aarket place auch aore aa.i1y than 
under the ~urrent "lmminent hazard" critarion. 
A number of analysts bave advocated areater empba.ia on poat·· 
aarketing controls as • vay of makins an FDA nev drug approval le08 
of an "nIl or nothing" decision whicb i. difficult to reverae once 
~ade. In particular, greater ftmpba.ia on poat-.arketing teata 
could make FDA investigatione take a aore.balaDced viev in aaa~ •• ing 
benefits versus risks of nev drugs and be Ie •• prone to axce •• lvely 
cautious behavior in .pprovinl drusa. Bovever, otherahave bypothllzed 
tbat .xpanded poat-marketing controla vi1l be used to add additioDal 
layera of regulation witbout any cbanse in pre-•• rket regulatory 
practice.. If ao, tbey obv10ualy vould tend to operate al a further 
diaincentive to innovation ratber than a .ean. of apeeding up nev 
dru8 introductions. 
In the final analy.ia, the attitude. aud orlanizational incentives 
at tbe FDA vill ~!ay a key role on bov increased rDA poet-marketing 
control a ~nd otber reaulatory chanaea)affect tba private return. to 
innovation. If rDA incentivea re.ain akeved tovard avoidina the 
acceptance of A "bad" drua (vhile beinl ~eaa concerned about rejection 
or 401ay of a~oo~drul) IfaDtln& tba rDA aore dlacretionary authority 
would very likely operate to 8lov dovn tbe drug approval procee. and 
.. 
8G 
r further incre.,. the co.t. of doyelop1a, Dev dru.e. It could 
thuD have the exact oppo.ite effecte On pheralceutical lnnoyatioD 
clai.ad by ite advocate •• 
Ob'lioualy, the incentivo .tructure at the rnA 18 DOt 
OD eaoy Datter to chanse throulh lesi.l.tive action. Tb. nev bill. 
Dake Gome bel inning in thi. ro,ard by declarin, tb.t tbe encourase-
aont nf innovation i. an import.nt objectiv~ of public p~licy. Bov-
ever, bayond .tatins this objective, Conare •• ai,ht con.ider .oae 
.pecific in.titutional aech.ni.D. for m.urinl that a aore balanced 
per.pective viii in fact be reflected in resulatory deci.ion •• 
One idea that has been advanced alons the.e line. vould be to 
create a ~i.tinluished panel of .cienti.t. and aedic.l espert. from 
el •• v~ere in the health comDunity to reviev annually FDA'. prosresl 
on nev aedicin •• a. veil a. to ~n.ider potentially valuable nev 
drua therapie. already in u.e abroad. Thi. type of body vould be 
D 1081cal cstonclon of the FDA advi.ory committee.. Bovever, in 
. 
contraat to the latter, which became involved only in the later , 
etasc. of the approval proce •• for .pecific aedicine., the propo.ed 
panel vould have a broader over.isht function and vould be desianed 
to brina the per.pective of .cienti.t. and aedical pre.criberl of 
drUB. into the regulatory deci.ion proce •• in a Bore complete and 
.y.tematic ~.y. The areater uac of out.ide expert. ha. been one 
of the aore succe •• ful •• pftct. of the British Sy.tea of drus re,ula-
tion. 
Vbile the effectivene •• of .ucb policie. in the United State. 
i. open to que.tioD, it vould •••• vorth esperimentins vith .uch 
••• eure. in ord.r to try to ,.nerate a aore balanced deci&i~n-.ak1ng 
environ •• nt, s.p.cially if FDA di.cretionary authority i. :~ be .1,-
Dificantly increa.ed in the v.rlou. vay. propo.ed in the nev lesi.-
lation. 
•• 'ropo.ad Change, in PatenC 'T~tectloft 
Ubil. dTUI T.,u14COTY TefoT ••••• ur •• ba •• r.c.i •• e! eOG.leierable 
acc.acioa troD eOTta1n la,i.latoT', l~du'trr p.c.at proc.ecioa bAD 
b.ou •• othar •• jo~ ar.a of luCarett by otber lelhlaton • A. du-
eu •• ad Abov., tho parlod of ,ac.at protaetloa la drul' uc¥ .~eralel 
about toa y.ar. ln 1aftlth aad haa b •• a tread ins dovavard ln recent 
y.ar. a. a r •• ult of tbe loal d.valopm.at periods .ad reaulatory 
.pproval time. for aev dru,l. Furtbermore, tbere il tbe prospect 
of lacr.al.d .ub.citutioa aad .ark.t peaetration by lenerlc product. 
aft.r patent. bav. expired 1a th. future period. a. a relult of tbe 
Ipread of 'tatl 'ub.titutlon lav. aad the Ircvth of programs like 
HA ~ elvan thl" crend., a number of lelt.lator. have belun con-
aiderinl ch. CI •• for lonser effactiv. patent lives oa nev drugs. 
SODa lovernmaat policymaker. aa~ .dvilo.y ,roup. bave rec.ntly advo-
caced r •• torinl part or all of the eff.ctiv. pataot life lost during 
che I!D aad NDA relulatory period.. For .xample, tbe Advicory 
Cosmitta. to Prl.idlot Cartlr'. Dome.t~c Policy Reviev on Indus-
~rl.l lanovation b •• recommendad .uch a po:\cy of patent life reltora-
CiOD for all producta lubject to pra-market regulatory reviews (i.e., 
eChical drul" food .dditive., pe.tlclde. and certain aedlcal devices). 
Iu addltlon, former HEW Secr.tary Joaaph Callfano, FDA Buraau of 
Dru. Cbi.f Rlchard Crout, and the autbor. of the Federal Trade Com-
.i •• io~tc Model Subatltutlon Lav have at dlfferent polnt. in tl=e all 
arCed tbat CODir •••• erlou.ly con.lder lucb • policy mea3ure as a vay 
of eo.p.n.atl~1 for innovation dl.iDc.ntlv.~ that al,ht arlae from 
othor publle polleie •• 
there bav. b.e~ introduced into CODlrea~ a number of le~islatlve 
bill ••• body1nl the b.slc ~oDe.pt of pltent rartoratloo ln ethlcal 
,. 
, . 
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, ~ ad othor afJldln'11 affected S=usmu. ~o~ e:u=ple. • 1111 Satto-
&e£.4 b7 SeDator layb uto the Hth eoacre •• , with Hftral. co-tIpouon, 
~ ac!4 ~ to the patC!Dt lUe at the tiM of rDl apprcrnl • ., tme !oat 
6Irlq the clJ.A1CAl tCUltiD& u4 rnA review period, up to • -rna- of 
~ . 
&'!ICftD 78&1'.. Of CDUne. the aelectiOD of aDy .pecific auabu of 1ean for 
~alt protection necessarily livel riae to difficult tradeoff. (i.e •• the 
poo~ib11it1 of too little incenti.e for iDDDvation .eraua the eneoura,~t 
of too ZIlch .. rut power). Theae tradeoff. 8U8t be evaluated under cOIdid-
cable uncertainty. Nevertheleal. there appurs to be ,rowin, CODcern amo1l& 
polJ..t:)'1U'kera ab~t the potential adverse impl1catiOD.S- of puaiotely alloving 
the CODtinued dovnvard drift in effective patent live. for dru,s; especia1l1 ~ 
cben the vario~ other adverse observed trends in the drug imlovation.al 
process and the high perceived • :Delits .. socated vith new drug therapie •• 
PateDt restoration together vito regulatory reform, are therefore like11 to 
rc.a1D IUjor policy issues for ethical drugs, when tbe 97th Congres. beg1.n.s 
in January 1981. 
• 
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Public concern with housing in the United States has both 
efficiency and distributional bases. Becaus~ housing 
expenditures are such a large fraction of the con~umer's budget. 
and because poor households have such small budgets, a serIes 
of Federal programs to provide "adequate" housing for "poor" 
households has evolved. beginning with the Public Housing A(t of 
1937. On nnrrow efficiency ground~, however, there has also been 
increasing concern about public policy and its effect upon 
the production and distribution of housing services. It is 
alleged that residential construction is a "backward" indu~try, 
characterized by a low rate of technical progress and thnt 
supply prices for new construction arc higher than would be 
indicated by efficiency in production. Concern is with the 
effe~t of eXistIng poliCIes upon the structure of the market 
aud wIth the design of publIC policles to foster technical 
progress, reduced costs, and increased output of housing 
services. 
In any practical context, of coutse, these distrIbutional 
and efficiency considerations are hardly separable. 
Nevertheless, a readIng of the reports of two presidential 
commissions established in response to inadequate living 
conditions of the urban poor (the Douglas and Kaiser 
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Commissionsl ) indicates widespread dissatisfaction with the 
economic health of the construction sector as distinct from 
the delivery of basic servic~s to the needy. The reports of 
these commissions, incorporated into the laniuase of the HOliBing 
and Urban Development Act of 1968, indicated that the goal of 
tla decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
Amer ican fanll1y,,2 required two types of public polices: policies 
to increase the flow of newly constructed, unsubsidizcd dwellings 
at affordable prices, as well as subsidy policies to improve 
the stock of existlng dwellings 
This draft considers public policy and the efficlency of 
the residential construction sector. Section II below records 
basic facts about the lndustrlal structure and relative 
performance of the housebuildlng sector. It summarlzes post-war 
empirlcal research about changes in productivity and the costs 
of construction, and describes briefly some of the more 
important innovations in materlals and techniques. It also 
assesses, largely on the baslS of intervlew data and ~h~ert 
opinion, the ma~nitude of cost savlngs attributable to ~ome of 
these innovations. Sectlon II also note& the relationship 
between reductions in labor and materials inputs and thelr 
effects upon the supply cost of houslng serVlces and the costs 
of occupancy for consumer. Flnally, limited and suggestlve 
informatIon is presented about the nature of private research 
and development activity. 
Section III discusses three aspects of industry structure 
and its relationship to public policy. This section 
investigates the cyclical sensitivity of the housebuildlng 
sector, the fragmented nature of the industry and Its 
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regulatory environment, and the federal role 1n 8upport1ni 
research and development and technical 1nnovnt1on. 
Some tenat1ve conclusions, based upon research in progress, 
are presented in section IV. 
II. SECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
A. Productivity Measures 
Throughout the 1960s the conventional wisdom held that 
productivity trends in housebullding lagged behind other 
sectors of the economy. Underlying all co~parisons of the 
rate of technical progress in this sector are at least four 
methodological and measurement problems. 1) appropriate 
adjustment for quality changes; 2) consistent definitions of 
inputs; 3) adJustments required by variations in the mix of 
slte and off-site actlvlty; 4) disaggregation of construction 
activities into the resldential and non-residentlal sectors. 
Although analogous methodological problems are lnherent in the 
measurement of technlcal progress ln all sectors of the 
economy, there are indications that these issues present more 
difficulties in the analysis of the residential constructlon 
3 
sector. 
Nevertheless, a consensus seems to exist that housing 
VIlS a "backvoard" sector of the economy through most of thls 
century. For example, by comparing independently derived 
indexes of building costs and new home prices, Grebler, Blank 
, 4 
and Winnick concluded in 1956 that productivity in residential 
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construction h.d remained relatively constant from the turn 
of the century through the mid-1950s. Applying a a1milar 
methodology to Don-residential contract cou6truction led the 
authors to conclude that "productivity has increased 
significantly in heavy 
5 
resident ial building." 
construction, but much less so in 
6 Writing in 1962, Denison found an 
absolute decline in input productivity in the construction 
sector during the 1930-1980 period. Dacy's analysis of price 
trends and productivity during the 1947-1960 period similarly 
concludes "[contract] construct ion product iv ity lagged 
considerably behind the average for the economy and even 
7 behind total services." Kendrick's exhaustive study of 
postwar productivity trends, completed in 1973, provides 
estimates of total factor productivity during the perIod 
1948-1969. Of 34 industry groups considered. the average 
productivity change in contract construction ranks 31st. 
Table 1 provides a summary of postwar productivit>· 
studies. indicating productivity estimates ranging between 
a 0.5 percent per year and 2.3 percent. dependIng upon the 
methodology employed and the perIod of analYSIS. In all 
comparisons, productivity growth estimates in contract 
construction are lower than for the rest of the economy. 
Raw productivity change measures for the more recent 
period are presented in the'bottom part of table 1. During 
t~e fourteen year perIod 1966-1979, productivity increases 
in ~ontract construction were smaller than increases observed 
in the overall economy or in the manufacturIng sector in 
Table 1: Postwar Productivity Trends 
. A. Estimate of annual growth in productivity in percent 
Contract Residential Manufacturing Private Construction Com~nent Domestic Economl 
Sims: 1947-1968 2.3 
Gordon: 1948-1965 1.4-2.8 3.4 
Dacy: 1947-1963 3.0 
Damar: 1948-1960 2.0 3.4 2.6 
BLS: 1962-1969 1.5* 
UN: 1953-1967 0.5 
Kendrick"948-1966 1.5 2.5 2.5 
1948-1953 3.6 2.9 2.8 
1953-1957 2.8 1.5 1.9 
1957-1960 1.1 2.0 2.3 
1960-1966 -1.0 3.2 2.9 
B. Average annual change in productivity 1966-1979 
Contract Hanufacturi ng Private Construction Domestic EconoMl 
Chase: 1966 -3.5 2.2 0.4** 
1967 11.0 4.8 3.8 
1968 -7.1 3.2 1.2 
1969 -9.8 -0.3 -1.6 
1970 7.3 0.0 3.3 
1971 4.0 5.1 2.8 
1972 2.8 4.2 4.5 
1973 -16.2 1.1 -2.7 
1974 -4.5 -2.5 -2.2 
1975 9.3 5.6 5.6 
1976 1.0 3.4 2.4 
1977 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 
1978 -7.0 3.1 -0.1 
1979 -5.5 1.3 -1.5 
·sing1e family housing 
*·private non-farm sector 
lal1 Kendrick figures are estimates of total factor productivity 
Sources: Evsey Domar, et a1., "Economic Growth and Production in the Unlted 
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany. and Japan in the Post-war 
Period," ReVlew of Economics and Statistics, Feb. 1964, p. 36. 
Douglas C. Dacy, "Productivity and Price Trends in Construction Since 
1947." Review of Economics and Statistics. Nov. 1965, pp. 406-411. 
Christopher Sims, "Efficit:ncy in the Construction Industry," Technical 
Studies. vol. II of the Kaiser Conmittee Report,. pp. 145-175 .. 
Robert T. Gordon, nA New View of Real Investment in Structures t" Review 
of Economic Statistics, Nov. 1960, p. 423. 
Robert Ball and Larry Ludwig, "Labor Requlrements fo,- Construction of 
Single-Family Houses,u Monthly Labor ~pview. Sept. 1971, pp. 12-14. 
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survel of Europe 
in 1969: Part I j Structural Trends and Prospects in the European Economy {New YorK, 1976 • p. 92. 
John W. Kendrick, Postwar Productivity Trends in the United States {NBER,1973 
Pr>. 77-85. Chase Econometrics, Current Data Bank. September 1980. 
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twelve of the years. Productivity changes in contract 
construction exceeded those elsewhere in the economy in two 
years. In 8 of the past 14 years, moreover, the raw 
productivity index (measured as constant dollar output per 
man hour) actually declined. The period as a whole indicates 
a modest decline in productivity in contract construction 
activity. 
B. Input and Output Cost Measures 
The available evidence does not perm~t a ref~ned analysis 
of productivity in residential construction. The trends 
reported for contract construction Include all resIdential, 
~ommercial and industrIal building as well as highway and 
heavy construction. In recent history, the residential 
component has varIed between 30 and 45 percent of the total. S 
A number of input cost mea~ures for residential 
construction are avaIlable from the postwar period. Table 2 
presents a summary of trends in four of these ~ndIces. 
Inferences about the relatIonshIp between productIvIty and 
variations in these indIces depend qUIte speclfically on 
their definitions. 
None of the four indIces presented includes land input 
prices. The Engineering News-Record index (EN-H) comblnes ~ 
construction labor and materlals input prIces in fixed 
proportions. Slnce lnput prlces are not adJusted for changes 
in productivity or technology, this index ignores technologIcal 
cbange within the sector. The Boeckh index welehts 










Average Annual Growth of Construction 
Cost Indices: 1947 - 1977 
EN-R DCCI Boeckh 
6.0: 4.6% 2.n; 
4.1 2.0 2.7 
2.7 -0.1 0.5 
2.9 2.0 2.7 
9.2 6.7 6.6 








Source: Computed frc~ U.S. Department of Commerce, Industry and 
Trade Administration, Construction Review, v. 25. n. 11. 
December 1979. 
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residences by wage rates, adjusted to reflect variable labor 
efficiency in each of twenty locales. Consequently, some 
technological efficiency gains are implicit in its values. 
The Turner index is computed frem bid estimates returned to the 
Turner Construction Company of the cost of standardized projects. 
Presumably, each flrm fully accounts for inputs and labor 
efficiency changes in its bids, so technological advance 
should be fully reflected in this cost index. Unfortunately 
only a few cf the standnrd projects which underlie the index 
are residential in nature. Finally, the Departme~t of Commerce 
Composite Index (DCCI) incorporates a number of construction 
cost indices (including the Engineering News-Record, Boeckh and 
Turner lndices). Some of its component lndices account for 
technologlcal change and some do not; thus lt reflects, in 
some part, productivity advances. 
A comparlson of the Boeckh or the Turner index with the 
EN-R index impll~s that actual construction costs in the 
residentlal sector rose less throughout th~ three decades 
than they would have lf technology were stagnant. However, 
the comparisons from 1967 on suggest a reversal and a decline 
1n residential construction productivity. A comparison of 
these two indices with the DCCI (which implici~ly accounts 
for sowe technical change) supports the same inference. 
A comparison of output prices is presented in table 3 













Average Annual Growth of Various Output 
Price Indices: 1947 - 1977 
WPI CPI CPI-R CPI-H 
3.5% 3.5% 4.5% na 
2.1 1.2 2.8 2.2%a 
1\ ., 
, " 1.5 1.5 U • .1 I." 
1.1 2.0 1.2 2.6 
3.4 4.6 3.6 7.0 








Source: WPI. CPl. CPI-R and CPI-H are from U.S. President. Economic Report 
of the President, 1978, (G.P.O.); NRS is from U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Bureau of Econom1c Analysis. The National Income and 
Product Accounts of the U.S., 1929-74; Statist1cal Tables. (G.P.O .• 
1977). and Survey of Current Bus1ness. v. 57, n. 7. July 1977 and 
v. 58. n. 7. July 1978; BOC 1S from U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Industry and Trade Admin1st r ation. Construction Review. v. 25. 
n. 11. December 1979,. ' 
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industrial commodites reflects general trends in the 
manufacturing and mineral products sectors of the economy. 
The consumer price index (CPI) measures price movement among 
food and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical 
services, entertainment and other services. Two components 
of the CPI's housing class also appear in table 3. The 
rent/residential component (CPI-R) incorporates price trends 
both for apartment rent and for imputed rent of homeowners 
(based on sales prices of new and existing homes). The 
homeownership portion of the CPI's housing class (CPI-E), 
introduced in 1953, combines a home purchase element with 
various operating and maintenance cost elements. Also 
presented is the implicit price deflator for purchases of 
new residential structures (NRS) computed by the Commerce 
Department and the recent Bureau of the Census price index 
for new single-family homes, exclusive of lot value (BOC). 
Presumably the latter index is the best indicator of output 
price trends. 
A comparlson of the NRS and the WPI or the CPI may 
suggest that homebuilding efficiency equalled or surpassed 
economy wide performance until about 1967. Slnce 1967, 
however, the relative prlce increases of new resldentlal 
-
structures (NRS) or new single family ho~~s (BOC) have 
exceeded economy wide price increases. Inferences based 
upon CPI-R or CPI-H are more ambiguo~s, since they include 
transactionspn used homes and include the land component. 
Any such comparison of output prices assumes that demand 
fluctuations do nocchange the relative prices of goods; 
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the comparison does, however, measure the entire economy's 
efficiency in producing housing--1ncreases 1n productivity 1n 
input suppliers as w~ll as builders. 
Recent work by Ferguson and Wheaton; who analyzed the raw 
data underlying the BOC index, presents disaggregated trends in 
output prices for newly constructed dwellings in four components: 
changes in the unit pric2 of land; changes in the quant,ity of 
land; changes in the characteristics of housIng structures; and 
changes in the price of a standardized structure. A comparison 
of the latter two components indicates that improved qualIty 
accounted for almost one fourth of the observed increase in the 
costs of residential structures dur1ng the period 1972-1978. 
On balance, the productivity and price eV1dence suggests 
a pattern of modest improvements in productivity in residential 
construction from 1947 through the mid-1960s, although 
construction d1d lag behlnd manufactur1ng actlv1tl'. Dur1ng 
the more recent pertod, the evidence suggests lIttle or no 
imp~ovement in productivity and a more substantial decline 
relative to other sectors of the economy. 
C. The Costs of Housing Services 
A comparison of costs and productivity in the product1on 
of residential structures may give a misleading picture of 
the importance of technical change and 1mp-oved techn1que 1n 
the costs of supplying housing services to copsumers. ~ab1e 4 " 
presents "typical" d1stributions of the total costs of prov1d1ng 
newly constructed hous1ng services as reported to the Kaiser 
Commission. As of 1968, only about 45 percent of the costs of 
new construction of single family bomes consisted of labor and 
materials costs. For multifamily units, about 60 percent of the 
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Table 4 
Distribution of Costs of Houslng Service Provision 






















Apa rtmen tin 











Source: The President's Committee on Urban Housing, The Report of the 
President's Commlttee on Urban HousIng: TechnIcal StJdlP.S, 
Washlngton, D.C. 
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cost of producing housing services is attributable to 
purchased inputs and labor. Development costs, including 
land, consist of 25-30 percent of the costs of production. 
Table 5 presents a "typical" distribution of the costs 
of consuming housing services as of 1968. The occupancy 
cost comparison appears quaint from the perspective of the 
1980s. It reveals quite starkly, however, the importance 
of debt retirement in the provision of housing services. 
Even at the typical 6 percent mortgage rates of the 19605, 
carrying charges represented 40-50 percent of occupancy costs. 
A comparison of tables 4 and 5 reveals that a g;ven reduction 
in the cost of materials and labor would reduce the total 
costs of produclng housing services by only about half as 
much. Tbis would presumably be reflected in occupancy costs 
by reductions in the face value of mortgages. As any 
recent purchaser of housing knows, however, e' _ n large 
reductions in tbe face values of mortgages are easily offset 
by small changes in carrying costs. 
Table 6 illustrates the relationship bet~een innovatlons 
wbich reduce tbe costs of labor and materials in houslng 
construction and the interest rates. For a bypothetlcal 
'" •• J $100,000 bome, financed with a conventional 30 year mor~gage 
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it indicates the productivity increase in construction wbicb 
1s offset by a 1 percent increase in the interest rate. 
Labor and materials are only a fraction of construction 
costs (and face values of mortgages), and level payments on 
cODvent1onal fIxed term mortgages are sensitlve to interest 
rates. Thus, it would require quite substantial efficiency 
gains in construction to offset the additlonal occupancy costs 
associated with modest lncreases 1n interest rates. 
Tables 4 and 5 :.re also su~~pstive of the lmportance of 
exogenous factors in the productlon and occupancy costs for 
housing serV1ces. Increased land rentals or site values 
observed durlnb the past decade increase production costs, 
even if there ~re subst1tut1on posslbilitles between capital 
and land in product1on. A decade of 1ncreases in property 
taxes make occupancy costs larger, even If n~re services 




Distribution of Occupancy Costs of Housing Services 
for "Typical" Developments in 1968 
Apartment in 
Single family mu1tifamHy 
detached housp med,um-ris~ 
Debt retirement 53~* 42:** 
Taxes 26 14 
Uti1ltleS 16 9 
Malntenance and repa i r 5 6 
Admlnlstratlve and Slmilar costs 13 
Vacancies and bad debts 9 
Proflt and reserves 7 
Total 100~ 100: 
*based on a 94.5: 3D-year mortgage at 6~ interest. 
**based on an 85~ 35-year loan at 61 interest 
Source: The President's CommIttee on Urban Houslng, The Report of the 
President's CommIttee on Urban Housing: TechnIcal Studles, 
Washlngton, D. C. 










Relationship Between Productlvity Gains in Construction 
and Occupancy Costs for Consumers: 
productlvity increase in percent requlred to offset a 
one percent increase 1n interest rates· 
labor and materials as a fraction of construction 
40~ 50: 60~ 70: 100~ 
23.8:- 19.0~ 15.8: 13.6~ 9.5% 
22.5: 18.0: 15.0~ 12.9% 9.0: 
21.3: 17.0: 14.2';; 12. a 8.5: 
20.0: 16.0: 13.3: 11.4: 8.0: 
costs 
*assumlng a 5100,000 house flnanced by a 30 year, level payment mortgage 
-11-
It appears that variations 1n the total costs of 
supplying housing services are less sensitive to technological 
changes 1n the production process per se than in other sectors 
of the economy. The costs of consuming these services are also 
less sensitive to ~ost reductions in labor and materials. 
D. The Stru~ture of the Hous~building Industry 
The residential construction industry is characterized 
by a r~latively small scale of production as measured by 
gross receipts or by numbers of units completed annually. 
Table 7 reports tbe size distribution of multifamily and 
single family builders as of 1972. For single family 
builders, less than a tbird of the firms reported gross 
receipts of one mililon dollars or more, or a volume of more 
tban about 100 unlts, almost forty percent of the flrms 
reported volumes of fewer than about twenty units per year. 
In the multifamily sector, sllghtly less than half the 
firms produced an annual volume ~reater than 200 units and 
an eightb of tbe flrms produced fewer than about 20 unlts 
in multifamlly dwelllngs. The annual volume of tbe typical 
builder of elther single fa~lly or mult1famlly dwelllngs 1S 
quite low. 
Even this descr1ption overstates the numer1cal 
concentration of builders by volume, Slnce it only includes 
firms with payrolls. It is r~ported that, in 1967, about a 











Distribution of Gross Receipts by Size 
of Builder, 1972 
Estimated number Single family 




















Source: u.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Construction, Washington, 
D.C., USGPO, 1974, p. 206. 
• 
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10 did not have a regular payroll. 
Information on trends in firm size is somewhat more 
elusive. Table 8 presents trends on the size distribution 
of single family builders based on membership in the National 
Association of Home Builders (NAHB). Inferences drawn from 
this table are tenuous, since NAHB has about a one third 
annual turnover in its membership, both very small and very 
large builders are likely to be underrepresented, and the 
distribution of units by scale of production may vary over 
the business cycle. In any case, the raw data ind1cate a 
decline in the scale of the build1ng industry during the 
decade of the 1960s. 
Trends Slnce 1969 reveal an apparent 1ncrease in the 
size and scale of homebuilders. For example, It 1S reported 
that the number of f1rms w1th greater than $10 m1ll1on 1n 
annual sale increased from 119 in 1968 to 369 in 1972 
(figures are unadJusted for 1nflat10n).11 Th~ Bluebook of 
Major Homebu1lders reports that the market share of builders 
with annual volumes in excess of 200 units rose from 17.2 
12 percent of total un1ts to 28 percent between 1969 and 1972. 
Table 9 presents the latest informat1on on tbe S1ze 
distribution of housebuilders. As measured by the number of 
establishments, firms wlth less than 20 employees comprised 
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almost 98 percent of "General Contractors-Single Family Homes," 
87 percent of "General Contractors-Residential Building," and 
94 percent of "operative builders." In terms of gross 
receipts in the industry, however, such firms comprised 78 
percent, 31 percent, and 50 percent of the three industries. 
The bottom part of the table indicates that firms with 
gross receipts in excess of a half a million dollars account 
for almost half of total receipts among single family general 
contractors and almost 90 percent of receipts among other 
general contractors. Such firms account for almost 8S percent 
of receipts among operative builders. 
Beyond the increasing share of the market accruing to 
larger firms, there is some evidence of increasing merger 
activity among the larger firms, at least through the mid 
1970s. Merger and acquisltion activity among the largest 
publicly held homebuilders has provided product line 
diverslflcation, geographic expasnion, and ln one fourth of 
11 t · I' t t' 13 a cases, some ver lca ln egra lon. 
The rapid and sustalned growth of U.S. Home, the largest 
American housebulldlng flrm since 1972, has been through 
merger and acquisltlon. Between 1969 and 1972, U.S. Hom 
acquired 18 companies, increasing sales from $J.7M to $205M 
14 in less than three years. U.S. Home merged wlth Homecraft 
. 1n 1977, and in 1978 issued $15M in mortgage backed securltles 
through a wholly owned sUbSidiary.lS 
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Table 8 
Size Distribution of NAHB Builders 
Percent of single Percent of total units 
family builders constructed 
Units constructed 1959 1964 1969 1959 1964 1969 
1-25 57.5 64.4 69.5 10.2 15.8 21.5 
26-100 29.8 27.6 24.3 25.7 32.7 36.0 
101-250 8.1 5.5 4.6 21.8 22.2 23.6 
250+ 4.6 2.5 1.6 42.3 29.4 19.0 
Source: National Association of Home Builders. A Profile of the Builder 
and His Industry. Washington. D.C .• 1970. p. 108. 
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Table 9 
Size Distribution of Residential Construction 
Firms (SIC 1521, SIC 1522, SIC 1531, 1977) 
number of employees 
total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500+ 
a. percent of establishments 
SIC 1521 100,993 72.0% 19.1% 6.6~ 1.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
SIC 1522 4,775 52.8 20.6 13.4 9.3 2.3 1.1 0.5 0.0 
SIC 153i 23,47i 64.1 20.7 9.5 4.0 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 
b. percent of total receipts 
SIC 1521 $21.98 33.3 25.7 19.2 12.3 4.6 2.3 0.9 1.4 
SIC 1522 S 4.5B 8.0 10.2 13.1 24.4 14.4 16.9 13.1 
SIC 1531 $22.9B 20.0 15.1 15.1 17.6 11.3 8.6 8.6 3.7 
gross receipts (in thousands) 
100- 250- 500- 1000-
0-24 25-49 50-99 249 499 999 2499 2500+ 
a. percent of establishments 
SIC 1521 100,993 14.7 15.1 21.6 27.4 12.5 5.8 2.3 0.6 
SIC 1522 4,775 7.0 8.7 13.6 23.0 14.5 11.4 9.7 7.6 
SIC 1531 23,477 4.7 5.6 11.7 23.4 19.9 16.4 11.9 5.7 
b. percent of total receipts 
SIC 1521 $21. 9B 0.9 2.6 7.2 19.9 19.8 18.1 15.5 16.0 
SIC 1522 $ 4.58 0.1 0.3 1.1 3.9 5.4 8.4 15.8 65.0 
SIC 1531 $22.9B 0.0 0.2 0.9 4.1 7.2 11.9 18.7 56.9 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1~77 Census of 
Construction Industries: Industry Studies, SIC 152~5IC 1522. SIC 1531, 
CC 77-1-1, 2, 3, US GPO, 1980. 
Hote: SIC 1521: General Contractors: Single Family Houses 
SIC 1522: General Contractors: Residential BUllding 
SIC 1531: Operative Builders 
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Despite any trends towards increased scale, bowever, 
tbe economic concentration of tbe bousebuilding industry is 
quite low. The 25 firm concentration ratio in the industry 
is six-tenths of one percent. 
There is little recent evidence on the relation between 
scale of production and the costs of production. Maisel's 
16 
analysis, presented in 1953, compares production costs of 
builders in three size classes. He estimates that production 
costs, including profit and overhead, for the typical single 
family dwelll~e are 2.6 percent lower for firms producing 
25-99 units than fer bmaller builders, and are 7.9 percent 
lower for firms produclng more than 100 units. More recent 
evidence by Cassinatis11 in 1969 suggests that labor and 
materials costs for a typical dwelling for firms producing 
200 or more units are about 12 percent lower than those of 
firms producing fewer 50 un~s. COOk18 concludes on the 
basis of this eVldeuce that significant economies of scale 
do exist. The magnitude of the relatl0nshlp between scale 
of production and the occupancy costs for housing services 
does not seem to be terribly large, however. Popular 
descriptions of the homebuilders suggest that there may be 
significant scale economles arlsing from productlon schedullng, 
improved x-efficlency, and vertical integration, at least 
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among the industry giants. For example, Fortune reports 
the increased stability in annual production made possible 
by high capitalization among the giants (e.g., Centex, Ryan 
Homes, and Kaufman and Broad), by backed securities, and by 
increasing "professiunalization" of management. 19 
One difference in production techniques by firms at 
the largest annual volumes is their reliance on prefabricated 
parts, or the output of the home manufactures industry. For 
example, the Department of Hou&ing and Urban Development's 
analysis of 511 major homebuilders revealed that the 25 
largest builders used "major" prefabricated parts in 52.3 
percent of units completed. For other builders, the 
proportion of uni ts with "major" premanufactured parts ranged 
20 between 27.2 and 35.9 percent. 
A comprehensive survey of the home manufacturers industry 
1S reported by Field and Rivkin. 21 They estimate that by 
1970, national production of manufactured homes (Including 
significant use of pre-cut, panel, or modular construction) 
was more than 310,000 units, and included about 21 percent 
of the market for new units. 
In 1978, it was estimated that manufactured hOUSIng 
output was at about the same level, 304,000 unlts and a 
somewhat smaller market share. 22 Home manufacturers teuded 
to operate at a larger product10n scale than conventional 
builders, but even among these :irms, about 30 percent produce 
fewer than 100 units annually.23 
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There are at least f~ur detailed comparisons of the 
relative costs of housing production using conventional and 
home manufacturing techniques. 
We~ner compares production costs for a typical single 
detached house with 1000 square feet of living space. 24 He 
compares conventional production at a volume of 150-200 units 
with off-site modular construction at differing scales. According 
to engineering estimates, excluding land and development costs, 
off-site modular construction at a scale of 5000 un1ts a year 
would reduce costs by 15 percent. 
Several estimates were prepared for the Douglas Commlssion 
for "typical" Single family houses. 25 It was estimated that 
the off-site production of pan~l ~alls reduces costs by less 
than 4 percent. Off-site construction of sectional and 
modular components is estimated to reduce costs, again according 
to engineer1ng assumptions, by as much as 20 percent. 
Ro~land compared production costs for low-rise garden 
26 apartments. The cost savings attributable to fully modular 
construction, comparlng a productlon scale of 12 conventlonal 
units w1th 1200 manufactured unlts, amounts to 9.3-13.7 
percent, again excludlng land and development costs. Finally. 
a comparison of high rlse constructlon uS1ng pre-cast walls 
and partitions with slmilar construction using masonry and 
dry wall partitions indicates a labor and materlals cost 
27 
saving of 16 percent. 
The cost savings estlmated 1n these 
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studies arise from two sources, the reduction in the number 
of man bours required to complete a given component of the 
final product and the substitution of cheaper and lower 
skilled labor. The nature of costs reductions is thus 
similar to technical progress in other sectors of the economy. 
However, comparative costs depend crucially upon whether 
wage comparisons are between the unionized construction 
sector and the industrialized sector or between the eXlstlng 
construction sector and other industry. For the construction 
of single family dwellings, for example, it has been 
estimated that less than a third of the labor input is unionized. 28 
Whether these cost savlngs are large or small depends 
upon one's perspectlve. Flrst, these comparlsons are based 
upon englne~ring estlmates and extrapolations, not upon a 
comparison of actur' production runs. Second, as noted 
prevlously, labor and materials inputs lnto structures account 
for roughly 40-60 percent of the cost of produclng housIng 
services. Third, these comrarlsons were made more than a 
decade ago. Field and Rlvkln, who are flrmly convlnced of 
tbe potentlal for cost reduction through home manu:acturIng, 
admit: "We must take It on faIth that economIes wI)l result 
from industrlallzatlon of home buildIng because conclUSIve 
evidence of lower costs does not exist. PresumptIve 
evidence from other IndustrIes that have undergone 
industrialization ImplIes that [manufactured] home bUlldlng 
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will produce substantial savings in cost • . • • ,,29 
E. Innovation and Research 
Some inconclusiveness in tbe importance of home 
manufacturi'lg as an alternative technique to "conventional" 
homebuilding does not imply that these latter methods have 
been static. 
Industry observers believe the current usage of "major" 
industrialized housing components in conventional construction 
is already quite high. When sucb components as pre-hung 
doors and pre-assembled windows are included, it has been 
estimated that about 90 percent of all new dwelling units 
built by conventional builders include major industrialized· 
housing components compared to an insigniflcant fraction just 
after World War II. In addition, lt is observed that before 
World War II, labor comprised 70 percent of on slte 
30 
constructlon costs compared with roughly 30 per~ent today. 
Besides tbe substitution of pre-assembled and 
manufactured components for on site techniques, innovatlon 
in constr~ction includes new materials, new techniques for 
assembling materials on site, new tools for implementlng 
given techniques, and perhaps lmproved management x-efflclency. 
Engineering changes in residentlal construction methods 
have been relatively mlnor, 1n terms of their oveall ~ncldence 
3] 
or tbei~ contribution to cost reduct1on. The use of brick 
for both structural and veneer purposes .las increased since 
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World War II as bas t~e proportioD of post-aDd-beam 
"California-style" construction. Better engiDeerini 
knowledge about concrete products bave allowed single slab 
(basement-less) homes to appear more frequently in cold Northern 
climates, ~here they .ere previou&£y unknown. Electrlcal 
wiring has been moved from baseboard raceways to the interiors 
of framed walls (largely because better insulation materials 
have made the practlce safe). 
These process changes do not appear to have resulted 
from innovation in constructlon methods. Wlder use of brick 
has apparently stemmed from a shUt in the relative price of 
brlck and wood products. Post-and-beam constructlon is among 
the oldest known structural englneerlng m~thods; its increased 
use of late is attrlbutable to cbanglng tastes--consumer 
preference for "open" houses--and to the development of 
double-glazed insulatlng glass. The Northward filtration of 
slab-bullt homes has resulted from better materlals, stronger 
and lighter concrete products, not from construct lon-method 
innovatlon. 
Two other postwar innovations in constructlon methods 
~er se do entail substantlal effic1ency gains: the use of 
2" x 3" rather than 2" x 4" studs and plates ln non-Ioad-
bearing partltions and the employment of a 24-inch framing module 
instead of the traditional 16-inch one. Adoption of a 24-lnch 
module allows a somewhat less than one-third reduction in the 
-28-
number of studs and a corresp"',nding decrease in the labor 
required for wall framing. The use of 2" x 3" lumber decreases 
the cost of interior partitions by about twenty-five percent. 
As with the other changes in building method, these innovations 
do not represent fundamentally new assembly concepts. Instead, 
they stem from the fairly recent development of lumber quality 
grading (superv ised by the COfMl"'rce Departl':1ent' s Ameri can 
Lumber Standards Comm1ttee) and from better engineering 
knowledge about lumber stress characteristics, WhICh has 
established that these new practices entail little or no 
32 
added safety r1sk. Interestingly, the 24-inch framing 
module may represent better engineering than the 16-inch 
module because Joists can be placed directly over the stud. 
Some~hat more important than innovation in construction 
methods, according to industry sources, have been the 
improvements 1n po~er tools and the greater use of heavy 
equipment during the past two decades. Circular handsa~s, 
po~ered mechanIcal hoists, compressed-air jackhammers and 
nailguns have all increased the productlvlty of laborers. 
Though no est1mates of the cost savings attributable to tool 
improvements have been found, one conjecture is that nallguns 
alone decrease framIng time by about twenty percent. Power 
handsaws may have generated savings of similar magnitude. 
Bulldozers, backhoes and other heavy equipment have decreased 
the time and cost of site preparation and excavation. 
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It appears that the most important technical changes in 
residential construction have been innovations in materials 
and the pre-assembly techniques discussed earlier. When 
three industry experts were each asked to list the five most 
important postwar :i3 cost saving innovations in constructlon, 
ooly one response (the use of 2" x 3" studs) dld not involve 
new materials or pre-assembly. The other responses were: 
prefabricated roor trusses (3 responses), plastic draln, 
waste and vent piping (3), other prefabri~ated 
components (2, both of the respondents mentioned roof 
trusses separately first, then clted other components: 
pre-hung doors and windows, prefabrlcated stalrways ~nd 
panelllzed construction), speclality plywood (2), 
gypsum wall board (2), insulating materlals (1), heat 
pumps (1), molded bathroom facilities (1). 
The importance of materials and pre-assembly innovations 
in technical change is emphaslzed by other industry experts. 
Johnson's enumeration of "important innovatlons" in 
residential constructlon durlng the two decades after ~orld 
War II includes some 120 items, more than 70 of which are 
materials improvement or pre-assembly. The most important 
34 innovatlons noted by Johnson include' 
- gypsumboard 
- improved plywood and plywood products 
- particleboard 
- preflnlshed sldlng and floor and wall coverlngs 
- light gage steel I-beams aod adJustable columns 
- plastic plping 
- molded plastic bathroom fixtures 
- washerless and SlOg Ie-level faucets 
- improved electrlC heat pumps 
- improved gas, oil and electric furances 
- ready mix concrete 
- insulating glass 
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- polyethylene vapor barriers 
- improved construction hardware 
- acoustical ceiling tile 
- indoor-outdoor carpeting 
In addition to improvements in wood products--particleboard, 
plywood, etc.--the intr~1uctlon of plastics into homebuilding 
has reduced total costs. The most well-known products are 
ABS (acrilonitrile-butadiene-styrene) and PVC (polyvinyl-
chloride) plastic drain, waste and vent piping. Industry 
sources sugg?st that ABS and PVC piping are employed at cost 
35 
savings of about 25 percent. Polyethylene is widely used 
as a vapor barrier under slabs. It is estimated that this 
practice has a 40 percent cost advantage over the former technique, 
hot-mopped felt. 36 Molded plastics have found increasing use 
in one- and multl-plece bathroom components, "Eignjficantly" 
reducing costs. 
Hard evidence on the cost savings or lncreased output 
attributable to these innovations does not exist, and any 
numerlcal estlmates are merely well informed oplnion. 
How well do the details of industry lnnovatlon correspond 
to the aggregate productlvlty trends of the sector? To the 
extent that these lnnovatlons represent cost savings on small 
i~jividual tasks and that, in the aggregate, these tasks 
amount to less than half of the costs of producing housing 
services, the effect of technological change may be rather 
small indeed. However, since output quallty at this level 
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of detail is quite impossible to standardize, some fraction 
of the returns to innovation may not be fully reflected 1n 
productivity measures at all. 
Innovation in housebuilding arises from formal and 
informal research and development which may be undertaken 
by housebuilders, suppliers, trade associations and government. 
Individual housebuilding firms conduct lltt1e in the way 
of research and development ~ctivity. Moreover, it is 
reported that "there is great reluctance on the part of 
builders and even housing m3nuf~cturers to experiment with 
new products and techniques, since innovations are perceived 
37 to be risky under many market conditions." 
The number of research scientlsts and engineers employed 
in the constructlon sector suggests that resources devoted 
to R&D is quite small. In 1966, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported 800 sClentists and engineers (including 
those with bachelor's degrees) doing research 1n the 
construction sector, about 1.7% of all sC1entists employed 
38 39 in the sector. In 1970, the figure reported was 1800. The 
1974 Natlonal SClence Foundatlon survey of scientists and 
engineers reported that 409 individuals with doctorates 
considered themselves working "principally" on housing. 40 
Some measure of the research supported by trade 
associations (in this case, the National Association of Home 
Builders, NAHB) is provided by its scale of operation. 
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Willis reports in 1979 that tbe NAHB research foundation 
employs a staff of'~ewer than 25 people, including secretaries, 
and that only one quarter of its work 1s for the general 
benefit'of members, and that the other three quarters is 
41 proprietary work." Much of its work is testing products of 
suppliers to provide independent verification of their 
pro~erties. Presumably the high turnover in NAHB membership 
contributes to its small scale of research. 
It appears, therefore, that a large fracti~n of the 
innovation in housebuilding is the result of R&D act1vity 
by suppliers or by government. Public sector involvement 
is discussed in the next section. The fraction of R&D by 
manufacturers and materials suppliers devoted to housing i~ 
not known (and in many cases cannot be allocated). However, 
in contrast to other potential innovations 1n homebulld1ng, 
it appears that the economic returns to R&D are more easily 
appropriable by the developer when they are in the form of 
identiflable materials and not lmproved techniques. Willis 
reports impresslonistic eVldence that Suppll~rs' R&D 
efforts devoted to housing are low. For example, intervlews 
with members of the Producers' Council (the trade aSSOClatlon 
of the manufacturers of building products) report that "very 
few of the large suppliers devote any of thelr R&D ~ffort 
42 
specifically to housebuilding. Research facilities of 
particular supplier associations such as the Brlck Instltute 
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of America and the Amerlc&L Plywood Association, tend to be 
small. 
Important to the profitability calculus of R&D 1n 
buildinb . even by suppliers of new materials who can capt~re 
the returns to successful innovation privately, is the 
profile of market penetration of a successful product. It 
has been estlmat~d that a potential innovator must be prepared 
to walt eIght to ten years after product development 
before reachIng an appreciable fraction of the market for new 
dwellings. 43 Presumably, the diffusion rate of new products 
is sens~tive to the~r relative reduction in production costs. 
But if most potential innovations are evolutionary and reduce 
costs for a small component of the buildlng production process, 
th~s suggests that the rate of adoptlon by bUllders wlil be 
low. This can be expected to affect the ex ante R&D 
decisIons of suppliers and their level of innovatlon 
invest~ents. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY COSTS AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Cyclical SensltIvIty and OrganizatIon 
The position of the residential constructlon sector as 
a large but volatile co~ponent of total ~nvestrnent actlvlty 
has provoked much analysis of the transmlSSlon of that 
volatility and of its impact upon the economy as a whole. 
Until recently, however, there has been little analysls of 
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the relation between instability in final demand and the 
micro-behavior of firms. Two recent works have related tbe 
cyclical sensitivity of the sector to the organization of 
competition and the performance of the sector. 
44 A short paper by Manski and Rosen presents a verbal 
analysis of the micro-economics of an industry characterized 
by large random variations in demand. The authors deduce 
five general propositions based on the general assumptlon that: 
those conditions for profit maximization--relating to 
production technology, output size, market area, and choice 
of output product itself--whlCh are optimal when demand is 
Rtaule are different from those that are optlmal when demand 
is unstable. 
First, given a choice between a product1on technology 
that is efficient within a narrow range of output and is 
quite inefficient outside that range and a production 
technology that is "reasonable" over a wide band of output, 
but best at no output level, there w1ll be a tendency for 
f1rms to choose the latter process if demand 1S unstable. 
Second, given a choice between hiring labor on a long 
term basis and hiring workers by the job, there will be a 
tendency to choose the latter when demand 1S unstable. 
(Presumably if demand is unstable, firms will also be less 
likely to invest in on the job training for workers, even 
if it is specific training.) 
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Third, given a choice between producing, at equivalent 
cost, a high quality perishable product and a lower quality 
storable product, the latter choice will be made if demand 
is unstable. 
Fourth, given a product ion ch{I"c/~ ')etween an output 
which performs a narrow range of fun;.tions well and others 
poorly, and an output which performs a broad range of 
functions adequately, the latter choice w1ll be made if 
demand is unstable as long as net fluctuations can be dampened. 
Fifth, given a choice between developing a small market 
intensively and operating in a less concentrated manner in a 
larger area, the latter choice will be made if net fluctuat10ns 
can be reduced. 
The basic conclusion of the Manski-Rosen analys1s is that 
demand instabil1ty, under these cond1tions creates a tradeoff 
between static economic efficiency and flex1bility in response 
to temporal var1at1on. Flexibllity and diversiflcati0n makes 
the ind1v1dual firm more able to mit1gate the shocks of 
random changes 1n demand. 
The model 1ndicates that, when denla.-:d 1S unstable, the 
average price paid by consumers is h1gher. Importantly, 
however, the profits of an individual firm need not be lower 
1n a world of demand instability than in one of perfect 
stability--sinoeinstability raises costs for all firms and the 
industry demand curve need not be perfectly elastic. 
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Thus, while demand instability may be costly to consumers as 
a group, it need not be costly to any single prod~cer. 
Manski and Rosen discuss this view 
of cyclicality in demand in the context of six telephone 
interviews wlth suppliers to the residential construction 
ir.dustry. They cllnclude with the remarks: "The contribution 
of industry studies to an understanding of the behavioral 
implications of instability is more potential than actual. 
Studying the detailed structure and operations of speciflc 
industries should offer a direct and fruitful approach to 
the question of instabllity. Unfortunately, we know of no 
industry studies which have tried to grapple with the 
instabi 11 ty question in a major way. ,,45 
Thus it is worth noting the internatlonal comparison of 
residential constructlon and housebuilding recently completed 
by Mark Wllll&.46 Wilils develops a simple model of the 
firm facing unstable demand which is a direct extension of 
the Manski-Rosen analysls. Instead of postulatlng an industry 
populated by ldentlcal firms, however, WIIIlS conslders the 
entry and exit of marglnal firms as demand increases and 
declines. ThiS model ;redicts, for resldentlal constructlon, 
that: the industry wlil be highly fragmented, with a large 
number of in-and-out firms; firms wlil use non-specialized 
inputs tn the construction of new dwellings; construction 
firms will be unlikely to use production processes with higb 
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fixed costs; and that the industry will oppose public 
programs that would jeopardize current market shares. Willis 
interprets his results as implying that fewer resources w~ll 
be devoted to R&D, that the selection of R&D projects 
will be distorted, and that firms will resist new products 
and processes of a labor saving variety. 
Of more interest than the theoretical refinements of 
this model, however, is the empirical evidence presented by 
the author. Willis presents a detalled comparison of 
aggregate housebuilding characteristics in the United States, 
England and France, and the results of a series of interviews 
with builders and suppliers in the three countries. 
Because housing starts have been more stable in England 
than in the United States and have been more stable in France 
than 1n England, a detailed international comparison provides 
some evidence about the link between demand conditions and 
industry structure. Willis' rich statistical and anecdotal 
evidence does ind1cate that firm sizes tend to follow the 
anticipated pattern that French f1rms tend to be more cap1tal 
intensive than English or U.S. firms, and that productiv1ty 
trends in construction show that increases in output per m~n 
hour have been signil1cantly larger in France than in England, 
and somewhat larger in E~gland than in the United States. 
Willis also presents sketchy evidence on private R&D 
activity in the three countries. Although this eV1dence is 
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!~r from satisfactory, the author concludes that reBourc~s 
devoted to R&D are relatively lower in the United States. 
Willis presents a persuasive argument that these, and 
other comparisons of performanc~ are causally related to 
demand instability. In considering the evidence presented, 
however, it must be recognized that both the extent of 
public housing and the relative sIze of contracts for public 
housing 1S larger in france than in England or the Unlted 
States; moreover the hi~torical pattern of French regional 
planning activity has facilitated the growth of a few large 
f1rms. Finally, for the essential inferences between demand 
stability and the progresslvity of residential construction 
the analysis has two degJ'e8$ of freedom. 
Historically, Savings and Loan AssocIations (S & L's) 
have provided 40 to 60 percent of new home mortgage funds, 
and maximum interest rates offered by S & L's have been 
limited by regulatIon Q. As a result, when market interest 
rates have exceeded ceiling rates, there have been substant1aJ 
outflows of funds from S & L deposlts to other forms of sav1ngs. 
Indeed, during the period 1965-1980, net flows lnto savings 
and loan associations have been strongly and negatively 
cortelated wl.tb the "spread" bet,"e~n passoook and regulat10n 
Q ceilings. 
Thus, in some part, tbe extreme sens1tivity of mortgage 
/ 
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lending and new construction to interest rates has been the 
result of public regulation. It is worth noting, therefore, 
that this source 01 cylicali~y in housebuilding will be 
removed by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act (PL96-22l) signed lnto law on March 31, 
1980. Under Title II of the act regulation Q and other 
limltations on S & L activity will be ~hased out over the next 
six years. Although the impact of interest rates on new 
construction activity depend more directly on the interest 
elasticity of demand than on speclflc regulatlon, lt is forecast 
(indeed, lt is intended by the act) that the reforms of 198v 
will lncrease the flows of depos}ts into savlngs and loan 
associations and will make mortgage lendlng more staLle. 
The arguments of Manski, Rosen, and Wlllis lndicate that 
these reforms wlll foster productivity galns in resldentlal 
constructlon and will stimulate innovattve activlty. 
B. Geographlca! Fragmentat10n and Local Regulation 
Because transport costs are an 1Mportant component of 
materials costs, because the average Slze of bUlldlng f1rms 
is small, and because (It is often alleged) local tastes 
vary, the geograph1c market served by most flrms 1S quite 
smal:. Among the glant firms, the geographlc coverage is 
not large. Hoo's survey of the 25 largest bUllders 
revealed that they operated, on average, 1n 6 states, whlle 
a sample of smaller f1rms (26th throubh 100th in sales 
volume) operated in 3 stat~s.47 Today, the largest slngle 
builder, U.S. Homes, operates ln 17 states compared with 10 
in 1977. 48 
~ . 
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In any case, the production process is, as a result, 
affected by a diverse set of public policies, highl~ localized 
in nature, wIth dIfferential Impacts across smaller firms 
and with more complicated effects within the markets served 
by larger fIrms. 
These local regulatIons, derIved from the police powers 
~f the indIvIdual states, and JustifIed in terms of health 
and safety responsIbIlItIes delegated to local authorIties, 
include: zoning control~, growth control and envIronmental 
regulatIons, subdIVIsIon regulatIons, and building code 
provisions. 
1. ZonIng. growth control. envIronmental and subdIVIsion 
regulatIons. 
The classic JustIfIcatIon for zonIng regulatIon, WhICh 
allocates partIcular land uses geographIcally, IS to internalize 
any spIllover effects arISIng from nUIsance land uses. The 
spatlal allocatIon of land uses achIeved by zoning removes 
or reduces these externalltles, Increaslng land values in 
the residentlal sector (and per~aps In non-residentlal uses 
as well). 
However, SInce most locally ralsed revenues are derived 
from property taxes, the flscal motl\e for zoning In suburban 
jurisdictions may be qUIte strong. If publIC serVIces are-
provided on a basls of rough equality per household, local 
authorities have an Incentlve to Insure that the marginal 
dwelling provldes more hOUSIng serVlces (and hence local 
property tax revenues) 
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~han the average house. Thus, in practice, zoning regulations 
often specify minImum lot sizes or floor areas for single 
family housing and regulate or prohibit multIfamily dwellings. 
The effect of such regulation on housing costs per unit 
of output depends upon the impact of local ordin~nces on 
the cost of land as an input into housing, as well as any 
addItional admInIstratIve or holdIng costs Incurred. If 
zonIng does reduce the allocation of land to residentlal 
uses, then raw land costs may be expected to rIse. 
Theoretical analyses of the effect of zonIng upon land 
allocation and Input prices to housIng have been undertaken 
by BursteIn, Stull, Hnmllton, and Ohls, ~1-!l.49 Not 
surprisIngly, the im~act of zon1ng upon raw land prIces 
depends upon the amounts of developable land 1n resident1al 
and non-residentIal sectors, the demand for development 
in alternatIve uses, and the SubstItutabIlity of de~and 
across civil dIVISIons ~Ith dIfferIng regulatIons. To the 
extent that the metropolitan-wlde system of land use 
regulation reduces the sup~ly of developable land relatIve 
to supply, we may expect prlces of land lnputs Into hOUSIng 
to increase. 
Empirical eVIdence on the effect of zon1ng regulation 
on land prices is broadly consistent with the hypothesis of 
land price escalatlon. Numerous studies have concluded 
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that zoning ordinallc~s increase the value of otherwise 
identical dwellings. In many cases, however, this effect 
of zoning may be attributable to the externality impact of 
50 
regulation. 
Of more importance to the supply cost of new housing. 
ho~ever. is the effect of density restrictions on the price 
of vacant land or new houslng. Sternlieb and Sagalyn's 
analYSIS concluded that larce lot (low density) zonln~ 
increased the unIt price of land for new slngle family 
51 housing built in Ne~ Jersey suburbs. Gleeson's anal)sis 
of Brooklyn Park. Mlnnesota estlmated that two thlrds of 
the lntra-clty varlation in land prlces (about $1500 per 
acre) was attrIbutable to ~onln~ desl~natlon and denslty 
5~ 
restriction. - Peterson's analysis of Northern Vlr~lnla 
suburbs found that denSIty restrlctlons had a sl~nlflcant 
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and quite large effect upon land prices. Peterson's 
results are consistent with land price a premIum in response 
to zoning restrictions which varies with accessibility to 
downto,",n. At a distance of 10 miles from Washington (Fairfax 
County, Va.), for rxample, parcels zoned 1/2, I, 2, and 10 
unIts per acre were sel:in~ for $5,800, S7,900, $13,700, and 
• 
$32,000 per acre respectIvely in 1974. 
RelIance upon comple, enVlronm~ntlll and ~ro'"'th m3na~vment 
programs has increased substantially In the past decade. For 
example In 1973. one jurIsdIctIon In the San FranCIsco-Oakland 
area had gro'"'th control re~ulatlons, thrre years later 
. 51 
thirty-one civil dIVisions had such re~ulations. 
Do",('ll reports all In~rl'a$l' of l~OO pl'rcent In tht.' numbl'r 
of communltll'~' lmpl)Sln~ envlronmental and/or growth 
55 
management restrIctIons durIng the perIod 197~-1977. 
Gro\\th control and environmental management incluae 
"open space" set as 1 des. ~ro",·t h t lml n~ ordi nan~es, urban 
service areas, permit limitntions, buildIng moratoriums, and 
environmental impact reVIew and complIance procedures. 
Locali t iet> typIcally Just i fy these controls In terms of the 
benefits of envIronmental quality, lower muniCIpal serVIce 
and capital costs, lo~er property taxes, and the preservation 
of community "character." 
Ellickson's analYSIS of growth management restrictions 
56 is similar conceptually, to the analysis of zonIng. He 
I· 
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concludes that any effective growth management policy is 
likely to reduce the supply of new construction, to increase 
the price of vacant land, and to increase values of existinG 
properties. Some empirIcal eV1dence is available on the 
magnitude of pr1ce increases. Case studies of San Jose, 
Santa Rosa and Petaluma. Cal1furn1a all conclude that the 
pr1ces of eX1sting standardized d~elling un1ts have increased 
57 ~Ith the adoptIon of such ordlnances. More Important for 
our purposes IS the effect of such tools on ~he surply prlces of 
newly constructed d~elllngs. The San Jose analysls estlmates 
that during the 1968-19i6 period the prlce of one bUllder's 
standard unIt Increased by 121 percent and 43 percent of thlS 
58 increase IS attrlbutable to gro~th control. 
Clearly the effect of such restrlctlons varles with the 
metropolitan wlde level of the1r imposlt1on and w1th the 
level of demand for new unlts. Thus it 1S worth noth1ng that 
a recent survey of the San FrancIsco area. where houslng 
demand has been increaslng rapIdly. indlcates that half of 
the jurisd1ctlons surveyed had Imposed some type of absolute 
59 
moratorium on new construction at some pOlnt Slnce 1970. 
In addltlon to the effects of such ordinances on land 
prices, there may be substantlal admlnistratlve and carrYlng 
costs imposed on construction firms by such regulation. For 
example, Frieden reports that. by 1965, more than half the 
states imposed some form of envlronmental impact reV1ew for 
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new construction. SO The environmental impact statement is 
typically the responsibility of the developer, and 1s often 
prepared by consultants engaged by the developer. If the 
dpveloper has purchased the land and has engaged in planning 
studles (as Frieden clalms is tYPical), then R lengthy 
review process imposes overhead and property tax costs as 
well as the carrYing costs for land. Mueller and James 
estimate that the cost~ of report preparatIon and tIme del3~s 
61 
amount to only $100-200 per unlt. However. It has been 
estimated that the delay costs assoLlated wlth the provlslons 
of state environmen~al quality regulations 1n California 
6~ 
amount to 4-7 percent of total cost of new units. In 
Hawaii, comparable figures are $325-450 per unit per month 
of delay. Delay costs for Edmonton ~ere estlmated at $700-900 
per month. 
SubdiviSion regulations can also Increase the unit costs 
of prodUCing ne" hous1nG. Subdlvlslon ordlnances oftpn 
require a complex package of off slte Investments by 
developers lnclud1ng streets, paths, lIghting, landscapIng 
and se~ers. For the San Francisco metropolitan area, 
63 Rands et al. report a range of develonment fees of $800 to 
$5919 for a single detached unit in 1979, and a range of $3948 
to $15,301 for a seven unit multifamily d~elilng. 
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In the San Francisco area, Gabriel, et ale report that median 
development fees were $1907 per unit in 1979. 64 Rands, et ale 
report a cedian development fee for single family houses of 
$2800 (or 3.5 percent of median new home prices).65 The 
private provIsion of public open space, bike paths, ~us 
shelters, parking and lighting are often the rule. 
FInally there is some evidence on the costs of delays 
implIed by development revle~ procedures. It is estImated 
that, In Houston. the process adds between $400 and $600 to 
66 the cost per d~ellln~ unIt. 
The net effect of thIs pattern of local regulatIon upon 
effiCIency In the productIon of a standardized unit of reSIdentIal 
servIces depends upon se\eral factors. 
FIrst, to the extent that zonIng removes or mItIgates 
harmful externalitIes. Increases in land values reflect hIgher 
levels of resIdentIal servIces consumed. 
Second, to the extent that fIscal zonIng IS successful. 
new housIng costs per unIt of ser\ice hre Increased and 
resources are redIstrIbuted toward o~ners of pre-exlstln~ 
reSIdential capItal. 
Third, to the extent that envIronmental and subdIVISIon 
regulations Increase land and develop~ent costs In accordance 
with willingness to pay, output of reSIdentIal services is 
increased. 
Fourth, to the extent that these regulatIons add 
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costs beyond those required for health and safety, or beyond 
those reflected in consumers' evaluations, they increase 
housing costs. It has been frequently alleged that the 
overall effect of these latter regulations is excessive; 
indeed it has been estlmated that "unnecessary Improvement" 
costs increased development costs by almost $900 per unlt 
67 
or about 2.5 percent in Northern New Jersey. 
Flfth and last, in residentlal constructlon Interest 
costs and carrYlng charges are enormously Important. Thus 
the real costs Imposed by delays in lengthy compllance reVlews 
and increases In the elapsed tlme of product1on add to the 
unit cost of ne~ housing services and are d€adwelght 
losses to soc1ety. 
2. BU1ldlng codes. 
DespIte the eXIstence of a model bUlld1ng code (or perhaps 
due to the existence of at least five "model" buildlng 
codes), there 1S only a modest level of unlform~ty a."nonb the 
approXImately 8000 local ord1nances WhICh set standards for 
the constructlon of resldentlal hOUSIng. In addlt10n to 
d1fferences among the codes themselves, there are dlfferences 
in the admlnistrative appllcatlon, enforcement procedures, 
and the dlscretlon given to bUllding off1clals, as well as 
the avenues of appeal to review boards and arbl~ration. 
Local building codes include three types of information: 
definitions; licensIng requirements; and standards. 
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Definitions specify, for example, what constitutes plumbing, 
while licensing provisions specify who may install plumbing. 
Finally standards spec1fy the m1n1mum quality or physical 
characteristics of materials or their performance character1stics. 
One role of local building ord1nances, therefor~ ln 
add1t1on to the promot1on of health and safety, 1S the 
promot1on of Job secur1ty or compet1t1on among labor groups. 
In add1t1on, however, local codes rat1fy 1nnovat1ve act1vlty 
by permltt1ng new technlques, mat~rlals, or equlpment to be 
used 1n construct1on. For the evaluat10n of ne" products 
and techn1ques, test1ng laborator1es (such as Under~r1ters' 
Laborator1es) pIa) a key role, but no test1ng result~ are blndlng. 
Thus approval by acy test1n~ lab0r3tor~ ne~d not 1mply product 
acceptance by any Jurlsd1ctlon. The d1fflculty of specifY1ng 
performance standards 1nstead of lnput standards means that 
the innovator must, in pr1nc1ple, submlt h1S product for 
test1ng at the local level. The cr1ter1a for acceptance may 
vary wlth the statutory prov1s1ons of the code and ~lth the 
competence of local off1c1als. As a reSUlt, 1t may be a long 
time before a cost-sav1ng or quallty-enhanc1ng 1nnovat1on 
achieves wlde usage 1n the market. 
A number of states have, however, adopted mandatory 
state codes for some types of construction. For 11 years 
the state of Connect1cut, for example, has had a uniform 
code, and has required that local bU1ldlng off1cials be 
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certified by the state. There is, however, considerable 
Anecdotal evidence that enforcement is far from uniform. 
It Ghould also be noted that some strides In uniformlty of 
state codes has been made in the area of Industriallzed and 
prefabrlcated parts. For example. in Callfornla a prefabrlC.ate,j 
unlt that receives certlflcation under state law at the factory 
is deemed to satlsfy any local requlrements 1n the state. 
Nevertheless. to the extent that the pattern of 
permlssable materials and technlques at the local level lags 
behind best-practlce technology. Increased un1t costs of 
housing result. 
There is confllct1ng eVldence on the magnitude of excess 
costs attr1butable to varlat10ns In bU1ldlng codes. Several 
studies have suggested that the direct effect of bUlld!ng 
codes upon constructlon costs IS small. For example. 
Maisel's early study of the San Franclsco housleg market 
concluded that an Increase of less than one percent In the 
costs of newly constructed hOUSing was attrlbutable to "kno\l,n 
68 
code ineff1cienc1es." 
Burns and ~h t tel back. 1n the} r report to the Kaiser 
CommiSSion. analyzed a survey conducted by House and Home 
(the leading trade Journal) In 1958. and suggested that If 
the 10 most "\\asteful pract lces' required by bUIldIng codes 
were eliminated. the average cost sav1ng for slngle family 
housing would be from 5 to 7.5 percent. "By assum1ng the 
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provisions [of build1ng codes] are randomly distributed and 
by taking account of their varying :,ole in communi"Cies," 
the authors conclude that " ... the estimates represent 
69 
:from 1.5 to 3 percent of the pr1ce of an average house." 
Several other analysts hav~ come to d1fferent conclus1ons, 
however. In expert test1mony presented to the Ka1ser 
Comm1ssion, Johnson con~ludes that " ... 1n large urban 
areas, 1t may be poss1ble to ach1eve on the order of a 10 to 
15 percent reduct10n 1n d1rect construct1on costs [or 5 to 
8.25 percent of sel11ng price by Johnson's calculat1ons] .. 
1f the constra1nts of codes and restr1ct1ve labor pract1ces 
arc removed and If the lndustry 1S allowed to produce as 
7C 
eff1ciently as 1t kno ..... s how." Survey eV1dence gathered by 
the Douglas CommlSS10n 1nd1cated some real cost reduct10ns 
achlevable by mass prOQUct10n under more un1form bU1lding 
71 
codes. The estimates indlcated that If 21 "excessive 
requirements"--not all of which are necessar11y in effect 1n 
any partlcular Jurlsdlction--were eliminated, $1838 would be 
cut from a tYP1cal $12,000 FHA insured house. ThlS represents 
a 15.3 percent reduction 1n constructlon cost (or roughly 
13 percent in sales prlce, if one-f1fth of sell1ng pr1ce 1S 
the land component). The comm1SS1~n report also notes the 
problems of one home manufacturer who estlmated that 
producing a standard product acceptable to the Jurisdictions 
w1thin his six-state market area would lncrease costs by 
$2492 or almost 21 percent. 
-51-
Information cn the cost inCrtlSes attributable to 
excessive code provisions gathered more recently is also 
inconclusive. On the one hand, Muth and Wetzler72 
presented regression estimates relating prices for newly 
constructed dwellings to a du~~y variable indicating a 
locally modifIed building code. Their results suggest that 
the average effect of local code variation on housing prices 
IS only about two percent. On the other hand, Babcock and 
Bosselman, on the basIs of Interviews with builders In OhiO, 
concluded that codes could more than double the cost of 
d o °d I 73 pro uClng reSI entia structures. 
An analysis of the diffusion of Innovation In homebuIlding 
74 
was undertaken by Oster and QUigley. For a sample of 
jurIsdIctIons, they considered the prOVISIons of local codes 
which permitted or barred a number of construction practlces--
all of which were generally agreed to be best practice 
(included were 2" x 3" studs and 24" framIng 1n non-load 
bearing partlt10ns d1scussed earl.er). Their anal~sis 
Indicated that many proxies for the competence of local 
officials and for the Importance of local Interest groups 
affected the speed of diffUSion greatly. In an earlier 
version of thiS paper, they estimated logistic diffUSion 
paths for several 1nnovations. These curves suggested that 
the interval of time ~etween the year when 10 percent of 
jur1sdictions permit an Innovation and the year when 90 
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75 percent grant perm1ss10n, may be as long as thlrty years. 
Hore important than the static excess cost inefficienc1es 
of b~1lding regulatlon, therefore, may be the dynamic effects 
of these barrlers upon the aggregate level of R&D effort 
and ItS allocatlon. With relatlvely long payback perlods 
an1 wlth important local lnteresmat stake, the ex ante 
profltablllty of research in bUlld1ng materlals--ls probably 
reduced, when compared to other research actlvlt1cs, and 
the allocatlon of act1vlty b~t~een labor-savlng and 
capltal-savlng 1nnovat10n may be affected. 
It 1S d1ff1cult to estimate the aggregate effect of 
these types and patterns of local regulatlon upon the supply 
cost of housIng. To some extent, the overall pattern of 
these regulatlons, no doubt, promotes health and safety or 
reflects wllilngness to pay for lmproved housIng servIces. 
To that extent, assoclated increases In houslng costs 
represent, not Inefflc1ency, but Increased output of housIng 
serV1ces. To a large extent, ho~ever, these regulatory 
patterns represent attempts at redlstrlbutlon frum ne~ 
resldents and/or construct1on flrMs to owners of eXlstlng 
propert1es or to other local 1nterest~ such as craft labor. 
To the extent that thls red~strlbutlon 1S successful, 
it increases constructIon costs and generates additIonal 
losses through excess carry'~g costs. Flnally, 1t may 
affect both th& level and dlstrlbutlon of prlvate research 
and development actIvity. 
~.-- -- ---~--.-------..:.-= .:-~--~-~====---=--:..:..-=:-- -
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C. Federal Support of R&D Activity 
As late as 1960, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, 
the direct predecessor to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, had an annual research budget of $15,000. 76 
The Building Research Advisory Board (BRAB) had been in 
existence for 11 years. BRAB, a committee of the National 
Research Councli (~AS) had been establlshed in 1949 as a 
non-governmental agency to stimulate and coordlnate research 
and technology In the construction industry. One reason for 
BRAB's establishment, it is asserted, was to limit any 
federal role in ho~sing research contemplated as a result of 
the 1949 Housing Act. 77 The 1949 Housing Act had authorized 
research on housing codes and technology, but followlng 
industrial Opposltlon, approprlatlons were sus~9nded In 1953. 
By 1960, some small fractlon of the activlties Jf the 
National Bureau of Standards was also devoted ~o building-
related actlvlties. 
In 1962, the Cl~ilian Industrlal Technology Program 
(CI!P) was proposed by the Kennedy administration--a 
Department cf Commerce effort to foster technlcal change in 
selected backward Industries, notably housing and textiles. 
Congressional and industry opposltion prevented the CIPT 
program from being adopted, but from BRAB's opposition to 
CIPT came a proposal for an expanded role for building 
research in the National Bureau of Standards (~BS).78 The 
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present Center for Building Technology. a division of toe 
Institute for Applied Technology, NBS, 15 a descendent of 
the BRAB proposal. 
The Center for Buildlnh T~chnolohY 1S the closest thinh 
to a U.S. natlonal research laboratory for the construct1on 
and housln~ IndustrIes, analohous to national laboratories 
in Scandlnll\'la, FranCl' and En~land. The prlncipal dlffl'rl'ncl' 
1S that the U S. t~stin~ faCllity In ~DS has no nuthorlt\ to 
promul~ate or enforce stand~rds Itself. In 1978 the Center 
employed n st~ff of 250, Includlnh 170 professlnals, had a 
budg~t of $14 ml111on, und"llseng:lhed In a Ilmitl'd \'urll'ty 
7~ 
of t~stlnh and rese~rch actl\ltles. 
NBS IS suppll'mentl'd b) thl' Natll'nal Institute of BUlldlnh 
SClences, a non-governmental advlsory board authorl=ed by 
th~ Housln~ Act of 1974, but not ~stabllshed unt11 1977. 80 
Before the establlshment of HUD In lDG5, federal 
research on bUlldlng t~chnology "as vlrtuall) non-e~lstent. 
By 1969, HUO's r~search bud~et "as less than $.5 mlilion. 
in 1970 it increased t~enty fold, and by 1980 It l~ at a 
HI level of $53 mlilion. Only a small fraction of these 
funds are allocat~d to building rese~rch. pcr sc. In 
FY 1977. for example, the largest fraction of HUD's research 
budget was spent on houslng assistance research (principally 
on housing al1o"anc~s themsel\'t'S and on analyses of the 
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behavior of recipients); 17 percent was allocated to 
community development and neighborhood preservation research, 
and 11 percent was spent on state and local government 
research. Roughly a quarter of the budget is spent on 
housing energy conservation, safety, standards, management, 
82 
and maintenance research. 
Table 10 indIcates the level and dlstrlbut10n of HUD 
adminIstered federal research funds from FY 1974 through 1980. 
HUD sponsor~d research has declined modestly in nom1nal terms, 
more subst~nt1ally 1n r~dl terms, dur1n~ the recent pC~lod. In 
contrast to other fed~ral rese=rch aCltlvities, houslng research 
has represent~d O.~2 to 0.25 percent of federal research funds. 
The HFD rcsv"lrch budget IS roughly 10 percent of the Department 
of AgrIculture research bud~et, the D~partment of Denfense 
research bud~et IS about 20 tlm~s as large. 
Of courSl', the HUD research bud~et dOl'S not represen t 
the only federal resources devoted to reSIdentIal constructlon 
technology. As noted in Table 10 substantldl research on resldentlal 
construct1on IS funded by the D~rartment of Ener~y and more 
limited research IS sponsored by the Department of Defense 
(and the Corps of En~lneers). as well as OSHA, EPA, CPSC, GSA 
~n 
and the National SCIence FoundatIon.' The exact splIt 
between basic and applIed research, b~t"een research on 
techniques,materials and regulation IS unkno"n, and in 
contrast to most Western European natIons, there is no 
centralization of research actIvity. 
It may be instructive to conSIder the one major attempt 
by the federal government to !oster an impro\'ed product Ion 
trchnology, to rationalize regulatory standards, and to 
create a ~ore stable environment for residential constructIon. 
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Table 10 
level and Distrlbution of HUD Adminlstered Federal 
Research Funds 1974-1980 
1974 1975 1976* 1977* 1978 
housing assistanc~ 
research $16.2 $15.6 $15.6 $15.8 $12.6 
safety and 
standards 2.9 4.1 4.8 6.1 3.7 
state and local 
government and 
research 7.8 8.1 5.4 8.6 
program evaluatlon 
and support 2.7 3.8 4.3 5.3 
othel' HUD 
research 33.3 36.6 32.3 36.2 39.7 
total HUO 
research 560.2 $56.6 $61.9 $71.0 $61. 3 
energy conservatlon 







39.0 31 7 
557.9 553.0 
21. 7 6.4 
Source: Department of Houslng and Urban Development. HUe Statlstical Yearbook, 
US GPO. 1974-1980. 
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1. Operation Breakthrough84 
The housing act of 1968 expressed as a goal the completion 
of 26 million additional dwelling units in a ten year perIod, 
an average annual figure that ~as forty percent larger than 
average annual number of hous,1ng cOl'lpletions during the 
previous fifteen years. In respons~ to the report of the 
Douglas Commlss1on, ~hlCh had included optImIstic projections 
on the POSSibIlIties for industrialIzed, mass produc~~ 
housln~, the act included Sl'C t lOn 108 to "encourage tDe 
use of new [construction] technologies." ThIS sect10n 
authorIzed the Secretary to select plans for the development 
of houslnb using new technologies, to construct at least 
1000 d~ellings a year for five years USIng fIve dIfferent 
technologies, to evaluate the technologIes, and to report 
the find1ngs to Congress. 
Governor George Romney becanll' Secret~ry of urn 1n J.lDuary 1968 
without a program but ~ith a clear mandate fr0m the prev10us 
ConGress to increase the supply of tlousing quickly. "Operat1on 
Dreakthrouf.h" was announced at a prcs~ conferenel.' In ~Iay 
1969 and formed the baSIS for ~uch of the ne" Secretary's testImony 
55 before the Senate that month. SectIon 108 of the houslng act had bl.'CI 
written rather narrowly, J.t "as intended tll test Whether 
economies of scale existed for ,~!taln promlslng technologies, 
and to report the results to CODgr~ss. AccordIng to the 
Secretary, the design of Operation Breakthrough thus included 
an attempt to use off-SIte factory methods--"new technologles"--
to increase the hOUSIng supply rapidly. Such a rapid 
increase in pr0duction reqUIred some understanding and 
modifi~atlon of other Institut10nal factors--the cyclical 
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nature of demand and the pattern of regulation--as well as 
k succesEful test for the presence of economies of scale 
along the way. 
Operatlon Breakthrough "attempted to increase the 
efficiency of the market mechanism for houslng output by 
reducing the institutional barriers among the various segments 
of th~ industry (locallzed buildlng codes, zonlng laws, etc.). 
Such action was ultlmately intended to 1ncrease the market 
incentives for prlvately funded R&D. the results of which 
would permit the lndustry to respond in a timely and 
appropriate fashlon to [secular] changes In supply or demand 
condlt1ons The breakthrough program gave heaviest emphasls 
to . . . the more speci f1 c R&D pollcy category. ,,86 
Operation Breakthrough would be 1mplemented 1n three 
phases: Phase I, Design and Development, on cost plus 
contracts with an expected durat10n of 2-4 months; Phase II, 
Prototype Complet1on. also on cost plus contracts w1th 
production in another 12 months; and Phase III, Volume 
Productio~ to last indef1nitely. 
In1tially, about 1000 des1gn prototypes developed dur1ng 
Phas~ I were to be constructed during Phase II cn WIdely 
varyin~ geographic sItes. These prototypes would serve as 
sales models for Phase III production. During th1S period 
as well, NBS would conduct l~boratory and fleld tests to 
verify their acceptabll1ty. Certificates of acceptance 
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would be issued, and the producers would then manufacture 
their systems for sale at a private profit. Originally each 
producer would install 5 to 7 housing systems to increase 
the chances of successful marketabllity. 
Phase II constructlon r~quired the selectlon of site 
planners, site developers, and sitclocatlons, as well as the 
select10n of hous1ng manufacturers. In add1tion, durlng Phase 
II, HUD would support state and local stud1es to ldent1fy 
sltes for full scale product1on. 
Note the deslgn of th1S arnblt10uS program. It ~ould not 
be unt11 several years after volume productlon bad been under~ay, 
that the congressional mandate (to test economies of scale 1n 
the market) would have been fulfllled. Note also that the 
Operat1on Breakthrough program or1glnally planned to SUbs1d1ze 
only 1000 unlts before beg1nnlng volume production. Sectlon 108 
~uthorlzed lnstead a test of 25,000 SUbs1d1zed unlts before 
submltt1ng a feaS1b1llty report to Congress. 
Apparently, Operat1on Breakthrough, as or1glnally 
concelved, would produce houses; and factorles to produce hous~s, 
and lnstltut10nal regulatory reform, and research and development 
of new technologles, and, in addlt1on, would provlde a 
demonstrat1on. With1n HUD, the Off1ce of ResearLh and Technology 
. . 
was elevated to Asslstant Secretary level and two former NASA 
/ 
officials were recru1ted to the program. The R~search and 
Technology office emphaslzed communlty development, analys1s 
of the entire delivery system, and the potentlal for modern 
management techniques. 
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Phase I RFP's were issued in June 1969 and firms bad 
90 days to respond. More than 600 propo~als were submitted 
(instead of the 50-100 expected). and HUD had 5 montbs to 
evaluate theIr technlcal and cost characteristics~7 The 22 
winnIng flrms. announced In February 1970 included several 
hrms new to the hOUslng Industry (e.g .. Republlc Steel) and 
four aerospace cuntractors. Ten of the systems select~d 
were of modular de&lgn. nlne were panel desIgns, and th~~~ 
used component assemblles. 
Eleven sites were selected for Phase II In response 
to 218 proposed by communlt les In 36 states. Wi th the 
exceptIon of ~ew England, they represented broad geographlcal 
coverage. Fundlng cutbacks subsequently elImInated two of 
these. Flnally, eleven slte planners and developers aere 
selected by June 1970. 
At Secretary Romney's request, the approprlatlons of the Offlce 
of Research and Technology aere Incrc3s~1 taenty fold. from 
$.5 mililon to $10 mililon. Policy declslons to e~phaslze 
integrated communIty development Increased deslgn and 
evaluation costs for a flxed Operatlon Breakthrough budget of 
$60 million. 88 
With three months to respond to the Phase I RFP, it was 
clear that potential entrants were forced to rely on 
"off-the-shelf" technologles, whic~ would then be tested and 
refIned durlng the 2-4 month develcpment effort. The 
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development of evaluative criteria was entirely BUD's 
respons1b1l1ty, since HUO's certiflcate of acceptance would 
certlfy health, safety, habitability, and (perhaps implicitly) 
marketablilty of the dwell1ngs. 
A hard-nosed dec1s1on to design appropriate performance 
spec1flca t ions and conduct tests relat 1 ve to performance was 
requ1red 1f the prototypes were to be marketed at all 1n 
other 10ca11t1es w1th restrict1ve code provis1ons, and if 
subseq~ent R & 0 was to he st1mulated. This proved to be 
a difficult undertak1ng, requ1r1ng time and money as well 
as the redes1gn of more than half of the prototype plans. 
Phase I was scheduled for complet1on by August 1970, but 
was not, 1n fact, completed unt1l one year later. 
The NBS development of performance based codes was 
d · f 1 89 reporte 1n our vo umes. The codes also contained novel 
prov1s1ons concern1ng the habitability and durab1llty of 
dwell1ngs. The performance standards 1n the codes necess1tated 
some "reasonable englneer1ng Judgments," (Much as bU1ld1ng 
codes themselves often do 1n pract1ce). Some ambiguity was 
introduced between the development/des1gner in~erpretat10ns 
and tbe NBS 1nterpretat1on. More importantly, however, 
ambiguities were 1ntroduced into the interpretations of FHA 
underwriters and potential leaders. 
As precious time was lost during the initial phase 
(!lnd as it was feared that more precious momentum would be 
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lost with further delays), the strategy of parallel R ~ D 
was introduced. Parallel R&D had been successfully 
employed for a decade at NASA in producing pure hardware. 
Apparently the strategy of parallel R&D proved very 
costly. Four dlvis1ons: technlcal, site planning, "market 
aggregation" (i.e., subsequent market1ng under Ph~se III), and 
financ1ng, each ronducted development actlv1t1PS slmultaneously. 
The relat10nship among these activit1es was not well-known 
ex ante, and the 1mpl1cat1ons of alternat1ve development 1n 
anyone d1v1s1on were hardly understood. As a result, 
valuable "t1me was used up redes1gn1ng housing systems and 
reallocat1ng them across sltes to meet f1nancial comm1tments 
arranged before the sltes and systems had been completely 
des1gned and evaluated." 90 
Substantive changes had to be made 1n more than half of 
the hous1ng systems, increas1ng costs, remov1ng innovat1ve 
component& and leavlng llttle t1me for dlsrasslonate 
evaluation of the redeSIgned systems. By the t1me the 
impl1cations of this were understood, 1t was slmply too late; 
site development and mortgage fInanCIng for Phase II had been 
locked In. 
Phase II contracts were Signed wlth 21 of the 22 buildlng 
firms and wIth the slte developers. For legal reasons, these 
contracts were ultimately on a fixed fee basis, Wh1Ch 
increased the risk to manufacturers. More 1mportantly, 
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however, HUD was in the position of being unable to acquire 
legally any comparative cost data from Phase II. 
Given budgetary realltles, Phase II could only be 
financed by privatP mortgage financing backed by FHA. FHA 
had already seen lts prlmacy wlthln HUD ecllpsed by the 
elevatlon of the Offlce of Technology and Research. The 
Assistant Secretary for Housing Production and Mortgage 
Credlt, a former presldent of the Natlonal Assoclatlon of 
Home Builders, allegedly interpreted Operatlcn Breakthrough 
as an attempt to "federallze" resldentlal cO:lstructlon. 9l 
In any case, appllcations for flnanclng Phase II and Phase 
III were not expedlted at local HUD/FHA offices. Of more 
import, however, was that designs were up to the new 
performance standards, not the lnput-related (and FHA 
established) Mlnlm~ Property Standards (!lIPS). Flnally, the 
MPS were themselves under reVlew, and many in the lndustry 
were qUlte nervous that MPS "'ould be replaced, in an instant, 
by the NBS performance criterla. In any case, FHA flnanclng 
arrangements required compllcated, lengthy, and costly 
procedures 
\ 
The first Phase II prototype (in Kalamazoo, the 
f' 
Secretary's home state) "'as completed in March 1972. ~ost 
of the other sites were about a year behlnd schedule. At 
this point, given the lengthy delays and the loss of 
momentum, it was decided to per~lt Phase II and Phase III 
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operations in tandem, subject to the condit1on that Phase 
II prototypes be "sufficiently advanced." According to -::he 
NAS rev.iew, levels of quality assurance were qU1te low, 
especially when compared to the des1gn tests Wh1Ch had been 
imposed in Phase r.92 
As Phase II and Phase III proceeded 1n tandem, federal 
rent Subsld1es and Sectlon 236 SubsIdies were offered for 
Phase III unIts to speed p~oduction of Phase II prototypes. 
For the 17 producers who intended to proceed to Phase III, 
the 1nducement to complete the prototypes was qU1te strong. 
Sect10n 2~6 set aS1des of 1000 units per producer were 
offered. For the other 4 producers, th1S prov1ded no added 
inducement to complete the "exper1ment" 1n a t1mely fash1on. 
As a result of the d1ff1cult1es w1th the FHA, HL~ 
authorized the redeSIgn of Phase III to accommodate local 
bU1ld1ng codes a~d ~WS. 
On January 16, 1973, Pres1dent Nixon Imposed an 
1ndef1n1te morator1um upon ne~ allocat1ons of Sect10n 236 
SUbS1dy moneys. 
The rest, as they say, .1S "h1story." The or1g1nal 1000 
SUbSIdy un1ts per producer was honored, but no add1t1onal 
units were author1zed. Producers were forced to substitute 
"standard" components and procedures for "lnnovative 
technologies" to comply with MPS, at 1ncreased SIte and 
off-site costs. 
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In all, about 25,000 Phase III units were completed in 
150 different developments using Section 236 set asides. 
Only 1500 units were completed for unsubsidized occupancy 
at market ~nterest rates. 93 
As of 1977, less than 7000 ~nnovat~ve un~ts had been 
marketed outslde of Operatlon Breakthrough by these f~rms 
at market ~nterest rates. 
No factory came close to completlng a sinble volume run. 94 
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The I!lC ~or veh1cle 1nJustry usu.lll i r.l:.~s h1C;h 1n 1mV)!'":'ar,ce a.'fc.-q 
'-!nt!rlcan inJustries. 1"1 19"-;. the \'eh1cle and motor 1ndustry alone 
employeJ 1.6 m1ll10n workers and had ~et s~lcs of S162 b11l10~. 1 A 
study of the 1nteract10n between pl.Lll.c po11cy and 1nnovat10n 1n thlS 
1ndustry should be interest1ng 1n lts ~I r1ght, Slnce 1t w1ll tell us 
somethlng abo~t a slgn1f1cant fract10"l of 1ndustrlal actlvlty lr the 
U.S. It 10'111 also Y1eld 1ns1ghts lnto the problems of publlC pol1cy 
when government aqenCleS fac.: ollgopolles and lnto thE: strength 3r.j 
weaknesses!: of requlatory pollc1es ",t.1ch try to 1nduce te':"rr.olOGl Crl! 
changt! . 
lt 1S 1mrvrtant t,l dlstlngulsh between the two. EJ nro1Jct lrnC\ .... OL-:. 
we l'Iean changes In the f 1nal rroduct;) wh~dl consumers buy. By orc:x:x?ss 
ln~ovat10n. we mean chanqes in the methods bi WhlCh the ~rod~ct~ ar, 
manufactured. These two categorles are not wholly separabl,': (~3r=~_ 
1n product characterist1cs frequently req,Jlrc lor follow from) ch.l~c;:es 
1n =anufActurlng techniques. ~nd, at the lll'11t, dlscover1ng how tc ma~e 
the 5..me quaIl ty automoblle "'1 th fe .... e. r 1nr ':ls and d1scover 1ng ho ... t<. 
make an 1m~roved quality automob1le w1th the same 1nputs hlve a ~rcat 
deal of conceptual Slm11ar1tlcs. Stlll,thc dlstlnctlon 1S usetul. 
Both kinds of innovations hAve been iaportant in the .ator v.h~cle 
industry, but regulatory policy has been largely &~ at product 
lnnovatlon. ThlS could be contrasted ~lth, for example, the electr~c 
utll~ty or steel lndustrle~, ~n WhlCh regulatory polley (~xternallty 
regul~t~on of alr a~d water pollutlon) has largely affected proces~ 
~nnovatlon. 
The remdlnd~r of thlS pacer will bP org~nlzed as fullows· Sect;cn 
II wl!l descrlbe the general lndustrla~ lrganlzatlon of the ~tor vehlt!e 
lndustry. Se~tlon III wlll dlSCUSS th~ gell~ral cha~actcr of technlca! 
progress 1n the 1ndustry, coverlng both F~oJ~ct 1nnovatlon and flocess 
lnno\'atlon. Sectlon IV w1lI review the m3Jor government pollcles Wh1Ch 
have 1nfluenced technlcal progress 1n thlS lndustry. Sect10n V will 
anal)'ze the quest10ns that can be r31sed concerr.1ng government POllC1CS 
Wh1Ch affect techn1cal progress 1n thlS lndustry. And Sectlon VI wlil 
offer sonx~ brlef conclus1o~ 
- ~-
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II. 'nIE IftDUSTIlIAL OMGANIZATION OF 'nfE terOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
Tbere are A numbor of iaportant features of the current atructure 
of the da.eSt1C ~tor vehicle induetry:2 The aajor ~i •• are large: 
they are few: the barriers to de nouveau entry are extr.-ely high: 1n 
the automob1l~ segment of the industry the companles are dea11ng largely 
A. 
wlth unsoph1stlcated buyers in.lMrket 1n WhlCh replacemeT,' demand IS 
dOlfu.ant and bt .Irt! loyalty 1S l.Dlportant; and lead t11f,CS are long, large 
SUlTlS nust be spent., and large SWl.no£ In deM.:md are !'Osslb:e, all of 
Wr.lC~ =omblne to :reate large t1SKS. 
General H"tors, Ford, and Chrys! er arc the lea:hng compa'lles 10 
botr the al.tomobl.le and tru(..k. markets. Thel were, resrectlvely, the 
second. fourth, a"d slxteenth largest l'ldustrl.ll com[,an1es (bi' sales) 
1n the UUlted States 1n 1979. The fourth largest produ=er, AIr.erIcan 
~tcrs. was the l09th largEst 1ndustniJl COMpany HI 1979, the fl fth 
largest truck produ=er, InternatIonal Har\ester, was the 27th lar~est 
1nJustr1al cOMFany 1n the U.S. 
TheSE: very large compan1es ha\'e tt:'lh\ed to domlrate the auto and 
truck dreas. Table 1 pro\'ldes the averagt. Nc-·rth Amer1can pro:l.lct.1C-, 
sh.lres for tile yt'ctrs 1976-1977. 3 Table:: pro\lde~ t.he i1veraqe UnIte:: 
St.ates sales shd.e~ for thes~ san~ yeals. Imlrrts hdve, of course, 
'lTadl.all:' t.lkt..n a larger shue ;:Jf the t,.::. automoblle ~n.et ovel t.'1: 
past 25 years. !n 1979, t.he llT1pO:-t sUilre> W.IS 2;\, d':lU' 19-< 1t l: 
expected t.o rISl' well abo\,(' 2~'. WhE',:nt'1 thL' 19P,) flJ.lre 15 ., te-:- ,,_r. 
debdte (auj cc.uld tt. afte.·ted by currv: puhlIC 1,,11CY declslon-> .... 1 " 
respect to t.arl!fs '::'l.:i ql.ot.,:.) Evel' wItl t.1l .. In~1'.:S10n ot the lrl~ ""--
1n market share f1gu~es, 1t 1~ n~\ertheless clear th~t t~ three 1 •. 
do=estlC producers stIll dO~lnate the markpt. 
t'able 1: Averaqe North ~ricAn Production SMres-,1976-1979 
Auta.obile Truck 
Averaqe Productlon (nurbers) 9,940,000 3,923,000 
Shares: 
AJner1can H.:>t01S 2.1\ 4.9\.] 
1 ,.5 13.1 
26.7 33.0 
3.4 
Ge:IE;ra.l. Motors 5"'. J 
Other \." .. ,: 2.3 
a. Inclu1~s J~~; 
b. Inc1_jes Cl.~,-ker. \".:>Hslo .~.: 1;' :."'1er=.=3. Clnj .J(.lv~ c,f ("1, .c,:; 
Source: Ho .. or \'t:~llcle Mdn.J~.1cture! s I.SS':>Cl')~.I.0f' :!9. '). 
.. 
~able 21 Average U.S. Sales (Reqlstratlons), 1976-1979 
AutclIlOblle Tr.:clts 
._--
Average Sales (nWllbers) 10,464,000 3,SOO,OuO 
Sh.lres: 
Amerlcan M..)tC"rs 1. 8\ ).9\d 
Ch:-ysler 10.7 12.0 
Ford 22.1 33.0 
Inter: ~:'l":1al Hdr.~stel 3.2 
Ge- en.l '1,) t ",'!' C'" 46. Q 4 - -
OttE: : 1 - .1.> t. :l 
b. Includes Checkel, VoIy~wJgun of Amerlca, anJ lmport5 
SOl-fce: Au torno t 1 Je Nt'ws (196('). 
• 
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All of the maJor d~stlC manur~cturers are character1zed by rxten-
SIYe vertical integration. All assemble theIr own vehicles and produce 
~ll or most of the1r maJor sheet me:al stamplngs, ca.tings, anc drive 
traln co=PQnents: englnes, tranSMlSSIons, ~~lc$, etc. All p=oduce some 
of the uUlcr parts and components of t~~lr vehlcles and buy.the remalnder 
from parts 5~PFl1ers. Despite thlS extensive vertIcal lntegratlon l.ra 
telTls of processes and components, howe'o'er, the JIIOtor vehlcle Indus~ry' s 
vertIcal Integratlo~when measured by the rat •• of val~e added to sales) 
1S only at or below the average for all manufacturlng. In 1978, General 
Metors' ratIO of val~e added to sales w~s 48.5\; for Ford It W3S 39.0\, 
and for O>rysle. It was 33.2\. For all IT..1"lufacturIng 1n 1976, thlS salt,e 
rJUO was 43.1'. 
The parts suppllers wl.th whom ~hey deal range frOM l.Jrge cOI"l?a;',le" 
s~:h JS BerjIv, Mrtorcla, and TRW, whlch wre also In the Forture 50~, 
to SIr • .lll m.Jdllnc f;'X..l r-anuf~cturerl'- wh..:;,.;c nar-cs arc y' :'al"l~ lar tc ari'cr,E: 
'l~lte tugl .. Tilt> on!/ entl lOts lnt{) t~c U.S. m.:;rkct ,,'I th( I'1st )( \'L rs 
ba5e and an establlshed product. 
The ~utornoblle market lS larClely one of technIca!ly Ur.SOrhlstlcate:-'" 
b.lycrs. Repla':E:l"Ient demand dorr.lnates the mal ket, and bra'ld 10ra1 tj I S an 
Il"lpor:ant pnenomenon. l.e., lf a manufa,turer loses sales because It has 
produced an unappeall.ng product, It wlll ha\e a dlrflc~lt tl.r-~ wlnnlng 
them back. 
-" . 
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Finally, the risks are h1gh. New models requ1re four to f1ve 
years of lead time. Hundreds of .il110ns of dollars au.t be spent 
veIl before a new model is introduced. B~rs are cloarly fickle 
and, because demand i. largely for replAcement, can delay purchases 
and retain thelr eX1st1ng cars longer. SW1ngs of 15\ or Dare 1n 
annual 1ndustry sales are not uncommon, and even larger sw~ngs l~ 
lndlVldual company sales are qU1tp posslble. 
The 1lrtp11catlcns of thlS 1ndustry struct~re fvr 1nnO\'at1on are 
prof~,und. The hlg'l barr1ers to entri me<l~ that 1f an 1r.:ler>€~:lent l:'n:>-
\,at.::>r has a "bett.:r 1dea" for a veh1cle, d l1"aJo:- compont:·~t (e.g., e::g.ne 
or trdnSlI:lSs .. en), or a manllfact_r1ng F_C,CE:SS, hl:; or.ly hope fer e.e r tu;ll 
succ£.ss lles ln cunvlnclng .:me amoflg a 11 terol h lndful 0= MClrufact~rers 
of that lr.rova~lC,r.·s w.Jrtr-. He has vlrt'13!ly nv hopl. o~ esta~:lst.~rg 
retalllng, or apparel rnan.lfacture, lr' w'uch c:flc1er.·. s:~l( 15 c;:. ... t ar .. -
tll/ely small. entry 1S compa-atlvely e.;os}, and .orneone w1th a "b<:~t.er 
ldea" could reallstlcally expect to brln::: 1 t lntC' Froduc~ 1(,:,. 
demand. But rroduc~ change lS rls~y, anJ the mJ:-e func~~e:'t~! t~~ ~hCl~~e, 
the r1sk1er It 15. 4 G th 1 k f h 1 h l'Jen e a= 0 te= n1t:'3 sop lst.=.:t. • .:n c: ;:~:~-
charges vould be qU1te rlskj. Buyerr r.ll::;ht not resr'c',.; !'\ dry ~\'e':, 
and a ser10Us technIcal fallu.e cou!j bt q.ltr cost:y a~~ galn t~e cO-~~'Y 
a reputatlon ot poorly eng1neeled cars. n s~'atc~1 tha~ :rst~3~ re::c= 
FIlnanly on styllng IT'I"'del ch.lrges \0.. t~ • ~"$t ':.c:! 
wpuld be less r.sky; a poorly designed Dadel would, of course lose 
sales but there would be no long run reputation involved; ln prlnclple, 
better deslg~ed models in the future co~ld regain tre sales (subJect, 
0: course, to the drags of brand loyalty). Even process charg~s, 
though pr:>mlslng cos~ SuVl"lgs, carrj the r1sk of ca_slng de:ectll.'e pilrts 
Wh1Ch can be e"ptenS1VE' to replace and can earn the cOl".pa~l· a bad rep.Jt3t1on; 
aga:l. graoJa: 1S- 1S llkel} tc ~ thE' fa',,'lc-; strate<?:,. 
\o.e no ... tJl', tr. the aL':u.ll E'Xi-Cr1ence 1n t.h~ IT'u:.or vl.l' .. cle 1ndu."try. 
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III. '!'HE CHARACTER OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
A. Pr~ue( Innovatlon 
It is d1fflcult to provlde ~ quantitative statement of the nature 
and extent of product improvements 1n the motor vehielz industry, and 
5 
we shall not try to do 80 here. Instead, we w1II offer a .are qual1-
tatlve descrlptlon of the character of product innovation. 
In the e1ght decades cf their eXlstence, cars and trucks have ex-
per1enced substant1al pr~uct innovat1on. Some aspects of the product 
have rema1ned constant: the 1nternal combustlon eng1ne 1S sull the 
Fr1marl =C~C of propulslon; four wheels are st111 standard, and the 
dr1ver has a seat and a steer1ng me~han1sm. But MOst other aspe=ts 
o! vehl;;les ha"e undergone substantlal changr!i: the Slze, shape, and 
eff1c1en=y of eng1nes ar.j thelr ernlSS10ns (pcllut1on' trarocterls:1cs; 
the natur~ of transm1SSlons; the slze,'weH':ht, comfrrt, a-d saf'ety cf 
TillS cIa 1m that there h...t=- bo:cn s:"?S~,J'!tl I chal l! '!:>l''" n-: rC'.J:!:' 
tlme Fattern to the 1ndus:rJ '5 1nnovat1on beh.,\'lor. 
The !lrst two decade~ of the twcntleth tent~ri, pr1cr to World ~.J: 
I, \ol (.'~ ,!.r.~rs of gleat fluld1ty for the lnoustry. Overdll gro ... ·~, \odS 
rap1d, entry was easy, llan} flnns d1d 1n fact enter and eXl t, ar~ :-.a~ket 
shares fluctuated extens1vely. New 1deas dccompan1ed the new f1rrrs, and 
the electr1cal starter ~tor, the v-a englne, the closed passenger com-
partment, .nd slgn1f1cant 1mprovements 1n t1res, 11ghts, and electrlca! 
systems were all 1ntroduced durlng thesp decades. 
, , 
!he two dec.des betveen the two World Wara CAn be .een •• a trans-
ition period. Entry vas now .-or. difficult. The nec •••• ry aanuhcturing 
fac1l1t1ea vere mor~ .xpensive: a rel1able dealer organization vas d1ffi-
cult to .ss~mb1e. A few flrms tr1ed to enter: more exited, By the en1 
of the 1920'5 the Si\me three compan1es that dr.1"I1nilte today's IIIOtor vehle'le 
market had a 72\ conblned market share of the auto market, In the early 
lq:!O's Gc'neral Hol"IS developed 1ts b"slc auto marketlng strateQ1t.!>: 
",.. car for every pUlse and purpose," whIch meoln~ blanketlng tt>e market. 
wlth models in e\'ery pnce range, And an an ... al IDC.lde1 change whIch wOl.~d 
encourage replacement purchases of new cars. Walter Chrysler, a General 
Hc~,:)r!> "gTldu.:.tc", revl\'eJ the 4111ng HaX'oocll-Ct • .Jlmers CorporatlO"l H. 
the early 19~O's, became pres1Jent 1n Ig23, brouqht out the Chrysler 6 
the followl1g YEJr, a"d changed tt-~ cor-pany's name to hIS olo'n the YC.Jf 
after th~t. He Tarldly adopted mdfketlno slratcYles th.:.l were Slmlla! to 
t.h':>se o! Ge"~I.JI ~.)tC1S, tOld too', ;~ngcI t.:J .l.!o~·~ t~~IT. but e',·e~f~.l:ly 
dId so lr t~( la:(' 19 .. S·s. 
\o.lt'1 e"ll!) !II(! •• Cl'!ICI.1t " I d' ,·,'fl..I"',' I"\J!ketlnC' t!ml''1a~~c; C': 
th~ pl.:>::L.: .t!>l!f) tt.e pacl..'..,1 Inrc·'.at!on ap,l..'.lrs tCJ have slack .... "leu 
sunewl.l! lr, "nlos Re!lneml..',u: C'ontlr . .JlJ tv bt. 1"\3":... Cars bt;'I.,H·\. 
larqt.r, he.l\h·r, anJ more pow .. rful. B) til. 1930'<; oodles wefe al: 
e:-.:-losed ~lId enllrely of stt:'cl. '"Aer"jY"olMIC'," slteaml1ll('::! desl;;ns 
rc~laced the square. boxy deslgns of 19~J'~. A~tDmatlc tranSl"\lSSlC"l~, 
JX"'~r br.u.es. lind pover ateerlng vere flrst dc\'(:lo~d for larger trucks 
and buses. At the end of the 1930's automatlC transm18S1ons vere beglnnlng 
to be applled to autoeoblles, but the ('utbt t'Jk of World War II bfC'cght 
al! automobIle prod.Jction to a halt. 
.. -/1-
~) 
It .h worth noting that the _aller COIIPaniea 1n the industry appear 
to have eccounted for a diaproportionate ahare of the innovations in 
the induatry prior to World War 11. 6 They MAy have been .are wll11ng 
tc t ue the r ulcJ of prodllct chanqe because they were 1 •• 5 able to 
Ir..lt:h the la: ler cotllt'anies' styl1ng DIOdel t.hanqes. 
The twt"' .. iec.ldc:; bfotween the lolte 194C"s a"1,i the la~c 1900'~ 
w~r(' c:earlv a perioj in whIch thE' alotr, market fCJ('lIsed 01. !otyllnq AI d 
IIIC"lt a,o ~ 5pre.H"! C" the IIIlJur pre-w;):, lnnovoltlol''> - auto'T.~t 1:: t "anslT .'.Slon 
an..! i ow_r (·.,.llrr'e-:t - anj Il1gh corrr:e~sl 'n en .In .. ~. A Q~'0d ,lute. rr ..... lur.~ 
o~ till' late 1940's wO.Jld havt: had bttlc dlf!lcult}' !n undcrst.l'.d1nCl .1 
car of the latE' lq(·O's. Parts suprllers pl.lyt·Q lIIaJor rol~s 1n M.Jlll of 
the tech'lologl c.:d developments that d1d occur. Te:-hnCllog1cAI .1d·:a:-.u.·-: 
were :requer.!.lr 1ntroduced on smdll volume eXI enS1":: 1I0odels a'")" the:., 
,le.lII}, r~ 't;('"cd risk!>. 
I It 1'> \o.,rth rct1ng lh'\t, pl1t,r tl' the' 1111.1 ICh.,O's, the- rejcr .. l 
/ 1.., 
J 
cltly 1n·lu~·"1. lrQ thE' pattcr.1 of VChl,'l(' de""}"pn(,f1t. 
1n 19{'~. In that year, Con<;rcss auth;:>rlze""l the b.'tt1ng of emlSSlC'1 
control stard.srds for vehlcles, and the follOWIng YE'.,r It olutllC'rl=ca 
extensive aafety standards. (A more det'llleci dlScusslon of these polloe!> 
wi 11 be prO'l.'lded 1n Part IV.) 
,"- I 
" .. , .,. ( 
"-
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~ese standards first took effect in the 1968 .ode1 year. !Emiss~on 
controls bad been required earlier in the 1960's in California). 
The standards did not have a .. rious impact on the industry until 
the early 1970's. The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, however, 
requlred subst~r.t~al redllct~ons in auto emission by 1975 and 197~, and 
the lndu.lry (and s~ of its suppl1ers) ~gan focus1ng a substant1al 
an.'ur.t of resei\Tch on emlssions reduction. The industry's inab1l1ty 
l: meet the or1glnal deadl~nes led to repe~ted delays 1n the scheduleJ 
1rpos1t1on of the str1ngent standarcs, w1th full 1mposit1on now sche=~:e~ 
!'I the early lqbC's. (Truck emlS~lOn:i ha.'p always been regulated mor£-
:er.!en!.:y. anJ Cc,I'T-arable redl.octll r.s are m't scheduled untll the mld 
19t'O's:. Th" l.ndl.o~~ry 11. tl,c. early 19~,1's se~tl('d on a c .. t.Jlyst tecr.-
n.:)log)· to c.)ntrol el'llSSlcns. Thl.!' has beer SIIFi lemented l.n the ~ar.l} 
,If,oJ alr mn.tures. (Ir, the e~rly 197(1'<;, tnt'L:1~. tW) CJcrscuS manufa;--
tUlers. Hn',ia drd Toyo Kocyo Ga::d~ I.h(,~(' .dt· ~niltl\e enOl-,e .!eSlll',!: 
as t~e way to meet the emlSSlon sta~J'1J~.) 
Also H. the eOlrl}' 1970' S ttte Department of TrOlnSFor~atlon '5 
Natlonal Hlghway Trafflc Safety Acmlnl~tratlon (NHTShl flrst tnee to 
establlsh !tandards that would requlrc paSSlve restraults - at the tll"E' 
It was thought th.H only alr bags would meet the n.·qulrem~rt - ~n .:111 
autom::>blle:>. The standards were chal!enge,~ 11. the COUl ts and overtur~e:::l 
standards, and thlS tlme tile stanJarj~ wlth:>to~d legal challenges. S 
Pas:>l. ve restralnts cue now schedule::! to be pl • .lsed ln durlng tho< 1992-
198~ lICodel years, but, unles<; Congress Sre~lrlcally requlres alr bags, 
requir ... nts, have DOant • refocusing of relearch efforts toward areas 
that the c~an1~s would not have pursued as vigorously. 
Finally, 1n DecPlber 1975 Conqress p.lsse.} the Enerqy Pohey an'l 
Consl.!rvation ~ct WhlCh estAbhshed fuel econnmy standards for automot.lles 
for 1978-1980 and 1985 (and authorized NHTSA to .et standards for the 
1991-1984 years); the 198~ standard of 27.5 mlles per gallon for the 
sol1ero-weighted average of new cars sold 1n that year by each company 
lS rou9hly double the fuel economy ach1~ved by the new car fleet 1n 
1973. For a penod in 1978 and 1979, lt appeared that the fuel economj' 
stan::3rcs would be ser10us1y b1ndlng on the domest1c manufacturf'rs ~mJ 
wo.Jld force them to take techno10c31cal .1ctluns WhlCh they would not othc!'-
~lse pursue. But the sharp lncrease 1n gaso11ne rrlces 1n mld 1979 h~s 
caused car demand to Shlft sh~rply toward smaller, more fuel ef(lClent 
~~.~, a"j tht current standards through 19Q 5 are unl1ke!y to be L1nd1n~. 
1" .. ShIft In demand lndu.:ed by the h1a~ fucll'l"lct' by Itself 15 shl:tlna 
:.ho;> s.!les wC'lohtcj d\'eragt' of mIlt's Fef callen subst.HltlJllj' UPlol:-::, 
m,'"t fur tt.~, =omtdnl(~ to develoF models .lnd techn.le.le!:> thlt ~'Ill il': 
y .. t ore.Her fuel ee:>"lon:. 
In Sur"\l'\.lQ. then. the emls .. 1ons ar I safety re;"IatIc .. 0' th, I.· .. r:': 
19-(1'5 anj th, sharp 1ncrease 1n the prIce C'f gasollnc 111 1979 tllS Ie: 
to a subst.!nt1al change 1n the pattern of 1nnm:at10:: 1n the motor vehH it' 
1ndustry. Huch more effort lS be1ng devoleJ to met'llng the rcgu!.ltory 
requlrements and 1n 1nCTeaslng fuel efflclc~~i. The cycle of muo~. 
changes has been cons1derably stretched out, .:1S cOlT'.pared wlth the !J.lt tell' 
o! the 1960's. The 1ndustry's prod~ct lnnov.HI<'n attcntlon h.ls elc Ir I} 




Unlike prodllct innovation, proccas. innovation in the IIOtor 
vehicle industry is sUlceptible to quantltative investi9ltion, at 
lea~t in an lndlrect ~nner. We can examine indexes of IIOtor vehIcle 
1ndustry output per worker and reta1l autom~bile prices and comp.:-.rt 
thell trends over time with those in other sectors in the economy 
As we shall see, the perfo~ance 1n these areas by the motor veh1clc 
1ndustry h~~ been relat1vely good. The cla1m th~t most engIneers 1~ 
~trC'1 t would be wIll1ng t-:> sf'll thl)lr grandmothers for tt.·: OP1'0!'" :l-1.1 t~· 
tu Solve 25.: reI ci'lr rr .. 1:,' t>e an e)a-1rJerat1o~., but It 1S ClC'31 th.Jt the 
tlO: shol-ld b.' added. Slnce 19~9, th€.· bure .. l of L.":!hC'r S~.ltl!:tlCS t. s 
been ad).J<;tlng the new cal fr1ce 1ndex for product qual1ty ll!'prOVenen~s. 9 
.- ~""-..-,. 
Thu~, the relatIve pattern of car prIces VIS-.l-VIS other prlces~ l~ .1 
l-r,.,j.;et uf b,)th process and product lmpro\,ements. Slll'.lolr!y, b .. ,_uwsC' 
the output lndex~s are derIved by del10ltlna value Inl('xeF by prl~' 
In,h.'xe:., the laror prOdUCtlV1ty me.IS.Jrc! S1"111 ... r1y r .. ~lect .1 mIx (' !. 
1'10':"t.S5 .lnu produ<.:t 1nllova t 10ns. Thl 5 olu~h"l • S ,,-:: I nil; 11T'l'!'"eSS! v :. 
to the rest u[ the e~ollor) 1n thc~e 1n~Lxes 15 due to process lr~r~ ~r_ .t~. 
bl.t tt-ert! 15 ", sa:l!if'actory .., .. ay or \Cr1IY11.: ~t-l~. 
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Labor productivity index~s. The time pattern of ~n indeK of 
output per worker will reflect not only ir.nOVyt1ons but also simple 
substitution of capital (and, if the degree of vertical inte<3tatlon is 
not held constant, other mater1als) for labor. Thus, changes 1n the 
index are hkely to overstate the <xt.( At of p",.c innovation. 
Stlll. labor productlvlty improvements are a major concern of publlC 
pohc~', and they probably are lndlcative of broad cost tendenc1es. 
In an earller study,lO this author found that for the years 194~-
19b7 labor productlvlty In the motor vchlcle industry lmproved at all 
averiqe rate ("If 3.96\-.;. 33\ per yeu, .... hereas the lmprove-nent f:,r all 
manufactunng .... as or.ly 2.80\-3.33\ per year. That stuJy used relatlvel)" 
cruj~ m~aS~Tes of out~ut (th~ Federal Feserve Buard's lndexes of lndus-
trlal produ=tlon) anf. a set of labor lndexe~ .... hlCh .... ere not ~atche~ 
exa~tly t':> ttl~ outj t senc:.. 
It l~ no .... posslble to ~pdate and l~flnl th0se flgures. The bU!~3u 
hCJ~.r for t.he !:lOt:>r ve~llcles and .:-qJ1prr.\.r.t lnd ... stry (SIC )";"!}. Til\.. o .. tt.-.~ 
ard l.ili=:r In::lexes are match(.j to c.:l:-h oth"'r • .:Ind the d..Jta are coll\.\..te_ 
0/\ .1'1 establlshm.:nt bas1s, so the gross probler.s of c:.han:Jc!.. 1", t.tat' Of: •• rl. 
0' vertl:-al u:tegrilt10r, have been el1mlriatecL 11 The data t .... ter.d bl(.r tc-
19<"'1 an; also 1ne-lude a spl1t bet .... een produlllon .... olkers .1nj non-t>rr>.!uL-
t10n wori,ers. 
Til!Jle J prov1C>es the average anr:ual lllCl~d5es ln cUt!'Jt }-c:.r v- loy(.~-
hour be: .... een 1957 and 1978 an;) !o:- a nu-,bel" uf sub-penod sphts, 0.\.:- the 
entlr~ perlo1. labor procllctlvlty llT.prove,1 .,t a rate of 3.S\ I,er ye II' 
1n the ItlOtor veh1cles an:l e~Jlprnc:lt lndu!:: ry. tlle r.1te of lncre':&Sl: WJ~ 
.. 
-,c, .. 



















































































I. All rates of H.c-rea'-" an. th~ slope cocfflclcnt l.f au orJlr.ary lC.lst squarc~ 





















~y contrAst, in all manufacturing labur ploductivity rose by an average 
of only 2.'\ per year, and in the ent~re prIvate sector labor productiVIty 
rose by only 2.4\ per year. 
Data fvr the time pcr lI.')d sr,ll ts C.J..' be used to test t-h~ pro!JUsi tIcn 
that there ha~ been a sig'llfIcant SlOWI'1q of the rate of Froduct.'J1ty 
InC'! ease and th.":. yovernm nt regulutl'JII !!'Ight be a calAse of ttllS Sl.:lclt~·.11 ':1. 
Th~ "swItchln:j of reglmo!s" mcthodolcryy, flr~t I'rOi'v5ed t'i' Rld.ard :u.:lndl l2 
an~ further reflned by Stephen Gl..ldfeld ant! RIchard Q'J.mdt ,13 prov1dt!s 
a "'''.lr.s of testIng these prC.l!-,os1tlons. The methodc..'lo,]y '-:lIb {or a:. 
eXalT'1natlon of altern.:lt1ve spll ts of the d.lta tc flnd th.lt <;p11 t WhlCh 
YIelds the largest dIfference In hrcg1nes." 
As call be seen In TalJl£: 3, the data for the spll~s by l'erloJ 1n-:1.-
catt: tl.at labor p Ojuct1Vlty rvse less rap1dly 1n the l3tt.er part of 
the~e 22 years than 1n the forn~r Fart. the d1fference I~ slgn1fIcdnt. 
EI ... t ~!';( p3ttern of the srlllS IndIcate th.1t tI,e s~ow~r growlh had be'] '.: T. 
b) :he m1d 1960's and dld not gPt any w~r~e 1'1 the 1970's. I! ~~ usc 
u! J11': crer . .:e 1n reglm(.J 15 not f"ur,.! H. l~I"" SpIllS ~l',J::-h fl')cl.~ OT" the.' 
1 Sr', '. as I. ne "reglme." tol." gOVE'r'1m( • n. 1\ l 1°1' '1 bC'CC'T. l I. \. 
St.l.l.':'..JS 1mt-"t on the 1I.'..Jst:-y only 11. the c:lrly 197J's. Tr.us. ~I.l~ 
set o' 13t.1 w("..Jlc! T~~ slAlf:lrt a cj.1lm thlt CE'';l.Jl.JtlC .. 1003_ ref.l,Crl',lLle. 
for tIL' slackt. .ln~ ('t r:-oJlJCl\Vlt~ 4rc)lo,~11 III tl.1S ': jj~·r/. 
(r-.("te, thuuuh, that for all m.l,ufacturlr'1 and ~or ~hc e .... t.·t> !'r~ ·~t\' 
sector rtS the s?l.l.ts fo:">!!> more (m toe 197u'!;. tll.:- ~rowth 1:"1 pro"..Jlll.ltv' 
does slacyers. The cau· ... s of thIS general -ie.C'ler.1tIon 1n produ .. ~l\·!ty 
growth are, of COl'rse, w1dely debated. FleQulatlon m.l)' be one of thf'r1.1 
I : 
-'1_ Vrtlllll'fPL t"Allt. r~ 
OF POc-~ QUALITY 
This last conclusion 1& re1nforc~d by the data for product10n 
and non-production aDployees. One of the claiDed consequences of requ-
lat10n is tnat more Employees must spend more time filling out report1nq 
forws and enqlneers and technicians must spend MOre of their time try1nq 
to devise ways of meetinq government requlations. If this were occurr1nq 
in Q ser10US fash10n 1n the 1970's in the motor veh1cle industry, we 
would expect to see a greater slackenlng 1n the rate of 1ncrease of 
outFut per non-productlon worker than in the rate of increase of output 
per product1on ... ·orke!. The 0PPOS1 tc appears to have been the case. 
Relative rates of prlce incredses. A second way of try1ng tv measure 
rela~lv~ rates of innovation is to me3sure relil~lvc rates of prlce 1n-
c.re.3s£'$. Of course, pnce increases dlso ret lect lllcreases lrl th: ce.s!.":. 
of lnpt:ts ard change5 In proflt mart?lns, as well a!:J lrr,t)vatlo,s. 1:1 
th1S rcsp~=t, though, a cl)lT11'ar1scn of pr1Ct 1nc'reases 1S pr:..b.lbly 013St:d 
(C'f&~ttlr; th1~ tu sc~e 
extent, how~\er, lS the fact th~t L~e il~tcmoblle ~rlcL lnd~~ lS reuJI~rli 
,1"'~.lsted ~\-r quaIl t:' lmprOVel"<.;'~ts, ... he:-c3s pr1ces In other sect:;rs 
sonetlMcs ah' and SOMetlmes are not ad)ustf'ri fOl qual1 ty 1lT1prOVements" I 
T.lble ~ prov1des the a\"eraqe allnu .. l rate of lncrcasc of the nc· ... 
C':ll cunponent of the conS\l.'ller prlce lndcx between 19S~ ana 1979";~ iL' 
compan,s.:>n purposes, the average lncreases 1n the durdble geods ccr, p-
nent of the CPI and 1n the overall CPI ale also prov1ded. a~ are thc 
relat1ve rates of 1ncre"c;t: of the new t.ar I'Tl=e 1ndex as com} 3re;! t( 
the other two 1ndexes. As can be seen, the rate of 1ncrease of new ;~r 
pr1ces has been arpreclably below th~~ of" the over;!ll cpr and e E:II of 

















Table 4: Average Annual Percentage Increase in PricesA 
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a. All rat.es of lncrease an' the ~lo!,e C'oe!!l':lent of an Onh'ldry least squares 
regresslon of the loqarlthm of the prlce lndex on tl~r. 
-20' 
,- ,.- 0P1G!rJ~l PAGE !S 
L t{~ .. 0, F-CO~ CUALITY 
The fo~r result ~s not surpr~ain9, since the overall CPI 1ncludes 
the prices of services (for which the rate of productivity ~ncrease 
would be expected to lag behind that of lllanuhctured goods and 
hence the pr1ces of Vh1Ch vould be expected to rise .are rap1dly) 
and the prlces of petroleum products and other energy items (the 
prlces of ",hleh have risen sharply since 1973). But the d1fferent1ul 
vls-a-V1s t~e d"r.J.ble g.,OO:i component (of w·,l.:h neloo autOl:lOb11es 
thel:lselves are aOOl:t 12,) 15 less eype:-tec ann hen:.e more 1mpres r l .... e. 
Ag.un, we can use tht- "sw1tchIng C'( n:gl"<!s" t.~t"'.or1',l(J<;y tc 
~xamlne j1fferen.:es 1n beh~vIcr w1th1~ the loncer 1955-1979 rEr1o~. 
~s lS In:Lca~ed !"l ':'atJlc :, tt>( nC" .. C.:l: rn .. <! 11 ::redse: we:" t;(( .• t·.: 
H the :utt"': it'll.j tl ..... 1r LtC. e.:.I" :""10-:. '"_t til' l<ltt .. :! PO 
b.?twEe" the ne ... ,'olr 1n-ie' ·.rd ,:t-,. :i'I _ .. Il I :'1 l', t'.1. 1,,' 
.. ---
H.'- ::.1: we reconc1le :.hlS fll;.:hna ('~ a n:.rrO'-l'1'J 1'1 tr.~ 1970',; 
u! the r~lat1 .... e perfort'l~ncc on pr1ces w1th t'l·-, rre',lous e\ldcn,~ o· 
F1rst, 1t r:llght be causej by a more rap1d :'lIcrease 11'. the cos~~ 
sectors of the e,:ol'orry. Un~ort.unately, In:,.t cost !nde'{(>s .)r~ n:->t 
'dblc 5 presents the 3\erage arlllU.ll rat-r ... ! ll • .:rease of Ford's U.!::>. 
ho ... r1y lab::- :-.:>sts 11nclu.hnQ !r~;;~c bt:'nE' .' '-oJ dr"i, for comparlS, n, 
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Table 5: Average Annual Increase in Hourly C~n.ation 
(including fr~nge beneflts) 





































































a. All rates of lncrease are the slo?c :o('ffH.lel.t 0& dll lrJlI.lI") l~lS'" "'-.'HS 
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OF POOR QUALITY 
-- -_ - ___________ > 2 ___ •• 
OYer the period 1959-1979. the United Autonobile Workers d~d relat~vely 
':Iell for its members. But AS the time penod sphts focus on the 1970's. 
the relath'e increase in Ford's labor costs appear to have narrowed 
\'ls-a-V1S the rest of the economy: i.e .• rel~tlvely .ccelerat~ng lab'Jr 
Custs carno: explalfl the naT!"OWl.nq prlce pE-:!';'["ITIC''lce. Unfortunau.ly. 
It lS not pcss!!-le to make a sl.mllar dE'terlTlhatlcn :or tither l.npl..ts 
Al ternat:. ... ely, the laber productlvl ty lndexe=: :nay be Cqf'."'-l:.: 
:"IVst!y tht· et 1eets of inpl..t substl.tutlcn a;,o the rel~tlve rat'? of 
ln~r~~se l~ total factor .rc~uc:IJlty 1n ~ntor vehl:les V1S-a-V1S 
other sectors may have slackened 1n the 1970's. Fer ex~~le. Genera: 
Mot~rs' lr.!l3~lon adJustej accountlno lndlcates th~t the real amount 
c: car-lt3: FCI emrloyee (worldwld.;!) lncrase~ b~' 65 .. between 19':;7 and 
2979, Ur::.:rtu:lately. there lS ll'ttle o~her data c.a11able. 
ThJs. w~ are left w1th a puzzle. The ~t"r .ehlcle lndustry's 
relatl\.· rerfor.'3 Ice In labor prO,1u:-tlVlty ;=;"10.( ~ lO the 197;J's; 
'."ects 0: p:---,t.. 
n-: ..!~!t"'-~ :d'"tS c-:- .1.l~-!" :--. "~ .... -tl\!!'· 1---"· ~-I 5, t.!t Wt.. :3~ ... t·· 
• r:Cl=!:' .. ,. 
erlSS10ns frort lactcclec;, OcCUp3.tl:Jn...l: S .. ,:.:l: ..lr.c Health Ac..'T..r.!s~: • 
regulatlo~ of wcrxplace praetlces, Dera~t~~~t 0: Laber regulatlon l' 
pe~Slon f~ds, etc. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
r£' The ~ract of thL~e other reqJlations has been comparatlvely mlnor, as 
comparej Wlth the exhaust ~mlSSlons and sai~~y re9~latlons. The rcla~lve 
ma~nltude of the most lMFoltant of these ~~her regulatory areas, lndust%ldl 
alT an.i water p<:llul1;1r control, can b,: found 11' General Mntors (,xl'£nllllUl~S 
lr t'a~ are.l, r<; C'crplrt..· "ltl. its expc .ilturt ... (Jil motor vehlel, (rl:iSlcr.~ 
",nj s.1!ety. The.,e ilgJres are tnunti u, Tub.£' 6. The relatl\E: lMpo[tar.~e 
C: lnJ.Et!"lal all ar.d water po~lut1::n ';vlltrv! has nec:n gro'" lr-:: , but It l' 
st111 bE-low :'J\ of the C"ompan}"s cXr,,:ndlt'lTcS on motor ·/e .... lel .. cm.SS1'1nS 
51'CEO the ~~.:'v's an lmport':lOt tren! 111 the In::aJstry's n,Y\Ufactullr.'j 
~ % X(,5S~S h3~ Peen the S..ilistl tl.t1vr. U! CQ!'l t.ll for latar. Till $ lS C'X-
p:.:l~::; .wJ th;: current "robot lZ3t."n" C't .:'SSL'T.b!y llf.t- ~roces$es. Partly, 
thp !1-:er3-:'..!!t. ,..-
_ .... ".-l 1- , .1. ~ J 
.,. .... ~ .. I ~ .,' f • .. _ j .. ' _ ..... ~ • ~. _-=..£... L ... _1_' __ • t r 
:-I.:::>~-:r~. ror eXaJr.rle. lab0r C'< st'> wt.·re '_'\ • :hc costs 0: .111111 ,t.: l~ 
1 ~7a. 
an lncre4S1n~ rlOldlty 10 product10~ .r0C(~S(S. ~hlCh 1n tUln h~s leJ tr 
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General Motor.' Expenditures on Industrial Air and 




Pollution Control Safety 
(1) (2) (ll-C?l 
S17 nll:.or. $445 1II1111on 3.8\ 
6!> 503 6.8 
). 528 6.7 
5-. 5';8 9.5 
!>~ -; 4", 7.e 
tJ' C\t J 7.1 
7 .. ~, .:. t r 
":. J ' ) (I. } 
1 •. 'I 
.1- t ~l\ 1" ~ 
lr~ , 1": H .9 
.. 1.11 J 1'J.~ 
.: \.'\.rce ~n~ral Motor~' lO-K rCP0rt~ . 
rigid .anufacturing technology il '.pable of adapting) and avay from 
.are f~ndamental product lnnovatlons (for which the existing technology 
i. too rigid and which, therefore, vould require the acrapping And new 
purchase of very expensive capital equlpment).l8 Abernathy has prov1ded 
a fevexamples. But, as vas argued 1n Part II, the balic structure of 
the industry probably b1ases it Away from fundament~l product change. 
the c~pltal lntensity of the product1on processes is probably only 
pushlng 1t .llghtly farther in a dlrect10n 1t is already headed. 
Second, lt ap~~3rs that the motor vehIcle 1ndu~try has n~t bee~ 
19 th~ m4)O! dlSCO\Jrer or developer of most new manufacturlng pro=esse~. 
1n thIS SE'C"tlon "'3\L 1n,hC".ltL'd, th ... '"1, lur "eh1:-le Innust!y has bCE' 
quIte .,.Joe at .:lJ.J!'tl'1Q ;\'1J adoptln.: thc.c !nranvatlon for use In lts 
home ten It-:,ry. 
Th.J~ !..ll In l.Jlt III 101 ... have PX.JT . r .... J Inr._)VdtlO"l~ - tnt: ()\ tc',;-·,: 
freque'1tly eXamlnl?j lS expen::hture!.. on rese.Jrch and development -
the InF.Jts lnto the r'ro~ess. ThIS r.le.Jsure C"annot tell us anvthlng atr.' t 
1n~OV.ltlon u"less there lS a str1ct one-to-urae relatIOnshlp betw~er 
JnFutJand outF".JtJln thIS process, bu~ It llny be able to tell us Soll'<>~~!"; 
about efforts at Inr.ovatlen. 
7ht.' ddt.J 0:- R , D eXpC"ldltures as a l'e! e'1tJge of salLs :tr t) l 
Ie ... 1J ny thre£' notl'r vehlcle nan.;f ,rLrcr~ .lH' provlJed 1n TaLlc 7. 
Unfortu'1dtely, the data extend cnlv t~ck tn 19&7. Hefore dlSc~sslca 
the lrnpllcatlcns o~ the data. we sh':>.JIJ (J::t.r sone cavclts. rust, 
~ ...... " ....... U(-"4(.( ~-t..-...; 
t'le d.Jt.J alt: rep< rtcJ b:, the cor! 1Il1CS" lh. N-rtr k .. 
metor vehIcle dolt.l are only estlroltLS. 
,-...... 
~ 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POO'l O~ALITY 
Second, there are no .trict accounting standard. for what is counted 
a. -R , D expenditures.- ThuI, different coapanie. may include d1fferent 
items: and, since ~ , D is a high prestige actlvity, there i. probably 
a general tendency toward over-.tatement. 
The data in Table 7 lnd1cate somewhat slm1lar trends. The Chrysler 
and Ford wor1dw1de R , 0 efforts were relatlvely ~nchangcd 1n th~ late 
1960's and eJr1y 1970's, rose 1n 197J an1 197~, ~ecllnerl subs~q~ent11. 
~.lt.1 s~ a f1m1:.H ~att('r::. ~elleral Mo~CI"" wor1dw1de R&D effort 
ros( ear11er 1 n the 1 <"170' s, peakt:d 1n 197.;. then dec 11r.ed. anj cr.l ~ 
rcsc ll'IO:ierately in 1979; tht- JIIore hlTJ.tcJ North Arnen:-an :ja:EI do r:;t 
~ho ... .3 ri~ ... =.n He earl/ 1~70's but she"," tt.c !'.Jm~ ~lk lr. 197';. 
U:.exl el teJ sales ShOl tralls (lowerlng ttJ", base of the perccnta:;e) 
m3i' have bee:. at least partla! 1y respons!ole fer the rJ.se J.n 1979; all 
~hr('e C:lII'1.1nleS haj dls3~p.)lntJ.nq sd!es 1n that ye.H, an:'! Chrysh.: h,'= 
dlsap~~1~t1ng sa1~~ J.n 1978 as well. 
Tt . ., last C'olU1ll!" of Table 7 p~ts t.h.·-(. m.:-.vers 1n }-ersyectl.e. 
,- - . 
1975 ar..:! 19:'(,. but they were subse .. ~er.ti~ -i,,·l..l)crl to the earl~ 1)'< '5, 
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t'Gble 71 .... arch and De"'l~nt !lIpenditure., a •• 'aroenteqe 
of Sales 
Chrysler ~ I General Motors I 
• 
I Motor 
North IIorth I North I Vehicle 
Amerlcan ~rl.caIlj Alncrlcan • and 
Motor Motor Motor I Equipment All 
Worlchllde Vehlcleab tlorlct.llde vehlclea: Wor1dwlde Vehic1eA I Industry Hanu!actur:.nc 
I 
967 1.8\ 3.Ua 3.S 3.0\a 2.1\ 
368 1.8 3.0 a 3.0 3.0 a 2.6\ 2.1 
)69 2.3 3.,) a 3.: ~.O a 2.:: 2.2 
no 1.9 3.1 3 ., .4. 5.3 c :1."'; 2.1 
)71 1.8 1.2 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.4 2.0 
J72 1.9 2.0 3.1 2.9 3.5 2.4 2.8\ 2.0 
173 2.1 2.2 3.5 3.4 3.5 2.4 2.9 2.0 
174 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.4 4.3 3.0 3.2 2.0 
)75 1.7 2.0 3.1 3.3 3.1 2.7 3.0 2.0 
176 1.8 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.7 2.0 
177 2.C 3.1 2.6 2.; 2.0 
178 2.5 3.4 2.6 
'79 3.0 4.0 2.9 
R4D ezpendlturas ~stt.ated by Carroll and Schneld~r (1979) 
Sa.l .. e.UaAted by J:&iser (1979) 
Abnoraally high. because of .trike 
urces: lo-~ reports flIed by the comp~~ltS wlth the Securltles and Ex=hange CornmlsSlon; 
U.S. ~tional Science Foundatlop (1979 ); Carrell and Schnelder(l979); ~alse~ (l~~3) 
-.. 
It!f 
OP.:~:\:'L P;'GE IS 
OF POOH QUALITY 
Passive roatrainta wore originally ~cheduled for 1976 but then delayed 
to tho early 19BO'.. Pdor to the .harp incroaae in 9aaoline price. in 
'979, it appeared that the fuel econoey .tandards of the .arly 1980'. 
would require exten.ive 1nnovation by the companie.. Thua,. good CAS~ 
could be .ade for .ither end of the 1970's AS having required heav1er 
R , 0 expel,chtures so as to JDeet impend1n,) regulatory requ1rements. 
Some addltional 11gh: on thlS question 1S yielded by one extra doto 
serles. General Motors, in its 10-K reports, ha~ 11sted lts exp~n~_t~r~s 
.. "'n "research, englnet!rlnq, rellab111ty, LnS!e=tlon, and testln-j" ~Qr 
em1SSlons control and safety regulatlo~ !lor )966 onwarc lIt lS lnte~es:l~; 
wher. the fuel ecenol"lY stan::!ard5 of the 1geO's s~em(:d :rost llkely to b-< 
ta: :!In;:l. Trese eypera:::hture>., af' a rercentdqE' of N-,:-th Ar.lc.rlcar • .lutc;:::o-
tl'we sales, are 11sted 1n Tarle 8. It aFl,.:>a15 tr.lt reql.)at1v. was 1r?C~~"lC 
he.l\ler req~lrements at the beglnnlng of th~ decace than at 1ts en~. Tt~s 
rrobably expla1ns the pattern 1n the overall General Motors R&D serles .-
Tlble 7. The ford and Chrysler r15CS 1n 197 anc 1974 were Frot~~!l = __ 
a 1 so to regula tory re'1u1rements. The Genera 1 Motors e\ l-ienC"(". th,,~q·-. 
znake 1t llkely that the Chrysler and Ferd pe.)l.,.s dt tht.' en" of tht' dt:= _:l_ 
w(': t. due to a coml>ln.JtlC'n 0: de~rease'; s ... les ar.d th(' prcsswl \. S '::. .(' .-": . _. _-~ 
mere !~el ef!lcle~t veh1c1es and net to em1~Slons an~ s.l!ety res~!~t_=:. 
D. A SUlTlan on t~e Charact~r of In:;0 .. a~6"":-
. 
It seems clear th~t 90ver~cnt regu)J~;n' h~s had a maJor ~.'~, ~ 
cr. lnnm:atlon in the metor vehlcle lr.~Jst.ry T~lS rcc.Jlatlo~ h ... ~ I ... ~ 
lts e!£~=ts l.ugely In the proJuct M0,:l!!lca r 10n arc ... 
\ __ 1. 8: GenerAl Motor.' Research and Development Expenditure. on EMissions Control 
and Safety, as • Percentage of Marth Amerlcan Automotive Sales 
19f.e 1. '\ 
19€-9 1.~ 
1970 _. _ .;.3 
10 71 1.7 
19-2 LA 
19-: l. -
10 -- 1. -
- .. 
B-~ , . .. -
197b 1.1 
lQ77 1.1 




- " ~ It d~es not appc~r that reg~13t10n tan ~ held respon.ible for the 
m.:xle!:>~ slackelllnq lr. productlv1ty lmprovements that has occurred. 
Reg~lat10n aprea~s to have haJ a quant1tative effect on the R&D 
b~doe~s 0: the m4Jor comFdn1es 1n the earl~ 1970's. 
ft'e no ... ',urn to d JIIOre complete deSCrlt-tlon of thls rcgulatlo~1 
an.1 tt. .. ('t' .to: government 3ct .. ~r.S a"~ I·r,'~r.lr'ls th ... t have f'c"sslbly 




IV. GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUAlITY 
There are three &ets of policies by the Federal Government which 
hove been relevant to innovation in the ~tor vehicle industry: regula-
tlon 0: air ~~llutant emissions, safety, and fuel economy 1 the 1969 
antitrust suit attacklng joint behavior w1th respect to emissio~~ 
control; and d1rect government funding of research. The pol1cies 
operate 1n qU1te dlstinct1ve ways ~nd wlll be dcscr1bed separately: the 
cor.troverS1CS concern1ng their effects on innovation wlll be left to 
Part V. 
A. R€~ .. !atlol, 
l.:-j:::~j Wl.th thL En·l.ronrnenl.J: r rctect!o'l ;"(~er .. -y (EPA); U.e CerilTtl"lpr l 
Al' p<'lJJtant ernlSS10"lS reqJl.H10'. T~t: Feder.ll Govcrnrr.cr.t f1r~t 
txcam(.' lr.vohed lr. eM1SS10ns reguliltlon 1: 1905. 20 ThE! Motor Vd .• cle 
Alr Poll1Jtlon Act of 1965 (!lrecte.1 the rK'paTtl"lCnt of Health, Educa:..or. 
3'1'; Welfare (the predecessor 1.0 thlS area to lPA, wh1ch was estat!lshlJ 
1n 1970) to set ernlSSlons standards for automoblles. The fJ.rst standar~s 
a~Fllec to thc 1966 model year and co\ered hydrocarbo"l (HC) and carbo, 
(Co) 
mono~ldefteM1ssJ.ons. By 1970 th£ standard~ 1m?11ed approXlrnate!J a 50~ 
reductlon In exhaust emlSSlonS from uncontrulled levels. In Oec~mbcr 
of that y~ar, tht! 1970 Amendmenls to the Cle.:m Al!" Act called for a 
further 90\ reductlon In HC and CO emlSSlons by 1975 (l.e., a 9;;, rc-
d.lctlon fro"T' uncontrolled levels was lmpl1ed) and d 90' Tcdl.::-t lCl. l' 
Illtr-ogen oXldes (NOx ) by 1976. 21 
-J'-
ri' 
- In 1973 the deadlines vere delayed a year through administrative decisions 
by EPA. In 1974, Congress delayed them another year, and in 1975 EPA 
delayed thc~ yet another year. Pinally, in the late auaaer of 1977 
Congress pAlled the 1977 Amen~nt to the Clean Air Act which delayed 
the He and CO requirements to 1960 and 1961 relpect~vely.22 and eased 
the NOx reduction to 75\, vith 1961 as the new deadl~ne.23 The 1977 
Amendments also spec1tied that He and CO emissions trom trucks should 
be redu.ed by 90\ from uncontrolled (1969) levels by 1983 and that NOx 
en1ss1ons should be reduced by 75\ by 1985; the 1970 Amendments had 
slmply requ1red that EPA regulate truck emlSSlons, w1thout speclfylng 
the levels, a~d ErA had set standarJs WhICh were consIderably less 
strlngent than these WhlCh wel~ requIred c~ dutomoblles. F1n~lly, th~ 
1977 Amendlller.ts called for EPA to set st.:lndarcs for f-nrt:.culate e:r,l~S .. Or.S 
for VE!h1cles. thls vas a1Me': pnmar.11y at dIe!'el;;. EPA has suL5t<'1uentll 
set stanJalds [01' a'..ltom;)b11C's al\o lqht-c' ty tcu-k,; wh .. ~h o:all for a 
reJuctlon by 1985. 24 EPA 1'3 cUlcentlj deve]o:'lng partlcdate st.Jlldarrs 
f.Jc hea\"J -duty trucks. 
tlon. Flrst, for the categorles of automoblles and of llght-dutj truc~s, 
the emlSSlons stn~dards are set 1n terms of the maXlmum allowable emlSSlons 
of each pullutant 1n gramsper mIle for each vehIcle. The standards apply 
un1formly wlth1n each categury to all new vehlcles sold, no averaglno 1S 
allowed, and small Hondas and large CadIllacs are ~th expected to Meet 
the same standards (but the grams per m1le standards are more lerlent fer 
the class of 11ght-duty trucks than for auto~~blles). In effect, the 
requIrements assume that all automobIles serve the saMe r~rFOse and nerce 
sh()uld meet the scune ab~~l'!~e reg~lclt::lry req.ll=ement~; Ul( salT'C r.:ls be .... 




For heavy duty trucks, however, it hAS 
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been more obvious that this 
a •• ~tion could not be aade, and the ~issions r~uirements instead Are 
stated in terms of aaxilllUDI allowable eIIissions per brake-horaepower-hour. 
Second, Belling a vehicle which does not .eet the standards 15 a 
vio13tlon of the law and carries a flne of up to $10,000 per vehlrlL. 
The flne 1S understood by all partie!: to be prohibltlVe and not t,o 
operate as an em1!:sions or effluent. !ee. The only eyct:ptlcn to th1s 
l~ that the 1977 Amendments allow (, "fI(·")conform.lncc penalty" for heavy-
made th1s nor..:ontormou$ i-,enalt, OpE"lallOn..l1 bet hdS lnt!lcau j 1: 1n~t:':l: 
vehl:les arc testLd over 5J,OOQ mlles pllor to pr~dU':~lO~, 3nd Sl'.~ 
19;0 ErA ha~ tes tej sa.": 1 ~s f :cm asscrl 1 i' II IlL' l'rodu:- t1 Uf,. l'ut thL rL 
aTE- no cunent feaerdl req~J1re'!1ents on clctu.JI cml~~lO'IS fro!" In-U~L 
"ehlde;,:;, tho~gh a numL~r of states ,nj locallt1es current!.y h.:we 1n-
use emlSS10ns Ilm1ts and EPA has plal,~ for mc re COl1'1 reht!r.S1vC 1nSf'c:..tlon 
~nd rr..llntenance progtams 1n the 19bJ's. 
Safety legu]a:lon, The federal Government fll st became 1n\o!'J(-l 
• I 
1n ve~lcle s3fety l~ 1962.- In that year Cnnglcss d1re:ted the Dep_r:-ent 
1n 197,,\ to set standards for hydr<ll:lJ.:- brdh. flU1j. 5tar,d.Jrds for s·_.)~ 
b,lts (Whl.:h were belng ClffereJ vclur':.l:1l~ b:' the al.to COf'l:"'nl':") ... ~ e 
Adrllnl.tratl.,n (GSA) to plt;!5crlbe safety stilndards for vehlcles bv_:h~ 
by the red~ral G0ver~pt. 
.' ,;-:;> 
• Oejure, this changed very little, lince the CSA had always had the power 
-4 
to let lpecifications for the vehicles it bought; ~ !!£!2, it ind1cated 
that Congress expected .are lefety. In 1965 GSA .et 16 8.fety standards 
(and one air pollution control standard) for the 1967 .odel cars 1t 
would buy. 
In 1966, 1n the wake of Ralph Nader's Unsafe at any Speed 2B anJ 
t'le revelauon that detect1ves hued by Gener~l Motors had harrassed 
N3d~~, Congress passed the National Traff1c and Motor Vehlcle Safety 
A,t of 1966. It dlrected the Department u( Commerce to set safety 
Stand3rds for all veh1cles. The first stand~rds wer~ set fer the 19~o 
I'l.·:kl yE';;,. .... l"d f\.rther stanj,;lrds were se~ fer subse-i",er.t ye.Hs. 1n ~~70 
wC'ul! dl.tOlft.lt1cally proteC"t Cisr occl..-a .. ts 1n the ,"cnt cf a crash .... th: -'-
th~lr h3\lng to take any POSltlVC actlons) be reqJlttd on all a~~o~~>lle 
b: 197t-. At the tlrne 1t was thought that d1rbags were the only 101., .... tL 
meet t~e requlrcment. The regulat10ns wer~ challengej 1n the cour:s or 
o\erturned 1n late 1972. 29 (The electronlc lnterlock syste~. Whl~~ "'J~l_ 
not allow a car to start unless the frunt scat occl..pants had buckle~ the-
wIts, was an 1ntellmrD!'.lS·.lrc for 1974 arid 1'.:)7:; Wh1Ch sur\l'ed tt.e C"l" 
1:1 1974 when !"\.lny cars' systerrs f~lled to ... · d. :'rorerl,. dr,j lL''ignss 
-J,l-
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_n vent back to the drawing boards, and in 1977 the agency 4qa:n 
proposed that passive restraint. be requlred, this tiDe to be phas~J 1n 
dunng the 1982-1984 model ye.lrB. This tim ... the requ1atlons .urvlv~d 
court challenges. 30 By 1980, however, it appearad that automat1c belts 
(wb;h a..:tom3tlcally enclose a front seat occup.lnt when thc !ror-t door 
lS c1vs~d), rather than a1rbags, would be th~ dev1ce~ 1nstallcd 1n ~st 
or all Colrs to me~t the require~nts. ThIs has angered so~e memLer~ of 
CO:I~·::-t 31!:-3;;"). As of th1S .... rltlng, a b:.ll 11, C~n I!'cr~ ~h ... ~ ',Lt.! i 
::1.,1 • t'1e St3;,_.:a l tu 19f:3 z.:t wou1a rc"u.rc. "hJt sc..,'" •. rba'.!s l:c c! 'c.r· 
St It-;-1.1/ 
c' t",(. !u .. a r ! (" rr~cs a PC,"~!:-! C.! \1:- t:J ::-j ,vl.. .. pC"" "c·.l~l(., 0"; J .. "', : It 
F11,,1l\, tll,,!c 1S no feder.)l prograr fOI In-use Ins?! ctiC', bu'. I.! 73;, 
FUl! C'C'0"\Otnj' regu1atlon In Decembcr ! 97~ Congress p.l<;serl trc Er,L" 
PUllC) and Conservat1on Act, .... hlch estab1l5hed fue. eco:-:o:-j' st,,- lU.JS " 
a~·OfX)blles 18 mlles per gallon for 1976,19 mpg :()r 19·~, 20 !".'j ~_, 
Il'd ~7. 5 Il't:: ~r)r 1965. The Act also lnstruc-tc,i Nfl!:::;" to set st_', !.:- ~ 
the 1971-197~ 1ntenm years for autos, wn!(.,h th~ agency dId 1n :..1: 1-:)'· 
<.1nd tv set stol-:dards for llght-cuty true-s, Wlil,h !1C agc~er h.:' <..-, J::. 
;;:) 
~- Standards for heavy-duty trucks were not required (a9a1n, one suspectJ, 
because the claim that all veh1cles vith1n the class could be regulated 
un1foraly could not be susta1ned). 
Unl1ke the emissions and .afety .tandards, the fuel economy standards 
do not apply to each individual veh1cle but rather to the sales-we1ghted 
avcra3e of each Mdnufacturer's veh1cle sales 1n the appropr1ate category. 
Fu~ther, the or1ginal law conta~ned a one year carry-forwarj, carry-back 
pro~lSlon, and 1n 1980 the carry-forward, carry-back allowance was extend~d 
tC' t.hree yea!"s If a manufact'.lrer falls to meet the stardard Car.:! c.Jr-,ot 
take a~·.·antage of the carry-bad~, carry-forwarc}, the COmpil"ly 1S s_l:;Ject 
to a pe:lalt.y C-I S5 per 0.1 rlpg th3t hlS fleet a'lerdCe f~lls sho:-t c..f the 
sta~j.lr=, tv be at t lled tc all vehlcles solei by tt.at rna"l'_f.:.cturer 1:. t: . .:It 
ThwS, 1f (;e:-eral Motors sc.·ld 4 1T'11lJ.'"1 c~rs .:. a IT'odc~ year 
and t"le s3,es-welohtej averdQe fuel ec-~no~y of th~: flett fe!l sh~r: of 
In.·er,':l'.·CS tl,.l': are cOI"'f'lrable to thusl of <1:' l!: €:. t fce . 
T~e s:3njards .ll~l) to the f1rst 50,000 ~lli . : a veh1cle's !l!e: 
th~ f Je! e:c~o'"1)' of edch model veh1cle 1S dcter.'ll"ed a!' a b}'-prc:::!.:-~ (.:- I..:;'" < 
prp-rrod~-t1on cert1f1c~t1on tests for ')IT I~llutant eIT'1!'SlC~5, Tr~r, 
.lTe n.:- requl.re:nents that apply to J.n-use veh1cles. 
Fur abcct two year!' - rOUGhly the penD:! between NHT5A's cst.lt.:s:--
of the Hterlr" yea! standards 1nJul, 1977 ilr.;1 J..:ly 1979, wren tho :_.; 
effe:'ts of th~ sh3r~ ns( lr. gasoll.r.(> ~T1_C~ h.'! lx'c' felt - 1t ..1'--..1' ... 
that the f .leI econo:-y stancards for .I_to,,; \, l:·!.. .. b1nCl.ng d"C ..... _ . 
f ... r~ the .. cl"panl.es to t.ake a:.t10ns ..... 1C.'1 the ~lrJ".('t could not C'" l~l::(' 
has .hifted tho .Al •• -vei9hted AvorA90s of the .. nufActurer •• harply 
towArd &BAllo:-. 80n fuel-efficient vehicl .. ; aia1larly, the likely 
aarket roaponse to future fuel-.aving innovationa appear. auch .are 
f.vorabl. and w~uld .ativate the ca.panies to pur.ue fuel .ffic~ency 
vlqorously, even ~n the absence of the current .tandards, The current 
debates over fuel economy standards, then, focus on whether and to what 
extellt. the automobIle fuel economy &tan=ar~s should be t1qhter.cd .. tter 
1965 a~d on the llqht-duty truck standards for the mId 1980's, 
("'~e ctt.e', less well k .. ..:lwn fuel ec:mc"':' prC\'I!:lcn !:h,,_!j be nerJ-
tloned, In the fall of 197e Congress r~sse~ the Energy Tax A=t e: 19-0, 
~".1=1 c-ontalnc,j a s£'t of "q is guzzle:" t.3Y~S, These .Ire CXC1S .. tdX(.!: 
W"'l.', lm~ 1)' nC' \'10lat10n of the la,,-, Th~» al£' whelli' 1ndcr'endcr:t Of thr 
tue: e~on~n} stanJ.lrds Jyst d£'scr1bc~ 3~l ar;l: to each car sold WhI=h 
!a!ls ~l"" d cert3ln level. For exa~rle. fer the 1980 mod£'1 yedr, eact 
L'r l~...I: fd11eJ tc achleve 15 rnpg was S~l"'Ct to a tax of S~OO - S55:" 
de;'t.>lIdInq C'r the extent to w~'Ilch It !el: sho:t of th.lt floure to thIS 
d_t'l.:'s kn,'''ledge. no cars were rei_ueJ to 1'.1)' the tJ'< 1n 19:-,',]) 
B} l'·~~. tl.~ 1T11n1n.w "cept3ble le\'c! \0"1:1 be ::2,5 r-::-; .11 j the tax r.me·.: 
!r0r $500 t~ 5J,8,O, 
d=.nr.st the lndl\1dudl motor "'ehlcI£' :::a- ·• .... t_It:~!: .,-j trclf lrl~_!'tl\ 
a~:_'c: lt1 '1,)'; Tht> SUIt ch'f;:;ej th ... • oJ l':!~ ,', ~ .-l • .-~nSllIO a~:,?,'· 
d1"Onl the IM'..lfacturers anJ ~ther J,l't t;d:I.:.' h ... .! CO'lst1t~t\.·: 
"c.:>ntract, COl"l11ln.!t1on, , , .or COnSpl! 1;:-) ;n : ... !.tr.llnt cf traoe" \O!-.l:=r 
hd::! de14}ed the developnent o! roll-Lmt e~lSS10ns ~-:~tlcl tec!-n;--!C'c:: 
.. ' j WhlCh there!o!'"e W.,s a \ lol.ltlC'n o! Se~t h-:. 1 o~ tOe ~·Ier- .. r. AC't, ~ 
.~ 
-11-
The SUlt vas settled vith a consent decree in Septe~r of 1969 
vi~ no adal.slon of quilt by any of ~e parties. They 8greed, howev~r, 
to end the croas-licensing agreement, to a~id exchan91ng proprletary 
informatlon Vl~ each other, and, in essence, to refrain fro. any )Olnt 
If 
behavlor vi~ respect to ~e develo~nt~e.is.ions control technology. 
The 1969 consent decr~e represents the Justi~e Department's bas1C 
poSIt1on towarj )Olnt research efforts. 
71, h,..r_. 
1S deeply SUSp1C10US that 
" 
1n any )Olnt effort ~e cOIIInOn interests of the industry lIlay preva1l 
In M.l;' 1979. 
how(.'\er. the Just1ce OepartJnt.nt ag:-eed to "lle .. Gel'er.,l H"tors to f>«:ll 
Wl th un,crt.J.l', (,0 Iscq Icnees. 
'".J 
1", rn .. !tIo.... In 1\,r11 19"79 th~ DI~tT.~: Court sUp<'n:lslng t.ht. cor.scnt 
tlrr,. ~ 4 
~e=Tee h3; je=ld~j to extend the PT~~I~ltIo~,cn lrfo~atlon e,=hano~~ 
'" 
~!.-! J("'1r~ TereTts to go\errunent agt'nclcs fC'r an ad.!.tlon.:;1 10 ye.lT5 111 
dnj funjed outs1de researcr on motor vChlt', ~ 17 l~e InOt1vat 11 ... 
t~ c. l'C"st.l! 5crvlce ha\e C"!1..~ucted teS~ol ...... i~" ~~ ti .... T .L' ... 
-1'1-
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EPA and NHTSA have conducted and funded rese3rch 
" 
to gain a basIs 
for regulatory requIrements: S1nce there is always an explicit or implIcIt 
feaSlbil1ty test that regulatIons ~st meet. the agencie. need theIr own 
sour~es of 1nfo~ltlon. to serve at least as a part1al check on what the 
motor vehcle companIes ~re cla1mln; 1S feas1ble. NHTSA research on safet.y 
lS als~ a1mee at denonstrat1ng safeLY possIbI11ties and goadl~9 the lndus~ry 
lr.tO further research efforts. The Urban ~SS Trans1t Adm1n1str3t1o~, 
also wlth1n the Department of TranSi'Orta~lcn, has funded research or. bu~ 
des1~n, as part of 1ts efforts to help develop and fund urban translt 
syst.er-p. The Enerqy Developt"'£'nt an:: ReseaT~h AdmInlstratlcr. (ERDA I, 
WI ~nlr' th~ De~ .. t tment of Energy. has ~\.::de= reseolrd. on thE' de\'eloprrent 
~: electrIc vehlcles and on turb1ne englne£, as part of Its ~ISSIO~ to 
e~:vurage more efflC1ent usc of ener~i and encvurage alterr. .. tlves to 
r~trvle.r use. 
~ an $25C' ralllC'r. pc: year. vlth or.:: <i!;..:'l.t :';C M1lllcr. cf t.hlS cur' ~:-
o! WhICh r~ughly $3 b1lllon vas spert or. ~c:th Amerlc2n rrotor vehl~lc 
reseurch. If the spendln; of the ot~er vet:cle manufacturers and of the 
Nnd~ 
~arts and ~terl,Jls supplIers were l":.:::lude~. the .total would be well abc\'e 
$~ blll1or.. And the Federal Govern.~-:.t spe::-#is about $29 b1lllon ua all 
research, of WhlCh S1';.2 bllllon 1S s?en~ fer non-~Illtary purposes. 
Th~s, the federal sums spent on motor vehlc]p research are not large 
1n c~rl.an either to motor vehicle industry R , 0 or total federal 
R , 0 expenditures. 
Reoently, a new research progr~ has come 1nto beln9, the Coopera~lve 
~tomot1ve Research Pr09ram (CARP). CARP had ltS or1glns in a De~e=bcr 
197E speech by Secretary of Transportatlon ~rock Adams, in wh1ch he 
called for an effort to -reinvent th~ automob1le,· so that a goal 0: 
50 rrp.., cO.lld be met by the 1990's. Ada.-.s' i'ropos31 wa~ e\'entually tr,,":s-
formed 1nto a )~lnt1y !unde~ bas1c research program on !und~enta! aSie=ts 
C'~ InOt.)r v~hH.1e co,strUC!lo:l. design, an:: 0t'_ratiC'r, wIth the fede:_l 
G .en.:!>Cn· .!n~ tll.:- au'o~blle l"l~l!st y s. h:tlr.g thE: costs 50:5J .• :-! 
t~.:- M.!~l.fa:-tu!ers sFlltt1~:- tl'~ cC'~ts .:lrI.'rq the;"'~h'es 1n rror .... rt: • 
t.: sa !es:. Tpt~ r rlo ~% d""l, 1n e5SenCE-. ~?e~ I ! H'S _ q.:C'tJ of resedf e1. 
lIst of rt.'~ear::-" t"I'l.S. 
flS • .!: ~t'l·. tht' Feder ... } ~"' .... ern:ne:-t has ari'rc'trl3te:l $1: m11hc:- tt, 
v. 
A. Regulatl.on 
Kost of the debate concerning motor v~hl.cle regulation focus~s o~ 
the strl.ngc",\cy of the regulatl.ons; l..e •• It. 15 a deoote over the ccs:.s 
and beneflts of the requlatl.ons and whether the le .. els of ~tnragerl:l' 
b_7 vlll 1nst..:,l.:! con:er-trdte on the cOhsequences of the ':"~t.:!. c.f thl 
re~'..:Q:lors !;)r 1nnO\'dt10n 1n Ue mc~or Vt!h1Clt: indl.stry. 
Flrst. tt.e c~rrent fer.'! of reg.J!atlC'l may be tI~llng to lnd~ce to,-
r .\ l:1no.'at.on frorn the IN)tor veh1clc !ndustry 4!nd not enough ct.<.lnc .. s 
lr beh.l\'.or frc~ rnotor1sts. The prirr.u·',i aF:r, aC"h ~f Congress and t~( 
reu~:a~,lrs h .. s been to confront the MO~::r ... ehl~le 1'"1d.Jstry an.1. lr e!!e.:t. 
say. -'I'hl S 15 your problem: you should :lX l. t ,- Partly. thlS star.ceo 
ref!..:ts Cer~ress' belle! In t!1e buurJ!ess tech:-.olc;l.cal lngln'..:.ty c! 
50:;1 . .;-ost", H1.-he: prlces for gasol1r.e .In.' swre!y tI,t:' low SC'=ld~ ccs: 
ard t.: seelo:. out low ellllSSlons zrodels. 4C' In':'::l:l,es tu encouraCJe I"OtOJ 15:5 
to veal' .eat belts would surel)' be less socl.a11\ eXl'enSlve -h,ln t! \. 
4' DAndatory irstallat10n of paSS1\~ restralnts •. 
.. 
Second, the inflexible nature of standards which have the fonn 
of -every vohicle ..,st .eet the atandard or else •••• - (e.g., the 
emissions and safety standards) has • serious effect on innova~10n. It 
dlsc~urages research on innovatio~vhich may be low cost vhlCh cann~t 
q~lte achieve the standards; -a miss ~s as good as a =ile.- It dls~ourages 
research on innovatlons VhlCh are very good at meeting sore standards b~t 
have dltflculty In rneetlng others. For example, dle<:>el enC;lne~ are 
nat _r..slly low emltter!" of CO a"lc He"; dlescl vc?hlc~e!" us~ally t-.l'L 
emlSSlons below the -cleanest" comf-'nablc> gasollne VE:hlClt:.::i. But It. loS 
dlffl=ult to redu=e the NOx and particulate errlssions of d:esels to the 
le\'els achle':ed by gasollne vehicle~. The lnablllty to trade off ~ooc 
achlevement 1n the one area agalnst not-50-good achlevement In the other 
area has, at var10US t1mes 1n the past decade, d15couraged research on 
diesels. 
Further, 1t lS clear that the or1<;lnal 1975 and 1976 deadl1nes 
errbo~led 1n th~ 1970 Amendments to the Clean A1r A=t c.~ated a ~lxt~re 
of 1nCe;'lu .... es for the companies: One the one hand, If they thought the 
A=t W.lS really g010g to be enforce~, t~ey need~d to flnd a qt1=~" low-
r1sk ~af of meet1ng the requlrement~. even If thlS me~n: a hlcn cos~ 
te=hr.o!og). Cn the other hand, 1t was hlghl}' unllkely t'la:. the feo,. l<.:-gt-
to meet thl standards, as long as t}:e App!aran=e 01 .:l g:>e:3 !al~', e!!c:-: 
was r-.. ll~talnc1; thE: cre:hbll1ty of t~;> t:lIfLrL'c[".c~~ ot thE: p .. ll.;:: I" .:r.> ... ~.::~ 
W3S qulte low, Hence, SCI!!c? surreptl='us foot jr<gg~'lg wo.lld ha'lI_ be€':1 
vorthYh11e. It appears that both klnjs of 1nct:ntlves c~~ 1ntc p13 . .:l~ 
Var10U!I tlE!'kS for var10US cOlllpanles.42 lIelther set of lncentlves FtCVloe 
the proper IIIOtlvatlon fer research and de\·elopn.cnt. Ar. e:fl..lent f"e !.:ste:-
would do so. 
"Vl -
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!!\ird, becau.e the regulatory .tru~ture can only iJIpoae standards 
that are perceived to be feasible and feasibility (to a CJreat extent) 
depends on research and development information generated by the 
regulated co.pan1es theaselve., the regulation itself .ay retard 
research and 1nnovation 1n the regulated area. Th1s is most 11kely 
to harpen when thE' requlat\)r faces a I!IOnopo~y or a tl,qht ol1qor,~ly. 
A monopol1st1c lnterest In restr1cclng 1nfo~t10n are qU1te cl~tir. 
I I sw:h lnstanCE's, a regulatory a9'.!nc 1 wOul" have to re 1/ 0:1 1 t:; 0 .. 7: 
rese3~ch or on that of th1rd part1es, b~~ L~th are clearly 1nfer1~~ 
t~ thc k.Lr.j o~ 1niorl!l.ltl.on t~lat the re"ul.,teJ 1ndustry i tSl:lf 1~ 
c~pable cf ;enerat1n~. (~y contrast, 1- a corn~~tltlv~ 1,dustry, 
each fun' wodd try seFarately to deve!,,;. the feas1ble technology. 11': 
the hope that the regulator would then ad~pt the approprIately 
strl~gent standards and the successful flr~ cOwld watch Its rIvals 
wlthe~ or co~!d make large profIts fro~ llcenslng ltS cech~ology to 
ther.J An effluent fee (or sllTUlar Inccl"tlvd appro3ch would red.J=e 
thls proble~, Slnce even the monopoly fIrm alw3ys experiences a Olre=t 
g ... ln 1n discover1ng low cost ways o! reCl..C1ng 1tS emlSSlons yet fJrtt.er. 
Fourtt., the fleet averag1ng appro.:.;::h er.boched 1n fu ... ::' ecor,orj 
drF: "a.:h enbc:hec 1n the emlSS!On!: alld s~fcti' sta-.::iards. ~7 
B. A:ltltrust 
~(. alg~-.ents for and ag.:llns~ JOH.o; fC·"':.cH'ch efforts are [ald'" 
stral9ht forward. J01nt research can avold ~ostly dup)1cat10:l. It 
~an en=oura~e an 1nterchange and lnterplay 0: ldeas whlch na) lea~ :0 
new 1ceas which ~1ght not otherwlse occur. Hut the )Oln: lnterests of 
.. '111-
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an lndustry MY 11e 1n .uppre .. ing .cae innovations VhlCh individudl 
ccepetition al.ght pur8Ue. Thia polnt is especially clear in the context 
of externality regulation, but it can hold equally validly for ir.novations 
l.n an unregulated aarket. "l'hlS need not be another ver.ion of the apoch-
ryphal tale of the oil ~anies euppressing the invention of the pill 
tr.at turns vater l.nto gllSohne: . i.,~"", c't is a loglcal extenslon of 
the propositl.on that a .anopcly could flnd it vorthwhlle not to offer 
acme var1etlcs or qual1ties of a good that a ~tltlve lndustry would 
offer. 4~ 
Accordlngly, one's assessment of the wlsdom of J01nt research 
~fforts depends on one'~ V1ews of llkely dupllcat.on, 1dea c~chang~ 
an= =,olnt ohgopollSt1C l.nno,·atl.O:l suppress!on. There 10; ll.ttl~ 
qu~stlon that the motor veh1cle l.ndustry h~s eXI~r1enced more com-
petlt10n from ove~seas sou~c££ ~n the past 20 years thun w~s true 
basec hea\ 1 ly ")n rerceptions of what the dornest· C 1ndust:-y lS able 
tc. achH'v£' JU,:: the aegrf'e 0: compc::r:or tr~m ab!o:ld lS <lways 
sub)ec t to the whlms of the IY.>htl.c:l! prL'.·e~3. 
It 15 th1S auth(r's Judg:"lent. that the 'i.nns fron JOlnt n:s~<ll"cL 
are not likely to be great and the risks are probably greate:-. 
e~7ec1ally 1n regulatory areas. 
C. Federal Fundlng of ~esearch 
The ar~uments for and against federal f~ndlng of researc~ 
are als~ ra1rly strdight forward. Resea~ch. espec1ally baslc researcr.. 
has the f~llar property of externalitles. The f1rm dOlng the resea:-:~ 
lS unl1kely to be able to capture all of the galns of the out~wt of 
• 
• 'I$"-
the re •• arch. Thus, the social benefits from research exceed the 
puvate beneht&. Also, private firms flay be le •• inclined to take 
ri.ks then would be socially vorthvhile, or they .a~ have too short 
a time hor1zon and use too high a discount rate. For .11 of these 
reasons, a prof1t-mAximizing f1ra lS 11kely to conduct too little 
research from a social perspect1ve, and th1S problem becomes progressIvely 
worse as the research beCnlleS progressIvely more bas!c. Thus, there 
1S a case to be made for .~ kind of soc1al funding or ass1stance 
that WIll sUl'plement pr1vate researc-h effolts. Also, 11 a MOnopoly 
f1rM 1~ an 1ndustry lS not conductIng rescJrch on products that It 
feJrs may sl~fly d1vert demand fro~ ltS more ~roflt~ble 1te~s,4S 
a ,3S<? for go\,erruno:>nt researc-h can be mildc. Furthc.r. as I.oted 1n 
Part I~, 1~ a reculatory conte~t, gover~m~nt agencIes need to condu~t 
rescarc-h sc as to have a check on what·the regulated 1ndustr1es are 
Cla1l"'11lg 1S feas:t.le. Ane 1n a PU,c1IdS1n'l ccntext., gO':ernment 3gen:'les 
m3Y .,eed tC' cond\..cot the1r own rese'\r.:-h so as to better assess the ~ro~IlCtS 
they Furchase anj perhaps suggest alternall\'<?i; to ve.,dors. 
There are two maJor problems w1th government fur.dlng of research 
t'lat 1S !neant to supplenent pr1vate effo:-ts. F1rst, tne government. 
hmdeJ rese,lrch may supplant rather than supplement the pr1vate 
research: I.e., government funded research becomes a subst1tute fo:. 
rather than a co~le~nt to, pr1vate rese~rch. Th1S 1S progressl\el: 
l!lOre llkely as the research progress1vely becomes more apphcd a',J 
development orIented. Th~s, the net addltl')n to total researc:": l~ 
sm~ller than expected or, at the llmlt, n,n-~X1stent, and there 4r( 
clear d1str1butional (equ1ty) conse~~ences ~h1t flow from goverrr.c· t 
funding rath~r than pr1vat~ fundlng. 
Second, bocaU8e govern.ent _geneie. do not face a JUrket test, 
there i. 1 ••• a •• urance that-the research that 1. funded by government 
will u1tiaately prove to be socially vorthvhile,at 1 ... t, .. judged by 
~arket&. (Of course, if qovernment is funding research on externa11ty 
problems, which the pr1vat~ sector would otherv1se ignore, a market 
test is inappropr ute-unless oS IMrket test 1S creatt·1, thrCJ.I:jh de\'l(.es 
such as effluent fees.) Government aqellcles hl\e heltt.cr the pro! 1t-
maxIm1z1ng ~t1VCS o! pr1\ilte f1rms nOl l~e compct1tIve push c~ fe3T 
of survIv31 1n markets. Th.l~, l.na!'fr-f,rl.ltc rec;~,,:-ch and "'cste be~ ~:"~ 
~re 11xely. ard thlS problem becomes mcre sev~re as the resear_h co~es 
cl~ser to the market: 1.e .• - as lt beco~es ~ort aprl1ed ~nd develop~ert 
oriented. 
Tho;! argurnentJ both for and agal'lst government f. nd1.ng pOlnt 1.r. 
the same direction: Government fUlaJ1ng th.:at 1S duecteo at supplem<;:l.urg 
pr1vatc research should fo~us as much as pcss1ble on the baSIC research 
end of the spectr~. Only the =onopoly-Ilmltatlon, regulation, and 
~'urchaslng argument:; po1nt toward ltOre arrlled research. 
B]' thEse standards, the federal progral:ls get a mlxed ratlng. 
So~e b~SlC researct 1S belng funde~ (S~O rllllon), Lut nuch ap?lleJ 
research (e.g., on electric veh1cles) 15 31so OCCUlr1nc. NHTSA 
conducts 3 modest amount of research ($60-S65 mIlllo~), nuch of It 
on ac 'ldcnt causa~lon. EPA cond'Jcts ve":"y !lttl~ reseClrC'h (at 1:.est. 
a few rnllllor dollars). 
The ~AN proQram see-s reasor~ly we~l u~slgne~ to avolc the 
pl:falls of feder~l fundlng. It fc~uses on ~~SlC research. It 
tr1es to 1nduce ad~ed research froc all pa:tIes, above some base-
llne, And it ave! :. Bast of the JOlnt colluslon problem by speC1fY1ng 
that each party undertake the rese3rch se!3rately but dlssemlnate the 
.. 
r •• ults (vh1~h would probably occur anyway). A program of $100 
million per year is not large when viewed againDt total motor vehlcle 
R , D budgets in the $4 billior. range, but it surely constitutes a 
~uch larger fraction of the total of basic r •• earch that i. being cor.--
ducted.-
In the end, the ~ program mal have more value ~s a symbol -
as an 1nd1cat10n of a non-hostile attitud~ by the Federal Governm~nt 
toward the industry - than as a program that ach1eves great break-
ttlro.1ghs. but It 1S well desIgned, 1t 1S 1nexpens1vl', and 1t lS ur.-
llkely to do .lny hann. Most economlSts WO'Jld surely w1sh they c('lul...! 
S.lj' the 53.me about 1I".31:y othE:r 9c,ven.l" .... r t I rC'lrams. 
D. S")o·.Jl..; \\e MO\.')t ~")other fota-.r~tt.· 0: I\r~ lle ProJE'. t" 
At \arlvUS tll!leS 1n tt:e p3:::>t de ,h'!t t,h\.re have been calls for 
d ~d~51\~ !ederal eff~rt tn ~evcl~r 'the f lU~l0n" to the p:Jb,e~~ 
n<:atcJ bl lI'.:tor 1.e'llcles dn..! the Irtr na. ,'o'"lbustlon t'nClne. 
l'r::::blem!.o of v(,l-Ilclf's; at the en:: of the decade the problem WcJS fuel 
C.;:ms .... -nrtl"r.. The success:ul fedt!r.ll eFfort!' to devel0l- the a to!". 
bomb (tt-,e H l!.h.Htan ProJect) and t.) put a Mol;) on the moon (the 
Apollo Pro~ect) are frequt!ntly hel:! up as exarrl-'les. 
7hE" l!\C't;or vehlcle proble:n 15 dlift'rer.t, ar j Hu: hatt.l I ar . .! 
'\,'.:>110 ProJects d" not prov11e useful gUldes. Efforts to flnd "th~ 
sol utltln" to the motor vehlcle prob!en. ougnt ttl pa!'s dn expecte:= 
c,-,st-bcneflt test: thls author 15 U:1.Jware of s:.ch tests belng lr:,osec! 
0") t~e earlIer proJects. F~r::her, the L~rller rro]ects 1nvolvcl th~ 
Feder"l Gc\ern'1lc")t as the flnal purch3~er ~'f tne tec"1noh'g)' to be de-
vt.l;Jpe~ 
"'~ ... j, • 11..1 
It co..:ld mao:e the Iln.ll Ut!,::sl::'rs d' t' "'~lt -dS 1"::'>:: Sol::: .... :_. , 
po • 
By contrast, IIIOtor vehicles tu\ve to be sold annually to 15 11'o1111on 
purchasers. The DOtor vehicle aanufacturerl have strong notions as 
to vh~t i. and is not ~3rketable. 1nd the potentlal for aerious con-
fllets between the funder of the technology d~velopment and the seller 
of the flnal product 15 qUlte clear. 46 
Modest Zundlng, along the llnes of CARP, ~ay prove beneflclal; 
maSSlve funding, along the llnes of Manhattan ur Apvllo. w~uld 
proba~ly be a ~stake. 
V1. COOCLUSIONS 
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Technical ch4nqe in the ~tor vehicle industry will contiDe to 
be an illlpOrtAnt concern of public policy. Pollutant &.'Il1811ions and 
safety regulatory proqrams will continue to receive .. jor attent1on, 
&oj the total fuel consumption of the u.s. vehicle fleet is likely to 
be a continuing target for p t1.blic policy. The abil1ty of tt.e domestIC 
industry to co~te agalnst overseds producers will also rema1n hlgh 
er. ti,e llst of public policy concerns. 
As thIS raper has argued, the Federal Govcrnne,t cer~a.nly cun 
a!:eCl the uv~rall dIrectIon and, to a IIMlted exte~:, the o\crall 
car. - or s~u~ld - affect the ~vcrall ~acc 1n a ~o~e sJb~tuntlal way 
lS 0) en tu q:.es~lor •. 
ProJects. see';:, unw1se: the much mer£' 11ml ted CARl' r-rogram seems 
reasun.ltle C~. at worst, harMless. The current SUSjlClOUS Vle ... of 
J01nt ll':dustrj' research ef!orts seen'.:. senslble. The maJor are.l of 
ben~:lClill c.hanqe would be ln the rcgul.ltur)' progra=os themselves. 
Econorusts have lcng called for requlatory prograrrs that er?loy 
eCOnOl!'.l:: lncent1 ves rather than "colmlanc and contro!" ~echr:lq"es. 
USU.llly on the grounds of s~atlc-e:.ono:nlC e![lC1enCj. I\s ... ~ tid '-
argued ln thlS paper, an economlC lncer,tlve approa:, wuuL~ .,1 so 
h.ne IIT'?Ortant favorable consequen;es for Inrov~tlcr lr tl .. .! :n~~~r 
r 
, 
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GOVERNMENT STIMULUS OF TECli';C!...OGICAL PROGRESS: LESSONS FROM AMERICA~ HISTORY 
Richard R. Nelson 
Yale University 
I. Analyzing a Complex Historical Record 
The preceding case stud1es reveal a record that is rich and complex. 
The United States indeed has had considerable exper1ence with policies 
aimed to spur or guide or constrain industrial innovation. Let me 
briefly review that exper1ence as recounted in the case studies. 
A Bnef Review 
From the beginnings of the ind~stry. t~e federal governMent has ~:=n 
a major stir.ulator and supporter of techr.olcg1cal advance 1n aircraf:. 
Military procure~ent has, at virtually ali times, accounted for a 
sign1ficant fract10n of total sales of the ~ndustrJ' D,re::t SO·/ern~:.:~: 
support of R&D has taken several forms. During the heyday of rJ.c;, 
government funds supported R&n a~d testing r:lat1ng to aircraft 1n gEr:~a-~ 
during th1S ti~e the gener1c aspects of nili:ary and com~erc1al tL~nn:.J;-~5 
were relat1vely undlfferentlated and advanCeS 1n unaerstanding o~ cesl~-
principals relevant to one uSually ~ere rele/ant to the other as ~~~l 
The governr;-.ent also, of course, func!ed R&~ en alrfr_ .. ~s and corr~i)nen:s. 
lntended for spec1flc 1T'111ta"y "leeds. altro:';"l Hl nar.; cases ttl:.: c::r7"::a~'e~ 
invested the1r o~n funds 1n hopes of wlnning a procure~ent contract. 
Since World ~ar II govern~ent R&D mon1es have gone largely into work 
with specif1c m1litary ap;>11cat10rlS ir. mlnd. It has turned out that a 
good portlon of ml11tary technology contlnues to be also applicable to 
c~vll aviation, although recently these techrologies have been dra~ing 
2 
apart. The post war era also ;s marked by an attempt on the part of 
government to pull forth and support the-development of a commercial 
supersonic transport, an experience which ended as an expensive abort. 
CAB regulat10n of the airlines, and the constraints on vertical inte-
gration imposed by the Airmail Act of 1934, also have been important 
influences on the way civil aircraft technology has evolved. 
There has also been a strong military, and space, interest in com~uter 
and sem1-conductor technology. In semi-conductors. most of the early 
work that laid the found3t10ns for the industry was privately financed. 
Government R&D fundin~ came later. On the other hand much of the early 
exploratory research on computers was done under governr.~nt contracts. 
Government procurement accounted for a large percentage of the sale of 
both industries in the early days. Wh11e, as the industries began to 
tap commercial markets. government procurement and R&D funding came to 
play sroG~~:~ -oles. in both industries the government roarket contlnues 
to be signif1cant. PubllC monies have cont1nued to support universlt)-
based research relevant to these industr1es and advanced education. 
Anti-trust considerations have played an important role in the evoluticr. 
of both lndustrles. Had Bell laboratories and Western Electric gone 
lnto comr.erclal produc~ion of seml-conductors. the industry llkely wou~d 
have taken on a very d1fferent shape than it dld. Anti-trust controversy 
seems to sWlrl continuously around IBM because of the domlnant positlcn 
it has achleved 1n the ~omr.ercial computer market. 
For many years public funds have supported appl1ed and bas1c research. 
higher education. and extension, relevant to agriculture. Unllke the 
situation 1n the three industries mentioned above. in the ca!e of 
agriculture there has been no r.~jor public procurement interest. Ho~~\er 
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the farmers of the United States have fonned a strong political 
constituency demanding, and to some extent guiding, government R&D 
support. The public R&D syste:J has largely been operated through the 
agricultural colleges and experimentation stations of the state 
universities. Decislon making regarding R&D allocation has been largelj 
decentralized to the individual stations, which depend on their state 
leglslQ~ures for a hefty portion of their funding. 
In pharmaceuticals, as in agriculture, significant federal monles 
have gone into basic research, and into the establishment and maintenance 
of programs to train sClentists. However federal funes for phannaceutia1 
appl ied research and developr.Jer.: have been fenced in ~o "orphan drugs" 
for which the cOll1Tlercial market is likely to be small. It is apparent. 
that there eXlsts a strong poli~ical constituency for basic research 
fundlng; at the sa~e time there are strong politlcal constraints agalr.st 
signlflcant federal enc~oachr.Jent into the propr~etary domains staked 
out by the pha~~ceutlcal compar.;es. Pharmaceutlcals also is an indus~rj 
marked by a compllcated regulat:ry regir.e whict- sig'11 flCan~l.1 affec~~ 
the cests of R&2. 
The auto~oblle lndustry. and resldential cor,5tructlon. have exced;:~:=: 
neither signlflcant feaeral proc~rerrent, nor muc"l federal R&D sU~l=ort' 
for eltner baS1C or appl1ed work. Regula:ory re;lr.es, however, ha\e 
stronglj inf1uenced technologica~ acvance in bot~ sectors. Both 
sectors have seer. federal attemp~5 to launch an ~&D support progra-. 
Politlcal support for these, hO~E,er, has been ~eak and where progrars 
have been inltla:ed they have not been s~stained. 
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The Analytic Problem 
How can lessons be drawn from th~ r·c~ experience described in 
the case studles, and from other stud =~7 In principle we want to 
draw up a matrix. The rows would delineate varlOUS policy instruments. 
the columns certain industry characterist1cs, the entries should measure 
the feasibillty and effectiveness of a policy under a particular set of 
industry characteristics. 
The task, so defined, presently 1S imposs1ble. Simply classlfyirg 
the policies and the relevant industry character1stics is a challenging 
task; trac1ng cause and effect relationships is extraordinar1ly dlffic~·~. 
In general a wide variety of policies have imp1nged on each econOii: 
sector and each POllCY has been comolex and chang1ng over tlme. In 
both aVlation and agriculture government funds have gone 1nto support 
of appl1ed R&D, but the programs and the objectives are very differer.: 
1n these two cases. Regulatlon has meant dlfferent things 1n auto~ob~le5 
and in pharamceuticals. There is no obvious "list" of policy instruments 
one can thlnk of to def1ne the rows of tne matI lX. Indeed slmplj 
descrlblng, and broadly characteriZlng. the dlfferent gQvern~e~t ~clicies 
e~ployed i~ a compl1cated and worthwhlle research endeavor. 
What are the lndustry characteristlcs which dete~ine feasib1l1ty 
and likely effectlveness of dlfferent ~oll:y lnst~uments (assum1ng 
thes~ can be ~ell descrlbed)? nhy has ~aJor government R&D support 
proved feaslble and effective 1n aviation; but not 1n residential 
constructlon? The questlon suggests that one 1~portant industry 
character1stlc 1S the presence or absence of a ~ell defir.ed procurement 
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interest. Perhaps so, but government R&D support has been feasible and 
effective in agriculture. What differentiates agriculture from housing? 
Simply identifY1ng the key industry characteristics that seem to explain 
these differences is a challening analytic task. 
Even if we could layout the rows and columns in an obJective manner. 
cause and effect relatiunships are not easy to discern; technological 
progress in an industry might be fast or slow and take the Darticular 
directions that it d1d for any of a wide variety of reasons. Given the 
current state of knowledge it is not possible to estimate, with any 
precis1on, what effect a policy had. To what extent did public R&D 
money slmplJ replace pr1vate R&D monies in the early days of the computer 
industry? In aviation? Has public R;D support really made a difference 
lately in seml-conductors? To what extent has regulation deterred 
pharmaceutical innovat10n? These are very difficult questions. 
In short 1t lS very hard to tease out from the historical record 
clear cut lessons that are applicable to future POllCY decisions. However 
I will try. Much of what follows obviously will be Judgmental. In 
effect I will be presenting a set of hypotheses about what kinds of 
pollcles are feaslble and effective ln w~at contexts. While I believe 
they are conSlstent with the historical record as revealed in the case 
studles presented here, and with other evidence I know about, like any 
theory WhlCh flts a fragment of eVldence. this one may prove qUl te wror.9 
1n a number of places, or even in broad scope. 
We are lnterested ultlmately in understanding the sources of varla:lcn. 
Different policlCS have been apphed ln dlfferent industries. ,J'T'.e ha'.e 
been smashing successes, others wlthout effect or worse. However 1n 
order to sort out the characteristics, reasons for, and effects of 
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var1ation, it is important to get hold of the common elements. There 
are several general characteristics of technological advance that are 
apparent 1n all the case studies. One;s the apparent inherent 
uncerta1nty involved in technological advance. A second is the centr~l, 
but often myop1c and strongly context depen~ent, role of producers and 
consumers ,n the generation, and screening of technological advance. 
The thlrd 1S the important role played by non-market elements (as well 
as market ones) in the 1nstitutional structure influencing technological 
advance. 
Allor the case studies reveal that technological advance involves 
considerable uncertainty. When a person or organization begins the quest 
for a product or a process ~f a certain kind it is not clear exactly what 
the outcome will be. Design configurations and solutions take shape 
in the course of trying to achieve these. How successful the quest wlll 
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be 1S revealed only after the fact. The uncertainties take on a some~hat 
different form in d1fferent technologies. T~us Grabowski and Vernon 
describe the hunt for a new pharmaceutical as, l,terally, a search. 
Katz and Phillips discuss the considerable uncertainty dur1ng the 195Cs 
reglrding WhlCh new tec~nology was 901n9 to replace the old vacuum tute 
in co~~uter des1gn. Mowery and Rosenberg point out that ln the deslsn 
of C1Vll aIrcraft, theoretlcal calculat10ns resolve only a smali port10n 
of the uncertalnties. Some of the semi-conductor compan1es placed 
their bets heavlly on lntegrated clrcu1ts. others hung tack. 
The uncertaintles about how a technology fru1tfully can evolve are 
compounded by uncertainties about ~h3t futJre technologies will be 
useful, and WIll be bought at a profi!able volur.e and pr1ce. Just as 
different indlviduals and R~D organizations lay their bets differently 
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about which technological paths are the most promising, so they tend 
to differ in their assessment of the market. A nUMber of companies 
that developed strong technologlcal capabllities for the design of 
computers falled to antlcipate a large bUSlness market. IBM made a 
bet that such a marxet existed, at the same time that it acquired the 
technological capabillties to meet it. The American automoblle companles 
had little reason to believe that consumer demand would swing sharply 
towards smaller more fuel efflcient vehicles, but it did. 
Thus, whi1e the detalls dlffer fron lndustry to industry, ln none 
of the cases does R&D, and follow-on technological work, appear to be 
actlvities that are plannable ln any neat and tldy sense. The uncertaln-
ties seem to be innate. From a social pOlnt of Vlew, effectlve pursult 
of technologlcal advance sepms to call for exploration of a Nlde varle:y 
of alternatlves and the selective screenlng of thesp. after thelr charac-
terlstics have been better revealed--a process that seems wasteful wlth 
the wo~derful V1Slon of hindsight. As :he supersonlC transport case 
indlcates ho~ever, hindslg~t may be much clearer than foresig~t. 
All of the case studles also reveal the central role of the producer-
provlder (usually private enter~rlse) or the demander-user (who ray be 
prlvate or pU~11C) ln the generating and screening of tec~nologlcal 
advances. The producer, and the user, have certaln lnfo~atlonal and 
motlvatlonal advantages over ot~er parties. Producers llve with the 
prevalllng process and product technology. and know things about lt, 
its strengths, ltS WEaknesses, certain potentlalltles for change, that 
people and organlzatlons wlthout that eX~!rlenCe cannot know. Users 
~a~e slmilar speclal knowledge about the products and serVlces t~ey employ. 
/ 
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It is natural, and essential, that this special knowledge, and immediate 
motivation for 1mprovement, playa central role in inducing and guiding 
the innovation process. Moreover, in a market setting it is users who 
ultimately wlll determlne whether a product wlll be dcr4nded, and 
producer~ whether it w1ll be produced and ~ow. 
This sa1d, it should be recognlzed that that vislon may be narrow, 
and that mot1vat10n 1S very context-dependent. Both the computer and 
sem1-conductor case studles reveal companles reluctant to move a~ay from 
technoloY1es wlth whlcn they were famlllar to try radically dlfferent ones 
In the seml-conductor case lt lS 1nterest1ng tnat new compan1es and n0t 
the ald tube ~roducers were th( key lnnavatars. Sl~llarly, user-c~nsumers. 
llke producers, fall intc comfortable hablts. Had IE:1waited for 
potentlal users of bJSlneSS computers to art1culate a clear-cut a~.ar.~ 
for them before decldlng that a market llkely eX1sted, the advent of 
the computer age would have been slgnifh:antly delayec. 
The motlVatlon of producer and user 1S strongly l",fllJencec by ~r.e 
detalls of the tect.r:logies lnvolved, and by the particular lnst1:..;tlc"al 
and legal se~tlng. There 1S llttle galn f~r a for-proflt seed verdo~ tc 
develop better self-~rc~agatlng seeds. It does pay t~e seed vend:r :J 
develop better hybrld seeds Slnce the farmer, e~ch ye~r, has to go 
bac~ to the source; he Cdnnot create next years sepc5 from th,S ye~rs 
plants. It was a dellcate, and ~ot 1nevltabl£, legal deC1S10n tha~ 
ruled that antlblotlcs, although natural substances, ~ere patenta:le. 
Wh1le patents dCln't carry much force 111 tI,e se:ni-conc .. ctor lndustry, 
and ;nnovatlO~$ are quickly lmltated, the ad\a~t~ges :. a heac-st~rt 
~rp stlll slgnlf1cant e"ougt. that flrms have :-(lI;;ve t~ innovate. Goverr.-
rrent regulatlon, much rrore than expressed consumer de-and, has pu;led 
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innovation towards safer and less environmentally harmful automobile 
designs. CAB regulatlon in the form of constraints on air fares, tilted 
airline compet1t1on toward providing more attractive service, and stimulated 
the market for faster and more comfortable planes. It was a governmental 
market, not a private market, that made it profitable for Texas Instruments 
and IBM to invest 1n sem1-conductor and computer R&D. Fluctuations in 
the demand for housing, and build1ng codes, significantly dampen incentlves 
for innovat1on in bU1lding construct10n. 
In sum, while producers and consumers play central roles in the 
innovat1on process, and they should, their informational advan~~ges 
may be associated w1th myop1a. The1r motivations are strongly influenced 
by speclal technolog1cal circumstances and the particular legal and 
1nst1tut1onal sett1ng, and by publ1C as well as private demands. 
More generally, it 1S important to recognize that technolog1cal change 
involves non-market, as well as market, elements. In all of the industry 
stud1es presented in this volume, there was a public interest expressed 
through publ1C pol1cies in certa1n aspects of performance of the incustr1es. 
There were elements of cooperatlon as well as compet1tion in resear~h and 
development. 
In aVlat10n, computers, and 1n semi-conductors there was, for ObV10US 
reasons, a publ1C lnterest 1n how the technologles and the industrles 
evolved Wh1Ch transcended the lnterest of part1cular private purchasers 
or producers of the products. In these cases the public interest was 
manifested 1n a governmental demand for goods and services of a quite 
speciallzed variety, and 1n pclicles assoc1ated wlth procurement. 
In the other four industrles studled, there was no such important 
procurement lnterest. However, a publ1c interest in certa1n aspects of 
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industry performance shows up tn other poltcies. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, automobiles, housing and agriculture (as well IS aircraft) 
4 public interest 1n saf~ty, envIronmental protection, and in insurin~ 
certaIn standards more generally was made manifest in regulations. 
Several of these IndustrIes also are marked by various forms of 
subsIdy to producers or consumers. CitIzens ~nd scholars may dIvIde 
on the merIts and demerIts they assign to these regulatIons and SUbSldlCS. 
But the fact IS that publIc polIcIes to constraIn or supplement mar~et 
me::hanlsms pervade the American economy. And theIr wor~lngs slgnlflcantl) 
Influence the envIronment for industrIal InnovatIon. 
Further, the R~Q systems of most IndustrIes Involve both COMpetItIve 
and cooperatIve elements, the latter often univerSIty based. In all of 
the IndustrIes surveyed, fu~-rroflt flmls creatIng and ta~Ing a prcrrletal} 
Interest In certaIn technologIes are a large part of thc story. But In 
all of the Industnes one can observe, as well, a system of RSD COOrel·,ltlO!'. 
and exchange of technologIcal InfOl'matlC'll. In somc cases gover'n'Tlent ~oll':Y 
has plJyej a large role HI bUIldIng and sUPPol-tlng thIs cooperJtlve ~)5~cr .• 
In oth~r cases, a smaller role. 
Wah these comon elements laId out, we can explore the dlffuencc5 
In polICIes, In Industry characterIstICS, and In the apparent vla~Illty 
and effectIveness of polICIes, revealed by our case studIes. (In what 
follows I also WIll draw, whele approprIate, on other studIes.) As 
stated at the outset, I cannot dIrectly layout a matrIx. There are 
several alternatIve paths to follow. I could try to assess what 
industries In a sense are success storIes and dISCUSS the policies 
and structures assOCIated WIth these, and then go on to dISCUSS the 
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failures. I could divide the industries by some kind of structural 
characteristics. It has prov~~ more straight forward to try to 
classify policies (instruments) and proceed to consider where they 
were and were not employed and why. and their efficacy in different 
contexts. 
A Road Map 
One rough divISIon among instruments places those that 1nvolve 
d1rect government fundIng of R&D In one category. and those that 
indlrectl) influence R!D or other act1v1ties involved ln lndustrlal 
1nnovdtlon 1n anoth~r. While thIs dlvls10n 15 plausible on its face. 
notIce that the lInes between the categorIes are blurred not sharp. 
How does one tre"t. for example. procur~'enl contracts whIch cover 
the cost of R~~ incurred earlIer b) a company, who antIcIpated the 
subsequent contract? How does one treat specIal tax credlts for R&8? 
These probleMS notwIthstandIng. I shall ha=:drd such a break. 
In Sec t Ion 2 1 dea 1 with government support of R&D. Here my 
obJectlve WIll be to categorlze meanlngful'y the dIfferent kInds of 
government R~J support programs revealed In our case studIes. to 
analyze the reasons for the signIfIcant dIfferences In such polICIes 
across IndustrIes. and to make judgments as to what kInds of programs 
worked and whIch ones dIdn't. dIstInguIsh among four kInds of 
govern~ent R&D support prograMs; those assocIated WIth public procurement 
or other well define~ publIC objectives. those that Involve an extenSIon 
of suoport of scientific ba31c research to support of research to advance 
gcnerlc technologIcal knowledge. programs that are aImed to 
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neet reasonably well defined cliente1 demands, and picking or supporting 
·winners" in commercial competition. 
In Section 3 I consider a wide range of government policies that 
do not involve dIrect R&D support -- regulation both old style and new, 
antitrust, policy regardinG patents -- to name the central ones. But 
5~mplJ lIstIng these as irstruments covers up some fundamental problems. 
RegulatIon. for example, hd~ meant fundamentally different thIngs in 
different industrles~ the thrust of antitrust poliCIes also have been 
dIfferent. etc. Relatedly and equally important, the central purp~se 
of these poliCIes often has little to do with spurring or guidlnQ 
industrial innovation. There are serious questIons as to whether they 




II. Government Suoport of Research and Development 
The case studies reveal significant differences among the 
industries in the extent and kind of federal Rand 0 support. The 
government has been an Important source of both applied and baSIC 
research fundIng In the evolution of aviatIon. computer. and semI-
conductor tech~ologles. The government also has productively 
supported both applIed and basic research In agrIculture. While the 
government has been an Important supporter of baSIC research relevar.t 
to pharmaceuticals. public funding of applied research and developner.t 
has been mostly constraIned to "orphan drugs". n.e government ne-ver 
has been able to mount a sustaIned Rand 0 program relevant to the 
hOUSIng and automobIle IndustrIes. 
It is not easy to measure the effIcacy of the varIous 30vern~ent 
Rand 0 support programs. In the three defense Industries they 
certaInly have bought US technologIcal prImacy. CrItICS have argued 
~th that much of the bought technology has not been necessary for 
natIonal securIty but rather has inflamed the ar.1S race, anc trJ~ 
many of th( Rand 0 prograns have been InordInately expenSIve and 
wasteful. It sl,ouid be noted that contributIons to the ad .. ance of 
CIVIlIan technology made by defense and space ~rogramc;,whlle t'1~ 
focus of our case studIes has been a "spIll ov-t'r" and certawly not 
the prInCIpal Intent of these programs. The advance of CIVIlIan 
technology was the central purpose of the government Rand 0 support 
programs In agriculture. and cf baSIC blo-medlcal research. The rate 
of return on the publIC lnvestnent in P. and 0 for agriculture undoubt~dly 
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has been very high. Quantitative estimates are more difficult with 
respect to the returns from support of bio-medical researchi however 
this too generally is regarded as a very successful research program. 
The case studies also reveal too expensive fiascos - the supersonlC 
transport project. and project breakthrough for the housing industry. 
How can one make intellectual order out of this varied experience' 
propose it is important to distinguish among the followlng categorles 
of government Rand 0 support programs. First. Rand 0 support almed 
to achieve a well deflned government purpose - as the procurer.ent of 
a new weapon system or the solution to the automoblle em~ssions 
problem. Second. support of baslc or generlc research relevant to 
a particular technology or technologles and not pointed toward 
achieving any partlcular product or process - as research on the 
nutrltional needs of wheat. or the propertles of certal" exotlc 
materlals Thlrd, support of applied research and development on 
products and processes that serve clvillan, not governmental purposes, 
and whose acceptanc~ depends 1n large part on market calculations 
made by nOIl-govern~ental actors. This latter c~tegory ought to ~e 
further dlvlded. I th1n~. 1nto programs where the potential users 
have a cons1derable 1nfluence on allocatlon. and programs where a 
govern~ent agency has relatlvely free handed control over the 
settlng of goals and pr10r1t1es. Dlfferent k1nds of programs 
Obvlously d1ffer 1n the range of lndustrles where they are po'lt1cally 
feaslble. and the k1nds of circumstances where they are likely to be 
effectlve. 
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Rand D Support Associated with Procurement Needs or Other well 
Defined Purp~ses 
In three of our case studies - aviation, computers, and S~l­
conductors - there was a strong and recognized governmental demand 
for the products produced by the industry in questlon which led to a 
particular and focused publ1C interest 1n certain k1nds of technolog1cal 
advances. I malntain that a recognlzed public sector demand for 
certain types of technologlcal improvement lends two lmportant 
features to the policy context. First, lt means that the government 
(or the relevant government agent) is in a pos1tlon to define 
technological targets according to 1tS own criteria, and that 1t has 
(or at least has the mot1vation tc have) some expertlse abo~~ the 
technolog1es 1n question. Second, the recogn1zed govern~ental need 
lends legltlmacy to govern~ent atte~pts to stiMulate and gU1ce the 
evolution of the relevant technologies. 
One should note that publ1C procure~er.t does not 1nev1tably le5c 
to act1ve publ1C sector effort to mold or stlmulate technolog1cal 
advance. The federal government procures typewrlters, off1ce 
calculators, automoblles, and a wide varlety of products that are 
1dent1cal or vlrtually so w1th those purcllased by non-govern~ental 
users. In these cases the federal govern~ent usually has choser. 
slm~l) to act as an 1nformed shopper. Even 1n cases where govern~ent 
demands are sOMewhat spec1al, the governnent has not always stepped 
in with a spec1al procurement contract for the creation of a product 
tailored to lts use or, even, strongly advertised its soecial 1nterest, 
with the irr.~licit prQm1se of procurement. In the three 1ndustrles 'n 
r . 
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question, however, the relevant government agencies deliberately 
tried to induce the development of products that were suited for 
their purposes. The vehicles employed included procurem~nt contracts 
written so as to cover the Rand 0 costs of the particular design 
(a disguised form of Rand 0 support), direct Rand 0 support 
associated w1th a procurement contract, and support of basic and 
generic research. 
If publ1C sector needs and private sector needs d1ffer sharply. 
the procurement and applied research and development funding parts 
of such pol1c1es would not fac1litate the evolution of technology 
for the private sector. At least these three cases suggest. however. 
that goverr,mental efforts to advance technology for public sector 
purposes can also enhance technological capabil1ties to meet 
pnvate needs. In the early days of these technologies Rand 0 
a1med for a governmental purpose almost always had some commerc1al 
spillover. It might be noted that as these t~chnologies matured 
the governmental (m1l1tary) market and the civ1lian market began to 
separate, with the civil1an market becoming increas1ngly 1mportan~ 
to certa1n compan1es. GovernMent financed appl1ed research a~d 
development assoc1ated wlth public procure~ent. and Rand 0 
flnanced by the companles themselves and aimed for products 1n 
the clvillan market, b~ca~e dlsslmilar. At the present tine the 
prlncipal lmpact of the government on the evolut1on of clvillan 
technology in these lndustries would appear to be through p~bllC 
support of basic and generlC research. This falloff in "spill 
over" has led to proposals that the government consciously fund 
orojects that have likely clv1lian beneflts. The superson1C 
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transport ought to warn aga1nst this strategy. and I will present 
some general arguments against it later in this section. 
The lesson I draw from these cases is not basically about 
the efficacy of spillover. It is that the government has the 
capablllty to intelllgently fund applied research and develo~ent. 
as well as basic and generic research, where there is a well 
defined public interest in certain kinds of technological advances. 
I propose that the orphan drugs are another case in point. 
Here, as wlth the examples of defense procurement, a government 
agency stands ready to see that the fruits of Rand 0 are employed. 
There 1S a recog~lzed publlC commitment to try to cure or relieve 
people with grave diseases. If necessary, public monies will go 
into the procurement of whatever it takes to do this. The orp~an 
drugs are not, as 1t were, in the positlon of havlng to make it on a 
conventional co~~rCla1 market. As with the case of the declslon 
by the Oepart~ent of Defense to procure a new fighter (or as wlth 
the space program) one can argue about how wuch tax money oug~t 
to go into the pursuit of the obJectlve, and about whether t~e 
program is belng conducted efficlently. But there is no Questlon 
about the political legltlmacy of the program, or about the pote~tlal 
abillty of government declslon makers to marshal the informaticn 
needed to make senslble Rand 0 declslons. 
The case of pollutlon abatement, I propose, is similar 1n 
context 1f not in POllCY. Slnce the mlddle 1960's there has be2n 
a well recognlzed publlC lnterest attached to the development of 
technologies that are less pollut1ng than those currently b~ing 
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employed. Some public monies have gone into Rand 0 on pollution 
abatement. The clean air act of 1970 marked a commitment, howe/er, 
to a strategy for achieving the objective, which minimized the 
government's dlrect role in funding Rand D. Rather the strategy 
was to induce prlvlte funding of Rand 0 through the imposition 
of regulatory requlrements which could only be met by the development 
of new technologies. White and other scholars have argued that 
thlS has proved an inefficient and costly way of drawlng forth 
the new technologles. Glven a recognized public commltment to 
their achlevement, the government certalnly was in a position to 
fund Rand 0 on 1tS own, and to organize to gain the informatlon 
needed to make sensible Rand 0 allocation decisions. 
The examples that come from our case studles suggest two 
th1ngs. F1rst, there are a wide range of technologies assoc1ated 
with pub11C procurement, or public subSldy of certa1n k1nds of 
private purchases, or regulation, where there are recognized publ1C 
objectives in certain kinds of advances. Second, regarding these 
the government has taken a wide variety of strategies on the ex~ent 
and kind of Rand 0 it will support. At one extreme the govern~en: 
has f1nanced the bulk of the re1ev~nt Rand 0, and at th~ other 
it passively has stood as a consumer. While assessment of th1S 
claim depepds on a case by case eva1uat1on, I would argue that 1n 
many cases the govprnment has bee~ too passive, that the returns 
to public fund1ng of Rand 0 on public needs would be very high, 
and that indirect means to "pull" technology (as through regulat1on) 
often a~e more costly and less efficient than direct Rand 0 support. 
, 
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Note that my argument he,'e h not that government support of such 
~ and 0 would have significant "spill over" benefits. It is simply 
that there are a large number of tec~nologies where there is an 
identifiable public interest in certain kinds of advances. and ~n 
many of these cases federal Rand D funds could be spent to yield a 
high social rate o~ return. 
The efflcacy of such programs depends. however, on the ability 
of the relevant government agencies to gather the appropriate 
informatlon and make senslble Rand 0 allocation decisions. To do 
so will require strong partlcipation by users. Rand 0 support 
programs have to be designed to achieve this partlcipation. It is my 
conjecture that the development of better technologles for the provlsl0n 
of publlC services, as for mass transport, garbage collection, repairing 
city streets, etc., potentlally can yield a very high rate of return on 
the public Rand 0 dollar. However, unlike the Depart~ent of Defense, 
when the Department of Transportation or the Department of Houslng 
and Urban Development make Rand 0 allocation decisions they are not 
usually maklng them regarding items that they themselves will prccu"e. 
The principal users wl11 be state and local govern~ents. Similarly, 
pub11C f1nan:1ng of the Rand D required by environmental and safety 
goals may yield high soc1a1 returns, and avoid the high private costs 
and tangled relations that corne from the current regulatory strategies. 
However. the new technolog1es will ultiIT'.ate1y be employed by private 
firms. not federal agencies. The institutional machlnery needed to 
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spend such public Rand 0 monies efficiently will have to be different 
than that of the D~partment of Defense or NASA. Perhaps the pluralistic 
decentralized structure of :he government's agricultural Rand 0 support 
programs would provide a better model. 
?l 
support of Baslc and Generic Researcn 
Absent a recognized public interest in the evolution of a 
part:cular technology, certaln constralnts appear on the government's 
abllity to fund Rand D. In the first place a government agency ha~ 
no particular claim to be able to determ1ne Rand 0 priorit1es, 
and m7.y be blocked from access to the informatlon necessary to do 
so. Se~ond, the legltlmacy of publ1cly financed K and 0 ~rograMs, 
which may upset the status quo withln an industry, may be questloned 
and such programs politically blocked. These constraints are 
part1cularly blndlng wlth respect to applled Rand 0 aimlng to 
achieve part1cular new products and processes. They appear to 
be much les~ confin1ng fer public supDort of bas1c and generlc 
research a step or two away from specific application. 
Ou~ case studies show the government act1vely Involved 1n 
support of such research not only ln the three industries where 
there was a strong procurement interest - aVlation, ~ompu~e~s. 
and se~l-conductors - but also ln agrlculture ana the SC1E~tlf~c 
f1elds relatlng to ph~r~aceutical developments as well. i,e 
aborted Coc;:;eratlve Autc~ctlve Research Prograi'1 represerl<:.:d an 
at:empt to extend thlS tYJe of publlC prograr. to the aut~r.oblle 
,noustry 
To understand the nature and importance of these publlc prog~ams. 
it lS 'mportant to recognlze that technologic3l kn0wledge lnevlta~ly 
lnvolves a publlC as well as a proprletary component. The publlc 
part of technologlcal ~nowledge ~enerally does not relate to 
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the design or operational details of a particular product or 
process, but to broad design concepts, general worklng characteri~tics 
0) processes, properties of materials that are used. testing 
techniques, etc. Most of such knowledge is not patentable. Much 
of it is openly shared among scientists and engineers working in 
the field, whether they are iocated at universlties, government 
laboratories, or corporate laboratories. 
The kind of research which leads to such knowledge is not 
generally the sort that an academic scholar, pursuing fashionable 
questions in a standard scientific field, would explore. Rather 
the research questions are posed by technological problems and 
opportunities, and the objective is to enhance that understanding 
and the capability to solve practical problems. Tn some industrlp.s, 
progressive pr1vate companies the~selves ~upport so~e of this type 
of research. Whlle some secrecy is involved, lt 15 recognlzed that 
the findings from this type of research ought to f-ow into the 
public domaln. Such a research system flts 1" between more fundamental 
research deflned by the traditlonal sciences, and the applled r~searc~ 
and develop~ent of the flrms in the industry. To be effectlve, the 
system has to make good contact wlth both sides, but avold too much 
overlap and duplication. 
In the judgement of Evenson~and other scholars. the agr'cultur~l 
'ciences have in general managed to define their niche appropriately. 
The research they do l1es in between on one s1de the basic academ1C 
sciences like chemls~ry and biology and on the other the research 
that goes on in public experimentation statl0ns and private compan1es 
; 
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to develop better seeds or fertillzers, etc. Both sides influence 
the kind of research that is done, and monitor quality and efficacy. 
The bio-medical research community is a similar system. It too is 
pulled from one sIde by the interests of practitioners (physicians) 
and private companIes 1n having practical problems illuminated, 
and from the other s1de disciplined by scientists in the more basic 
sciences. It is interesting that both the agr1cultural sciences, 
and the bio-medical SC1ences, tend to find their home 1n univers1ties, 
but in professional schools rather than 1n colleges of arts and sciences. 
The government provides the bulk of support for these two research 
COmmunltles. The allocat1on of research resourtes, however, is gUllIed 
only loosely by government agenC1es. The Department of Agriculture 
and the state leqtslatures and the National Inst1tutes of Health, 
the principal support agenc1es, leave the deta1ls of allocation to 
machinery operated by the research corrvnun1t1es themselves. However, 
1n po11tlcal de11berattons about the level of fund1ng and broad 
research strategies, the focus 1S very much on the pract1cal bcne;'~s 
that have flo~ed from the programs and th~ practleal pr~tle~s th~~ 
future research prO~tses to resolve. 
Mowery and Rosenberg remar~ that the old NACA dld not sponS0r r~(h 
1n the way of bastc research. In the pul11ng and tugg1ng on t~e ere 
hand to be applted and relevant and on the other to be rtgorous d~d 
scient1f1c, dur1ng the 20's and 30's the f1rst kInd of pull clearly 
was signlftcantly stronger than the second. Thts well may reflect that 
NACA, unl1ke the agrIcultural expertmentatton statIons and the rrcdlcal 
schools, was a free stand1ng organl:attona,l enttty, not afftltated wttft 
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a university or universities. Nonetheless, NACA undertook 
many experiments and studies that were relevant to aviation technology 
in general, rather than concentrating on particular aircraft designs 
that were being contemplated or were on the drawing board. In that 
sense, NACA certainly did support generic research and. as history 
testifies, to strong positive effect. The role of NACA diminlshed 
after World War II. In the post war era the armed services increaslngly 
funded thelr princlpal contractors to do the kind of research that ~ACA 
used to do. 
No sharply separate generic research programs mark the computer 
and semi-conductor industries. While sometlmes speclal government 
agencies wer~ invol~cd (for example ARPA) as wlth aV1ation after 
World War II, government func~ for gener1c research for these technoloqles 
have flohed to compa~1es and to the un1verS1tles. But th,S reseJrc~ 
support has been very 1mportant. Funds continue to be sign1f1cant. 
The aborted exper1ence w1th CARP suggests that government progra~s 
in support of bas1c and gener1C research are po'ltical'y acceptable 
1n v1rtua"y any 1ndustry. Comoan1es do not perceive such progra."~ as 
pOS1ng sharp threa~s to the1r commerC1al pos1t1ons, or the threats 
1f perce1ved are seen as d1ffuse and not read1ly 1dent,f,able as 
dangerous ~o any part1cular port1on of the lndustry Slnce propr1etJr~ 
knowledge 15 not needed to gU1de allocat1on, mechan1sms can be 
e~tabl1shed to allocate resources sens1bly. 
The key quest10n 1S the eff1cacy of such programs. In the lndustry 
studles in this volume the verdict is posltive. Where private com~ar.les 
support llttle gener1c research, the case for publ1C support seems 
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specially strong. Where private companies support such research, 
the case for public funding is diminished, but certainly not eliminated. 
Thus in the computer industry and in sem~-conductors, where the companies 
themselves do engage in significant funding of generic research, there 
is advocacy not opposition for government funding of research at 
universities. While there is a risk that public funds in such cases 
largely replace private funds rather than adding to them, I don't thlnk 
the casr is persuasive. 
In short, CARP, and COGENT appear to me to be programs tt.at were 
on the right track. When the nation returns again to serious 
contemolatlon of public programs to spur lndustrial innovation. 
SuPPOit of generlc research would appear one of the more promising 
of the possible lnstruments. 
-------
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Support of Clientele Oriented Applied Research 
Public support of basic and generic research does not require 
program officers to form judgements about what particular technological 
developments would be most valua~le. Rather the objective is to enhance 
understanding of relatlvely basic prlnciples, to explore certain 
potentially widely applicable technological routes, etc. Because 
this is the kind of research that is being funded, there seldom 
is an immediate pf~ceived threat to the proprietary interests of 
particular groups of firms. In contrast government programs of support 
of applied research and development for an industry whose products 
are evaluated largely on commercial markets both requires a mechanlsr. 
to ma~e commerical Judgements and may provide some signiflcant 
percelved threats to certain firms. 
The case of public support of applied research an~ development 
for agriculture indlcates that, even with these constraints, a feaslble 
government progran may be effective. It is lnterestlng to consice" 
which aspects of the industry, and the program, have permltted an 
effect1ve program. 
In the first place, farm1ng is an atomlst1C industry, and farr'1~rs 
are not in rivalrous cor.petltlon with each other. Differentlal access 
to certaln ~lnds of technologlcal knowledge, or property rlghts 1n 
certaln technologles, are not lmport~nt to lndlVldual farmers. ThlS 
fact at once means that farmers have little incentlve to enqage in 
I Rand 0 on thelr 1wn behalf, and opens the posslblllty tnat the 
farming communlty ltself would provide a politlcal constituency for 
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public support of Rand D. 
The Federal/State agricultural experimentation system 
established under Hatch and subsequent acts, marshalled that support 
and put the farmers in a position of evaluating and influencing the 
applied Rand 0 that was done under public fundiny. The system is 
highly decentralized. The regional nature of agricultural technology 
means that farmers in individual states see it to their advantage 
that their particular technologies be advanced as rapidly as possible. 
where private companies are funding significant amounts of innovative 
work and the industry is reasonably competitive, it is in the interest 
of the farmers, as well as the companies. that public Rand 0 money 
be allocated to other th1ngs. As Evenson descr1bes it, a reasonably 
well def1ned division of labor betwepn publicly funded applied research, 
and privately funded has emerged. 
Evenson and other historians of technical change in agriculture 
have argued that the applied research and development efforts of the 
experimentat10n station did not Y1P1J rarticularly high rates of return 
unt1l a body of more sC1entiflc and technological understanding was 
developed. It was th1S comb1nation of an evolving set of agriculturai 
SC1ences based 1n the un1vers1t1es and supported publicly, and appl1ed 
research and development also publ1Cly funded but mon1tored polit1cal1y 
by the farmlng COmMunlty, that-has made publlC support of agrlcultural 
technology as successful as it has been. 
Can the experlence ln agr1culture be duplicated elsewhere? It 
is apparent that many people have seen hous1ng and agriculture as qUlte 
similar. Henry ~allace, who earl1er served as Roosevelt's Secrptary 
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of Agriculture, clearly drew the analogy when after the war he tried 
(and failed) as Secretary of Commerce to 1~it1ate a major program 
of federal funding of building research. The efforts to revive that 
idea, under the Kennedy administration, also were explicitly based 
on the agrlcultural analogy. The analogy also was drawn in ProJect 
Breakthrough. It is obvious that there are important differences. 
In the first place. while the building industry is atomistic, 
construction mar~ets are local and therefore builders are. to some 
extent. in rivalrous competition with one another. However. since 
individual bUllders possess little in the way of proprietary knowledge. 
thlS was not a partlcularly important obstacle. What was more lmportant 
was that suppllers of inputs and equlpment to bUllders p~oduce different. 
and rivalrous, products. Dlrect government support of applied res~arch 
and development was viewed by many of them as potentially threatenlng. 
Had the builders of houses formed a strong constltuency for govern~ent 
support of Rand 0, these resistances of input suppllers mlght have 
been overcome. However, no such constltuency developed. Unllke the 
case ln agrlculture where far~ers saw lt to their competltlve advantage 
(as a group) to have thelr technologles advanced relatlve to the 
technoiogles employed by farmers ln other reglons, bUlluers apparentl) 
saw no such advantages for them. 
Nor dld there exist ln houslng, as there came to exist agrlculture. 
~ sClent'flC communlty who could pOlnt persuaslvely to promls1ng areas 
for applled research and development. Residentlal construction lac~s 
a broad sClentlflC base from which to mount applied research and 
development endeavor. 
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Thus agriculture had both a constituency interested in getting 
applied research and development relevant to their needs undertaken, 
and ultimately at least a sound scientific basis und~rneath its 
technologles. Residential construction has neither. My conjecture 
is that programs in support of residential construction technology 
will not be politlcally feasible until the clientele is established 
to support and guard them, and will not be effective in the absence 
of some sort of underlying scientific base. 
It probably is the case, therefore, that the agricultural model 
of publlC support of applied Rand 0 is not readily extendable to 
many other industries. There may be a few, however, to which such 
a program is applicable. Again, the key ingredients would-appear to 
be a group of users of a technology who are not in rlvalrous competitlo~ 
with each other but who, together, have a signlficant interest ln 
getting thelr technologies advanced, and a strong enough selentific 
base so that appiled research and development can be fruitful. It 
mlght be noted that these are the conditlons under WhlCh one might 
thlnk of establlshlng lndust~y ~ccoperatlve" rese3rch and develoc~e~~ 
laboratories. Indeed, the agricultural experimentation statlo~S ml~ht 
be regarded as Just that, except fer one important difference. Much 
of the POllCY dlScusSlons about cooperatlve research and develoD~ent 
has presumed that pub11C funds should account for only a small portlon 
of total Rand 0 monies, and that the industry should contribute the 
bulk of the funds save for, perhaps, the first few years of the progra~. 
Under such terms it has proved hard to get much cooperative Rand D 
underway and substained. The agricultural case suggests that the 
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requirement for industry financing may be a mistake. In industries, 
like agriculture, where such programs are plausible. prices tend to 
follow costs. The returns to successful Rand 0 go largely to 
consumers. not to producers. The difficulty with extending the 
agticultural model is not that the public at large would not beneflt, 
but that the co~ditions under which this model is applicable would 
appear to be rather special. 
--------- ----------
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Goverment Guided Applied Rand D With Comm~rc1al Ends 
In project Breakthrough, and the Supersonic Transport Project, the 
Government got itself into the business of trying to identify or develop 
products that would sell well on complex commercial markets. In 
Project Breakthrough the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
was not itself a major builder of houses, or a procurer of non-
subsidized housing. It thus did not have any particular expertise 
for judglng what types of designs would be most promising, or even those 
which likely would sell or rent. Thus it was easy for the depart~er.t, 
and congress, to lose track of the objectives as the DrOQram was debated 
politically. Similarly, the FAA was not in the buslness of buildlng, 
or procuring, commerlcal airlines. The commercial a1rlines were 
slngularly dlscouraglng when asked about thelr interest in a super-senlC 
tralsport. The aircraft producer5 showed no particular lnterest 1n 
desigr,lng and building such a vehicle, until the subsidies grew very 
large. 
Very few of the housing designs created through Project Breakthrough 
proved viable comnercially, nor dld they serve as a slgnlflcant b~S'5 
for follow-up deslgn work. The Brltish/French exper1ence w1th the;r 
suoerson1C transport 1ndlcates how fortunate the Unlted States was 
that the program was stocDej before 1t resuited HI a technolog.call .. 
viabl e a 1 rcraft. 
I, along wlth many other economlsts, would argue that the lesso~ 
here is general, not partlcular to the~e two cases. There are many 
other studled cases, ~ost of these European. where the govern~ent 
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has tried to identify and support particular products that ultimately 
would prove to be commercial successes. While there are a few successes, 
the batting average has been very low. except where the government in 
question has been willing to subsidlze or require the procurement of 
the completed product as well as the Rand 0 on it. 
This should not be surprising. In many of the industries where 
this has been attempted (in Europe) the private companies also were 
investing 1n Rand 0, and the government was in a position either of 
duplicating private effort, subsid~zing that effort and probably 
therefore replac1ng private Rand 0 monies, or investing in a design 
that the private companies had decided t~ leave alone. In the last 
case it might be argued that there is legitimate publ1C role in 
supporting work on des,gns that are a generation ahead of those that 
the companies theMselves are exploring. However, as tht supersonic 
transport and a number of other like examples indicates, the sensible 
way to explore the next generation of technologies is through doing 
generic research, building and studYlng prototypes, etc. The appropr1ate 
research proqram 1S one modeled after NACA, not one MOdeled 3fte~ t~e 
supersonic transport project. 
If the Un1ted States were to drrp lts anti-trust laws, and the 
obJectlVe of perserv1ng internal compet1tion that those laws embocy. 
then it m1ght_be~possible to mount a policy to help lndustry search 
for "winners". In various of the European countnes, and Japan, 
competltion is viewed not so much 1n terms of rivalry among domestic 
companies, but in te~s of conpetition from abroad. In these circum-
stances it is poss1ble for the government to work with industry as 
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a whole, and to participate in laying the bets, and in dividing 
of the market. As t~e law exists in the United States, much of 
the information needed to guide a government program to help 
industry find and support "winners" is proprietary, not shared 
~mon9 f1rms, and not accessible to a governmental body. The 
experience of the European govern~e~ts in trying to pick winners 
ind1cate~ the costs of these American constraints are not se~ere; 
constraints are looser in Europe and the record of public 
pol1cies to help industry indentify and support winners is not 
encouraging. The experience in Japan mayor may not be different. 
At the present time not enough is known about what the Japanese 
actually do to make a Judgement on thlS. In any case, modes 
of government - industry cooperation in Japan are so radically 
different from those 1n the United States that it 1S doubtful we 
can learn much of use to us from the Japanese experience. 
It is a shame that so much of tne discussion about government 
support of ,ndustrial Rand 0 1n the United States has sW1rled around 
the question - should the governnent try to Plc( wlnner:;? The eVldence 
that comes from our case studies answers that questlon with a resounding 
negative. However the expe~lence also shows that there are many other 
potentially frultful ways that the govern~ent can support industrlal 
research and development. 
III. Policy Affecting the Climate for Private R&D 
Much of the preceding section was spent disentangling differfnt 
kinds of government R&D sup~ort, attempting to identify the reasons why 
such support has taken different form in different industries, and 
,hazarding guesses as to the effects. The same kinds of analytical 
challenges face uS in this section, which is concerned with a variety 
of ~ifferent government policies which have influenced the climate for 
pr1vate R&D and innovation, but which do not involve direct governmen~al 
support of R&D. Regulat10n, for example, has meant very different 
things in the various industries studied. 
The fact that the policies considered here do not involve direct 
R&D support may not be the most important difference between them, and 
the policies co~sldered in the preceding section. The policies discussed 
above ObV10usly were intended to influence technological advance. However, 
many of the policies cons1dered here were put 1n place for quite other 
purposes. It is not clear ~hether, or to what extent, they realistlcally 
can be regat~ed as instruments that might be consciously employee tc 
1nfluence innovation. Put another way the problem is this. Virtually 
every policy of govern~ent influences the climate for innovatlon in sc~e 
way, in greater or lesser degree. For only a few is their influence on 
innovation a major factor considered in their des1gn and 1mplementation 
Which polic1es should be cons1dered explic1tly here? Presumably those 
whose influence lS sign1f1cant, and whose design 1S inf~~~ncible through 
evidence about it's impact on innovation. Unfortunately evidence of 
magnitude of impact lS hard to come by. Therefore the focus must, and 
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should be. on polici~s widely reg~rded as having a significant effect. 
and as subject to modification to make that effect more positive or 
lp.ss negative. whether this belief is justified or not. Since the case 
studies contaln ,elatively rich ~at~rial on them. I shall fncus on three 
such classes of policy - regulation. anti-trust and patent and other 
policles affectlng property rights on lnventions. I conclude this 
section by discusslng why it is not llkely to be fruitful ~o look to 
instruments such as these to playa powerful roie in any package 
designed for the express purpose of stimulating industrial innovation. 
Regulation 
If the reader of this volume commenced with any strong slmple 
ldeas of the effect of regulatlon on technological change in industry, 
the case studies should have dlsabused him of these. The studi2s reveal 
how diverse regulat10n ;s and how complex and subtle sometimes are 
its influences. 
The autor.:obile industry and, to a lesser extent, residentlal 
construction rev€:al what has been called "new style" regulation a: 
work. (As t~e housins exarple test1fies. new style regulaticn is 
not so new). Regulat10n here amounted to the lmposition of certaIn 
requirements on the products produced or the technology employed w1t~ 
the obJectiJe of assuring certain standards of q~ality. or safety. 
or protectlng the env1ron~ent. etc. However regulation has nae qUlte 
diff€:rent pur~oses 1n the two cases, anti has had different consequences 
for technological advance. 
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In the housing case, regulation has been conservative. Building 
codes and standards have stuck pretty close to prevailing techniques 
and materials, or simple modifications thereof. Far from being aimed 
to draw forth new materials and methods, in housing regulation has aimed 
to monitor and screen these and in fact has made significant innovatlon 
expensive if net downright impossible. In contrast, in the case of 
automobiles regulation has been used aggressively to pull forth new 
technologies. When the regulations were imposed lt was well understood 
that prevailing technologies could not meet the standards. One can 
argue about whether regulation was the most appropriate or efficient 
method to pull forth the desired innovations. White, and other 
scholars, belleve that the route has been inefficient and expensive. 
Above I have suggested that the regulatory strategy led to government 
neglectlng direct R&J fundlng. But it certainly is no: the case 
that regulation has aeterred lnnovation. 
Pharmaceutical regulation is somethlng else agal~. Orlginally 
concerned with maintalning purity standards and safety, in the 1960's 
regulatlon began to try to assure efficacy as well, and to constrain 
and monitor the safety of the R&D process itself. There are very 
real questions about whether the post 1950's regulatory environment 
has increased t~e efficacy of the new drugs that reach the market, or 
guarded the safety of patlents and experimental subJects to any 
significantly enhanced degree. As Grabowski and-Vernon argue, it 
is not easy to pin down and 5eparate the effect of U.S. pharmaceutical 
regulation on the flow of new pharmaceuticals into the cornucopia. 
It is clear, however, that regulation has significantly increased 
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R&D costs. and delayed the introduction of n~ drugs compared to the 
date of introduction in countries with different regulatory regimes. 
The effects of new style regulation show up less strikingly in 
the other industry studies. However, environmental and safety regulation 
has in recent years come to playa significant role in influenclng the 
fertilizers and pesticides that farmers could use, and relatedly, the 
tests and hurdles a new substance must overcome before it can be intro-
duced to the market. To my knowledge, however, no study of the 
effect of such regulatlons on the flow of fertll1zers and pestlcides 
has been made, comparable to the studIes of the effects of regulatIons 
on the lntroduction of new pharmaceutIcals. 
Of our case studIes, CIVIl aVIatIon has been the industry that has 
been most strongly Influenced by what has been called "old style" publIC 
utIlIty regulatIon - regulatl0n aImed at constralnln, prIces and reQ~lrln] 
certaIn standards of servIce del ivery. In thIS partIcular case the 
aIrlInes. WhIle regulated. were in rIvalrous competItIOn wlth each C1t"CI"" 
Further. the Industry dOIng most of the relevant R&~ - the alrfrane 
Industry - was not regulated The consequence of regulatIon undoubtcdi.v 
was to spur InnovatIon. 
As has been the case In 0ther regulated but rIvalrous IndustrIes. 
for example rallrcads. here regulatIon must be understood as settIng 
floors under prIces as well as establIshIng cel1lngs. In the aIrlIne 
case the result was thdt sInce rate competltlon~was blocked on lucrdtlve 
competItIve runs. the aIrlInes' competItIveness spIlled over Into the 
providing of better serVIces. and seats on more attractive aIrcraft. The 
consequence was that the aIrlInes proVIded a strong. indeed eager, mar~et 
for new aIrcraft. It often I.J~ been argued that old style public utIlity 
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~gulation stifles innovationi this most emphatically was not the case 
here. This is not to argue that the ~gulat1on of air transport was a 
desirable POllCY from a social point of view or even that the stimulus 
provided by regulation for the development of transport aircraft was 
socia'ly desirable. It simply is to warn against the simple minded 
notion that regulat10n generally deters innovation. 
In view of the diversity of regulation and its impact, deregulation 
or regulatory reform means different things in different industries. 
For the airlines it has mear.t the abandonment of rate regulation and 
the relaxation of CAB control on routes. While the new regime of aircraft 
competlt10n may provlde strong demand for new alrcraft, it is hard to 
argue that the de~and w1ll be any stronger than it was under the old 
regulated reg1me. although the pattern of demand may be different. Alrllne 
deregulatl0n lS part and parcel of the deregulatlon movement for industrles 
which. in the past. have been treated as public utilit1es despite the fact 
that thelr structure perm1tted cons1derable compet i t1on. 
Reform of environ~ental and safety regulation involves a d1fferent 
set of lssues and strategies. Here the move~ent 1S to create regulat10~ 
settlng mac~lnery that wl1l cons1der costs as well as benefits, towarc 
using perfor~ance standards rather than prescr1bing particular techr.Jlo;l€~. 
and (In some cases) toward the use of fees or marketable licenses ratre,-
than quant1tat1ve restr1ct1ons. In my m1nd there lS no doubt that such 
a r~fonmed regulatory reg1me would provide a better, If not necessar1ly 
a str0nger environment for the generation of technological advances 
that respect environmental and safety values. However, what is needed 
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here is more sophisticated regulation. not "deregulation. II Unfortunately 
much of the apparent thrust toward modification of "new style" regulation 
is toward abandonment rather than reform. 
For the pharmaceutical industry regulatory reform largely means 
simplifying and speeding up the evaluation procedures for new drugs. 
,Gravowski and Vernon argue the current regulatory regime has signlflcantly 
retarded and increased the cost of pharmaceutical innovation in the 
United States, and that the most effective available vehicle for spurring 
innovation is regulatory reform. However, of the industries studled 1n 
this volume, pharmaceuticals probably is unique in this respect. 
Antitrust 
Just as with regulation, many people carry around in their heads 
an over simpllfled and d1storted view of what antitrust has meant for 
technological advance. The case studies reveal q~lte compllcated and 
varied stones. 
The pharmaceutical and automoblle lndustrles have been trad·tlon~1 
targets of antltrust prosecution. Usually, h~~ever, the antitrust 
cases have not lnvolved 1nnovatlon, or R&D, directly, but rather have 
been concerneo wlth such old fashloned matters as prlce flxing or other 
"consplracics 1n the restra1nt of trade." In the pharmaceut1cal 
industry a few of these have ,nvolved patent llcenslng, and other 
related issues. However neither the Grabowski and Vernon study. no~ 
other stud1es of the pharmaceutical industry, have argued that 
antitru~t has had much of an lnfluence on lnnovation in the industry, 
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one way or another. 
In the automobile industry, it is quite po~sible that concern 
Ibout antitrust action has deterred General Motors from being as 
agressive technologically as it might have been. On a few occasions 
antitrust has touched directly on issues relating to R&D and technolo9,cal 
advance. The restrictions on patent pooling and on certain forms of 
cooperative R&D were noted in White's case study. The lawyers 
for the automobile company certainly had misgivlngs about what the 
antitrust divlsion would do if they joined the prooosed Cooperative 
Automotive Research Program. However present antitrust guidelines, 
which permit cooperative R&D if the results are net treated as 
proprietary, would appear to leave room for programs of thlS sort 
and for most fruitful kinds of government-industry cooperative programs. 
The computer in~ustry 1S an interest1ng one for thinking through 
certain conundrums about antitrust and industrial innovation. The 
history presented in the this volume stops at just about the time 
that IBM ach1eved the dominance which it now has maintained for 
close to twenty years. As Katz and Phillips shew, IBM was su~cessful 
in part because lt guessed right technologlcally, and in part because 
it Judged the market lorrectly. Other scholars have remarked that 
its prior domlnance in punch-card calculator business gave ISM a 
special advantage 1n the sale of computers to buslness users. Scholars 
and lawyers may dlspute regardlng whether it was technological leadershlp, 
shrewd Judglng of the market, effectlve marketing, taking advantage 
of old ties, or behav10r prosecutable un~er th~ antitrust laws, which 
have enabled Ia~ to preserve its dom1nance {in large scale civilian 
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computers). The antitrust cases have involved, however, in an essent1al 
WlY, complaints about the way IBM goes about designing and introducing 
new computers, and the remedies proposed include some that would 
significantly limit the freedom of action of IBM regarding R&D and 
innovation. 
The case stud1es reveal at least two striking instances where 
antitrust and other structural policies preserved or made a competitive 
market structure with apparent salutory effects on industrial innovation. 
Although some scholars maintain that AT&T had no interest in going int~ 
production for sale of transitors anyhow, the consent decree legally 
foreclosed that option. The evolution of the semi-conductor industry 
might have bee~ different had AT&T decided to get into the commercial 
market. It also might be noted that the consent decree, while most 
visablc in our semi-conductor study. stopped AT&T from goinq into any 
commercial market not directly connected with the telephone service. 
not merely the semi-conductor commercial market. The evolution of 
the commercial COMputer industry mlght have been significantly d1fferent, 
absent the restraints on Bell labs and Western Electric. As this 
report 1S written, Congress and Ad~inistration are debating proposals 
to relax constra1nts on AT&T. 
A second example of government policies which influenced on 
industry's structure in a way that had a profound impact on technologlcal 
advance lS the rev1sed a1rmail act of 1934. Th1S act broke up vertlcal 
integration among airlines. airllne manufacturers, and (1gine manufacturers. 
and left a more open and co~petitive structure. Again. it is difficult 
to judge what would happened if the industry remained vertically integrated, 
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but it is hard to imagine that technological advance would have been 
any faster than it was. 
Patent and Related Policies 
How about public policies affecting patenting and, more generally. 
the ability of the company to appropriate the returr.s to an invention 
it makes? Again, the picture is mixed and complex. 
In the pharmaceutical industry it is apparent that the ability 
to patent a new drug is virtually essential if that drug is to be 
profitable for the company that creates it. Indeed the whole history 
of the pharmaceutical industry would have been different had the 
courts ruled that antibiotics, as natural substances, could not be 
patented. However, in pharmaceuticals the question of the effective 
duration of a proprietary market hinges not only on patent life but on the 
decisions of physicians and pharmacists, and laws impinglng on these 
decisions, regarding whether to prescribe and give out a generic or 
brand drug when the former are available. Arguments against generic 
prescription are, in effect, arguments that protection provided by a 
patent ought to extend beyond its legal limit. Of course the effective 
life of a patent in the pharmaceutical industry depends on the relation-
ship between the date of patentlng, and the date of commercial 
introduction of the product. The testing and l;cens;nQ requ;reme~ts 
mean that there is eften a very considerable lag between patent 
'application and commercialization. Returns to invention in the 
phanmaceutical industry clearly depend on a wider set of variables 
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than the strength of patents. 
For many of the other industries studied, legal protection of 
proprietary rights seems to be less important than in pharmaceuticals. 
Key patents have played a role in the evolution of mechanical machinery 
in agriculture, and in lnducing new chemical compounds like fertilizers 
and pesticides. However, while hybrids were judged patentable, it is 
not apparent that a patent adds much to the protection a seed company 
has for its particular hybrld. A potential competator cannot really 
discern the exact nature of the crossing that led to the particular 
hybrid seed. In this case the patent may be minor rather than major 
element in assuring appropriabllity. 
In semi-conductors, while firms patent their new device~, these 
patents do not have much force. Sometimes producers of new devices are 
able to hlde thelr design from potentlal cOlI"petitors by "potting." But 
in this industry imitatl~n generally is quick. Indeed the insistance 
of government and other purchasers of semi -conductors on '!second sourc 1 n;" 
in effect requires that a flrms new desiqn be produced by another firr.l 
as well as the lnnovator. The profits to a successful irnovator in t~'$ 
industry would appear to rpslde largely in the headstart which prov1des 
a short period ~hen the innovatlng firm is the sole supplier, and an 
ability to move down the learning curve before ether fi~s get lnto 
production. 
Wlth a few interesting exceptlons. patents appear not to have 
played a particularly important role in inducing, or making profitable. 
innovation in automobi12s or civil aricraft. Indeed in both industries 
there has been a tradition of relatively easy patent licensing. or even 
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'p~tent pooling. The reason for the lack of interest in a particular 
p't~nt would appear to be that automobiles and aircraft are complex 
systems, and that particular patentable components do not really play 
much of a role in determining the attractiveness of the overall system. 
It is the gene~al overall engine~ring of the product that counts, and 
~hat is not readily patentable. Much the same situation seems to 
apply in computers. While patent suits marked the early history of 
the industry, IBM's prominent position does not rest on its patent 
holdings. 
General Purpose Instruments. More Generally 
It would be easy to draw on the case studies and other material 
to extend the llst of government policies which influence the climate 
for industrial innovation. Some of these policies are broad in scope, 
although their influence differs from industry to industry. The tax 
codes are one of these. While the lnfluence of the tax code i~ pervaslve. 
partlcular features, like the treatment of capital gains, appear to be 
particularly imDortant in certain industries. Thus it has beer. argued 
that the hig:ler taxat'on of capltal gains that came with the tax bills 
of the early 70's had an especl~lly strong negative effect on funds to 
finance innovatlon in-the semi-conductor lndustry. It is unlikely that 
these statute changes had a comparable effect on aviation. While monetary 
pplicy is cross-cutting, our particular monitary institutions segregate 
the housing industry, and make that industry bear the brunt of the 
economic fluctuations to a great extent. Some policies are aimed at 
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particular industries. Special price support programs certainly have 
influenced technoloqical advance in agriculture. The trade agreement 
with Japan regarding the importation of television sets especially 
affected the U.S. seml-conductor industry. I could qo on. However, if 
our search is for instruments that can be considered powerful tools for 
a policy to stimulate industrial innovdtion, such extended listing and 
analysis is not likely to be fruitful. There are several reasons. 
First, the broad policies in question have been put in place for 
a variety of reasons. Arguments about t~eir affect on industriai 
innovatlon wlll carry only limited weight in influencinq the debate 
about thelr reform. ThlS is not to say that such arguments have no 
influence. Thus a tax credlt for R&D was proposed by several groups 
as an important instrument to spur innovation. and surh a tax credlt 
was part of t~e recent Reagan tax modificatlon purchase. However. 
R&D tax credit was but a small part of that bill, and lt is unllkely ~hat 
the particular proposal would have been heeded had there not been a 
general thru~t toward tax reductions of various kinds. 
Second. the broad policies in Question often differ lr. the 
particulars of thelr ap~lication f~OM sector to sector. Therefore. 
it is virtually impossible to idEntify any general rules for reform 
of any of these instruments for tne purpose of spurrlng industrial 
innovation. Rather. the most salient proposals would appear to be 
industry specific - for examole particular reforms of pharmaceutical 
regulatlon. 
Third, while undoubtedly in SOMe cases there is a trade off bct~'ecr 
stimulus of industrial innovation and other policy objectives, our 
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per~~al of the c~se studies suggests that in most instances the reforms 
that make sense in terms of enhanced stim~lus of the right kind of 
innovation makes sense in terms of more general criteria as well. Thus, 
while regulatory refon~ is not a broad panacea for stimulating faster or 
better directed technologica1 advance, the kinds of reforms that 
scholars long have prooosed on gro~nds of general economic efficiency 
for pharmaceutical regulation, and auto ~missions control, probably would 
affect innovation in the rlght direction. Our case studies reveal a 
few instances where anti-trust may be acting as a restraint on certa~n 
types of industrial lnnovation, but certainly provides no general 
indictment of anti-trust policy on these grounds. The antf-trust issues 
involved in the suits a~ainst IBM or AT&T are complicated. As a general 
rule, however, it does not appear that anti-trust is hobbling innovat1on 
by business. Slmilarly, there appears to be n0 general naQic in refor:~ 
of the patent law, or in the patent policies of particular governffie~: 
agencies that fund R&D. 
Let me not be mlsunderstood. It may well be that establishment of 
a generally supportive climate for industrial R&D 1S the most lmD~rta~t 
thing the government can do to facilitate ,n1ustrial innovation. I would 
put particular stress of the inportance of strong aggregate de~and, 
relatively stable demand groHth, and predictable prlces. 
When business conditlons are good, and incomes and demand are 
QrCWlnQ rapidly and predictably, business firms can anticipate 
an expanded market, and make their investment and R&D plans accordingly. 
When demand is stagnant, or uncertain, investment in new plant and 
equipment is deterred, and R&D aimed to tao new markets may look like a 
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very risky proposition. Of the industries studied in this volume, 
housinq is the one that is most noticeably influenced by changing 
macroeconomic conditions. Quigley, and others, have argued that the 
cyclical sensitivity of residential construction is an important 
factor exp1ain1ng the structure of the industry, and the limited 
',ncentives for innovation associated with investment in durable 
equipment. However, virtually all industry is subject to some 
cyclical influences. The demand of farmers for new agr1cu1tura1 
implements 1S cyclically sensit,ve. A non-trivial proportion for 
the demand for semi-conductors is cyclically sensitive. Econom1c 
slumps hurt the airlines, diminished thelr abi11ty and incentive to 
invest in new equipMent, and reduce r~turns to the design and 
deve10p~ent of new alrcraft. 
However, even if there were no effects on innovation, it ~ou1d 
be the objectlve of macroeconomic policy to achieve substained 
growth, hlgh employment, steady prices. As with regulatory and 
a~ti-trust policy, the objective of st1rr.u1ating innovation carr1es 
no partlcular implicat10ns for flsca1 and monetary pol1cies. 
It see~s to be 11ke th1S in general. If the speciflc interes~ lS 
in stlmu1ating innovation, it is a m1sta~e to look largely to ger.e~al 
purpose pol1cies. The design of them can be 1nflue~ced only marglr.a~l: 
by concerns about lnnovation, and often concern for innovation d~es 
not pOlnt to departures from policies that are sensible on more 
general grounds. If "lnnovatlon" policy is to have any ~eaning. search 
for one must be focussed on more speclalized lnstruments. 
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IV. A Brief Summing Up 
In the preceding section we identified a wide range of government 
policies that defined the climate, influenced incentives for, and 
imposed constraints on industrial research and development. In virtually 
,all of our cases studies cne or more of these government policies were 
an important part of the story. However, the n~st important such 
policies differed from industry to industry. While it is apparent 
that a number of specific reforms might have signif1cant benefits, 
the case studies do not seem to reveal any general and powerful 
guidel1nes for regulatory or anti-trust or patent policy reform. If 
a serious mandate reemerges to find and implement government polici~s 
that will significantly spur industrial innovation, while there is 
an understandable temptat10n to look for modification in these 
instruments to do the trick, there is not much leverage there. Moreover 
the k1nds of improveMents in macroecono~ic and other policies that make 
most sense in terms of stimulus of the right kind of innovation, make 
good sense in terms of other cr1teria as well. 
If government is to look specifically for policieS that may have 
a sign1f1cant stimulating effect on industrial innovation, the place 
to look 1S in the bag of R&D support policies. In this chapter I have 
not attempted to give a general rationale or justif1cation for actlve 
government su~~ort of R&D, nor to draw up flne theoretical arguments 
to gUlde such policles. As I stated in the introduction, a decade or 
so ago economists had much clearer and more pointed theoretical views 
about these matters. The'externalities frOM R&D and the uncertaint1es 
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involved led. according to the theoretical perspective prominent 
at that time, to a di"ergence between the quantity of R&D ex;:,~"1iture 
that firms would find most prof1table, and the quantity that was 
optimal from a social point of view. The firms woul~ spend too 
little. Public support or subsidy th~refore was warranted, and 
ought to be focused on those kinds of R&D and on those industries 
where the external ities and the uncerta1ntie~ were the greatest. 
Subse,~uent theoretical work has led economists to .:iraw a more 
complicated picture. A competitlve reglme in which firms gain 
property r1ghts on certaln of their technologies draws forth some 
R&D that is socially wasteful. Major technoiogical uncerta1nties 
call for a variety of appr~ac~es with open knowledge of routes 
being explored and what is beinq found along the way, and not a 
bl9 push along one particular road. The problem wlth market induced 
industrial R&D allocation l,es in the portfolio, the alloca:10n of 
resources, rather t~an in a total magnitude of effort. 
But 1f the problem 1S not simply characterizable as "too llttle" 
research and develoD~er.t, the design of appropriate governrent po1ic1es 
requlres wechanls~s to identify the partlcular klnds of research, ar.d 
so~etimes t~e part1cular projects, that are being under-funded. T~erE1n 
lles th2 pro~leffi. Go~ern~ent agencies are seriously constralned ln tr.e 
informatlon they are able to marshal dlrectly or irdlrectly to gUide 
the a110cation of publ1C R&D monies. 
Tre historlcal experlence canvased in trls volur.e suggests 
that there are thr~e routes that can be followed. One is to 
a~~nllate government R&D support with procurement or another 
well ~efined publlC objective. A second is to define and fund 
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arenas of non-proprietary research and allow the appropriate 
scientific community to guide R&O-allocation. The third is to develop 
~hanisms whereby potential users guide the allocation of applied 
research and development funds. A fourth kind of policy, in which 
government officials try themselves to identify the kinds of projects 
that are likely to be winners in a cOMmercial market competition. is 
seductive, but the evidence collected in this volume and other studies 
suggests that it is a strategy to be avoided. 
These are qualitative judgements drawn from qu~litative and 
i~pressionistic case studies. While I can provide some reasoning to 
make them plausible, I can provide ~o tidy and powerful general 
theoretical justification for them. Perhaps the lesson that econ~ists 
should draw from their earlier attempts to base prescrlPtion for 
government R&O policy on theoreticals arguments is that this is a 
dangerous game. Economic reality is too complicated to be fit 
well by any simple theory. More complicated theories generally 
point in different policy directions depending on the quantitative 
magnitude of certain key paraweters. The design of good policy depends 
on hard empirical research. and not simply on theoretical reasoning. 
There are two ~ajor weaknesses with the evidence provided in 
this volume supporting the above propositions atout policies. Flrst. 
the evidence comes largely from studies of seven U.S. industries. 
Second, at that the evidence is qualitative and judgemental, not 
quantitative and readily verifiable. 
The first weakness is not as serious as it might seem. although 
this study would have been enriched had coverage been wider. There 
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are available a number of other lndustry studies. some of the 
United States. some of Europe. There are also several across 
the board evaluations of government policies in support of 
industrial innovation, partic~larly policies of European countries. 
The concluSlons drawn in thlS chapter were influenced not only by 
the case studies presented here. but also by thlS other evidence, 
and are consistent by aud large wlth both bodies of data. 
The second weaxness is the serious one. One can try to avold 
having to base conclusions largely on qualltative and impresslonistic 
evidence by constructing forma1 models and hypotheses and estimatlng 
and testing these wlth statlstics. To some extent this kind of 
work has been done for agriculture. But such quantltative conclusions 
are no bet~er than the models and t~e data on which they are based, 
and these contaln large elements of the subjective and judgemental. 
Personally I fear more the falth that lay persons, POllCY makers. 
and even scholars. often show 1n quantltatlve conclus1ons drawn frc~ 
shaky models and data than I do conclusions tha~ are expllcitlj 
qualitat1ve and Judge~ental. When our kno~ledge l~ stronger, when ~e 
understand th1ngs well enough to hdve conf1dence 1n the baslc for~ 
of the moaels we wrlte down, when we have data tha~ are more confor~abie 
w1th our operatlng models then 1S the case at pre~ent, then quant1tati\~ 
stud1es can playa greater role. I would argue that at the present 
time, however, the most promlsing route towards-such stronger knowledge 
is case stud1es of the sort presented here, and the kind of qual,tatlve 
judgemental analysls developed in th1S chapter. 
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